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The 1951 Refugee Convention protects the basic right of an individual to 
be treated as an independent social agent of justification. It embodies the 
moral and legal framework through which any person can assert a claim 
to have their basic human rights respected, regardless of where they are 
located in the world.  Partialist and impartialist theories of statehood are 
bridged through the recognition that states are obligated by universal 
morality and international law to accept Convention refugees into their 
territory. Any discretion states may have to reject Convention refugees 
consists entirely in the exclusion clauses, and cannot be grounded in any 
other claim. The discretion to exclude is exceptional and circumscribed. 
 
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention excludes serious international and 
common criminals from protection. While the clauses of the Refugee 
Convention are said to capture an autonomous international meaning, the 
reality has been marked by vastly divergent interpretations both within 
and among states. This lack of universality has allowed an expansionist 
trend to germinate, with some states seizing the opportunity left behind by 
normative and legal heterogeneity to initiate broad-based security 
measures in relation to refugees. 
 
This thesis maintains that the current lack of universality stems from the 
absence of an overarching theoretical foundation to exclusion. Three 
doctrinal debates relating to the exclusion of individuals as ‘serious non-
political criminals’ under Article 1F(b) are closely examined: ‘serious’ 
crime; ‘non-political’ crime; and, standard of proof and evidentiary issues. 
Points of intersection between refugee law and other fields of law, 
including extradition and counter-terrorism, are given careful attention. A 
refugee law understanding of these doctrinal concepts is developed, 
directed by an integrative theory of ‘human security’ that highlights the 
need to preserve individualised assessment in refugee determination. The 
centrifugal force of ‘human security’ reveals that state security interests 
and refugee interests are not ineluctably polar. Rather, both are grounded 








Foremost appreciation goes to my primary supervisor, Dr Cian 
Murphy, whose invaluable guidance and support has made this a far 
better text. Thank you as well to my secondary supervisor, Professor 
Guglielmo Verdirame.  
 
Special thanks to my Director, Kevin Lunney, and other colleagues at 
the Department of Justice Canada. Their good-natured support is 
deeply appreciated. 
 
Heartfelt thanks go out to the following people as well, whose support 
and guidance (in a variety of forms) has helped me to complete this 
work: Dimitar Panov, Jacqueline Atkin, Dacy Djordjevic, Millie 
Hrnjez, Sasha Holden, Catherine Callaghan, Maris Kask, Laura Lo 














The author is employed as Crown Counsel with the Department of 
Justice of the Government of Canada. However, all the views 
expressed in this thesis are solely those of the author in his personal 
capacity as a PhD Candidate at King’s College London, and must not 
be construed as being in any way attributable to or endorsed by the 
Government of Canada. The author acknowledges that several of the 
views he expresses herein, in his personal capacity, are not 
consistent with the position of the Government of Canada on the 
doctrinal issues examined in this thesis. 
 
Cited cases with which the author has been involved in his capacity 
as Crown Counsel have been marked with an asterisk (*) in the Table 
of Cases appearing at the end. 
 
Sources of any kind published or available within the three-month 
period prior to submission have not been considered in this thesis. 
 5 
Contents 
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION: THE EXCLUSION OF SERIOUS CRIMINALS 
FROM CONVENTION REFUGEE STATUS .......................................................................... 7 
1.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 7 
1.1.1 Finding Equilibrium ................................................................................................ 7 
1.1.2 Exclusion for Criminality: Article 1F ................................................................ 10 
1.1.3 The Scope of this Chapter.................................................................................... 11 
1.2 A FOCUS ON EXCLUSION ................................................................................................ 12 
1.2.1 Exclusion on the Basis of Criminality ............................................................. 12 
1.2.2 Exclusion for Serious Non-Political Criminality: Article 1F(b) ................. 17 
1.3 PROBLEMS OF UNIVERSALITY AND PROPORTIONALITY IN EXCLUSION ....................... 20 
1.3.1 The Concept of An Autonomous International Meaning ............................ 20 
1.3.2 A ‘Serious’ Crime .................................................................................................... 24 
1.3.3 A ‘Non-Political’ Crime .......................................................................................... 25 
1.3.4 Standard of Proof and Evidentiary Issues ...................................................... 28 
1.3.5 ‘Balancing’ Inclusion and Exclusion ................................................................ 30 
1.4 THE APPROACH OF THIS WORK ..................................................................................... 33 
1.5 THE STRUCTURE OF THIS WORK ................................................................................... 36 
CHAPTER 2 – THE ETHICS OF STATEHOOD AND STATE RESPONSES TO 
REFUGEES ................................................................................................................................. 39 
2.1 THE SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER ....................................................................................... 39 
2.2 THE ETHICS OF STATEHOOD.......................................................................................... 41 
2.2.1 The Partialist Strand ............................................................................................. 41 
2.2.2 The Impartialist Strand ........................................................................................ 48 
2.3 BRIDGING PARTIALITY AND IMPARTIALITY THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS ....................... 55 
2.4 ‘BALANCING’ ..................................................................................................................... 62 
2.5 HUMAN SECURITY: THE CONVERGENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY 
 INTERESTS ........................................................................................................................ 66 
2.5.1 The Development of a Human Security Approach in Security Discourse 
  ...................................................................................................................................... 66 
2.5.2 The Relationship between Human Security and Human Rights ............. 79 
2.6 HUMAN SECURITY AS A FRAMING TOOL........................................................................ 89 
CHAPTER 3 – ‘SERIOUS’ CRIME ........................................................................................ 92 
3.1 THE SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER ....................................................................................... 92 
3.2 CHARACTERISING AN ACT AS A ‘CRIME’ ........................................................................ 94 
3.2.1 ‘Crime’ in International and Extradition Law ................................................ 94 
3.2.2 Approaches to ‘Crime’ in the Context of Article 1F(b) ................................. 97 
3.3 APPROACHES TO THE THRESHOLD OF SERIOUSNESS REQUIRED FOR ARTICLE 1F(B) 
 EXCLUSION..................................................................................................................... 100 
3.3.1 Drafting History of Article 1F(b) and ‘Serious’ Crime ................................ 100 
3.3.2 Objectives of the Exclusion Clause ................................................................. 104 
3.3.3 The Role of Expiation .......................................................................................... 105 
3.3.4 International versus National Standards of Seriousness ........................ 112 
3.3.5 Mechanistic Approaches to Determining Seriousness ............................. 115 
3.3.6 Contextual Approaches to Determining Seriousness ............................... 119 
3.4 A HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH TO DETERMINING SERIOUSNESS .......................... 125 
CHAPTER 4 – ‘NON-POLITICAL’ CRIME ........................................................................ 131 
4.1 THE SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER ..................................................................................... 131 
4.2 EXTRADITION LAW ......................................................................................................... 133 
4.2.1 The History of the Political Offence Exception ............................................ 133 
4.2.2 Definitional Problems and Concepts of the ‘Political’................................ 137 
4.2.3 Juridical Attempts to Create a Workable Concept of Political Offence – 
 Early Case Law ...................................................................................................... 138 
 6 
4.2.4 National Approaches to the Political Offence Exception .......................... 142 
4.2.5 Narrowing of the Political Offence Exception – Statutory Tools and 
 Bilateral and Regional Treaty Arrangements ............................................... 147 
4.3 COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW .......................................................................................... 151 
4.3.1 Terrorism as an Emerging Legal Concern .................................................... 151 
4.3.2 Definitional Problems: Terrorism as an International Legal Concept .. 154 
4.3.3 Regional and National Approaches to Counter-terrorism: Further 
 Trends toward the Legally Presumptive Non-Political Quality of 
 Terrorist Acts ......................................................................................................... 158 
4.4 NON-POLITICAL OFFENCES IN ARTICLE 1F(B) EXCLUSION LAW .............................. 161 
4.4.1 Objectives of the Exclusion Clause ................................................................. 162 
4.4.2 Judicial and Legislative Narrowing of the Concept of the ‘Political’ ..... 166 
4.4.3 Recent Movement toward Rediscovering a Contextual Approach ......... 172 
4.5 A HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH TO DETERMINING ‘NON-POLITICAL’ ...................... 178 
CHAPTER 5 – STANDARD OF PROOF AND EVIDENCE ............................................ 190 
5.1 THE SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER ..................................................................................... 190 
5.2 STANDARD OF PROOF: ‘SERIOUS REASONS FOR CONSIDERING’ .............................. 191 
5.2.1 Standard of Proof for Inclusion ........................................................................ 191 
5.2.2 Standard of Proof for Exclusion – Preliminary Observations ................. 195 
5.2.3 ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ as Higher or Lower than a Balance of 
 Probabilities ............................................................................................................ 198 
5.2.4 ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ as a Reflexive Standard – A Human 
 Security Approach ................................................................................................ 204 
5.3 NATURE AND QUALITY OF THE EVIDENCE .................................................................. 209 
5.3.1 Formal Evidence ................................................................................................... 211 
5.3.2 Substantive Evidence .......................................................................................... 218 
5.3.3 Controversial Evidence ....................................................................................... 223 
5.3.4 A Human Security Approach to Assessing Evidence ................................ 230 
CHAPTER 6 – INDIVIDUALISED ASSESSMENT IN REFUGEE DETERMINATION
 ..................................................................................................................................................... 237 
6.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 237 
6.2 ‘BALANCING’ INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION .................................................................. 238 
6.2.1 Approaches that Promote ‘Balancing’ ............................................................ 238 
6.2.2 Approaches that Reject ‘Balancing’ ................................................................ 242 
6.3 PRESERVING INDIVIDUALISED ASSESSMENT IN REFUGEE DETERMINATION .......... 246 
 
Conclusion      253 
 
Bibliography      261 
Cases, Legislation, Other Legal Instruments  281
7 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction: The Exclusion of Serious 
Criminals from Convention Refugee Status 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1  Finding Equilibrium 
 
 International refugee law is at a crossroads. It is clearer now than 
ever that the international refugee regime must learn to find the path that 
ensures its continued primacy as the basis upon which people are globally 
insulated from the abuse of their human rights. The other path offers only a 
place in the proverbial history books. Uncovering the path of survival lies 
not in the magical discovery of a metaphysical source of refugee law values, 
but in the effective capacity of the international refugee regime to satisfy 
both the interests of refugees and of the states which receive them, and to 
do so in a principled way. The final words of Goodwin-Gill and McAdam’s 
The Refugee in International Law lay out this existential challenge for 
refugee law: 
The law will need to prove its value in the years to 
come, not only in continuing to ensure refuge for 
those who need protection, but also in navigating 
the pressures of globalization and the competing 
and competitive interests of States. In particular, the 
legal component of the international refugee regime 
will have to be flexible enough to encompass States’ 
security concerns, but without compromising 
principle; and sufficiently adaptable to 
accommodate both the lawful needs of those in 
flight, and the now perhaps inescapable desire of 
many States for order in migration. Clearly, the 
tension will continue, and the art and aim will be to 
ensure that what has been achieved so far is not 
lost.1 
 
 While it is clear that this tension between the needs of refugees and 
the interests of states presents a moral and legal challenge, it is less clear 
how such a tension might be resolved in an enduring and principled way. 
Much of the political and legal discourse since September 11, 2001 has 
been reactionary and infused with rhetoric. The agents of this discourse 
play to the perceived sensibilities of a security-conscious public by drawing 
                                                        
1 Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, 
OUP 2007) 555. 
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an increased association between refugees and ‘security’ or ‘terrorist’ 
threats.2 Indeed, the increasing politicisation of the omnipresent dilemma 
faced by the liberal democratic state – how to find ‘equilibrium’ between the 
defence of refugee rights and the state’s security concerns – has led to a 
widening of the gap both within and among the political, academic, and 
judicial discourses. State policy-makers, judges, and legal scholars find 
themselves standing farther apart than ever.3 
 Further, refugee law faces particular challenges with respect to 
consensus-building, generated by the fact that its discourse occurs at both 
the national and international levels, and in ways which are often 
inconsistent and confusing.4 This discursive divide has been made even 
wider by a paradoxical web of increasingly restrictive measures at the 
national level undertaken against a backdrop of continuing pledges to 
refugee protection at the international level. As refugee policy scholars have 
highlighted, states have continued to talk human rights while seeking to 
limit protection obligations and broaden security measures.5  
                                                        
2 Guillermo Bettochi, ‘The Events of September 11: Possible Repercussions on 
Refugee Protection’ in Terrorism and International Law: Challenges and Responses 
(George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies 2003); Evelien Brouwer, 
‘Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism: A Changing Dynamic: Legal and Practical 
Developments in the EU in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11.09’ (2003) 4 
EJML 399; Penelope Mathew, ‘Resolution 1373 – A Call to Pre-empt Asylum 
Seekers?’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security (Hart 
Publishing 2008); Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘The Transformation of Border Controls in 
an Era of Security: UK and EU Systems Converging?’ (2010) 24(3) JIANL 233, 244-
245; Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘Immigration Control in an Era of Globalization: 
Deflecting Foreigners, Weakening Citizens, Strengthening the State’ (2012) 19(1) 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 3 (more broadly, on the globalisation and 
securitisation of migration control and resulting increase in state power); Satvinder 
Singh Juss, ‘The UNHCR Handbook and the interface between ‘soft law’ and ‘hard 
law’ in international refugee law’ in Satvinder Singh Juss and Colin Harvey (eds), 
Contemporary Issues in Refugee Law (Edward Edgar 2013) 67. 
3 Many writers have highlighted this increased politicisation and polarization of 
refugee law; see, for example: Volker Turk, ‘Forced Migration and Security’ (2003) 
15 Int J Refugee Law 113; Brouwer (n 2); Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘Forced Migration: 
Refugees, Rights and Security’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Forced Migration, Human 
Rights and Security (Hart Publishing 2008); Idil Atak and Francois Crepeau, ‘The 
securitization of asylum and human rights in Canada and the European Union’ in 
Satvinder Singh Juss and Colin Harvey (eds), Contemporary Issues in Refugee Law 
(Edward Edgar 2013) 227-257; Catherine Dauvergne, ‘Refugee Law as Perpetual 
Crisis’  in Satvinder Singh Juss and Colin Harvey (eds), Contemporary Issues in 
Refugee Law (Edward Edgar 2013) 13-30 (she sees both positive and negative 
effects flowing from the ‘perpetual crisis paradigm’). 
4 Matthew J Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the 
Response to Refugees (CUP 2004) 1-5.  
5 ibid 229; Satvinder Singh Juss, International Migration and Global Justice 
(Ashgate 2007) 5-6. 
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Contemporaneously, judges have tried to make sense of such developments 
within existing legal discourses and doctrinal analyses, but with varied 
legal and theoretical underpinnings. In dealing with new and difficult 
questions, some look to traditional refugee law for guidance, others to 
international human rights law, some to criminal law, and still others to 
extradition law. Meanwhile, scholars seek to deliver to both groups – states 
and judges – their own formula for a normative foundation which should 
inform the balancing of interests and which will generate the proper content 
of that balancing.6 However, both among and within these groups, fluid and 
opportunistic conceptualisations of ‘international crime’, ‘security’, and 
‘terrorism’ appear on a discursive scene that seems to be without any real 
boundaries. Ultimately, state policy-makers, judges and academics, all of 
whom are ostensibly speaking about the same thing, are nevertheless 
speaking in very different languages.7   
 This work represents a modest step in an effort to bridge this divide 
amongst the agents of refugee law. It seeks to take this step by developing a 
normative framework in an area of refugee law that has been particularly 
troubled by the absence of a cohesive theoretical narrative: the exclusion of 
serious criminals from international refugee protection. The beacon treaty – 
the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 
“Refugee Convention”) – requires nations to provide protection to those 
fleeing persecution from their homeland,8 while concurrently denying such 
protection to those who have committed serious criminal acts.9 Whereas the 
positive obligation of the Refugee Convention requires signatory states to 
provide protection from persecution to those who need it [Article 1A],10 the 
                                                        
6 Geoff Gilbert, ‘Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses’ in E 
Feller, V Turk, and F Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law (CUP 
2003) 429-432. 
7 n 3. 
8 Article 1A of the Refugee Convention requires signatory states to provide 
protection to a person who: “owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it.” 
9 Article 1F of the Refugee Convention provides that the protection of the 
Convention does not apply to those who have committed serious criminal acts. The 
full provision is provided at the beginning of the next section, s 1.1.2. 
10 n 8. 
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exclusion question asks states to deny that protection to those who 
(although they may need protection) do not deserve it [Article 1F].11 The 
normative challenge arises in an attempt to ‘balance’12 these two putatively 
competing objectives. 
1.1.2  Exclusion for Criminality: Article 1F 
To facilitate conceptual clarity about the meaning of ‘exclusion’, the 
treaty provision which will come to frame this project is provided here at the 
outset. A refugee claimant is excluded from receiving the protection 
provided by the Refugee Convention if he is described by Article 1F of the 
Refugee Convention. A person is so described if there are: 
serious reasons for considering that:  
 
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war 
crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in 
the international instruments drawn up to make 
provision in respect of such crimes; 
  
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime 
outside the country of refuge prior to his 
admission to that country as a refugee; 
 
 (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations.  
 
Article 1F therefore excludes from refugee protection the perpetrators of 
either serious international crimes or serious common crimes. The Article 
has simply been presented at this juncture so that the notion of ‘exclusion’ 
might be understood in a preliminary and general sense. Much work must 
                                                        
11 For the underlying rationale of excluding the undeserving, see: UNHCR, 
Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (2003) 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f5857d24.html> accessed 17 March 2014, paras 
3, 8; European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), ‘Position on Exclusion from 
Refugee Status’ (2004) 16(2) Int J Refugee Law 257, para 8; Colin Harvey, ‘Is 
Humanity Enough? Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the Rights Regime’ in Satvinder 
Singh Juss and Colin Harvey (eds), Contemporary Issues in Refugee Law (Edward 
Edgar 2013) 73; on the idea that exclusion protects the integrity of the institution 
of asylum, see: UNHCR, Statement on Article 1F of the 1951 Convention: Issued in 
the context of the preliminary ruling references to the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities from the German Federal Administrative Court regarding the 
interpretation of Articles 12(2)(b) and (c) of the Qualification Directive (July 2009) 
(Statement on Article 1F) 6, 33. 
12 For the purpose of this introductory chapter, the concept of ‘balancing’ between 
state interests and individual refugee interests is left unchallenged. In chapter 2, 
this trope of balancing will be examined more carefully, and a more nuanced 
conception of ‘balancing’ will be promoted. 
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be done before that doctrinal context can be seriously engaged with. This 
and the next chapter undertake that important preparatory work. 
1.1.3  The Scope of this Chapter 
 
 This chapter continues by justifying a focus on the exclusion 
question. That justification consists of two elements: the instructiveness of 
the exclusion question to speak to both the interests of individuals fleeing 
persecution and the interests of receiving states; and, the suitability of 
criminality exclusion for the development of a principled theory of human 
security. A more particular justification for examining exclusion under 
‘serious non-political criminality’ (Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention) 
will then be undertaken. That justification also consists of two elements: an 
interest in addressing an underdevelopment of interpretive guidance 
relative to criminality exclusion more broadly; and, an acknowledgement 
that Article 1F(b) offers a meaningful doctrinal environment within which to 
build a principled and workable theory of security that is instructive for 
both common criminality and ‘terrorist’ acts. 
 Once the value of an exclusion-centred examination has been 
defended, this chapter will introduce the substantive topics to be elucidated 
in the main body of the work. The idea that refugee law is meant to speak 
with an ‘autonomous international meaning’ is first explored. Following 
this, a preliminary account of the problems of universality and 
proportionality faced by Article 1F(b) exclusion law is set out. There are 
three substantive areas to be examined: (1) what is a ‘serious’ crime? (2) 
what is a ‘non-political’ crime? and, (3) what is meant by the ‘serious 
reasons for considering’ standard of proof, and how does this affect the 
manner in which evidentiary issues are understood and resolved? These 
three substantive elements culminate into a final question about 
proportionality or, as is more commonly referred to in refugee law 
literature, ‘balancing’: should ultimate decisions about exclusion ‘balance’ 
the nature and severity of the criminality with the degree and nature of the 
persecution feared by the claimant for refugee protection? The problems of 
universality and proportionality instantiated by each of these elements are 
broadly emblematic of a missing theoretical narrative for this area of 
refugee law. The premise of this work is that the discovery of that missing 
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narrative lies in the process of addressing the particular problems 
presented here. 
 The penultimate section of this chapter sets out the doctrinal and 
interpretive approach of the project: an analysis which examines its subject 
matter through the lens of the 1951 Refugee Convention, but with a need to 
address the particular problems of today’s refugee and security landscape. 
Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief overview of the chapters forming 
the body of the work. 
1.2 A Focus on Exclusion 
1.2.1  Exclusion on the Basis of Criminality 
 
 A justification of an exclusion-focused examination is first required. 
After all, the so-called ‘inclusion’ question has traditionally been the 
primary concern of refugee law. Since the inclusion question concerns itself 
with the identification of those persons in need of protection from human 
rights abuses in their country of origin, it is understandable that such a 
question dominates refugee law discourse.13 On the other hand, a unique 
debate surrounding the legal and normative dimension of criminality 
exclusion from refugee protection is also worthy of attention. Under the 
discursive structure of this debate, the question refugee law must ask itself 
is how to effectively and fairly exclude those who do not deserve refugee 
protection, apart form simply identifying those who need protection.14   
 Of course, refugee law will continue to ask both questions. However, 
an exclusion-centred approach may come to pervade many of the current 
debates, especially in the current climate of ‘security’ and ‘terrorism’ talk.15 
Refugee law discourse is increasingly bringing focus on the negative 
exclusion lens (i.e. who is ‘out’), rather than the positive inclusion lens (i.e. 
who is ‘in’). Why should this be, given that the inclusion question is the 
                                                        
13 For example, the major scholarly works in international refugee law (Grahl-
Madsen, Hathaway, Goodwin-Gill) focus largely on the inclusion question, as do 
other scholars. Exclusion as a topic tends to be partitioned off into rare special 
projects such as the 12 Supp (2000) edition of the International Journal of Refugee 
Law (IJRL). 
14 n 11 (regarding the rationale of excluding the undeserving). 
15 n 2, 3; see also: Steven Poole, Unspeak (Little Brown 2006) 126-162; Jef 
Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU 
(Routledge 2006) 147-152; Daniel Moeckli, Human Rights and Non-discrimination in 
the ‘War on Terror’ (OUP 2008) 44-49, 168-174; Elspeth Guild, Security and 
Migration in the 21st Century (Polity Press 2009) 1-29. 
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embodiment of international human rights in action? Can the agents of 
refugee law ‘find equilibrium’ by focusing on who is ‘out’ rather than on 
working to strengthen the idea of who is ‘in’? Why should this work accept 
the exclusion question as a distinctly important question to tackle, rather 
than maintaining the traditional focus on a more positively constructed 
taxonomy of refugee rights that treats exclusion as a corollary question? 
 The answer to these challenges to the value of an exclusion-centred 
examination is twofold. First, the exclusion question speaks directly to the 
so-called ‘balance’ or ‘equilibrium’ between international human rights and 
state security – the importunate challenge faced by international refugee 
law. In an even broader sense, that is as a matter of political philosophy, 
the exclusion question speaks to that normative equilibrium in Western 
liberal democracy whereby the state ensures that human rights are 
protected (as required by both national and international law) if it can 
concurrently ensure its security, social cohesion, and way of life. Of course, 
the more significant question is whether equilibrium can be achieved and 
maintained in a principled way, and in particular by resort to the principles 
of liberalism itself. Or, contrariwise, is the liberal democratic state resigned 
to the fate envisioned for it by Bockenforde,16 where it cannot guarantee the 
liberal principles upon which it exists without itself resorting to illiberal 
measures? While theorists of refugee policy may provide different answers 
to these questions depending on their vantage point, as Gibney highlights, 
the equilibrium question does have the potential to act as a point of 
convergence for the partialist and impartialist strands of migration 
philosophy.17 
 Thinking about these questions leads naturally into the second 
reason for an exclusion-focused examination: it provides a potential for the 
development of what might be referred to as a ‘principled theory of security’ 
within international refugee law. At a time when terms such as ‘state 
security’ and ‘terrorism’ are used for political and legal purposes alike, the 
exclusion clauses provide an environment where theory and law might 
merge to create a principled approach to the otherwise seemingly limitless 
concept of ‘security’. As Weiner correctly observes, “‘security’ is a social 
                                                        
16 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, State, Society, and Liberty: Studies in Political 
Theory and Constitutional Law (JA Underwood tr, Berg 1991) 246-257. 
17 Gibney, Ethics and Politics of Asylum (n 4) 82-84, 243-260. 
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construct with different meanings in different societies.”18 The challenge is 
“to find an analytical stance that, on the one hand, does not dismiss fears, 
and, on the other, does not regard all anxieties over immigration and 
refugees as a justification for exclusion.”19 Admittedly, a principled 
approach which effectively serves the many interests engaged by refugee 
law will not be easily discovered. Although success is not guaranteed, 
attempting to meet this challenge remains meaningful. 
 This potential for the exclusion clauses to act as an appropriate 
space for the development of a principled theory of security – a theory 
which then informs the interpretation and substantive legal content of 
those clauses – is certainly not universally accepted. For example, the 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles has maintained that 
“consideration of the national security interests of the host country is not 
appropriate within the scope of Article 1F…” on the basis that there exist 
other legal mechanisms through which such interests can be pursued.20 
This approach is both legally flawed and dangerous. It is legally flawed 
because the security interests of the receiving state were clearly one of the 
fundamental purposes for the incorporation of the exclusion clauses into 
the Refugee Convention.21 As confirmed by the Travaux Preparatoires22 and 
the UNHCR Handbook, exclusion represented “a desire on the part of States 
to deny admission to their territories of criminals who would present a 
danger to security and public order.”23 
More importantly, an approach that denies a place for security in 
exclusion is dangerous because, although the intent of the approach may 
be to avoid the politicisation of exclusion issues, leaving security out of the 
exclusion equation in fact leads to the opposite result. Without any 
principled concept of security informing the exclusion question, the door is 
                                                        
18 Myron Weiner, Security, Stability and International Migration (MIT Press 1990) 
195. 
19 ibid 196. 
20 ECRE, ‘Position on Exclusion’ (n 11) para 5. 
21 Zrig v Canada, 2003 FCA 178, paras 65-67, 118-119; Ovcharuk v MIMA (1998) 
158 ALR 289 (FCA); Jayasekara v Canada, 2008 FCA 404, paras. 28-29; Goodwin-
Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 1)175. 
22 United Nations, Travaux Preparatoires, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Twenty-fourth 
Meeting  (UN Doc A/CONF.2/SR.24, 27 November 1951); Summary Record of the 
Twenty-ninth Meeting (UN Doc A/CONF2/SR.29, 28 November 1951). 
23 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
(HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.3, 2011) para 148. 
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left wide open for refugees to be excluded for acts which may be 
characterised (in a legally defensible manner) as excludable crimes, but 
which do not threaten the host country’s security in any meaningful way.24 
In this light, Sloan has observed an expansionist trend to the use of the 
exclusion clauses in both Canada and the United States.25  Similarly, 
Nyinah has noted the “tendency of Article 1F exclusion to become 
increasingly politicised,” a tendency which does “not augur well for a 
principled approach to the interpretation and application of the exclusion 
clauses.” Indeed, this increased politicisation forms part of a broader 
picture in which “the institution of asylum risks becoming a casualty in the 
fight against terrorism.”26 
Ultimately, the school of thought which would leave any 
consideration of security out of the exclusion question fails to imagine a 
difference between a signally politicised notion of security and a principled 
theory of security. By failing to do so, it allows the former to seep into the 
exclusion analysis insidiously. Rather than ignoring the state interest in 
security, an interest which will be pursued by the state whether or not it is 
acknowledged by refugee law, the development of a principled theory of 
security within exclusion ought to be cultivated. Doing so will guard against 
its opportunistic appropriation. Moreover, the premises of any principled 
theory of security must include at the very least a number of basic tenets, 
allaying some of the fears generated by an amorphous and highly politicised 
vision of security.  
Five basic principles framing a principled theory of security for 
exclusion law can be stated as follows: (1) the restrictive approach to 
exclusion which the UNHCR has promoted and most states have adopted 
must be maintained;27 (2) “Article 1F is not to be equated with a simple 
                                                        
24 Goodwin-Gill, ‘Forced Migration’ (n 3) 1-18; Gilbert, ‘Current Issues’ (n 6) 449-
450; Catherine Dauvergne, ‘The Troublesome Intersection of Refugee Law and 
Criminal Law’ in Katja Franko Aas and Mary Bosworth (eds), The Borders of 
Punishment: Migration, Citizenship and Social Exclusion (OUP 2013), 76-89 (on the 
increasing criminalisation within refugee law, emanating from a hostile discourse 
grounded in a misguided concern about the criminality of refugees). 
25 James Sloan, ‘The Application of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention in Canada 
and the United States’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 222, s 7.  
26 Michael Kingsley Nyinah, ‘Exclusion under Article 1F: Some Reflections on 
Context, Principles and Practice’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 295, s 2.1.1, 
3.5.3. 
27 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion 
Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
 16 
anti-terrorism provision;”28 (3) the focus of exclusion must be on a person’s 
acts rather than on labels such as ‘terrorist’ or ‘security risk’;29 (4) 
procedural safeguards and individualised assessment must ensure the 
exclusion of persons who have committed serious non-political crimes 
without denying asylum seekers rights of due process or contravening the 
state’s international obligations;30 and, perhaps most importantly, (5) the 
“human rights purpose of the Convention helps inform both the reasons for 
extending protection to persons and the reasons for denying it.”31 
 A principled theory of security is functionally vital. Indeed, without 
an overarching theoretical narrative of security, the possibilities for using 
the exclusion clauses for a variety of political motivations seem endless. 
Clearly, security issues and security measures arise outside the refugee 
context in an entire host of manifestations, and increasingly so.32 However, 
this does not change the attractive proposition that a meaningful place to 
engage in a discourse about security is a place which demands a discussion 
about universal framing principles. Consequently, it would be reckless to 
forego an opportunity to build a principled framework of security which can 
reasonably withstand the vacillations of momentary sociopolitical 
pressures. Since it is clear that all states, including liberal democratic ones, 
will pursue ‘security measures’, the goal is to ensure that states do so in a 
principled way.33 As Goodwin-Gill and McAdam suggest, ‘security’ can 
                                                                                                                                                            
(HCR/GIP/03/05, 2003) paras 2-3: the exclusion clauses must be applied 
restrictively and scrupulously, and are exhaustive of exclusion from the Refugee 
Convention; UNHCR, Background Note (n 11) paras 4, 7. 
28 UNHCR, Statement on Article 1F (n 11) 8. 
29 ECRE, ‘Position on Exclusion’ (n 11) para 7; UNHCR, Note on the Impact of 
Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) on the Application of Exclusion Under Article 
1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (9 December 2005) 
para 7.  
30 On procedural fairness within exclusion generally, see: Michael Bliss, ‘Serious 
Reasons for Considering: Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness in the 
Application of the Article 1F Exclusion Clauses’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 
92; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR), ‘Safeguarding the Rights of 
Refugees under the Exclusion Clauses: Summary Findings of the Project and a 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Perspective’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee 
Law 317, s 2. 
31 Lorne Waldman, ‘Exclusion under Article 1F(b)’ (2009) 
http://www.lornewaldman.ca/articles/analysis-application-article-1f-b-refugee-
convention> accessed 15 March 2014, 20; Pushpanathan v Canada, [1998] 1 SCR 
982, 1023-1029. 
32 n 15. 
33 See, for example: David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional 
Freedoms in the War on Terrorism (New Press 2003) 183-208 (where he maintains 
that although there is nothing per se wrong with increased border control and 
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indeed provide the necessary theoretical basis for the application of the 
exclusion clauses, provided it is kept within a framework of 
accountability.34 This idea will receive further elucidation in the chapters 
that follow, as the central theme of this work is developed: a conception of 
exclusion from refugee protection consisting in a principled theory of 
human security, guided by a process of individualised assessment and the 
international human rights paradigm of the Refugee Convention itself. 
1.2.2  Exclusion for Serious Non-Political Criminality: Article 
1F(b) 
 
 While the benefit of an exclusion-centred examination has been 
defended, the question remains whether a more specific focus within 
exclusion is justified, one which concentrates on a particular subset of 
those who are criminally excluded from refugee protection. This work 
suggests that in fact a more precise exposition of exclusion for serious non-
political criminality [Article 1F(b)] is warranted for two reasons. First, in 
terms of coherent interpretive guidance available to those engaged in the 
practice of refugee law, international legal developments have emerged in 
relation to categories more traditionally associated with international 
criminality: war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity 
[Article 1F(a)].35 This focus on conflict-related international criminality 
within refugee exclusion is certainly understandable. After all, internal and 
international conflicts often generate both the refugees and the persecutors 
which refugee determination systems must deal with.36 Since the adoption 
of the Refugee Convention in 1951, subsequent international treaties such 
as the Rome Statute (which established the International Criminal Court) 
                                                                                                                                                            
information-gathering on foreign nationals, this must be kept within an 
overarching commitment to the rule of law); see also: Goodwin-Gill, ‘Forced 
Migration’ (n 3) 15-16: the greater threat to democracy than terrorism is when 
“democracy reacts in repressive ways that are themselves incompatible with 
fundamental values, including the rule of law.” 
34 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 1) 176; see also: 
Christopher Rudolph, National Security and Immigration (Stanford University Press 
2006) 200-216 (where he maintains that recognizing the security dimension to 
migration does not necessarily require states to close their doors to immigration; 
rather, Rudolph argues for a comprehensive framework of security for migration 
policy, based on what he refers to as a structural statist model). 
35 For an overview of Article 1F(a), see: Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in 
International Law (n 1) 162-171. 
36 Sivakumar v Canada, [1994] 1 FC 433 (CA). 
 18 
have clarified definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity.37 
Such a process has brought these normative and legal concepts up to date. 
Conversely, no comparable developments at the international level have 
occurred with respect to serious non-political criminality.38 Certainly, in 
relation to the other strands of criminality exclusion, international 
developments with respect to Article 1F(b) are long overdue. 
 The second reason justifying a focus on serious non-political 
criminality is one which has become increasingly recognised by refugee law 
agents, and which is closely linked to the discussion of ‘security’ in the 
previous section. Just as, broadly speaking, the exclusion clauses offer a 
meaningful space within which to develop a principled theory of human 
security for refugee law, Article 1F(b) specifically offers a suitable doctrinal 
environment within which to develop a principled and workable legal 
concept of ‘terrorism’. Connected to this assertion are two fundamental 
points: (1) extant legal definitions of terrorism at the international level lack 
the degree of precision required to engage in a proper assessment of 
exclusion under Article 1F(c)39 for acts committed which are contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations; and (2) exclusion 
determinations must focus on the underlying criminal act and not on labels 
such as ‘terrorist’.40 
 In this vein, a conceptual dissociation between the United Nations 
and the UNHCR has emerged. This divergence arises in relation to the legal 
quality of the phrase: “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations.” On the one hand, the United Nations Security Council has 
resolved that ‘terrorism’ is contrary to its purposes and principles and has 
sought to provide some broad definition to that term.41 On the other hand, 
the UNHCR maintains that despite what may at first glance appear to relate 
                                                        
37 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998. 
38 Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, ‘Article 1F(b): Freedom Fighters, Terrorists, and 
the Notion of Serious Non-Political Crimes’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 46, 
ss 2.3.1, 4.1. 
39 For an overview of Article 1F(c), see: Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in 
International Law (n 1) 184-190. 
40 UNHCR, Background Note (n 11) paras 49, 81, 83. 
41 See: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001); United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005); United Nations, A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility; Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change (2 December 2004) < 
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/a_more_secure_world.shtml>  accessed 
15 March 2014, paras 157-164. 
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quite specifically to Article 1F(c), in fact Article 1F(b) remains the most 
relevant provision with respect to the exclusion of those engaged in terrorist 
acts.42 This is so for two reasons. Firstly, Article 1F(b) is still able to 
accommodate an application to acts which are commonly understood as 
‘terrorist’, since such acts are likely to fail the predominance test in the 
determination of whether a crime is ‘non-political’.43 Secondly, since the 
term ‘terrorism’ lacks the legal precision needed for principled application, 
the use of Article 1F(b) will help to “ensure that the terrorist label is not 
abused for political ends, for example to prohibit legitimate activities of 
political opponents.”44 Taken even further, the UNHCR claims that 
“unwarranted applications of the terrorist label could trigger recrimination 
amounting to persecution against an individual.”45 
 This approach of the UNHCR recognises that the United Nations 
apparatus has multifarious dimensions, and that within that apparatus the 
Refugee Convention must preserve its quality as an international legal 
regime. This means that not all developments at the international political 
level can be easily transposed into the lex specialis of the Refugee 
Convention. As Goodwin-Gill and McAdam state, “it is one thing to say 
terrorism is contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
and quite another to translate that into a rule of law.”46 Whether a legal 
definition of ‘terrorism’ with operability under Article 1F(c) can be realised 
remains to be seen. For the moment, the threat of an opportunistically 
expansionist and politically motivated use of ‘terrorism’ as a legal label has 
meant that Article 1F(b) has taken centre-stage in providing an account of 
terrorist acts within refugee law.47 
 Similarly, this work recognises that Article 1F(b) provides a unique 
opportunity to develop a workable legal concept of terrorism for refugee law. 
It is not alone in that recognition. For example, Kälin and Künzli transform 
                                                        
42 In fact, UNSC Resolution 1624 (2005) specifically refers to 1F(c) in paragraph 7; 
but UNHCR, Note on Resolution 1624 (n 29) paras 7-8, maintains that 1F(b) is still 
the most appropriate clause for terrorism cases, unless they are clearly of 
international impact. 
43 The predominance test receives further elucidation in s 1.3.3. Simply stated, the 
predominance test asks whether the common criminal nature of the act outweighs 
its political motivation. 
44 UNHCR, Background Note (n 11) para 84. 
45 ibid. 
46 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 1) 196. 
47 UNHCR, Background Note (n 11) para 83: “Article 1F(b) is of most relevance in 
connection with terrorism…” 
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an international right of resistance48 into a very skilful articulation of the 
benefit of an Article 1F(b) analysis for ‘terrorism’ cases: 
Using the principles of Article 1F(b) applicable to 
offenders of common crimes in cases of terrorist acts 
will allow for results to be reached which are both 
satisfactory and in line with legitimate interests of 
States to combat international terrorism and, at the 
same time, help to protect persons against very 
serious political persecution even if they, in fact, 
have used violence….How can Article 1F(b) CSR51 
be applied in a way that does justice to those who 
have exercised their legitimate resistance to very 
serious injustice or who deserve international 
protection because their quality of being bona fide 
refugees clearly outweighs their criminal past?49 
 
While the transformation of Article 1F(b) into a doctrinal space allowing for 
a principled approach to terrorism remains to be realised, certainly the 
potential for such a realisation calls for some attention. A focus on Article 
1F(b) seeks to explore that potential. 
1.3 Problems of Universality and Proportionality in 
Exclusion 
 
 This section first defends the value of legal universality to the law of 
exclusion. The defence of universality largely consists in its instrumentality 
to guard against the expansionist use of exclusion that is inspired by 
conceptual heterogeneity. Such expansionism does not bode well for refugee 
law as an international human rights protection regime. Once the value of 
universality has been set forth, it is followed by an examination of some of 
the specific problems presented by exclusion in the realisation of that 
value. 
1.3.1  The Concept of An Autonomous International Meaning 
 
To this point, a focus on exclusion for serious non-political 
criminality has been justified largely by appealing to the claim that such a 
focus will further the construction of a principled theory of human security 
for refugee law. This work seeks to move in that direction by confronting 
                                                        
48 For a broader account of how limited acts of terrorism, in collective defence of 
human rights, could be regarded as ‘illegal but justifiable’, see: Ben Saul, Defining 
Terrorism in International Law (OUP 2006) ch 2. 
49 Kälin and Künzli, ‘Article 1F(b)’  (n 38) s 4.3-5. 
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the fundamental problems of universality and proportionality which have 
plagued the exclusion question. The normative framework emerging from 
this process will help to construct a model of security which serves both the 
interests of individual refugees and of the states that receive them. 
Certainly, while courts propound the principle that the Refugee Convention 
speaks with one true international and autonomous meaning,50 the reality 
has often been marked by vastly divergent interpretations both within and 
among states.51 
Not everyone might be immediately convinced. Are the courts right 
about this quest for an autonomous international meaning? Is universality 
something that refugee law agents should strive for? Why is universality a 
good thing, or more precisely, why is a lack of universality a bad thing? In 
fact, it might be argued that strict universality within international law is 
itself illiberal, running contrary to well-ensconced canons of state 
autonomy and the role of the state as citizen protector.52  In this light, 
Gibney has observed that although the rise of the liberal democratic state 
has represented a change in how the particularistic agency of the state is 
legitimated, it has generally not changed the fundamental view that the 
state ought to be a particularistic agent.53 
 As will be explicated in the chapter that follows, whether one defends 
a particularistic or universalistic view of the state within international 
refugee law depends primarily on one’s theory of statehood more broadly. 
Nevertheless, it is enough at this point to suggest that regardless of 
theoretical orientation, one must acknowledge the necessity for a certain 
                                                        
50 See, for example: R (JS)(Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 15, para 2. 
51Elspeth Guild, ‘Asymmetrical Sovereignty and the Refugee: Diplomatic 
Assurances and the Failure of Due Process’ in James C Simeon (ed), Critical Issues 
in Interntional Refugee Law (CUP 2010) 121-122; LCHR, ‘Safeguarding Rights’ (n 
30); Sibylle Kapferer, ‘Exclusion Clauses in Europe—A Comparative Overview of 
State Practice in France, Belgium and the United Kingdom’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J 
Refugee Law 195; Joe Middleton, ‘The Exclusion Net’ (2009) 159 NLJ 780; see also: 
SS v. SSHD [2010] CSIH 72 (SIAC) para 6: “In principle, the meaning of Article 1(F) 
should be autonomous and found in international rather than domestic 
law….Unfortunately, that meaning has not yet been authoritatively determined and 
may never be.”;  see also the four discussion points in ss 1.3.2-1.3.5 of this 
chapter; such wide variation is not unexpected given that the Convention drafters 
ultimately decided that it would be up to each individual state to determine 
exclusion rather than to have an international body carry out this function; see: 
James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths 1991) 214-15. 
52 For example, Hobbes’ description of the state or ‘commonwealth’ as citizen 
protector: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (JCA Gaskin ed, OUP 1998) 111-115. 
53 Gibney, Ethics and Politics of Asylum (n 4) 197-212. 
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minimum standard of international commonality if refugee law is to exist 
credibly as an international legal regime.54 After all, if the aim of 
international refugee law is to set a benchmark for basic and universal 
human rights, then surely it must start with the development of a universal 
and principled basis for agents to determine the exceptional circumstances 
under which those rights will not apply. This is not to suggest that states 
are without any margin of appreciation in applying the exclusion clauses. 
As long as there are sovereign states, all international legal regimes (refugee 
law among them) will experience some operational variation. However, 
universality problems with the application of Article 1F(b) exclusion are 
profound rather than ancillary. The fact that there is no dependable 
agreement on the question of whether something is even a ‘crime’, let alone 
whether it is ‘serious’ or ‘non-political’, instantiates this international arena 
of difference.55 
 While such indeterminacy would be considered intolerable within the 
structures of national legal regimes, it persists for fundamental questions 
such as exclusion within international legal regimes. It might be argued 
that this lack of universality is instrumentally protective, allowing more 
generous states to guard against expansive interpretations of the exclusion 
clauses as part of broad-based security measures. Ultimately, such an 
argument against universality does not withstand closer scrutiny. 
Exclusion has always been based on the principle that, as a measure which 
derogates from the basic human rights guarded by the Refugee Convention, 
                                                        
54 Nyinah, ‘Exclusion Under Article 1F’ (n 26) 295: “Although the views of all 
practitioners will not always be in perfect harmony, it would be true to say that the 
vitality of the protection regime depends on there being a broad consensus and 
shared understanding among its major actors on matters of fundamental justice.”; 
James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (CUP 2005) 
introduction (where he argues that refugee law can exist as the single most 
effective, truly autonomous remedy if it is anchored in legal obligation, detached 
from monetary considerations or policy and preference); in a broader sense, this 
quest for universality can be viewed as an attempt to mitigate the clashing 
normative environments described by Alison Kesby, The Right to Have Rights: 
Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law (OUP 2012) 116-117: “the human is 
precariously balanced on the border between the international and the national: 
from the perspective of international law, he is recognized as the bearer of rights on 
the basis of humanity, and yet at the national level, reduced to the deportable alien 
and denied recognition as the subject of rights.”  
55 See ss 1.3.2-1.3.5 which follow. 
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it must be restrictively interpreted.56 Accordingly, any universalisation of 
exclusion principles must be similarly premised on the restrictiveness 
principle and the overarching human rights paradigm of the Refugee 
Convention. In fact, rather than promoting restrictiveness within exclusion, 
a lack of universality has allowed an expansionist trend to germinate, with 
some states seizing the opportunity for broad-based security measures left 
behind by legal heterogeneity and confusion.57  
This legal confusion is marked by a lack of universality that is truly 
multidimensional. To expose these multiple layers of disunity, a 
restatement of Article 1F(b) at this point is instructive. A person is excluded 
from refugee protection under Article 1F(b) if there are:  
serious reasons for considering that he has 
committed a serious non-political crime outside the 
country of refuge prior to his admission to that 
country as a refugee. 
   
From this relatively compact provision has emerged foundational 
disagreement about three distinct elements found in the very wording of 
Article 1F(b): (1) what is a ‘serious’ crime? (2) what is a ‘non-political’ crime? 
(3) what does the “serious reasons for considering” standard of proof mean, 
and what type of evidence is acceptable in order to satisfy it? One final 
question, although not arising from the wording of the provision directly, 
asks whether in applying the exclusion clause, the nature and gravity of the 
crime must be ‘balanced’ against the nature and degree of persecution 
feared? Each of these questions will be examined in turn. At this juncture, 
the aim is not to provide comprehensive answers to these questions, but 
rather to set out the many sub-questions that this work will endeavour to 
answer. 
                                                        
56 n 27; see also: Geoff Gilbert, ‘Running Scared Since 9/11: Refugees, UNHCR and 
the Purposive Approach to Treaty Interpretation’ in James C Simeon (ed), Critical 
issues in Refugee Law (CUP 2010) 85, 118. 
57 n 24-26; see also: Anthony M North and Joyce Chia, ‘Towards Convergence in 
Interpretation of the Refugee Convention: A Proposal for the Establishment of an 
International Judicial Commission for Refugees’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Forced 
Migration, Human Rights and Security (Hart Publishing 2008) 225-261 (where they 
propose that the ‘dangerous lottery’ created by such wide state variation in the 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention should be addressed by creating a new 
international body); James C Simeon, ‘Monitoring and Supervising International 
Refugee Law: Building the Capacity to Enhance International Protection and 
Democratic Global Governance of the International Protection Regime’ in James C 
Simeon (ed), The UNHCR and the Supervision of International Refugee Law (CUP 
2013) 313-343. 
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1.3.2  A ‘Serious’ Crime 
 
The first requirement for exclusion under Article 1F(b) is that the 
crime committed must be ‘serious’. However, this determination is more 
challenging than it might at first glance appear, since the categorisation of 
an act as a ‘serious crime’ is an interpretive rather than a prescriptive 
exercise. As the UNHCR Handbook acknowledges, a ‘serious crime’ is 
difficult to define since even the term ‘crime’ has different connotations in 
different legal systems.58 Despite this acknowledgement, the UNHCR 
maintains that a serious crime ought to be a capital crime or a ‘grave 
punishable act’.59 Moreover, whether an act is a serious crime “should be 
judged against international standards, not simply by its characterization 
in the host State or country of origin.”60 Although such assertions are 
generally uncontroversial, how they might be translated into a working 
definition of ‘serious crime’ within the context of exclusion under the 
Refugee Convention is not clear. What are these international standards 
regarding serious criminality? Do these standards provide sufficient 
interpretive guidance for agents of refugee law who must deal with the facts 
presented by real cases and who must infuse these broad statements of 
principle with a functional value and clarity? 
While generally accepting the ideal of an international autonomous 
meaning to the exclusion clauses,61 courts have struggled to discover that 
meaning within a international jurisprudential scene marked by varied and 
often inconsistent interpretations of Article 1F. Compounding this lack of 
universality, agents applying the exclusion clauses tend to respond to such 
inconsistency at the international level not by striving to find the missing 
international meaning, but by seeking guidance from their own national 
systems of criminal justice and migration law. Since decoding an 
international meaning of ‘serious crime’ has often been difficult, courts 
have tended to fall back on the state-centred paradigm with which they are 
most comfortable, often using sentence thresholds as the guiding feature. 
Unfortunately, by resorting to the tractable instructiveness of the familiar, 
courts end up stymieing the development of an international meaning to 
                                                        
58 UNHCR, Handbook (n 23) para 155. 
59 ibid. 
60 UNHCR, Background Note (n 11) para 38. 
61 n 50. 
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the exclusion clauses. In the end, the notion of an autonomous 
international meaning has regularly given way to domestic legislation and 
national legal approaches that are mechanistic in their application.62 
Perhaps more significantly, even when a structural principle with 
respect to seriousness finds some agreement – such as the fact that a 
determination of seriousness must take into account contextual factors63 – 
the normative framework delimiting those factors and giving them content 
remains unclear. For example, what role, if any, does expiation play? If 
exclusion, like extradition, is primarily aimed at ‘fugitives from justice’,64 
should not the fact that a person has served his sentence or benefitted from 
a pardon or amnesty be relevant to the question of seriousness? Or does 
the concept of exclusion encapsulate a wider margin of discretion which 
recognises that expiation does not necessarily alter the criminal character 
of the individual or the ongoing threat to security that he presents?65 Such 
fundamental questions have persisted with respect to the characterisation 
of a crime as serious for the purpose of Article 1F(b), with agents taking 
starkly different approaches. The result has been radically temporalised 
and regionalised interpretations of ‘serious crime’, making the vision of an 
autonomous international meaning appear challenging indeed. 
1.3.3  A ‘Non-Political’ Crime 
 
While the first prong of Article 1F(b) exclusion has been troubled by 
issues of interpretation and application, the second prong – that the crime 
must be non-political – has been equally problematic. Even when the 
seriousness of a crime is clear, such as for homicide, determining whether 
that act was political or non-political is not a straightforward task. On the 
one hand, it is vital to the integrity of the Refugee Convention that the 
                                                        
62 See: Jayasekara v Canada, 2008 FCA 404, para 43 (on the importance of the 
perspective of the receiving state in determining the seriousness of the crime); in 
another context, Article 1F(a), see: SS v. SSHD [2010] CSIH 72 (SIAC) para 6: 
although in principle there should be an autonomous international meaning, such 
meaning has not yet been authoritatively determined and may never be; further, 
the principle of internationality must give way to domestic legislation and must be 
considered in light of EU decisions and legislation. 
63 Both aggravating and mitigating factors; see: UNHCR, Background Note (n 11) 
para 39; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 1)178. 
64 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 1) 175 (they refer to 
it as the ‘fugitives from justice thesis’). 
65 ibid; UNHCR, Handbook (n 23) para 157; UNHCR, Guidelines (n 27) para 23; 
UNHCR, Background Note (n 11) paras 72-76. 
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perpetrators of serious non-political crimes not be permitted to use the 
refugee protection regime as a shield against lawful sanctions. On the other 
hand, it is similarly important that those being sought for political 
persecution in the guise of criminal prosecution not be denied the 
protection that they need.66 But how does the same legal regime 
concomitantly keep serious common criminals out while protecting those 
engaged in genuine political activism? Is it even possible to draw a 
discernable line between a political and non-political crime given the 
inescapably perspectival dimension of political violence? 
 The UNHCR suggests that is possible to achieve the right balance by 
adopting a predominance or proportionality test to the question of whether 
a crime is political or non-political. Stated in simplified terms at this point 
in the analysis, the predominance or proportionality test asks whether the 
common criminal nature of the act is disproportionate to any avowed 
political objective. If so, then the crime is considered to be non-political 
despite its putative political motivation. This approach borrows heavily from 
the extradition law realm and has been adopted in one form or another by 
most states in applying Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention.67 
 Unsurprisingly, not everyone is convinced that the proportionality 
test effectively strikes the sought-after balance. Speaking about the various 
permutations of the predominance or proportionality test, Fitzpatrick has 
observed that “a coherent interpretation of ‘non-political’ in Article 1F(b) is 
elusive,” and “state practice applying Article 1F(b) imports many of these 
models, often in a suspiciously result-oriented fashion.”68 Indeed, the 
proportionality test in its current form is so broad that it can accommodate 
almost any desired outcome. Does this simply produce determinations that 
a crime is political when decision-makers are sympathetic to the avowed 
political motivations of the perpetrator, and a finding of non-political when 
they are not? If an application of the non-political element of Article 1F(b) is 
primarily results-oriented, as Fitzpatrick suggests, then how can the 
proportionality test be infused with a principled framework in order to avoid 
this? Or should the proportionality test be done away with altogether and 
                                                        
66 UNHCR, Background Note (n 11) para 100. 
67 UNHCR, Guidelines (n 27) paras 15, 26. 
68 Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘The Post-Exclusion Phase: Extradition, Prosecution and 
Expulsion’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 272, s 2.1.  
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replaced with something better positioned to address current sociopolitical 
realities? 
 As Kälin and Künzli have insightfully noted, the loss of clear 
ideological criteria, together with the expansionist character of political 
violence, has made determining whether a crime is political exponentially 
more difficult: 
After the end of the great ideologies – republicanism 
vs. monarchism in the 19th and capitalism vs. 
communism in the 20th century – it has obviously 
become more difficult to distinguish between those 
deserving of asylum and those unworthy of refugee 
protection. Whereas nobody in Western Europe ever 
would have considered to examine whether a refugee 
should be excluded who had been throwing Molotov 
cocktails against Russian tanks in 1956 Budapest or 
1968 in Prague, activists from the many troubled 
regions in this world are increasingly often suspected 
of terrorism when applying for asylum today. But it is 
not only the loss of seemingly clear ideological criteria 
allowing us to easily distinguish between right and 
wrong which turns the topic of refugee protection for 
persons who have used violence into a moral 
minefield, but also the disturbing proliferation of 
political violence all over the world.69 
 
 Has this loss of seemingly clear ideological criteria led to a 
proportionality test that is sententious in its view of politically motivated 
violence? If there has been a loss of ‘innocent’ life, does this inescapably 
render the act disproportionate to the political objective and therefore non-
political and excludable under Article 1F(b)? Does the nature of the regime 
targeted by the political violence make a difference? Is there, as Kälin and 
Künzli propose, a “right of resistance in defence of human rights,”70 which if 
integrated into the analysis prevents the indeterminate exclusion of all 
persons engaged in acts of politically motivated violence by recognising that 
those acts might be justified in certain circumstances?71 Answers to these 
and other questions about the characterisation of acts as political or non-
political must be diligently explored if refugee law is to cultivate a vision 
that sees Article 1F(b) as offering an appropriate doctrinal environment 
within which to develop a principled and workable theory of ‘terrorism’. 
                                                        
69 Kälin and Künzli, ‘Article 1F(b)’ (n 49) s 1. 
70 ibid, s 2.1. 
71 On illegal but possibly justified acts, see also: Saul, ‘Defining Terrorism’ (n 48) ch 
2. 
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1.3.4  Standard of Proof and Evidentiary Issues 
 
Exacerbating problems of universality in the application of exclusion 
for serious non-political criminality is the use within Article 1F of a 
standard of proof unfamiliar to domestic legal regimes.72 What does “serious 
reasons for considering” mean? Suggested answers to this question have 
been widely divergent among the UNHCR, state actors, courts and legal 
scholars.73 While some have advocated that “serious reasons for 
considering” quite clearly contemplates something higher than the balance 
of probabilities civil standard,74 others have abjured this approach in favour 
of a standard which is lower than a balance of probabilities.75 Which of 
these contrasting approaches is correct, or more precisely, which one 
captures the autonomous international meaning of the terms of the 
exclusion clauses? Does the restrictive and exceptional nature of exclusion 
demand a higher standard of proof, or conversely, is a lower standard 
warranted given that the primary goal of exclusion is ostensibly not 
punitive in a criminal law sense, and given that the evidence of a serious 
crime commonly rests within another national jurisdiction? Or, 
alternatively, is this very debate about the standard of proof largely 
semantic, as suggested by the UK Supreme Court?76    
Even if an agreed articulation of the standard of proof were realised, 
questions about the nature and quality of the evidence used to satisfy that 
standard would still require independent attention. While it is universally 
accepted that the burden of proof for exclusion rests with the state, the type 
of evidence that the state presents in order to satisfy that burden has 
remained controversial.77 Since the act which putatively constitutes 
exclusion under Article 1F(b) has occurred outside the jurisdiction of the 
                                                        
72 Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons’ (n 30) s 2.3. 
73 UNHCR, Handbook (n 23) para 107. 
74 For the position that a higher than balance of probabilities standard is required, 
see: UNHCR, Handbook (n 23) paras 107-108; Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons’ (n 30) s 2.3; 
see also: ch 5, s 5.2.3. 
75 For an example of the lower than balance of probabilities approach, see: Ramirez 
v Canada, [1992] FC 306 (CA); see also: ch 5, s 5.2.3. 
76 R (JS)(Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 15, para 39: “Beyond this [that 
‘considering’ is closer to ‘believing’ than ‘suspecting’], it is a mistake to try to 
paraphrase the straightforward language of the Convention: it has to be treated as 
meaning what it says.” 
77 Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons’ (n 30) s 2.4; LCHR, ‘Safeguarding Rights’ (n 30) ss 2-3. 
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receiving state,78 the evidence which the receiving state presents to support 
the allegation of exclusion commonly emanates from the authorities of a 
foreign state. It is undeniable that state practice with respect to criminal 
law and procedure varies considerably, presenting serious operational 
challenges in determining the reliability of evidence supplied by a foreign 
government. Before relying on evidence of a foreign conviction or issuance 
of a foreign or international arrest warrant, are decision-makers required to 
assess the fairness of the foreign proceedings taking into account 
international standards on criminal justice? To what extent must those 
foreign proceedings have safeguards typifying a Western liberal democracy? 
With respect to evidence originating from an authoritarian regime, are 
decision-makers always precluded from using this evidence as the principal 
basis for an exclusion finding, or is a more individualised approach called 
for, taking into account the specific facts of each case, including any 
particular claims of unfair procedure? Furthermore, under what 
circumstances, if any, is the use of controversial evidence – secret evidence, 
sensitive evidence, or evidence obtained by torture – permissible in the 
refugee determination process?79 Undeniably, there are no quick answers to 
most of these questions, with agents of refugee law continuing to struggle in 
their pursuit of a harmonised response to the operational obstacles 
generated by the particularistic nature of state systems of criminal justice. 
A tendency by refugee law agents to determine such questions on an ad hoc 
basis rather than through the development of a principled approach has 
simply aggravated problems of universality in exclusion. Instead of running 
from these admittedly challenging questions, this work seeks to address 
them thoughtfully and comprehensively. 
 
 
                                                        
78 This jurisdictional/temporal element is specifically incorporated by the words in 
Article 1F(b): “committed… outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to 
that country as a refugee.”  
79 UNHCR, Handbook (n 23) para 108; Waldman, ‘Exclusion’ (n 31); Gurajena v 
Canada, 2008 FC 724 (weight to be given to a foreign warrant); Xie v Canada, 2004 
FCA 250 (foreign conviction used even from authoritarian regime such as PRC); Lu 
v Canada, 2008 FC 1112; Lai v Canada, 2005 FCA 125 (claims of torture); Biro v 
Canada, 2007 FC 776; Canada v Toktok, 2013 FC 1150 (unfair procedures). 
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1.3.5  ‘Balancing’ Inclusion and Exclusion80 
 
The three previous issues regarding exclusion under Article 1F(b) 
have generated considerable discourse among refugee law agents, and they 
contribute a generous amount to the problems of universality and 
proportionality that this work is attempting to confront. That discourse 
then culminates more broadly into the so-called question of ‘balancing’ 
inclusion and exclusion.81 The crux of this balancing question asks whether 
in making a final determination on exclusion from refugee protection, 
decision-makers ought to balance the nature and severity of the offence 
committed with the degree of persecution feared. Stated another way, if the 
persecution feared is credible and of a high degree, should the nature and 
severity of the offence need to be correspondingly higher in order to warrant 
exclusion? Or should proportionality make no difference – if the person has 
committed a serious non-political crime, they are excluded regardless of the 
persecution that they fear? 
Interestingly, the answer to this question has created a divide largely 
along agency lines. The UNHCR and most scholars advocate a so-called 
final ‘balancing’ consideration before applying the exclusion clause, while 
most state agents and courts have rejected it.82 Who has got this right? Is 
the UNHCR’s view of a proportionality consideration as a fundamental 
safeguard and principle of human rights law and international 
humanitarian law more persuasive? Alternatively, are governments and 
courts on solid ground when they observe that the exclusion clauses say 
nothing about balancing the nature of the criminal act with the severity of 
the persecution feared?83 
Legal scholars have assertively promoted the incorporation of a 
balancing requirement into any analysis of Article 1F(b) exclusion.84 In fact, 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam describe the rejection of a balancing 
                                                        
80 Also sometimes referred to as ‘weighing’ inclusion and exclusion, or 
‘proportionality’. 
81 Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons’ (n 30) s 2.1.2. 
82 Kapferer, ‘Exclusion Clauses’ (n 51) s 4.2. 
83 For the UNHCR position on balancing and a discussion of its rejection by many 
states, see: UNHCR, Handbook (n 23) para 156; UNHCR, Guidelines (n 27) para 24; 
UNHCR, Background Note (n 11) paras 76-77; For Canada, see: Jayasekara v 
Canada, 2008 FCA 404; For UK, see: T v SSHD [1995] 2 All ER 1042 (CA); see also: 
ch 6, s 6.2. 
84 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 1) 180-184; Gilbert, 
‘Current Issues’ (n 6) 451-455; LCHR, ‘Safeguarding Rights’ (n 30) s 3.2.1. 
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requirement by most state courts as being based on “little rational 
explanation.”85 Moreover, they maintain that a balancing or proportionality 
assessment is essential to the preservation of the refugee regime as one 
that is based on individualised determination. In this way, a balancing 
requirement within exclusion is seen as vital if refugee law is to achieve the 
ultimate objective of finding a humanitarian balance between a potential 
threat to the community of refuge and the interests of the individual 
refugee. In essence, balancing allows agents to retain a focus on the 
individual and to do justice to the protection objectives of the Refugee 
Convention without doing a disservice to the state of refuge – the 
omnipresent search for equilibrium said to lie at the heart of refugee law.86 
 The case for a balancing or proportionality assessment between 
inclusion and exclusion appears to have both rational and moral appeal for 
a liberal democratic society,87 so why have many operational agents in 
refugee law rejected it? Aside from the fact that the exclusion clauses make 
no mention of balancing, state agents commonly point to the existence of 
legal mechanisms of complementary protection to shield even the excluded 
individual from the most egregious human rights abuses.88 These processes 
enforce other international and human rights instruments and are designed 
to ensure that no person, including one excluded from the Refugee 
Convention for serious criminal behaviour, is refouled to a situation that 
poses a risk to his life, or a risk of torture or other cruel and inhuman 
treatment.89 And so this argument maintains that no balancing assessment 
is necessary within Article 1F exclusion since that assessment will receive 
due regard in a subsequent legal process. 
Is this a convincing argument? What about the fact that the Refugee 
Convention bestows a legal status (the status of Convention refugee) 
consisting of fundamental rights that far exceed the (sometimes temporary) 
                                                        
85 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 1) 180. 
86 ibid 180-184. 
87 See: Silver v UK (1983) 5 EHRR 347 (where the court explains that 
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general interests of the community with the fundamental rights of the individual). 
88 Gilbert, ‘Current Issues’ (n 6) 453-454.  
89 UNHCR, Background Note (n 11) paras 22, 76; UNHCR, Guidelines (n 27) para 9; 
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Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
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Freedoms 1950, art 3. 
 32 
right to non-refoulement which typically flows from a finding of risk in a 
subsequent legal process?90 Scholars have maintained that balancing must 
occur within the exclusion determination regardless of the availability of a 
subsequent legal process.91 While also maintaining its traditional position, 
the UNHCR has more recently added a qualification that “the 
proportionality test should include an examination of whether other 
guarantees under human rights instruments will apply.”92 Does this mean 
that decision-makers dealing with an exclusion question can essentially 
dispense with a qualitative balancing assessment if they find that other 
human rights instruments will apply to provide some measure of 
protection? If so, how could this possibly work operationally given that it 
requires a decision-maker under the Refugee Convention to gamble on their 
prediction about the subsequent decision of another agent dealing with 
other international human rights instruments?93 Certainly, the UNHCR 
acknowledges that the outcome of such a subsequent proceeding can be 
difficult for the refugee law decision-maker to predict. 
 In the end, the balancing or proportionality question in its various 
appearances is broadly emblematic of the problems of universality and 
proportionality in exclusion. As such, it is not at all surprising that the 
Expert Roundtable organised by the UNHCR in 2001, while finding 
commonality on many issues, simply could not reach consensus on the 
question of balancing.94 Nevertheless, while international harmonisation 
remains unrealised for the balancing question –as it does for the other three 
issues discussed in this section – the aim of integration remains. As the 
Expert Roundtable has described the challenge, “the goal should be 
towards developing a normative system that integrates the different 
applicable legal regimes in a coherent and consistent manner.”95 Over a 
decade later, although the goal of universality remains an elusive one, a 
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93 For a discussion of these post-exclusion processes, see: Fitzpatrick, ‘Post-
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continued commitment to the pursuit of a coherent and integrated 
approach to exclusion is as important as ever. 
1.4 The Approach of This Work 
 
This work aims to discover the potential for common ground 
amongst those engaged in theorising refugee law and those engaged in 
practicing refugee law. It seeks to avoid relegation to the exclusive realm of 
political or legal philosophy on the one hand, or insular doctrinal legal 
analysis on the other. Like the work of Gibney, its principal ambition is to 
contribute to the development of a holistic framework for refugee policy by 
merging value and agency.96 However, whereas Gibney envisions agency in 
the traditional sense, that is the state at the executive or policy-making 
level, this work looks to speak to a broader audience of agents. Indeed, the 
aim is to find currency with policy-makers, judges, and academics alike, 
albeit with respect to one relatively discrete but intersectional legal concept: 
the exclusion of serious non-political criminals from international refugee 
protection. Although modest in its immediate scope, the hope is that 
through this process of examination and analysis, a principled approach of 
transposable quality will emerge.  
 The approach of this work is essentially doctrinal, in that it treats 
the discipline of international refugee law guided by the Refugee Convention 
as the most appropriate space within which to engage in a discussion about 
the international protection of refugees. However, this is not to suggest that 
it will simply engage in a discussion of what the law is, based on a current 
understanding of international legal instruments. As has already been 
suggested, omnipresent problems of universality and proportionality faced 
by exclusion doctrine call for a normative framework to provide solutions to 
these problems, or at the very least to structure the debate about those 
solutions. The challenge of developing such a normative framework lies at 
the heart of this project. 
 Nor is the essentially doctrinal approach of this work meant to 
disparage the value brought to refugee law scholarship by other methods of 
conceptualising and examining refugee issues - as a question of political or 
moral philosophy, or as a sociological or economic enquiry demanding 
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empirical research and analysis. In fact, any discursive divide amongst 
different methodologies of legal scholarship is not necessarily 
unbridgeable.97 In the very least, there are certain points of intersection 
among legal doctrine, philosophy, economics and sociology, places where 
the potential for meaningful interaction exists.98  Accordingly, although the 
focus is a doctrinal one, this work certainly intends to take advantage of 
these points of intersection. Such interdisciplinary opportunities will aid in 
the development of a principled and more holistic approach to both refugee 
rights and security interests. 
Combined with a methodological approach that is essentially 
doctrinal, this work envisions the interpretive challenge for modern refugee 
law as requiring its agents to translate the historical understanding of 
refugee law in a way that positions it to meet the special protection 
challenges presented by current social and political circumstances. It 
preserves the teleological method - that is the interpretation of refugee law 
instruments in light of their original object and purpose - while 
concurrently recognising that refugee law instruments are living 
instruments and not locked in time.  An approach that synthesises 
“foundational insights…with an understanding derived from the normative 
legal context and political landscape within which the treaty duties are now 
to be implemented” ensures that refugee law does not become an 
anachronism.99 
 In taking on this interpretive challenge, the Refugee Convention will 
serve as guidepost. With this benchmark framing the examination, an 
analysis of jurisprudential developments in Article 1F(b) exclusion law will 
highlight problems of universality and proportionality. While notable 
developments in different national legal regimes will be examined, this 
exploration will be structured thematically rather than in a jurisdictionally 
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comparative manner. The aim is not to juxtapose and contrast different 
national approaches, but rather to identify important areas of conceptual 
disagreement about the exclusion question. Furthermore, in identifying 
these problems of universality and proportionality, and in contemplating 
ways of addressing them, the analysis will look beyond the ‘hard law’ of 
national legislative and judicial interpretations of Article 1F(b). Certainly, 
‘soft law’ instruments, and in particular those generated by the UNHCR, 
will retain a pivotal role throughout the examination.100 
 Similarly, this work will look beyond the Refugee Convention when 
its subject matter demands it. This will happen often with the question of 
exclusion. As observed by the European Council of Refugees and Exiles, 
“the exclusion clauses lie squarely at the intersection of other areas of 
international law, including humanitarian, human rights, criminal, and 
extradition law.”101 Consequently, developments in these and other fields of 
law (most notably, counter-terrorism law) must be given special attention if 
a holistic approach to the normative challenges of exclusion is to be 
developed. This task may often prove to be a taxing one. The fact that 
exclusion occupies a point of convergence has had a tendency to raise more 
questions than it has answered.102 The considerable preparatory work 
appearing in the doctrinal chapters of this thesis explores the similarities 
and the differences between refugee law and other fields of law, laying the 
foundation for the refugee law understanding that is then put forward. 
 Undoubtedly, the challenge will be to convert the intersectional 
nature of the exclusion question into a tool of integrative interpretation 
wherever possible, while also recognising the ways in which different fields 
of law remain distinct. Achieving this end lies in the recognition of the 
overarching human rights paradigm that provides the normative link to 
what might otherwise appear to be a simple interdoctrinal legal junction. 
However, as this work will illustrate, such a normative interconnectivity 
also presents significant challenges.103 Ultimately, whether the 
intersectional nature of exclusion might be transformed into a dialectical 
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tool remains to be seen. In a fundamental sense, this work is premised on 
that possibility for synthesis. 
1.5 The Structure of this Work 
 
Whereas the current chapter has introduced the essential questions 
underlying this project, Chapter Two will explore the main strands of 
statehood and migration theory competing to shape the content of political 
and legal approaches to refugees. A broad understanding of refugee theory 
will be explored, using Gibney’s useful taxonomy of the partialist and 
impartialist strands as the discursive framework.104 By bridging partiality 
and impartiality through human rights, the Refugee Convention will be 
positioned as a representation of universal morality and international law, 
obligating states to accept refugees. Any discretion states may have to reject 
Convention refugees must lie in the exclusion clauses themselves and 
cannot be grounded in any other claim. Such an exposition at the 
foundational level will provide a theoretical context within which to explore 
the development of a more discrete theory that speaks directly to this 
discretion to exclude, engaging the themes of international human rights 
and security which form the particular subject matter of this work. In this 
way, the second half of Chapter Two will develop a comprehensive theory of 
human security, grounded normatively in human rights, that will inform 
the examination of the doctrinal debates surrounding Article 1F(b). Human 
security will emerge as a framing tool, ensuring that the individual remains 
the ultimate referent object of security throughout the analytical process, 
and providing a coherent and consistent structure for continuing to ask the 
right questions. 
Once the theoretical foundations have been laid, Chapters Three 
through Five examine the fundamental elements of exclusion for serious 
non-political criminality, and tackle the interpretive problems presented by 
each element. Chapter Three will focus on the requirement that the 
disqualifying conduct amount to a ‘serious crime’. Various approaches 
(from mechanistic to contextual) will be examined in detail. As a framing 
tool, human security will endorse a broadly contextual approach to 
determining seriousness, grounded in international standards and 
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requiring a process of individualised assessment that considers all 
aggravating and mitigating factors. Exclusion, like inclusion, involves the 
making of a risk assessment on the basis of international normative and 
legal standards. As such, exclusion must be restricted to individual 
claimants whose criminal acts invoke a real concern for the basic human 
rights interests of the individuals in the receiving state. In this way, a 
human security approach represents a challenge to expansive 
understandings of serious criminality. 
Chapter Four then addresses the complex question of what type of 
criminal conduct can be properly characterised as ‘non-political’. 
Conceptions of the ‘political’ are examined within extradition law, counter-
terrorism law, and refugee law. Important trends toward the legal 
depoliticisation of ‘political’ acts, and the pre-emptive power of the 
‘terrorism’ label, are carefully scrutinised. Once again, a human security 
approach will ground both the inclusion and exclusion questions in the 
human rights standards of the Refugee Convention, and will ask questions 
that are aimed at protecting the core human rights of individuals. A 
contextual and individualised approach to the non-political question, an 
approach that examines both the circumstances faced by the offender and 
the circumstances created by the offender, will be developed. This approach 
includes the recognition that in limited circumstances and in certain 
political contexts, retention of the ‘political’ label may be justifiable even in 
the face of violent or personally injurious conduct. 
Chapter Five will start by examining the unique standard of proof 
found in the exclusion clause: ‘serious reasons for considering’. After 
canvassing different understandings of this unique standard, a human 
security approach will endorse a vision of the standard that is more 
contextual and flexible than implied by the judicial and scholarly 
preoccupation with placing it on the spectrum of more widely used and 
understood standards of proof. The second half of the chapter will then 
examine evidentiary issues more concretely, looking at formal evidence, 
substantive evidence and controversial evidence. Using a human security 
framework, a particular way of approaching each of these categories of 
evidence will be put forward.  That framework demands a procedurally fair 
and individualised assessment that is focused on the ultimate aim of 
obtaining clear and reliable evidence to determine the core human rights 
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interests at stake. Such an approach will allow refugee law decision-makers 
to reach well-reasoned judgments about exclusion, thereby honouring both 
the inclusion and exclusion dimensions of the Refugee Convention. 
Finally, the specific doctrinal themes explored in Chapters Three 
through Five lead to a consideration of the ‘balancing’ question, examined 
in Chapter Six. Approaches promoting a final balancing test will be 
contrasted with approaches rejecting it. A human security approach will 
then demonstrate that a contextual and individualised assessment of the 
three doctrinal elements makes a final balancing test unnecessary in most 
cases. That said, in those rare cases where a particular result is still 
unclear, a final proportionality test will be endorsed in order to preserve the 
overall purpose of the Refugee Convention to protect core human rights. 
Admittedly, the focus of this work is essentially doctrinal, framed by 
the Refugee Convention and its legal components. And yet this work also 
strives to make the synthesis of theory and agency meaningful and 
accessible. It will present not only a comprehensive discussion of the 
fundamental legal elements of exclusion for serious non-political 
criminality, and the particular obstacles faced by agents in their 
implementation, but will also provide a normative framework for tackling 
the problems of universality and proportionality which have been generated 
by the exclusion question. The aim is to find the missing theoretical 










Chapter 2 – The Ethics of Statehood and State 
Responses to Refugees 
 
2.1 The Scope of this Chapter 
 
 Approaches to migration policy occupy a wide spectrum. Common 
among all of them, however, is that what they advocate in terms of state 
responses to migrants is tied to broader views on the value of statehood. 
This chapter begins by examining the ethics of statehood and 
correspondingly of state policies toward migrants. Using Gibney’s taxonomy 
of the partialist and impartialist strands of theory,1 the partialist view will 
be examined first. Partialists generally fall into three groups: conservative, 
liberal, and communitarian.2 They argue that statehood has value to the 
cultural community that it embodies. Accordingly, partialists are supportive 
of wide discretion in state entrance policies toward migrants. On the other 
hand, impartialists3 see value to the entire human community in a global 
sense. They condemn the restrictive entrance policies of the modern state. 
Impartialists generally fall into two groups – global liberals and utilitarians 
– although some scholars adopt modified impartialist approaches. 
 Once both the partialist and impartialist theoretical strands have 
been explored, a bridge between the two sides will be built. This bridge has 
special meaning to the project here. In particular, while criticism of both 
the impartialist and partialist perspectives reveals that at a foundational 
level their proponents believe in different truths about morality and justice, 
one area does see them come together: the protection of basic human 
rights. Consequently, as the international legal embodiment of basic human 
rights, the Refugee Convention occupies that moral and legal space where 
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Response to Refugees (CUP 2004). Gibney’s taxonomy of partialist and impartialist 
theory has been adopted as the one most suited to the broad overview undertaken 
here. However, some scholars he includes are not discussed, whereas others he 
excludes are examined here. 
2 Partialists are occasionally referred to as particularists; they are also sometimes 
grouped into one category referred to as ‘communitarian’, or alternatively, 
categorized as liberal-communitarian, right-communitarian, and left-
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one universal voice emerges. A detailed examination of partialist and 
impartialist theory will show how the Convention refugee rises to become 
this ‘universal human’.  
 This broader theoretical exposition lays the foundation for the 
development of a more discrete theory with clearer applicational value to 
the doctrinal examination of this work – the exclusion of serious criminals 
under Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention. That more discrete theory is 
a human security lens grounded normatively in human rights. First, the 
development of a human security approach in security discourse will be 
examined. Paradigmatic shifts in how security is conceptualised, from a 
state-centred concern to a human-centred concern, are canvassed by 
looking at key developments in security discourse: the ‘broadening debate’ 
in security studies; the emergence of ‘human development’ as a 
fundamental precept of United Nations policy; and, the appearance of 
‘human security’ in national and international political discourse. Second, 
after canvassing the development of a human security approach to 
understanding security problems, the delicate relationship between human 
security and human rights will be examined. Several criticisms levelled 
against human security from a human rights perspective will be 
considered, including the claims that human security is simply rhetorical, 
or simply a policy tool, or most alarmingly, risks diluting human rights 
normativity through its exceptionalising and securitising discourse. While 
treating these criticisms as important cautionary directions to those 
attempting to work with human security, it will be argued that both the 
normalising quality of human rights and the exceptionalising quality of 
human security are generally overstated.  
 Rather than being positioned against each other, human rights and 
human security will be exposed as complementary, reflexive and mutually 
reinforcing. Human security will act primarily as a framing tool that 
accentuates a holistic view of human dignity grounded in both security and 
liberty. Applied to the doctrinal focus of this work, it will highlight that both 
the inclusion and exclusion questions in refugee law are directed at 
protecting the basic human rights of individuals. A human security lens, 
while normatively grounded in human rights, will serve an important 
corrective function by maintaining the individual as the ultimate referent 
object of security throughout the analytical process. Human security will 
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ensure that refugee law agents continue to ask the right questions when 
the problem of exclusion is presented. Indeed, that value of human security 
as a framing tool, and its harmony with human rights normativity, will be 
the theoretical foundation of this work. Before that discrete theoretical 
foundation can be fully understood, however, broader theoretical strands 
about the value of statehood need to be explored.  
2.2 The Ethics of Statehood 
2.2.1  The Partialist Strand 
 
 All partialists claim a value to statehood. States, according to the 
partialist view, are particularistic moral agents. They represent unique 
communities with a right to self-determination.4 While strands of partialist 
thought diverge in their justificatory basis, the reductively unitary principle 
that binds them all is the claimed value to a community of members. This 
value tends to carry with it a rather broad justification for states to 
prioritise the interests of citizens. Correspondingly, the interests of non-
citizens are entitled to far less weight. In this way, the partialist approach is 
commonly associated with a statist defence of more restrictive entrance 
policies toward migrants. Although some partialists speak about migrants 
specifically and others do not, the impact of partiality on approaches to 
migration policy is unmistakeable.5 
 While agreeing on the value of community, partialists disagree about 
the basis upon which that value ought to be justified. Some engage in a 
justificatory process which is distinctly conservative. For example, Scruton 
argues that the nation-state is the site of a “moral unity between people, 
based in territory, language, association, history and culture.”6 
Conservatives see the preservation of a single inclusive community of this 
sort as a precondition for social cohesion and legitimate statehood. This 
strand of thought is about foreclosing choice. Nation-states are said to 
                                                        
4 Gibney, Ethics and Politics of Asylum (n 1) ch 1 (provides an excellent overview of 
the partialist vew);  see also: S Avineri and A de-Shalit (eds), Communitarianism 
and Individualism (Clarendon Press 1992); D Rasmussen (ed), Universalism vs. 
Communitarianism (MIT Press 1990).  
5 Gibney, Ethics and Politics of Asylum (n 1) 24. 
6 Roger Scruton, The Philosopher on Dover Beach (Caracanet Press 1990) 320; 
Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (Penguin Books 1980). 
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provide people with a paradigm that fosters unity and authority.7 While 
some might find this line of partialist reasoning persuasive, most current 
partialists do not rest their claim on conservative principles, but rather on 
liberal or communitarian ones.8 Both of these sub-strands of partialist 
thought – liberal and communitarian – will be given more careful 
examination. 
Some scholars who might be described as partialist (or 
communitarian for that matter) can also be described as liberal.9 For liberal 
thinkers such as Raz10 and Kymlicka,11 individual autonomy remains the 
central principle. Given that modern partialist thought arose largely in 
response to the idea of universal liberalism attributed to Rawls’ seminal 
1971 work, A Theory of Justice,12 the notion of a partialist liberal view might 
at first seem paradoxical. But that apparent contradiction falls away when 
one realises that what distinguishes partialist liberals is not any departure 
from the liberal principle of individual autonomy. Rather, partialist liberals 
differ from global liberals in their view of how the exercise of that individual 
autonomy is conceptually and practically constructed. 
Partialist liberals claim that global liberalism has exceedingly 
individualised the process through which humans exercise their individual 
autonomy. As Raz maintains, the autonomy of the individual is not 
exercised in the abstract, but rather in a particular social and cultural 
context. In this way, cultural membership generates a foundation for self-
identification.13 By participating in a dynamic culture and community, the 
                                                        
7 Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (n 2)103-104. 
8 n 4. 
9 Variably referred to as liberals, partialist liberals, liberal nationalists, or liberal-
communitarians. 
10Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 
(OUP 1994); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press 1986). 
11 Will Kymlicka, ‘Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality’ (1988-89) 99 Ethics 
883; Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Clarendon Press 1989); 
Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (OUP 
1995); Will Kymlicka,  ‘The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas’ (1992) 
20 PT 105. 
12 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP 1971); Rawls appeared to present his 
theory of justice as something universal; however, Rawls subsequently departed 
from the universalist assumptions attributed to him: John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (Columbia University Press 1993); John Rawls, The Law of Peoples; with 
the Idea of Public Reason Revisited (Harvard University Press 1999). 
13 n 10; see also: Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton University Press 1993); 
Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, ‘National Self-Determination’ (1990) 87 J Phil 
439; Janna Thompson, Justice and World Order: A Philosophical Inquiry (Routledge 
1992). 
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individual is able to exercise his or her autonomy and choose how to live. 
Indeed, the partialist liberal notion of autonomy contends that individuals 
are ‘free’ when they make their own choices about how to live their lives 
among a range of options. These options have no meaning in a hypothetical 
sense, but only within a particular cultural context. Consequently, culture 
is what gives people a sense of orientation in the world. It gives them the 
language, symbols and epistemic tools to understand their world and their 
options. It provides individuals with a form of identity that carries relative 
temporal stability. States help to provide that social and cultural stability 
which facilitates identity and autonomous choice.14 
Accordingly, there are two basic claims to the liberal thread: (1) 
group membership provides members with a meaningful form of life and the 
tools to become autonomous; and (2) individual autonomy can never fully 
be realised unless members are able to reflect critically about any 
particular group to which they belong and make their own choice about 
how to lead their life. Accordingly, partialist liberals emphasise both 
autonomy and plurality. They do not deny that individuals are born into 
some historical communities (nation-state, ethnic group, religious group), 
while other communities might be less historically constructed (work 
association, neighbourhood). But what is common to them all is that 
together they create the plurality that becomes a condition of autonomy. 
True autonomy begins when an individual can reflect upon the norms and 
values of each of the communities to which they belong. Indeed, they might 
use the perspective of one of the communities to assess the values and 
norms of another. Ultimately, autonomous choice is grounded in the 
capacity to engage in such an assessment and to freely reaffirm (or not) 
their membership in each of these communities. In the partialist liberal 
account, autonomy cannot be properly understood outside of this social 
and cultural context.15 
Communitarians such as MacIntyre,16 Sandel,17 and Taylor18 agree 
that universal liberalism imposes too individualistic a model on the idea of 
                                                        
14 n 10, 11;  S Mulhall and A Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Blackwell 1996). 
15 Kymlicka, Liberalism (n 11); Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (n 11). 
16 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2nd edn, Duckworth 
1985). 
17 Michael J Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (2nd edn, CUP 1998). 
18 Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (CUP 
1985); Charles Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism 
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self. However, they claim further that standards of morality and justice 
cannot be determined from some objective perspective unaffected by 
temporal or social considerations. Instead, communitarians assert that 
concepts of morality and justice are firmly grounded in a particular social 
and cultural context. This context varies from one place to another and over 
time. Humans are fundamentally cultural beings and cannot be ‘abstracted 
out’ in order to aid in the formulation of universal standards of morality or 
justice.19 The communitarian objection to conceptions of global justice is 
captured by Miller, framed as a response to Rawls: if one starts by 
attributing to individuals the attitudes and beliefs of a modern market 
society, it is “not surprising that the conception of justice they are 
supposed to adopt should approximate to the conception which is dominant 
in those societies.”20  
According to partialists then, the culture that individuals inhabit is 
vital. That culture shapes their sense of self, their aspirations, and their 
very idea of moral agency. Rather than viewed in opposition with one 
another, individual identity and cultural identity are inextricably linked. 
These linkages between the individual and a cultural and historic 
community provide a special sense of a common life.21 As Taylor has 
rearticulated the Aristotelian view: “Man is a social animal, indeed a 
political animal, because he is not self-sufficient alone, and in an important 
sense is not self-sufficient outside a polis.”22 Further, such ineluctable 
interconnectivity inspires a right to live together in a form that the members 
have negotiated amongst themselves: a right to self-determination.23  Based 
on this formulation, the ‘nation’ represents a community of people who 
have a unique commitment to each other. Moreover, the members of that 
community are entitled to have that unique commitment respected, as it is 
indispensible to their human identity.24  
                                                                                                                                                            
and Nationalism (McGill-Queen’s University Press 1993); Charles Taylor, Sources of 
the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (CUP 1989); Charles Taylor, ‘Why 
Democracy Needs Patriotism’ in Martha Nussbaum (ed), For Love of Country: 
Debating the Limits of Patriotism (Beacon Press 1996). 
19 Taylor, Philosophy (n 18) ch 1; Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, 
Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Polity Press 1992) 22-40. 
20 David Miller, Social Justice (Clarendon Press 1976) 341-342. 
21 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic 
Books 1983) 61-63. 
22 Taylor, Philosophy (n 18) 190. 
23 Walzer, Spheres of Justice (n 21) 31-63. 
24 Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes (n 18) 26-27, 86-87. 
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  From this account of nations entitled to self-determination, 
communitarians slip quite easily into an account of states entitled to self-
determination. States are the political embodiment of the national 
community. They unite their members beyond simply the same legal status 
and territorial residence in a space that is recognised by international law. 
Rather, communitarians see states as an ‘intergenerational cultural project’ 
that is entitled to deference.25 Citizens share a community of culture – a 
system of shared ethical understandings, social practices, cultural 
traditions, and political projects in pursuit of the common good. As the 
communitarian Walzer suggests, a community of citizens is the most 
suitable political form for the preservation of that worthwhile cultural 
project.26 
Certainly, the effect of communitarian thought is to legitimate the 
state sovereignty system. The current system of nation-states with their 
wide discretion in foreclosing entry to outsiders is seen as crucial to the 
protection of national communities of people. To ignore the importance of 
sovereign states is to ignore the importance of culture altogether.27 The 
correlative effect of such a state protectionist principle on policies toward 
migrants is fairly transparent. However, instead of pointing to extreme 
scenarios where “the migration of peoples seems indistinguishable in its 
effects from the conquest of an invading army,”28 partialists tend to 
highlight the more subtle ways in which the entry of non-members can 
affect the community. In particular, they claim that new entrants can 
significantly change the cultural, ethical, and political dimensions of an 
existing community. And since the existing members of that community are 
entitled to preserve the cultural and political forms which they have 
negotiated, they should be given wide latitude in entrance policy.29 
While largely justifying restrictive state practice toward migrants, 
some communitarian scholars have tried to generate a less restrictive 
                                                        
25 Gibney, Ethics and Politics of Asylum (n 1) 26. 
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approach. The self-described ‘left-communitarian’ Miller30 has attempted to 
furnish a strand of communitarianism that does not necessarily represent 
migrants as a threat to the common culture embodied in the nation-state. 
He begins, as many communitarians do, by rejecting Rawls’ perceived 
universalist conception of justice. According to Miller, the concept of justice 
is in fact made up of several conflicting principles. Since different societies 
might weigh these principles quite differently, social justice cannot be 
universalistic in its materialisation. Rather, conceptions of social justice are 
part of more general views of society, which people develop by actually 
living in a particular society.31 As a result, moral agency sees realisation 
through national communities of people, and not through a hypothetical 
human self acting in a universally rational way. 
Miller’s aim is not to defend communitarianism across the board, but 
rather to distinguish between defensible and indefensible versions of 
nationality. As Miller puts it, he seeks to provide a “discriminating defence 
of nationality.”32 In his view, while national identity is one constituent of 
personal identity, there is no predetermined outcome about its legitimacy in 
particular cases. One must weigh it against other aspects of personal 
identity. The outcome of such a weighing process will not necessarily be 
state supportive, and in fact may require that an individual seek the 
overthrow of the current state.33 According to Miller, nationality is a 
defensible principle if it is based on the idea of common agency in a way 
that recognizes the equally legitimate claims of all members and pursues 
social justice. Ultimately, Miller accepts the inclusivity of the conservative 
strand, but only when it is egalitarian and combined with the self-
determination of the liberal strand.34  
Assuming that a particular nation-state is defensible according to 
these principles, then for Miller the nationality that it embodies is vital to 
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personal identity. Accordingly, it justifies moral particularism. Since 
obligations spring from the communal relations between members, moral 
and justice claims consist in the presence and strength of these 
associational bonds. Consequently, there are no special obligations owed to 
foreigners, other than in exceptional circumstances where the most basic 
human rights are at risk.35 Otherwise, while humanitarian considerations 
may lead nation-states to provide assistance, they “are not in most cases 
required by justice to intervene to safeguard the human rights of 
foreigners.”36 But although nation-states may not have a duty to accept 
migrants, in Miller’s strand of communitarianism, migration does not 
necessarily pose the social and cultural threat that it does in the others 
strands. As Miller contends, provided that immigrants and refugees come to 
share in the common national identity, migration is not in itself 
problematic. In fact, since the common culture need not be monolithic, all-
embracing, or static (like it is with the conservative strand), immigrants can 
still contribute to this common identity with their own particular 
ingredients.37 
Given Miller’s account of the common culture as non-essentialist, 
and as based on a conception of an evolving ethical and political 
community,38 new entrants are not necessarily viewed as a threat. However, 
in light of Miller’s particularistic account of claims and duties, it certainly 
does not encourage open migration either. In fact, Miller’s approach still 
leaves entrance policies up to the goodwill (or not) of the nation-state. 
Generally, states have been reluctant to voluntarily initiate more permissive 
entrance policies. In fact, states often rely on many of the same 
justifications for restriction that are highlighted by partialist thinkers. 
Those justifications are variably grounded in claims to preserve cultural 
commonality, political institutions, or the social justice and redistributive 
role of the state.39 Regardless of their particular grounding, however, all 
such claims ultimately legitimate the state sovereignty system and defend 
restrictive state practice in entrance policy. The value of that restrictive 
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state practice lies in the preservation of “historically stable, ongoing 
associations of men and women with some special commitment to one 
another and some special sense of their common life.”40 Certainly, partialist 
thought offers a broad defence of exclusionary state practice on migration. 
Approaches which try to achieve the opposite end will be examined next. 
2.2.2 The Impartialist Strand 
 
 Whereas partialists see states as particularistic moral agents, 
impartialists see states as cosmopolitan moral agents.41 The impartialist 
syllogism is relatively straightforward: states are moral agents; morality is 
universal to all humans; therefore, states must take equal account of all 
humans (citizens and non-citizens) in order to act morally.42 This claim of 
moral cosmopolitanism is often the starting point for concepts of morality in 
a broader sense. Indeed, many find great appeal in the Kantian principle 
that if something is moral for one person, then it must be moral for any 
person in those same circumstances. The notion of moral universality 
grounded in human reason – where all rational human beings belong to one 
moral community – is certainly the genesis of many great thinkers.43 
 This concept of universal morality is then transformed by scholars 
theorising statehood into a prescription for how states ought to behave as 
political agents and agents of justice. Unsurprisingly, impartialists claim 
that current state practices toward migrants and refugees are clear 
violations of human dignity. They infringe the moral right that every human 
enjoys to live wherever they choose. In this way, impartialist thought 
challenges the partialist view that community carries moral weight and 
ought to be preserved. Correspondingly, impartialists condemn state 
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practice as the structural representation of this unjustified moral 
particularism. In the end, impartialists call for open borders, or at the very 
least for far more migratory freedom than any state policy currently 
allows.44 How impartialists get to this point nevertheless varies. Generally, 
impartialists fall into two groups – global liberals and utilitarians. Each of 
these threads of impartiality will be examined more carefully, starting with 
the liberal one. 
The global liberal Dummett begins with the claim that respect for 
human freedom must be universal. This means that humans are agents of 
autonomy in a global environment, rather than in a particularistic one. 
Having adopted this starting point, the question for Dummett moves away 
from one which asks what entitles someone to enter a state, and instead 
asks what entitles a state to refuse entry to any person. Whereas partialists 
have taken the nation-state as their starting point, Dummett has taken the 
world as his.45 And so the framing of the question sees a corresponding 
reversal in the direction of the justificatory process. Given these premises, it 
is unsurprising that Dummett concludes that “it is one of the human rights 
of each individual to go wherever in the world he chooses and can afford to 
go.”46 There are two components to this formulation: an individual has a 
right to go wherever in the world he chooses and he can afford to do so. So, 
while Dummett’s universal liberalism requires that a right to movement be 
globally constructed, the exercise of that right is not necessarily egalitarian 
in a redistributive sense. 
There are two exceptions to this right of free global movement, 
according to Dummett: when the receiving country is in danger of being 
‘submerged’; or when the number of migrants wishing to enter would bring 
about serious overpopulation. These are ‘extreme’ scenarios which very few 
countries would ever experience.47 Moreover, these exceptions apply to 
migrants generally but not to refugees. Since the Refugee Convention is the 
embodiment of basic universal human rights, states are bound by 
                                                        
44 Gibney, Ethics and Politics of Asylum (n 1) 59-76. 
45 Michael Dummett, On Immigration and Refugees (Routledge 2001). 
46 ibid 73; see also: Ann Dummett, ‘The Transnational Migration of People Seen 
from within a Natural Law Tradition’ in B Barry and R Goodin (eds), Free 
Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and Money 
(Harverster Wheatsheaf 1992) 173 (where she explains how the liberal commitment 
to a right of emigration must logically correspond with a right of immigration). 
47 Dummett, Immigration and Refugees (n 45) 20, 52-53, 73. 
 50 
international law to admit refugees, without exception. In fact, the duty 
toward refugees extends beyond admission to include an obligation on 
states not to engage in measures to prevent refugees from reaching their 
borders. States commonly pursue such measures in a variety of ways (visa 
requirements, air carrier fines, inciting prejudice, creating the image of ‘the 
bogus claimant’). Respecting their duty to refugees requires that states stop 
these practices.48     
Other global liberals make similar deontological claims, although 
they arrive at them in somewhat different ways. Carens builds on Rawls’ 
theory of justice, and propounds a global liberalism that sees the basic 
liberties inherent to that theory of justice applied to all humankind.49 He 
frames the basic question as one which demands justification of the 
sovereign state system itself. In fact, according to Carens, the moral 
legitimacy of the state system hinges on the provision of some ‘safe’ state 
membership for everyone, namely a community in which their basic 
inalienable human liberties are respected. For Carens, although the state 
system is deeply entrenched, its legitimacy cannot be presupposed. That 
legitimacy still must be justified on moral grounds, and on an ongoing 
basis.50   
 If the moral justification for statehood requires that humans 
everywhere have a right to live in a community which respects their basic 
liberties as conceptualised by liberals, clearly a significant global 
redistribution of people would be required. A demand for liberal democratic 
states to open their borders much more widely is certainly the upshot of 
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such a moral justification.51 Furthermore, Carens rejects the argument that 
it is morally unjust to require states that meet the needs of their members 
to pay the price for those states that do not. He claims that the legitimacy of 
each particular state is ‘initially derivative’ from the legitimacy of the state 
system as a whole. Consequently, the fact that a state fulfils obligations to 
its own citizens will not legitimate the state system overall, if that system 
ultimately fails to serve the interests of humans in a universal sense.52 
 Finally, Carens’ ‘state legitimacy approach’ has particular 
consequences for policies toward refugees. Specifically, he distinguishes his 
approach from the ‘humanitarian’ and ‘causal connection’ approaches. The 
humanitarian approach focuses on the duty of a state to aid refugees if do 
so would be of relatively low cost to the state.53 On the other hand, the 
causal connection approach argues for a special moral responsibility (and 
therefore a greater obligation to assist) if the actions of the receiving state 
have contributed to the creation of refugees.54  While still seeing some value 
to these approaches as corollary principles, Carens’ state legitimacy 
approach focuses on whether the sovereign state system is itself 
justifiable.55 As a result, the conclusions it mandates for refugee policy are 
sweeping. Rather than allowing overwhelmed states to restrict entry, the 
urgency and moral responsibility of states grows as the number of refugees 
grows. Under the state legitimacy approach, a rise in the flow of refugees 
worldwide reflects an increasing failure of the state sovereignty system to 
serve the interests of all human beings. Therefore, instead of strengthening 
the case for increased state sovereignty, a growth in forced migration 
buttresses the normative challenge to that very method of organising the 
world.56 For Carens, just as early liberals challenged feudalist systems 
based on the arbitrary assignment of status and life chances at birth, 
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liberals must now be global in that aim. They must question the practice of 
statehood and citizenship when it shows its failings. After all, citizenship is 
similarly arbitrary, hinging as it does on the accident of birth.57  
Some impartialists combine these basic canons of the global liberal 
strand with other theoretical and pragmatic components in constructing a 
modified universalist stance on migration. For example, scholars have tried 
to add practicality to an international right of free movement by merging it 
with the idea of a social contract.58 While individuals still have the right to 
choose their state, they enter into a form of ‘social contract’ with that state, 
agreeing to be subject to the same rights and duties as everyone else in the 
community. Recognising the equal moral worth of every individual does not 
require states to admit everyone: if a person’s membership can be shown to 
be harmful to the new community, then he may be deprived of the right to 
enter into the contract, although liberal societies must apply ‘exacting 
standards’ in this regard.59 In this way, an international right of free 
movement is moderated by a recognition that existing communities have a 
legitimate interest in self-preservation. Although the overall position is still 
universalistic, the interest of the state as a community is given some 
weight.60 
 While global liberals such as Dummett and Carens are driven by 
their belief in the universality of liberal conceptions of rights, morality, and 
justice, some impartialists are inspired by other canons. One such 
impartialist strand is far more consequentialist in its focus. It starts from 
the same basic postulation that no special moral obligations arise from 
membership in a nation-state that are not owed to all humankind. 
However, rather than focusing on rights, utilitarian scholars like Singer and 
Singer concentrate on the consequences of states having closed their 
                                                        
57 Carens, ‘Migration and Morality’ (n 49) 25-27. 
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international law. Recognizing the equal moral worth of every individual requires 
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borders and adopted restrictive entrance policies.61 Based on the principle 
that each human life is worthy of equal consideration, the consequentialist 
critique is condemnatory: current state practices in immigration and 
refugee policy overwhelmingly privilege the interests of citizens over the 
interests of non-citizens. State policy unjustly entrenches this privilege even 
where the interests of non-citizens are far more pressing and fundamental, 
such as in the case of refugees. To privilege a citizen’s cultural or economic 
interests over a refugee’s more fundamental interest in preserving his or her 
life cannot be consequentially justified. Instead, utilitarian principles 
require states to accept all new entrants62 unless the situation approaches 
one of ecological disaster or a serious threat to peace and security.63   
On that account, the strict utilitarian approach requires states to 
open their borders until the costs to current residents of accepting one 
more new entrant outweigh the benefits accruing to that new entrant.64 
Some scholars with a consequentialist focus have highlighted a significant 
drawback to this strict utilitarian call for entirely open borders: adhering to 
such a unitary formula for spreading the goods offered by the social welfare 
systems of Western states would inevitably undermine the conditions 
necessary to reproduce those very goods. If Western states were required to 
accept all who wish to come, their ability to provide the social goods to 
current citizens and newcomers would be severely curtailed. While 
accepting the basic impartialist premise of states as agents of a universal 
morality, scholars such as Barry65 and Nielsen66 have argued that open 
borders are not a panacea to global inequality. In fact, other practices such 
as resource redistribution and the economic development of poorer regions 
must be combined with greater freedom of movement in some cases. While 
more permissive entrance policies remain on the agenda, they claim that a 
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more comprehensive consequentialist recipe for how to respect the equality 
of all human beings is needed.67 
Still others who might be described as impartialist depart from both 
the global liberal and utilitarian tradition in their development of a moral 
cosmopolitan view. Nussbaum builds on the ideas of Grotius and other 
natural law theorists68 to develop her own theory of human fellowship 
across national boundaries.69 Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities approach’ provides 
an account that specifies the basic entitlements of all human beings in a 
global sense. The principles framing this just global structure aim to 
respect national sovereignty, but within the constraint that every nation 
must promote human capability and human development worldwide. As a 
universal entitlement-based theory, the capabilities approach views all 
entitlements in the international realm (including national sovereignty) to 
derive ultimately from the dignity and sociability of the human being. 
Accordingly, Nussbaum’s approach requires prosperous nations to take far 
greater responsibility than they currently do for the improvement of human 
capability worldwide. While Nussbaum focuses largely on a global 
redistribution of wealth, care for the disadvantaged, and improvements to 
education, the capabilities approach would also require wealthier countries 
to initiate more permissive entrance policies.70 
This broad overview of moral cosmopolitanism has shown that all 
impartialists, regardless of their particular theoretical underpinning, see 
the state as an agent of universal morality. All share the view that states 
must drastically change their behaviour in order to discharge their 
obligations as cosmopolitan moral agents. A call for freedom of territorial 
movement generally follows, although each particular impartialist thread 
accepts some practical limitation (usually articulated as highly exceptional). 
In this way, impartiality serves as a principled justification for a vast 
redistribution of people and resources. Since immigration and refugee flows 
                                                        
67 Brian Barry, ‘The Quest for Consistency: A Sceptical View’ in B Barry and R 
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and of Money (Harverster Wheatsheaf 1992) 278-285; Kai Nielsen, ‘World 
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modern partialists to defend the exclusive rights of states” (Gibney, Ethics and 
Politics of Asylum (n 1) 38), Martha Nussbaum uses the natural law theory to build 
her own version of an impartialist approach: Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (n 58). 
69 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (n 58) 224-324. 
70 ibid 315-324. 
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are driven primarily by inequality, the impartialist ideal of open borders 
would certainly entail a significant movement of people from poorer to 
wealthier countries.71 As discussed in the section that follows, the 
universality which gives impartiality its moral appeal also drives the main 
criticism of it as impractical. 
2.3 Bridging Partiality and Impartiality through Human 
Rights 
 
 Theorists tackle large questions about morality, justice, and law, and 
the relationship between them. Accordingly, criticism of both the partialist 
and impartialist theories is extensive.72 Some of that criticism occurs at a 
foundational level, since all theory carries with it philosophical postulations 
with which the proponents of other theories might disagree. Any serious 
engagement with the criticism at that level is far beyond the scope of this 
work. Some criticism of each strand has been set out above, to the extent 
that a position is often articulated as a response to its rival. Further, as it 
relates to issues of statehood and migration, some general observations can 
be made regarding the main threads of criticism about partialist and 
impartialist theory.  
 On the one hand, partialists are criticised for exaggerating the extent 
to which states are rooted in a cultural community, while underplaying 
statehood as an act of territorial appropriation.73 In a very real sense, states 
are synonymous with territory. They represent a right to a particular 
portion of the earth’s surface and the resources located there. So when 
partialists depict states as cultural communities, they paint an incomplete 
picture. Firstly, the idea that cultural communities fit within state 
boundaries only applies to four or five of the world’s almost 200 states. The 
reality is that modern states have far more heterogeneity than partialists 
acknowledge. In fact, they are often an amalgam of several cultural 
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communities, some of which are more discernable than others.74 Secondly, 
linking a cultural community to a state does not necessarily justify the 
amount of territory occupied by that state.75 Indeed, even natural law 
theorists like Grotius and Locke suggested that control over particular 
territory or property was always subject to the claim of necessity. This was 
particularly true when those in control possessed more than they could 
possibly require.76 
 Related to this criticism which highlights the disproportionate 
territoriality of states, partialists are accused of undervaluing the 
importance of states as political agents. Whereas partialists focus their 
attention on those aspects of statehood that reflect an insular community, 
they tend to ignore the many other ways in which states act as political 
agents in an increasingly global world. States are not passive bystanders in 
the international realm. Rather, their actions have global consequences and 
cause many of the situations which precipitate migration in the first 
place.77 Taking this reasoning further, recognising states as global actors 
logically flows into the principle that they are responsible for the harm they 
cause, wherever that harm arises. According to impartialists, this 
straightforward responsibility principle debunks the partialist claim that 
states are particularistic moral agents. The responsibility principle confirms 
that states do indeed have obligations outside their membership.78 In 
response, partialists attempt to discredit this criticism on two grounds: 
refugee flows are almost entirely caused by the states that they flee; and, 
states are only morally responsible for those refugees to which their actions 
can be directly attributed. Naturally, impartialists see this denial of 
responsibility as an unrealistically hermetic account of how states act as 
political and economic agents on a global scale.79   
 While partialists are largely criticised for ignoring the territoriality 
and global political agency of states, criticism levelled at impartialists 
usually characterises it as impractical and idealist. Indeed, as highlighted 
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in the section on utilitarian discourse, impartialists are challenged for not 
adequately dealing with the social, economic and political consequences of 
allowing entirely free movement. Many impartialists simply gloss over the 
profound consequences that such movement would have on the socially 
redistributive role of the state that these same thinkers see as essential.80 
Aside from this common criticism, impartiality is also said to provide a 
misleading account of the moral obligations of individuals and consonantly 
of states. As Sandel asserts, it is not clear why one should accept the 
impartialist claim “that the more universal communities we inhabit must 
always take precedence over the more particular ones.”81 Notwithstanding 
the impartialist assertion that they are simply allotting equal moral weight 
to fellow citizens and non-citizens, the practical reality of trying to achieve 
egalitarian outputs of moral agency toward non-members potentially means 
compromising those outputs directed at fellow members.82 Does morality 
really require such a result?  
Some scholars suggest that morality, understood comprehensively, 
does not impose such a requirement. Occasionally, preference for one’s 
fellow members is constructed through abhorrent and illegitimate tacks 
(such as racial and religious stereotypes). Nonetheless, a preference for 
associational interests might also be rationally justified in some 
circumstances. As Nagel83 maintains, an individual perceives moral claims 
through two different lenses – the impersonal and the personal. 
Impartialists want to accept only the value of the impersonal lens so that 
they can determine what is moral through abstraction. But this just leads 
to the obvious conclusion that everyone’s life is equally important to oneself 
- the principle of equal moral worth. It ignores the point that moral agency 
also includes the personal view, namely that perspective which 
encapsulates all of an individual’s own projects, family, friends, fellow 
citizens, and other bonds. Why should the personal view not carry some 
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moral weight? After all, these associations are central to an individual’s 
identity. And yet impartialists just dismiss them as morally irrelevant. 
According to Nagel, concepts of morality or justice need to acknowledge 
both the personal and impersonal dimensions of moral agency. Morality 
and justice need to provide an account of both universal obligations and 
particularistic ones.84  
 And so the impartialist plea for states to act as cosmopolitan moral 
agents is criticised for telling only half the story. According to Habermas, 
just as much caution should be exercised with progressive visions of open 
borders as with regressive utopias of closed nation-states.85 On the one 
hand, Habermas asserts that the ‘postnational constellation’ must develop 
new political institutions that catch up with the effects of globalisation. On 
the other hand, even as an advocate of the universality of democratic 
constitutionalism,86 he acknowledges that a community can only 
understand itself as a democracy if it distinguishes between members and 
non-members. Even if that community is grounded in the universal 
principles of democratic constitutionalism, those principles must find 
realisation in the form of a collective identity.87  But for Habermas, viewing 
the democratic process as a common political culture does not lend itself to 
a fixed conclusion on the relationship between migration and statehood. 
Rather, the key is to acknowledge plurality while reimagining membered 
political communities in a form more suitable to handling that plurality.88  
 Ultimately, impartialists and partialists will continue to disagree 
because they believe in different foundational truths. Certainly, differences 
will remain between impartialist and partialist visions of what morality and 
justice require.89 That said, there is one principal area of convergence 
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between the two strands consisting in basic human rights. Basic human 
rights are those minimally adequate conditions needed to honour human 
dignity. These most basic conditions include the right not to be killed, 
injured, or abused in such a way that destroys basic self-respect and 
human dignity.90 They are also the very conditions which inform the 
meaning of ‘persecution’ under the Refugee Convention.91 Unsurprisingly 
then, it is in this moral and legal space where partialists and impartialists 
come together. They agree that sovereign states have little or no discretion 
but to provide assistance to those who have had their basic human rights 
violated. For Convention refugees, who are by definition at risk of being 
persecuted in their country of origin and cannot be aided there, such a 
violation of basic human rights translates into a universal legal claim to 
remain in the territory of a ‘safe’ state.92 Consequently, even 
communitarians like Walzer and Miller – who give very wide discretion to 
states in entrance policy in order to honour them as particularistic agents 
of morality and justice – acknowledge that states are morally and legally 
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obligated to accept refugees.93 Because the refugee embodies the violation of 
basic human rights by a sovereign state, the refugee also occupies that 
normative space where the significance of state sovereignty disappears. 
 Why should basic human rights inspire such a convergence? 
Habermas contends that “human rights provide the sole recognized basis of 
legitimation for the politics of the international community.”94 Human 
rights as legal norms protect individuals as independent agents of 
justification, insofar as that protection need arises from belonging to a 
particular community such as the nation-state. They “ground an inherently 
legitimate rule of law,”95 and “institutionalize the communicative conditions 
for a reasonable political will-formation.”96 In this sense, according to 
Habermas, cosmopolitanism must support itself on the moral universality 
of human rights alone. And yet human rights largely still get materialised in 
a particularistic form. Even universal principles see realisation primarily 
through a democratic constitutional state, in that such a model provides 
the necessary ‘epistemic community’.97 It allows people to understand and 
interpret these principles in a context that makes sense to them. 
Consequently, although universal, human rights are of an “inherently 
juridical nature and conceptually oriented toward positive enactment by 
legislative bodies.”98 
 Certainly, not all moral claims are also justice claims to be asserted 
through some juridical process. But human rights are both moral claims 
and justice claims.99 While the nation-state is the primary addressee of 
human rights as claims of justice, transnational and international bodies 
with a juridical dimension also address justice claims in a cosmopolitan 
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sense.100 And so to the extent that all juridical bodies are grounded in 
human rights, the question of whether human rights are universal or 
statist is an ill-posed question. As Forst contends, human rights are 
‘agnostic’.101 As both moral claims and justice claims with a particularly 
legal aspect, human rights see their materialisation in the practice of 
fundamental justice at various levels. Human rights express what it means 
to be an independent social good. They demand respect for the status of the 
human individual as an independent social agent of justification.  
 The ontological commitment of the Refugee Convention consists 
squarely in core human rights.102 It protects the most basic right of an 
individual to be treated as an independent social agent of justification. The 
Refugee Convention provides this protection by shielding individuals from 
‘persecution’, namely a violation of their core human rights.103 Accordingly, 
the Refugee Convention embodies the moral and legal framework through 
which any person can assert a claim to have their basic human rights 
respected, regardless of where they are located in the world. Although 
states are the principal addressees of these claims as justice claims, the 
application of the Refugee Convention is not dependent on the statist 
account. And so the divide between the partialists and impartialists, 
between the communitarians and cosmopolitans, falls away. The protection 
of core human rights is the moral and legal space that sees these groups 
come together. 
 Admittedly, this will not satisfy scholars who seek to answer bigger 
questions. For those who conceptualise and examine refugee and migration 
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issues in a broader way, questions about the legitimacy and moral agency 
of states will persist. As soon as one begins to speak about ‘refugees’ or 
‘migrants’ in a more expansive sense to include those leaving their country 
for non-Convention reasons (such as environmental disaster, poverty, or 
simple choice), the partialist and impartialist voices re-emerge.104 The same 
is true if one begins to speak about human rights more expansively.105 And 
it may well be that non-Convention migrants have a moral and justice claim 
to membership in a new state. But this broader account of migration is not 
the focus of this work. For the purpose of an examination centred on the 
Refugee Convention, the universal stance is the only stance, both morally 
and legally. States are obligated by universal morality and by international 
law to accept Convention refugees. Any discretion states may have to reject 
Convention refugees consists entirely in the exclusion clauses themselves, 
and cannot be grounded in any other claim. Accordingly, the discretion to 
exclude is exceptional and circumscribed.106  The theoretical foundation for 
that limited discretion is the principal focus of the rest of this chapter.  
2.4 ‘Balancing’ 
 
 Some comments about the concept of ‘balancing’ are needed at this 
point, before moving on to consider a theory of human security that will 
inform the limited discretion to exclude refugees. Chapter One began by 
ostensibly accepting the proposition that the future of refugee law consists 
in its capacity to balance the interests of individuals fleeing serious abuses 
of their human rights with the interests of the states that receive them. 
However, it was mentioned there that this very trope of balancing would be 
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scrutinised in the examination to come.107 A rejection of balancing 
apparently came with the principle developed in this chapter that refugee 
law (as an instrument consisting in core human rights) occupies that area 
over which states have no right to balance their own interests against the 
interests of individuals who need a new state. And so the idea of balancing 
seemed to disappear. However, it was then proposed that the exclusion 
clauses embody the very limited discretion which states retain to reject 
refugees on the ground that they are a threat to security. This appears to 
have reintroduced the trope of balancing, and in the most basic sense it 
has. But this work will not accept a nebulous conception of balancing. In 
order to understand this properly, some explanation is required about the 
multifarious use of the ‘balancing’ trope.  
 Firstly, the term ‘balancing’ is concurrently (and unfortunately) used 
in refugee law scholarship to refer to different concepts. In the sense 
discussed in the first chapter, it relates to the very specific doctrinal debate 
about whether a decision-maker must weigh the nature and severity of the 
criminal acts against the degree of persecution feared. Although not an 
ideal choice of words,108 ‘balancing’ in that sense is used to describe a 
particular legal question in the refugee determination process. As 
highlighted in the first chapter, agents disagree about whether the 
inclusion and exclusion clauses operate in an entirely disjunctive way. This 
disagreement is captured through the language of ‘balancing/no-balancing 
of inclusion and exclusion’, although not in ways that can be easily 
matched up with agents’ views about ‘balancing’ individual and collective 
interests more broadly.109 Indeed, ‘balancing’ is often referred to in refugee 
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law scholarship in this other broader sense: one that positions the interests 
of refugees against the interests of the state, and sees the main aim of 
refugee law as striking the appropriate ‘balance’ between these two 
interests.  
 This work resists that simplified understanding of the aim of refugee 
law. However, the resistance to balancing is more discrete than a wholesale 
rejection. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that the image of balancing 
remains a useful epistemic tool, to the extent that basic moral or legal 
concepts, such as ‘right’ or ‘duty’, are given meaning in contrapuntally 
constructed ways based in social reality. Consider the simple example of a 
‘right to privacy’. This right is given meaning by conceptually positioning 
the individual’s interest in being free from interference against other 
individual or institutional agents who might seek to interfere with that 
interest. Along these lines, the idea of balancing as a principled negotiation 
of social relations is cognitively instructive.110  
On the other hand, to the extent that the trope of balancing finds 
allegorical representation in the image of scales, where one side moving up 
inextricably brings the other side to move commensurately down, it has a 
deleterious effect on the analytical process. Applied to the refugee law 
context, this trope would suggest that when individual refugee rights are 
given greater consideration, the security interests of the receiving state 
must be given equivalently lesser consideration, and vice versa. Such a 
quantitatively determinate, zero-sum vision of balancing is as misguided as 
it is common.111 Its broad appeal is nevertheless understandable. As 
Dworkin has pointed out, the metaphor of “balancing the public interest 
against personal claims is established in our political and judicial rhetoric, 
and this metaphor gives the model familiarity and appeal.”112  
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But there is a fundamental problem generated by a constructive 
exercise calling for a ‘balance’ to be struck between two valid but competing 
perspectives. If each of these perspectives is accepted as valid, then how 
could difficult questions ever be settled without selecting one of the 
perspectives as determinative? If this selection is made on the basis that 
one perspective carries some normative supremacy, then there was no true 
competition between perspectives to begin with. On the other hand, if 
selection occurs on the basis that preference is variably shown for one 
perspective over another, then the justificatory process becomes entirely 
malleable. And yet, when the trope of balancing is used, that selection must 
be made. After all, “there is no third perspective – no perspective of ‘reason’ 
itself – from which the balance might be struck.”113 Additionally, this model 
of achieving ‘balance’ between individual rights and state security interests 
is far too simplistic and temporally oscillatory to provide wide-ranging and 
enduring guidance.114   
Consequently, instead of adopting the simple trope of balancing, this 
project will aim to discover an integrative theory of human security with 
centrifugal force.115 In place of an analytical exercise framed by an 
ambiguous balancing of interests, in a manner that almost invariably tips 
the scales in favour of the broad but typically vague security interests of the 
receiving state, a theory of security which places the human subject at its 
nucleus will be uncovered.116 Such a theory of ‘human security’ will allow 
agents to maintain analytical clarity and rigour by properly identifying, 
examining and assessing the interests at stake when both the inclusion 
and exclusion questions in refugee law must be answered. This is not to 
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suggest that a human security approach to refugee law will be able to 
provide a clear answer to all tough questions, especially those that arise 
when both the security interests of the individual refugee and the security 
interests of the individuals in the receiving state are similarly compelling. 
Difficult choices will still need to be made in certain cases, choices that may 
transcend the legal boundaries of the Refugee Convention.117 However, the 
opportunistic pliability of the balancing trope has allowed ‘state interests’ to 
enter the analytical process prematurely and with a poorly defined but pre-
emptive quality. In contrast, a human security approach will require those 
respective interests to first be properly identified, understood and assessed.  
These central claims of a human security approach to refugee law 
will resurface frequently and be developed more concretely through the 
doctrinal examination that follows in subsequent chapters. Human security 
will expose the scales for their undesirability. The theory will illustrate how 
security interests and refugee interests are not ineluctably polar, as is often 
envisioned, but rather converge in their ontological and epistemological 
commitments: both find meaning through the lens of the human subject, 
just as both stem from the value of human dignity and focus on the yield of 
such a thick concept. The comprehensive theory of human security 
developed in the next section will inform the entire project, and will furnish 
the missing theoretical narrative to criminality exclusion in refugee law. 
2.5 Human Security: The Convergence of Human Rights 
and Security Interests 
2.5.1 The Development of a Human Security Approach in 
Security Discourse 
  
 Traditionally, the study of security has been framed in statist and 
international political terms. The focus has largely been on the militaristic 
dimension to international power politics among states. Grounded in a 
realist understanding, orthodox security studies were constructed on the 
presupposition that the ultimate referent object of the value of ‘security’ 
was the nation state. Consequently, it defined state security interests in 
relation to the realities of strategic power among states. Such an 
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understanding was generally sceptical of the concept of international moral 
limitations on state behaviour, and would typically rise to the defence of 
state sovereignty against external threats.118 Realist understandings of 
security studies were pervasive during the Cold War era. The statist 
paradigm in the discourse of security was essentially concerned with 
illuminating the omnipresent effect of international power politics in the 
Cold War context.119 However, with the end of the Cold War and an 
increasing drift toward globalisation, those engaged in the study of security 
sought to capture a broader understanding of the concept central to their 
discipline.120 
2.5.1.1 The Broadening Debate 
  
 Indeed, one of the most pressing challenges to the traditional realist 
understanding of security studies was presented by the so-called ‘widening’ 
or ‘broadening’ debate.121 Faced with a diminishing concern over militaristic 
threats and an increasing concern over economic and environmental ones, 
many scholars who were engaged in security studies began to broaden their 
field of discourse. They did so by imagining paradigmatic shifts that would 
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take proper account of the changing nature of the threats that were now 
perceived to represent significant challenges to security. Scholars began to 
write about these broader dimensions to the security landscape.122 One of 
the leading thinkers, Buzan, challenged traditional understandings of 
security by distilling national security issues into five areas: military, 
political, economic, societal, and ecological.123 Previously considered to be 
distinct disciplines, these aspects were now being propounded as connected 
pentagonal sides. Such a conceptualisation of security did not dismiss the 
previously dominant realist account, but rather sought to integrate that 
account into a broader understanding by capturing the notion of 
‘comprehensive security’.124 
 It would be a mistake to suggest that the broadening debate was 
simply about finding recognition for new threats of a non-militaristic 
nature. Rather, even in its early stages, the broadening debate could be 
delineated into three aspects: (1) the nature of the threat; (2) the referent 
object of security; and (3) the means of seeking security.125 While the first 
aspect – the nature of the threat – might be seen as laying the foundation 
for the broadening debate, the other two aspects have been particularly 
instrumental to the emergence of human security as an analytical and 
policy concept. In fact, many pioneering scholars who focused on the first 
aspect and sought to reconceptualise security by expanding the spectrum 
of threats did so within the established realist framework of national or 
state security. Such a framework maintained the state as the ultimate 
referent object of security, as it was seen as the only political category 
through which one could make sense of the concept of security. After all, 
the security of human individuals ultimately depended on the security of 
the states authorised by the international system to protect those 
individuals.126 
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 While some scholars sought to incorporate different threats into the 
existing statist model of security studies, others imagined a more 
paradigmatic shift in their discipline. With influences derived from feminist 
criticism,127 a body of work emerged supporting a shift in the ultimate 
referent object of security, from the state to the human individual. This 
aspect of the conceptual evolution of security will be explored more 
comprehensively in the following sections of this chapter. The essential 
claim, however, is that states should be seen as a central instrument rather 
than the ultimate beneficiary of security. According to this approach, the 
human individual (and not the state) is positioned as the moral, analytical, 
and legal centre of security.128 Consisting metaphorically in the aphorism 
that the inhabitants of a house are more important than the house itself,129 
a ‘human-centred’ approach engenders both a moral and epistemological 
claim. The moral claim is clear: human individuals have greater moral 
weight than states.130 Drawing on this central moral claim, the 
epistemological claim insists that better answers to policy, operational, and 
legal questions will be achieved by preserving a human-centred framework 
throughout the process of attempting to understand a security concern.131 
2.5.1.2 Human Development 
 
 In addition to broadening the nature of threats considered relevant to 
security, and conceptualising the human individual as the ultimate referent 
object of security, a more expansive view of how to achieve security began 
to emerge. As von Tigerstrom highlights in her comprehensive work on 
human security, an important antecedent to human security is found in 
the concept of human development, an idea robustly promoted by the 
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United Nations, and in particular by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR).132 Human development captures a wide range of factors, 
including economic growth, life expectancy, food, education, health, gender 
empowerment, and levels of crime. These factors, often synthesised into a 
numeric indicator (the Human Development Index), speak to the broad 
question of human development: “a process of enlarging people’s choices 
and capabilities.”133 The central claim of a human development approach is 
the demand for a holistic strategy to improving people’s lives. It is an 
approach that seeks to tackle the various but interconnected influences 
which challenge people’s capabilities; influences which cannot be 
confronted simply through traditional statist understandings and means.134 
 While the UNDP began to publish annual reports in 1990, in which it 
progressively developed this concept of human development, the genesis of 
the current paradigmatic concept of human security is typically attributed 
to the UNDP’s Human Development Report of 1994.135 In that report, the 
concept of security is characterised as having undergone two fundamental 
shifts: a shift from territorial to human security; and, a shift from a 
militaristic to a human development understanding of how to achieve 
security.136 Parallels to developments in the academic debate are 
unmistakable. In this sense, the UNDP’s report - while often credited with 
the current concept of human security - was indeed more of an 
instantiation by a policy-making body of a new but evolving discourse that 
was already occurring within security studies.137   
 Nonetheless, the advancement of ‘human security’ as a concept with 
policy relevance on a global scale owes much to the UNDP’s 1994 Report.138 
In addition to promoting it as the central, unifying concept to a global 
understanding of security, the Report unpacked human security into four 
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key characteristics: security is a matter of universal concern; the 
components of security are interconnected on a global level – threats in one 
place affect the entire world; security is better achieved through prevention 
rather than intervention; and, security is a “people-centred” or “human-
centred” concern.139 It is these four characteristics which have informed the 
use of human security in both the national and international arenas. 
2.5.1.3 Human Security in the National and International Arena 
 
 It is undeniable that since the events of September 11, a powerful 
neo-realist resurgence has emerged, with a re-emphasis on state-centred 
and militaristic understandings of security.140 However, for a period 
between the emergence of human security in the 1980/90s and those 
events in 2001, the concept of human security enjoyed some favour and 
promotion in both the national and international domains. In the 
international domain, the idea of human security was actively promoted by 
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan,141 an approach which filtered 
down into the operations of several key international organizations, 
including the UNDP, UNHCR, and the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).142 
 Similarly, the concept of human security was adopted with 
framework stature by the Commission on Global Governance and the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.143 
Importantly, movement toward a human-centred understanding of security 
by such organisations invited a critical rethinking of the concept of state 
sovereignty itself – from one of territorial independence and prerogative to 
one of common concern and responsibility, and more particularly, the 
‘responsibility to protect’.144 Such concepts will be explored more fully in 
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the sections that follow. At this point, it is instructive to note that the 
emergence and use of the concept of human security in the international 
domain was instrumental in the development of an important normative 
shift in thinking about security: the protection of the state is vital not 
because the state is intrinsically good, but because it is essential to the 
protection of the safety and dignity of the citizens in it.145 
 While such a normative shift was perceptible at the international 
level in the early days of the inception of ‘human security’, similar 
developments at the national level were more limited. Indeed, the 
implementation of human security as a useful concept in analysis and 
policy was applied by few countries, most notably Canada and Japan. 
Further, the understandings of human security adopted by Canada146 and 
Japan147 in their respective policy frameworks were fundamentally different 
in scope. 
 On the one hand, the Japanese approach (also referred to as the 
‘Asian school’)148 propounded a broad view of human security, based on the 
principle of ‘freedom from want’. According to this view, security policy and 
measures must address all of the threats which compromise human 
development and fulfilment: economic, food, health, personal, community, 
and political threats. It is only through a comprehensive, holistic system of 
dealing with these multifarious threats that the aim of human security 
might be realised. Proponents of the broad view highlighted that the 
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traditional emphasis on only a subset of these threats left many of the 
factors which deleteriously affect millions of lives across the world entirely 
unaddressed.149 
 Conversely, the Canadian approach (also referred to as the ‘Western 
school’)150 propounded a narrower view of human security, based on the 
principle of ‘freedom from fear’. While recognising the desirability of 
‘freedom from want’, the Canadian approach was grounded in the premise 
that such a broad view was simply too wide and all-embracing to form the 
basis of effective policy instruments. Concerned that the broad view would 
amount to no more than impressive aspirational statements unmatched by 
corresponding action, the ‘freedom from fear’ paradigm was more focused in 
its aims: security policy should promote freedom from pervasive threats to 
people’s rights, safety and lives, with a particular attention on protection 
from violence. According to the Canadian approach, while security must 
remain a human-centred concept, to be effective as a policy tool which 
takes account of the actuality of national and international dynamics, 
human security needs to maintain a focus on the most serious threats to 
people’s lives.151 
 Certainly, the differences between the Japanese and Canadian 
approaches were emblematic, in a specific way, of the definitional problems 
which were emerging as agents attempted to make use of the concept of 
human security in its early days. For the most part, however, this discourse 
did not enjoy the benefit of the time needed for development, expansion and 
perhaps reconciliation. As already acknowledged, the strong, post-
September 11 neo-realist resurgence has to some extent relegated 
previously evolving concepts like human security to the margins of national 
and international discourse. Fortunately, academia did not abandon the 
concept of human security after the occurrence of that one, albeit 
momentous, event. Some modest growth in the development of the concept 
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of human security is appreciable in the academic discourse.152 Indeed, in 
the course of the development of the concept of human security, debates 
about its usefulness have been prolific despite its relegation to the margins 
of national and international politics. While some scholars have sought to 
employ human security as an analytical framework, others suggest that 
human security is conceptually incoherent and unworkable. It is this 
discourse, which has in effect kept the idea of human security alive, that 
frames the focus of the next section. 
2.5.1.4 Conceptual and Definitional Issues with Human Security – 
Bringing a Human-Centred Approach to International Law 
  
 A central debate found in the academic discourse is contrapuntally 
configured around arguments about the relative value of human security 
and human rights as the paradigmatic bedrock of international law and 
morality. That debate will be engaged with separately and more 
comprehensively later in this chapter, particularly given its prominence in 
relation to the domain of international refugee law. For the moment, some 
of the conceptual and definitional issues arising in the use of human 
security will be considered first, followed by an examination of the 
admittedly uncertain place for the concept of human security within 
international law. 
 As the discussion juxtaposing the Japanese and Canadian 
approaches to the concept of human security has revealed, definitional 
issues and differences emerged early on in its use. Perhaps even more 
significantly, however, these definitional issues can be viewed as surfacing 
within the backdrop of a wider debate: whether human security is a 
coherent and workable concept at all. Indeed, some leading scholars 
(including those, such as Buzan, who were instrumental in expanding the 
concept of security beyond the militaristic dimension) have argued that 
human security is conceptually incoherent and unworkable as either a 
theoretical or policy framework. Although recognising the appeal of a 
human-centred approach to security concerns, Buzan has maintained that 
“the cost to be paid is loss of analytical purchase.”153 
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 This notion that human security dispossesses security studies of its 
analytical value and rigour by changing the referent object to something 
unworkable and incoherent has been echoed by many other security 
scholars.154 While some writers have focused on what they claim is its 
questionable value for scholarly research, others such as Walker stress its 
unreality with the international political dimension: “the state is a political 
category in a way that the world, or the globe, or humanity, is not. The 
security of states is something we can comprehend in political terms in a 
way that, at the moment, world security cannot be understood.”155 
Ultimately, those sceptical of human security claim that its idealist quality 
acts in much the same way as political cosmopolitanism and its notion of 
‘citizens of the world’, by depriving the concept of any true analytical or 
policy strength.156 
 Still other scholars, such as MacFarlane and Khong,157 take a more 
moderate view of the value of human security, acknowledging some 
analytical potential while critiquing its most significant weaknesses. This 
more moderate criticism of human security has tended to focus not on the 
fact that human security changes the referent object of security studies to 
something incoherent, but that it is too broad and all-encompassing in 
terms of the threats which it seeks to address. According to this view, 
human security’s holistic dimension also generates its most fundamental 
drawback: if everyone and everything is a priority, nothing actually 
becomes one. In fact, such criticism claims that the concept of human 
security, taken at its normative face value, demands a capability for 
worldwide ‘social engineering’ that is impossible to realise. Consequently, if 
human security is to have any value as an analytical or policy concept, it 
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must be able to identify and address more discrete domains of human 
insecurity.158 
 In defence of human security as a useful concept in security studies, 
some scholars have stood by the broad, all-encompassing view which has 
garnered much of the criticism. They argue that if the concept of human 
security is defined too narrowly, it will lose that quality which gives it 
normative distinctiveness. By narrowing the concept to include only certain 
people facing certain types of threats, understandings of security will 
simply revert back to orthodox notions of national security, and will exclude 
the types of threats which have the greatest impact on the greatest number 
of people around the world.159 
 Most of the scholarship in defence of human security, however, has 
attempted to reconcile the concept of human security with the criticism 
about its idealism and impracticability. On the one hand, human security 
proponents seek to make it clear that the concept represents a “radical shift 
from the abstract imagery of the nation state, and its interests, to the 
visceral distress of the human.”160  Human security positions the individual 
“as the true lens through which we should view the political, economic, and 
social environment.”161  In this sense, use of the concept of human security 
represents a moral claim about the relative value of human individuals and 
nation states. Viewed primarily as a normative or critical project, with 
questions about how it translates into a policy tool being secondary, carving 
out this moral distinctiveness is indeed important to most human security 
proponents. 
 On the other hand, the desire to preserve both analytical and policy 
relevance has led some human security writers to address the criticism that 
their framework concept is too broad to be coherent, by adopting a more 
nuanced tack. The most common way in which such reconciliation has 
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been advocated is through the adoption of a threshold-based approach.162 
This approach is consistent with the narrower view of human security, at 
least in terms of its operational capability. It posits and classifies threats as 
a matter of severity, rather than as a matter of excluding certain types of 
threats while privileging others. While human security is concerned with a 
broad range of threats to the dignity of human lives, the manner in which 
such threats are dealt with on an international dimension will vary 
depending on severity. To be sure, international law, and in particular 
international human rights law, is primarily concerned with addressing 
threats of the most severe kind.163 As exemplified by the Canadian 
approach to human security, and as adopted by the Commission on 
Human Security, it is this threshold-based paradigm which has received 
attention as the most instructive way to develop human security as an 
analytically and operationally useful concept.164 
 Correspondingly, this more moderate and modest approach to 
human security is also better suited to accommodating paradigmatic 
principles within international law. At first glance, the capacity for human 
security to become congruous with fundamental international legal 
principles is ambiguous. Indeed, human security presents both a challenge 
to traditional and entrenched principles of state sovereignty and sovereign 
equality,165 as well as a propelling and complementing influence in relation 
to evolving conceptions of sovereignty based on principles of common 
concern and responsibility.166 
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 Theories of statehood and sovereignty have been comprehensively 
examined in the first half of this chapter.167 As discussed there, partialist 
and impartialist conceptions of statehood advocate different views of both 
international morality and international legal orders. While partialist 
thought is solidly grounded in orthodox notions of state sovereignty, 
proponents of an impartialist agenda embrace a cosmopolitan 
understanding of international law rooted in the idea of common concern 
and responsibility: state sovereignty is not an absolute principle; with it 
comes the obligation to bear responsibility for the security of individuals 
who do not fall within the territorial or political jurisdiction of the state.168 
Undeniably, the moral and legal cosmopolitanism of common concern and 
responsibility is consonant with a human security understanding of 
international law, although the resonance of such an approach is 
spherically variable.169 
 As von Tigerstrom claims, certain domains within international law 
are more receptive to a human security approach than others. While 
remaining problematic in relation to issues such as use of force in 
humanitarian intervention (a prospect which comes up squarely against 
traditional principles of state sovereignty), a human security or human-
centred approach has developed and thrived most obviously within 
international refugee law and other similar international human rights law 
systems.170  Since the fundamental tenets entrenched by these juridical 
systems have become part of customary international law, representing “a 
baseline of protection for individuals among the essential principles of the 
international legal order,”171 harmony with a common responsibility 
understanding of international law is far more apparent. Certainly, 
international refugee law and international human rights law are the 
principal examples of a human-centred framework that has had an 
extraordinary effect on the body of international law.172 
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 Other scholars echo this view.173  Indeed, in illustrating the claim 
that human individuals must be understood as the ultimate referent object 
and beneficiary of security, Jef Huysmans powerfully describes the 
discourse which embraces international refugee law as the foremost 
instantiation of this fundamental principle: 
Refugees and displaced persons who are individual 
rights holders are substituted for the state and its 
citizens as the primary referent object of security 
practice. While the latter are members of a particular 
state that faces a danger, the former are members of 
a universal rights system who have a reasonable fear 
that their life and freedom have been threatened, 
often by their own state institutions. They are defined 
by ‘entitlements legitimized on the basis of 
personhood’ rather than nationality. These 
entitlements exist and are sanctioned in a global civil 
society based on ‘transnational discourses and 
structures celebrating human rights as a world level 
organizing principle.’.174 
 
 Undoubtedly, the concept of human security and a human-centred 
approach is firmly linked to the normative discourse of human rights, 
particularly in a sphere such as international refugee law. Whether that 
linkage between human security and human rights is salutary or 
deleterious has been the subject of considerable debate. An examination of 
that debate follows. 
2.5.2 The Relationship between Human Security and Human 
Rights 
 
2.5.2.1 The Human Rights versus Human Security Debate 
  
 The relationship between human security and human rights is a 
delicate one. While both paradigms share the same concerns about the 
dignity of the human individual,175 they frame these concerns in somewhat 
different ways. Such differences have precipitated a lively debate between 
the proponents of human security and human rights, with claims made as 
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to the distinct value that is offered by each approach. The most common 
challenge to a human security approach, typically advanced by those 
claiming to defend the human rights tradition, is grounded in the assertion 
that human security is simply “old wine in new bottles.”176 This criticism 
maintains that the concept of human security is simply rhetorical, adding 
nothing of real value to the existing normative and analytical framework 
established by the human rights tradition. More significantly, it is argued 
that a human security approach threatens to dilute the inviolable core of 
human rights by seeking to prioritise certain rights over others and thereby 
introducing a version of ‘human rights lite’.177 
 In response, proponents of human security defend the distinct value 
of their approach by claiming that, while normatively grounded in the 
human rights tradition, human security simply represents a different focus 
by concentrating on fundamental rights relating to survival and basic 
human dignity. Moreover, human security is said to open up the ‘blind 
spot’ left by human rights – that murky normative and analytical space 
between individual security and state security.178 Human security 
advocates argue that human rights has long ignored this ambivalent 
relationship between individual and state security, a relationship which 
human security claims to tackle. Naturally, this claim (among others) has 
not been universally accepted, and defenders of the primacy of the human 
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 Many scholars writing about the interplay between human security 
and human rights evince a distinctly cautionary tone. They claim that 
although there is some limited potential for human security to add value as 
an analytical concept, human rights must distinguish itself from human 
security,179 lest it suffer from too close an alliance with the “ambiguity and 
mere rhetorical appeal of human security.”180 According to this claim, while 
human rights represents a true normative framework, human security is 
essentially a policy tool. This important ontological distinction means that 
human rights adherents must be cautious about embracing the concept of 
human security, a concept which is said to rest on feasibility and choice, 
and which is permissive of divisibility and prioritisation.181 To explicate 
their warning to human rights proponents, sceptics describe several 
interactions between human rights and human security – places of 
intersection between the two approaches which instantiate their 
differences.  
 To begin with, human security sceptics observe that human security 
seeks to integrate human rights as the normative groundwork of human 
security.182  This observation is admittedly a sensible one. Indeed, as a 
conceptual approach, human security draws much from the entrenched 
human rights framework. It understands the problems that it seeks to 
address by placing the human individual at the centre of analysis, and by 
infusing that centre with substantive content by relying on rights that vest 
in the individual as an ultimate referent object. In this sense, the 
ontological and epistemological commitments of human security are largely 
indistinguishable from those of human rights. As the Commission on 
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Human Security has affirmed, human security “helps identify the rights at 
stake in a particular situation. And human rights help answer the question: 
How should human security be promoted. The notion of duties and 
obligations complements the recognition of the ethical and political 
importance of human security.”183 
 However, for those committed to the preservation of an abidingly 
distinct human rights discourse, the re-articulation of human rights 
concepts into the admittedly related language of human security is 
potentially fraught with peril. As explicated in the previous section, human 
security approaches occupy a wide spectrum in terms of their particular 
emphasis: there are human security approaches that focus on all 
meaningful threats to human security, including threats stemming from 
political, personal, environmental, economic, and health factors; in 
contrast, more discrete human security approaches focus on the ‘vital core’ 
or most basic and universal human rights, namely those rights which 
ground the normative and substantive content of international human 
rights treaties like the Refugee Convention.184 While challenges to the 
relationship between human security and human rights exist along all 
points on this spectrum, it is the latter category which is said to create a 
particular tension. Those concerned about the effect of incorporating the 
language of human security point out that, firstly, human security 
introduces the problematic category of ‘super human rights’, and further, 
that such a re-articulation ‘securitises’ the discourse of human rights 
through its incorporation (and perhaps misappropriation) of that 
discourse.185 Still others see the concept of human security as potentially 
even more dangerous, claiming that the ‘individualisation’ of security can 
transform the relationship between the individual and the liberal state, 
ultimately leading to the expansion of state power and the erosion of 
fundamental rights.186 
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 The first point seeks to highlight that the concept of human rights 
maintains as a central principle that all human rights are indivisible and 
universal. More particularly, the claim is made that human rights cannot 
be prioritised paradigmatically to take account of special needs or threat 
levels – a value that is said to be plainly rejected by the discourse of human 
security.187 In its quest to preserve practical and policy relevance, human 
security approaches have tended to focus on so-called core or basic rights, 
thereby creating a taxonomy of human rights that is impermissible under 
the traditional human rights framework. For those sceptical of a human 
security approach, the end result is that human security lays no additional 
ground that human rights has not already set in place. Instead, it simply 
dilutes other important rights by engendering a category of human rights 
that are of an ostensibly top-level category, and yet not quite so pinnacled 
that they cannot be derogated from in exceptional circumstances.188 
 This leads to the second, and related, point that this reconstruction 
of human rights into levels of prioritisation, grounded in the language of 
those rights which speak to the ‘vital core’ of human security, results in a 
dangerous securitisation of human rights discourse.189 As Buzan 
highlights, re-articulating human rights in human security terms 
strengthens the idea that the desired end of human rights is ‘security’. 
More significantly, this end is then understood according to a conception of 
security as an upgraded or special threat faced by human individuals. By 
upgrading the violation of so-called core rights to a question of ‘security’, a 
human security discourse relocates the protection of the individual into a 
special or extraordinary normative space.190 Such exceptionality usually 
generates extraordinary measures to deal with what are perceived to be 
unique circumstances. The result is both normative and legal 
exceptionality, with ‘security’ often acting as a trump on other human 
rights.191 In contrast, the human rights discourse “is better placed to 
support the idea that the desired end is some form of desecuritization down 
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into normal politics.”192  While human security is seen as, perhaps 
unintentionally, infusing the concept of human dignity with normative 
exceptionality, human rights is seen as normalising the status of the 
individual in international law. The protection of the individual simply 
becomes something which is universally pursued through ordinary 
normative and legal frameworks. 
 While some human security sceptics focus on this so-called 
securitisation of human rights, others capture the danger of a human 
security approach from a different trajectory – the individualisation of the 
concept of security. Such criticism sees problematic consequences flowing 
from the central claim of human security that the individual is the ultimate 
referent object of security. In this regard, Mitsilegas argues that concepts 
such as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘human security’, in so far as they have led 
to an individualisation of security, have shifted the relationship between the 
individual and the liberal state in a manner that has resulted in the 
expansion of state power. The individualisation of security has fed a climate 
permissive of expansive and pre-emptive monitoring of individuals, 
positioning the ‘trusted’ individual against the ‘dangerous’ individual in a 
never-ending risk assessment. The state has used the perceived individual 
need for security as a basis upon which to increase its own power, 
intervening as the necessary protector of the ‘trusted’. In this process, 
fundamental rights and safeguards against state power are eroded, and the 
state emerges as “the only winner.”193 As with the other strands critical of a 
human security approach, an individualised concept of security, perhaps 
unintentionally, is seen as being paradigmatically disruptive of how 
fundamental rights are understood and protected. 
 
2.5.2.3 Human Security as a Complement to Human Rights 
Normativity 
 
 These variably constructed words of caution about the potential 
dangers of a human security discourse are not unwarranted. Those who 
undertake to work with the concept of human security must appreciate 
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these dimensions of vulnerability. However, when considering human rights 
law at the international level, both the normalising quality of human rights 
and the exceptionalising quality of human security are generally overstated. 
While human rights are propounded as indivisible, universal, and not 
permissive of prioritisation, the operationalisation of human rights through 
international legal instruments has indeed largely focused on core or basic 
rights.194 It is precisely the violation of certain rights, because they are 
universally understood as basic to human dignity, which allows the moral 
and legal dimension of a claim to move from a matter of domestic concern 
to one of international concern, either through international legal 
instruments and institutions, or as matter of customary international law. 
As concluded earlier in this chapter, the protection of core human rights is 
the moral and legal space that sees partialist and impartialist thought 
converge, the space in which international human rights law is 
grounded.195 
 In this sense, the idea that human security is responsible for 
creating and perpetuating a category of ‘super human rights’ is more 
illusory than real. The discourse of human rights in its international 
manifestation has accomplished this without any help from the perspective 
of human security. Indeed, when a human security approach is used to 
draw attention to new threats and new actors not traditionally captured by 
a human rights discourse, it is criticised as incoherent and impractical 
(that is to say, human security is too broad). On the other hand, when a 
human security approach focuses on those rights typically engaged by 
international human rights law regimes, it is criticised as diluting the 
normativity and indivisibility of the human rights framework (that is to say, 
human security is too narrow). But such criticisms could be equally levelled 
against different and established systems of human rights. Ultimately, such 
differences will matter very much to those who wish to carve out a distinct 
moral space for human security, and for those who seek to oppose such a 
development. For an examination such as the present one, which seeks to 
use human security primarily as a framing tool, it is not necessary to 
resolve such debates, which will undoubtedly continue. 
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 Similarly, the claim that human security creates an exceptionality to 
the protection of the individual, while human rights normalises this same 
fundamental concept, must be approached with caution. Whether the 
concept of ‘human security’ generates extraordinariness or normality 
depends on how one understands that term. Many agents who have actively 
promoted the concept of human security, such as the United Nations, see it 
as desirable precisely because it is a concept of universal appeal, speaking 
to the normal and everyday challenges to the well-being of human lives.196 
Rather than acting as an exceptionalising force, human security highlights 
the commonality of threats to human individuals. 
 Further, the related claim that this exceptionalising quality of human 
security leads to a securitisation of human rights, and thereby ultimately 
positions security to act as a trump on human rights, presents an overly 
simplified account of the relationships at work. Firstly, a human security 
approach, if it is worthy of the name, must preserve the human individual 
as the ultimate referent object of security. Consequently, the security 
interests of a nation must be understood and expressed in terms of the 
interests of the human individuals in that community, rather than under 
the banner of seemingly all-encompassing claims to ‘national security’. 
Secondly, the concept of derogation from rights is not peculiarly immanent 
to a human security approach. In fact, apart from certain rights considered 
to be non-derogable, human rights frameworks allow for derogation in order 
to take account of exigent circumstances.197 Both human security and 
human rights frameworks must grapple with these questions of derogation 
and exceptionality. How agents choose to approach the search for answers 
is likely to be different, both between approaches and within them. 
However, the notion that human security creates a distinct problem of 
exceptionality through a process of securitisation, a problem that would not 
otherwise exist, is perhaps only consistent with an idealist or aspirational 
conception of the human rights framework and tradition. 
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 Claims about the even more profound effect of a human security or 
‘freedom from fear’ approach on the relationship between the state and the 
individual are in some ways more difficult to address. To the extent that the 
individualisation of security has resulted in the restructuring of the state-
individual relationship to one of omnipresent risk assessment, in which the 
state repositions itself as mediator and protector while increasing its power, 
the dangers of a human security approach are real. As has already been 
discussed, human security may not be a suitable lens through which to 
understand all political and legal relationships. In so far as human security 
feeds a ubiquitous and never-ending process of risk assessment for all 
human movement, then its analytical utility is certainly outweighed by its 
deleterious effects. Yet again, as von Tigerstrom highlights, certain fields 
such as international refugee law are particularly amenable to a human 
security understanding.198 Indeed, as the ensuing chapters will show, the 
concept of risk assessment is paradigmatic to the field of refugee law, both 
in terms of the inclusion and exclusion questions that it addresses. Human 
security provides analytical coherence to that binary process of risk 
assessment, instead of maintaining a vague and seemingly all-
encompassing concept of ‘state security’ that acts as a trump on individual 
security needs. Moreover, in the context of refugee law, the state cannot be 
so easily extricated from the role of rights abuser, as it is state action 
violating core human rights that usually forms the basis of the inclusion 
claim. 
 Seen in this way, rather than positioning human rights against 
human security in a competitive stance, the aim should be to facilitate a 
dialogue between these two interrelated concepts in order to explore their 
dialectical possibilities. Even some human security sceptics acknowledge 
that the concept of human security may help human rights to “excavate a 
holistic view of dignity defined as security in liberty.”199 In this sense, 
human security highlights (perhaps more clearly than human rights can do 
alone) that human rights and security are not diametrically opposing 
objectives but instead converge. By accentuating that human dignity is 
grounded in both freedom and security, and that these are indeed 
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complementary aims, the concept of human security functions as a bridge 
or field of discourse.200  Human rights and human security are reflexive and 
‘mutually reinforcing’.201 As von Tigerstrom highlights, “[o]ne way of linking 
human security and human rights is to see the protection of human rights 
as a means of ensuring human security, and human security as a goal or 
objective of human rights protection.”202 It is this complementary, reflexive 
relationship between human rights and human security and, more 
precisely, the value of human security as an epistemic instrument that this 
work seeks to harness. Admittedly it is a modest and cautious use of the 
concept of human security. The essential normative framework certainly 
still consists in human rights.  
There will be those who nonetheless believe that human rights 
normativity and discourse can, without any help from the concept of 
human security, preserve analytical rigour when questions of ‘state 
security’ arise. Applied to the specific examination undertaken by this work, 
such a claim would suggest that human rights understandings alone can 
provide answers to both the inclusion and exclusion questions in refugee 
law. Just as human rights is the conceptual basis upon which the 
international refugee protection mandate of the Refugee Convention is 
realised, so too can the exclusion exceptions be understood as being 
grounded normatively in human rights. In this way, exclusion applies to 
those individuals who, by their actions, are determined to be violators of 
those very rights that the Refugee Convention seeks to protect, and who 
thereby represent a danger to the existing community of individuals in the 
receiving state. Proponents of such a view would entreat agents to see the 
value in preserving the normalising discourse of a human rights framework 
and in avoiding the exceptionalising discourse of a human security 
framework.  
 And yet while the possibility of such functionality certainly exists, 
the language and discourse of human rights has largely not to this point 
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demonstrated the modulation capacity to integrate such a centrifugal 
analysis. As human security advocates claim, and as even some sceptics 
admit, the discourse of human rights has suffered from a ‘blind spot’ in 
relation to security.203 It has not adequately captured a holistic view of 
human dignity that is grounded in both liberty and security.204 Instead, 
when the question of ‘security’ arises, human rights analyses have tended 
to fall into proportionality exercises which juxtapose the incommensurate 
interests of incommensurate referent objects, attempting to weigh the 
precisely identified interests of the individual against the usually imprecise 
but sweeping interests of the state. In contrast, human security steps in to 
provide agents with the analytical and framing capacity to unpack complex 
security problems, such as those generated by the concurrence of the 
inclusion and exclusion issues in a claim for protection under the Refugee 
Convention.  
2.6 Human Security as a Framing Tool 
 
Ultimately, the added value of a human security approach is 
grounded in its performative and corrective function. Rather than 
challenging the normative foundation entrenched by the human rights 
tradition, human security acts as a method of realising that established 
normativity. Human security keeps the analysis that is engaged by the 
juridical process properly framed. It ensures that agents continue to ask 
the right questions, even when the prospect of ‘security threat’ enters the 
legal question. It is at this point of entry that the analysis tends to 
deteriorate into conceptual sloppiness, ordinarily resurfacing as a balancing 
exercise which posits the human rights protection of the individual against 
the general security interests of the receiving state. Maintaining conceptual 
and definitional clarity by viewing the ‘human rights’ of the people in the 
receiving state as a security concern, also, has generally not been developed 
in the discourse of human rights. And yet how are agents meant to balance 
the security interests of one individual with those of an entire state, 
especially when the interests of the latter are typically expounded by 
reference to vague but potentially serious risks often based on secretive 
information? Agents must recognize the fundamental incommensurability 
                                                        
203 n 178. 
204 Oberleitner, ‘Porcupines’ (n 175) 597. 
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flaw of such an approach. It asks them to do something that is impossible, 
if it is to be done in a meaningful and coherent way. 
In contrast, a human security approach highlights that both the 
inclusion and exclusion questions in refugee law are directed at protecting 
the core human rights of individuals. This reflexive quality to the inclusion 
and exclusion questions in refugee law will be invoked frequently in the 
doctrinal examination to come, particularly when the distinct legal elements 
explored by each chapter are viewed through a human security lens. By 
ensuring that the individual remains the ultimate referent object of security 
throughout the entire analytical process, human security serves a valuable 
epistemic function. It maintains a coherent and consistent structure for 
framing the appropriate questions that arise in the juridical process. While 
that structure is based on the interpretive principles set out in the ensuing 
doctrinal chapters, it also demands a process of individualised assessment. 
Since human security serves to properly identify and examine the core 
human rights interests at stake (whether they relate to inclusion or 
exclusion), and since those interests will necessarily vary in nature and 
degree depending on the facts of the specific case, a process of 
individualised assessment helps to ensure a result that honours that 
purpose. It is principally in this way that a human security approach seeks 
to improve the quality of the answers – not necessarily by providing 
definitive normative content to those answers, but by defining the scope of 
the questions being asked in the first place.205 Consequently, while human 
security is normatively grounded in human rights, it performs this 
important role of helping agents to properly conceptualise and understand 
the nature of the problem before them.  
This is not to say that a human security framework does not involve 
the making of a moral claim. Indeed it does. Structuring questions in such 
a way that places the human individual rather than the state at the centre 
of analysis is itself a moral claim about the relative moral value of human 
individuals and states. Human security also advocates a certain 
understanding of the role of international law, one grounded in claims of 
common concern and responsibility among otherwise independent states.206 
These dimensions to a human security approach are important at a broader 
                                                        
205 von Tigerstrom, Human Security (n 118) 45-49, ch 2, 212-213. 
206 von Tigerstrom, Human Security (n 118) 54-58, 72-77. 
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theoretical and practical level. While acknowledging these more 
fundamental aspects and aspirations, the concept of human security is 
engaged by this work in a much less ambitious way.  
Simply stated, the value of human security as a framing tool, and its 
harmony with human rights normativity (rather than antagonism toward it) 
is the primary theoretical premise of this work: 
Human security practice concentrates on protecting 
entitlements legitimized on the basis of personhood – 
instead of national citizenship – which exist and are 
sanctioned in a global civil society based on the 
transnational discourses and structures celebrating 
human rights as a world-level organizing principle. 
This rationality frames insecurities and the tools to 
manage it quite differently from the national security 
framework with its emphasis on emergency policies, 
existential threats between friends and enemies, and 
a priority of protecting national citizens and territorial 
sovereignty.207 
 
Viewed in this way, a human security framework is grounded in the 
complementary rationale of human rights and human security.  Together 
they serve as universalist principles in the packing and unpacking of moral 
and juridical claims. 
                                                        
207 Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity (n 174) 28 (again, citing in part Soysal, 
Limits of Citizenship (n 174) 3, and referencing M Frost, Constituting Human Rights: 
Global Civil Society and the Society of Democratic States (Routledge 2002). 
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Chapter 3 – ‘Serious’ Crime 
3.1 The Scope of this Chapter 
 
 The previous chapter focused on the theoretical foundations to 
various approaches to international refugee protection. It first developed the 
claim that states are obligated by universal morality and by international 
law to accept Convention refugees. Further, any discretion states may have 
to reject Convention refugees consists entirely in the exclusion clauses and 
cannot be grounded in any other claim. That discretion to exclude is 
exceptional and circumscribed. It then proceeded to examine the theoretical 
foundation for this limited discretion to exclude. A human security 
approach, normatively grounded in the protection of core human rights, 
was suggested as the appropriate theoretical lens through which to unpack 
the legal questions raised by criminality exclusion. 
 In this chapter, the focus shifts to a doctrinal examination of 
exclusion on the basis of Article 1F(b): a person about whom there are 
“serious reasons for considering that he has committed a serious non-
political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that 
country as a refugee.”1 Attention in this chapter is on the requirement that 
the disqualifying conduct amounts to a ‘serious’ crime. First, an 
examination of the term ‘crime’ is undertaken. A brief overview of discursive 
themes within international law is followed by an analysis of ‘crime’ within 
refugee law, which has primarily concentrated on principles of double 
criminality from extradition law. 
 After this preliminary review of different understandings of the word 
‘crime’, the principal focus of this chapter is investigated. In examining the 
threshold of seriousness required for exclusion under Article 1F(b), scrutiny 
of the provision’s drafting history reveals the ambiguous quality of the 
concept of ‘serious crime’. Similarly, teleological insights point to different 
purposes of the exclusion clause. One such purpose is to prevent fugitives 
fleeing foreign justice from being able to claim asylum. Another purpose is 
to allow the receiving state to protect itself from dangerous individuals. 
                                                        
1 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, art 1F(b) 
begins as follows: “The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person 
with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that...” (emphasis 
added; the exclusion clause is mandatory).  
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Emphasising one purpose over another carries doctrinal consequences, as 
instantiated by a careful examination of the role of expiation in the 
application of the exclusion clause. 
 Following a discussion of these preparative doctrinal themes, an 
assessment of international (UNHCR), national and juridical approaches 
exhibits a variable preference for evaluating seriousness against either 
international or national standards of criminal conduct. Correspondingly, 
whereas focusing on national standards elicits mechanistic approaches to 
seriousness grounded in minimum-sentence benchmarks, focusing on 
international standards triggers contextual approaches that seek to 
preserve individualised assessment. Mechanistic approaches consisting in 
national standards of criminality have been opted for by many national 
refugee determination systems. However, recent judicial signals indicate a 
growing preference for an international and contextual approach to 
determining seriousness. 
 After exploring the various approaches to these key doctrinal 
questions, a human security lens is brought to bear on them. That human 
security lens recognises the complementarity of different purposes to the 
exclusion clauses. Moreover, human security advocates a broadly 
contextual approach to determining seriousness. This contextual approach 
is grounded in international standards and requires the consideration of all 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances unique to the particular case. 
Further, such an approach would restrict exclusion to those persons whose 
criminal acts invoke a real concern for the basic human security interests 
of the host community. As such, a contextual approach seen through a 
human security lens represents a challenge to current, expansive 
understandings of criminality exclusion.  
 Before that conclusion can be meaningfully understood, however, the 
normative and legal threads upon which it draws must be elucidated. This 
expository process begins with an examination of the method by which an 




3.2 Characterising an Act as a ‘Crime’ 
3.2.1 ‘Crime’ in International and Extradition Law 
 
 The focus of this chapter is on the threshold of seriousness for the 
purpose of exclusion under Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention. 
However, before that question of seriousness can be canvassed in an 
insightful way, a prefatory question must be addressed: on what basis is an 
act characterised as a ‘crime’? Most agents of refugee law bypass this 
preliminary question. They accept as self-evident that an act characterised 
as criminal by the receiving state’s judicial system is adequate to raise the 
possibility of exclusion.2 That possibility of exclusion then becomes a 
determination on exclusion by addressing two central questions, that is 
whether the criminal act is both ‘serious’ and ‘non-political’ in its quality. 
 In contrast, international legal domains outside of refugee law 
demonstrate a more elaborate discourse about the meaning of ‘crime’ in an 
extra-national legal sense. For example, debates within international and 
supranational (EU) law have grappled with the normative and legal 
foundations of criminality concerns that extend beyond the sovereign 
state.3 While a detailed examination of this discourse is well beyond the 
scope of this work, a few observations are instructive to the purpose here. 
As canvassed in the first half of Chapter Two, approaches to refugee law are 
tied to broader views on the value of statehood, views which fall somewhere 
on the spectrum between partialist and impartialist thought. Similar 
partialist and impartialist strands arise in debates about the value of 
harmonising the concept of criminality at the international level. 
 In the domain of international criminal law, this controversy typically 
presents as a question about how to resolve a conflict of laws – a situation 
in which a particular state’s normative and legal allegiances to a certain 
understanding of ‘crime’ are at odds with the norms entrenched in 
international law. For some proponents of a universalist stance, these 
                                                        
2 Andreas Zimmermann and Philipp Wennholz, ‘Article 1F’ in Andreas 
Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 597-598. 
3 Sanford R Silverburg (ed), International Law: Contemporary Issues and Future 
Developments (Westview Press 2011); Antonio Cassese (ed), Realizing Utopia: The 
Future of International Law (OUP 2012); Anthony Aust, Handbook on International 
Law (2nd edn, CUP 2010); Ralph Henham and Mark Findlay (eds), Exploring the 
Boundaries of Criminal Justice (Ashgate 2011). 
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dilemmas are actually ‘false’ conflicts of laws. In their view, the concept of 
universal jurisdiction over criminal matters in international law is simply a 
reinforcement of universally shared normative and legal sensibilities. Since 
international criminal law represents a set of universal commitments that 
are applied the same everywhere, no particular state can legitimately claim 
a sovereign interest in choosing any domestic norm that is contrary to 
international norms. In this way, international criminal law is seen as a 
powerful juridical recognition of global harmonisation.4  
 While others agree that the “norms of international law penetrate the 
‘armor of state sovereignty’,” they highlight that the scope of that universal 
agreement is really very limited.5 The core international crimes include war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression. These 
are seen as crimes which attack the fundamental values of the 
international community by compromising the peace, security and well-
being of the world as a whole. Conversely, it remains controversial whether 
other crimes that are undeniably serious (such as large-scale drug 
trafficking or terrorism) qualify as international crimes.6 In this light, 
international criminal law is able to neutralise normative and legal 
heterogeneity, or explain it away as a ‘false conflict’, by restricting its 
concern to a very limited type of criminal behaviour. 
 Still others question the most basic claim immanent to international 
criminal justice as the neutral enforcement of normative and legal 
commitments that are universally shared. As Koskenniemi suggests, 
international criminal law does not represent a harmonious collection of 
universally accepted norms, but rather a place of discord between the 
                                                        
4 Anthony J Colangelo, ‘Universal Jurisdiction as an International “False Conflict” 
of Laws’ in Sanford R Silverburg (ed), International Law: Contemporary Issues and 
Future Developments (Westview 2011) 63-92. 
5 Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (TMC Asser 2009) 28-39. 
6 ibid; see also: Colin Warbrick, ‘The United Nations System: A Place for Criminal 
Courts?’ in Nigel D White (ed), Collective Security Law (Ashgate 2003); on the 
uncertain international criminal law status of crimes of aggression, torture and 
terrorism, see: Paolo Gaeta, ‘The History and the Evolution of the Notion of 
International Crimes’ in Ralph Henham and Mark Findlay (eds), Exploring the 
Boundaries of Criminal Justice (Ashgate 2011) 169-180; Bibi van Ginkel, 
‘Combating Terrorism: Proposals for Improving the International Legal Framework’ 
in Antonio Cassese (ed), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (OUP 
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developed North and the global South.7 Exemplifying this divide is recent 
resistance by African nations in extending the scope of universal 
jurisdiction, which they view as an attempt by Europe to broaden the reach 
of its criminal law.8 For Koskenniemi, what is often presented as the 
universal, objective dynamic of international law is in fact inherently 
political, driven by proponents who are also its principal beneficiaries.9 
Similar debates about the feasibility and desirability of legal 
harmonisation initiatives are found in EU law as well.10 Within the field of 
criminality exclusion in refugee law, such debates from international law 
also inform debates about the application of Articles 1F(a) (crimes against 
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity) and 1F(c) (acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations). Since sub-clauses (a) 
and (c) are only concerned with crimes of an international character, they 
are normatively and legally grounded in public international law.11 In 
contrast, the common criminality focus of Article 1F(b) retracts the concern 
back down to the national or bi-national level, at least in terms of 
understanding what constitutes a ‘crime’. As a result, discursive analogies 
for Article 1F(b) are typically extracted from extradition law, and more 
particularly, the requirement for ‘double criminality’.12 Generally, treaties 
make extradition possible only if the requirement for double criminality is 
satisfied, meaning that the act must be a crime in both the requesting and 
requested state.13 Further, while such crimes need not be called by the 
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same name in both jurisdictions, the types of crimes for which extradition 
is possible are specified in the applicable treaty, and typically include only 
more serious offences which are punishable by certain minimum terms of 
imprisonment.14 Similar bilateral comparative approaches dominate the 
approach to ‘crime’ in the Article 1F(b) exclusion context, although with a 
less rigorous application of double criminality principles. 
3.2.2  Approaches to ‘Crime’ in the Context of Article 1F(b) 
 
Within refugee law itself, whether a particular act qualifies as a 
‘crime’ is a question that has been addressed infrequently. This is 
undoubtedly because most acts for which exclusion under Article 1F(b) is 
contemplated, such as murder, causing serious bodily injury, or armed 
robbery, are universally condemned by national criminal justice systems. 
Since such an act is criminalised by both the country in which it took place 
and the host country making the refugee determination, no conflict of laws 
arises at this basic level. Despite the UNHCR’s recognition that the word 
‘crime’ has different connotations in different legal systems,15 the discourse 
around Article 1F(b) has focused primarily on the whether an act is a 
‘serious crime’ (read together) and whether it is ‘non-political’. Judicial 
consideration of the word ‘crime’, on its own, is uncommon.  
Nonetheless, one such opportunity to consider the meaning of the 
word ‘crime’ did arise in a case involving conspiracy to import heroin into 
Australia. In Ovcharuk,16 one of the judges of the Federal Court of Appeal of 
Australia contemplated the meaning of the word ‘crime’ in the context of 
Article 1F(b). The principal issue in that case was whether Article 1F(b) was 
confined to fugitives from foreign justice, which the court said it was not 
(and which issue will be explored later). Nonetheless, the Court also 
addressed the question of what constitutes a ‘crime’. It started with the 
observation that “the Refugee Convention contains language that is 
                                                        
14 See, for example: UN Model Treaty on Extradition 1990 (A/RES/45/116) art 2 
(one/two years); Fugitive Offenders (South Africa) Order: Cap. 503 Laws of Hong 
Kong, art 2 (more than one year); Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 
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(HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.3, 2011) para 155. 
16 Ovcharuk v MIMA (1998) 158 ALR 289 (FCA); all three judges (Whitlam, Branson 
and Sackville JJ) wrote separate reasons for judgment, concurring in the result. 
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imprecise and not capable of application with “taut logical precision.””17 
Given this interpretive flexibility, the Court noted that the word ‘crime’ in 
Article 1F(b) is capable of several meanings. After undertaking a detailed 
examination of these several possible meanings,18 the Court concluded 
that, for the purpose of exclusion, a ‘crime’ must involve conduct that is, or 
was,19 justiciable in a punitive sense: “it is hardly a beneficial construction 
of the Refugees Convention to exclude a person who has never engaged in 
conduct for which he or she is liable to prosecution.”20  
Consequently, while penal justiciability must at some point exist, 
there is no strict requirement for ‘double criminality’. In circumstances 
where the extra-territorial conduct is a justiciable crime in the country of 
refuge irrespective of where it took place, then Article 1F(b) can apply even if 
the conduct was not criminal under the law of the country in which it 
occurred. According to the Court, Article 1F(b) reflects no preference for 
which country’s laws should be applied, and therefore may also capture 
extra-territorial conduct that is rendered criminal by the laws of the 
receiving country. Consequently, on the facts of the case before the Court, 
it was irrelevant whether conspiring to import heroin into Australia was a 
criminal offence in Russia, since it was a justiciable crime under Australian 
law irrespective of its extra-territorial occurrence.21 A similar approach to 
the meaning of ‘crime’ within Article 1F(b) is suggested by a Canadian case, 
albeit demonstrated through the reverse trajectory. In Rihan, the Federal 
Court held that the decision-maker ought to have considered whether the 
conduct amounted to a civil debt and not a crime under the laws of Egypt.22 
Since the conduct in question would only have been a crime in Canada if it 
had occurred within Canadian territory (which it did not), deciding if the 
claimant’s conduct amounted to a crime under Egyptian law became a 
                                                        
17 ibid (Sackville J) 301. 
18 ibid (Sackville J) 304: Sackville J observes four possible meanings to the term 
‘crime’: (1) conduct that is criminal under the law of the country where it occurred; 
(2) conduct that is criminal under the law of the country of refuge regardless of 
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articulated by the House of Lords in T v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department) “recognised as criminal by the common consent of nations.” [T v SSHD 
[1996] AC 742 (HL) 759]. 
19 That is, a case where the person has already been prosecuted for the conduct. 
20 Ovcharuk v MIMA (1998) 158 ALR 289 (FCA) 305. 
21 Ibid 301 (Branson J), 305-306 (Sackville J). 
22 Rihan v Canada, 2010 FC 123. 
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relevant preliminary determination that the decision-maker should have 
made. If the answer to that preliminary question was that the claimant 
could never have been prosecuted anywhere for his conduct, then exclusion 
under Article 1F(b) would be precluded. 
Sensibly, courts appear reluctant to uphold exclusion findings with 
respect to conduct that could never have been prosecuted in any 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, case law has also made it clear that there 
is no need for equivalency between the respective criminal offence 
provisions of the two countries.23 In fact, how the conduct would be 
perceived by the criminal law of the receiving country would appear to be 
the more decisive factor.24 Similarly, there is no requirement for the 
decision-maker to identify and particularise every element of the alleged 
offence, as in a criminal trial. In the refugee law context, having ‘serious 
reasons for considering’ that such a crime has been committed by the 
refugee claimant is sufficient for the purpose of exclusion.25 
In the end, whether conduct constitutes a ‘crime’ for the purpose of 
Article 1F(b) is a question which is typically and easily bypassed. Instead, 
focus shifts to the requirement that the act be ‘serious’ in its nature. It is 
precisely this seriousness threshold that almost invariably renders the 
basic constitutive question unnecessary. As a result, while double 
criminality per se may not be directly relevant to all applications of Article 
1F(b),26 the seriousness requirement makes it very unlikely that exclusion 
could be properly applied in respect of an act that is not considered 
criminal by both the country of occurrence and the country of refuge.27 
Moreover, as suggested by Zimmermann and Wennholz, little is gained from 
focusing on the particular designation of an act as a ‘crime’: “the term 
                                                        
23 Canada: Jayasekara v Canada, 2008 FCA 404; Zeng v Canada, 2008 FC 956; 
Vlad v Canada, 2007 FC 172; Australia: Ovcharuk v MIMA (1998) 158 ALR 289 
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5, s 5.2. 
26 Geoff Gilbert, ‘Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses’ in E 
Feller, V Turk, and F Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law (CUP 
2003) 448. 
27 Zimmermann and Wennholz, ‘Article 1F’ (n 2) 598. 
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‘crime’…has to be understood as a non-technical term. Accordingly, the 
applicability of the exclusion clause is not dependent upon whether any 
individual act is classified under applicable rules of domestic law as falling 
within certain categories of punishable offences such as Verbrechen and 
Vergehen in German criminal law.”28 Indeed, rather than placing any 
particular emphasis on the word ‘crime’, the adjective ‘serious’ or ‘grave’ is 
far more decisive in the proper interpretation of Article 1F(b).29 As will be 
supported by a human security approach, it is the seriousness of an act, 
and not its particular disapprobatory designation, on which the application 
of Article 1F(b) rests.  
3.3 Approaches to the Threshold of Seriousness Required 
for Article 1F(b) Exclusion 
 
 The appropriate theoretical and legal framework for determining 
whether a crime reaches the threshold of seriousness for exclusion under 
Article 1F(b) remains a widely debated and litigated question. In principle, 
all Convention-applying states ought to employ the same framework, in 
keeping with the notion that the Convention speaks with one autonomous 
international meaning.30 As with most areas of refugee law, however, the 
question of what constitutes a ‘serious’ crime has been approached in a 
variety of ways, both among and within Convention-applying states. While 
normatively and operationally problematic for agents of refugee law, such 
divergence is hardly surprising in light of the provision’s history. Indeed, 
even at the drafting phase in 1951, marked differences in approach were 
apparent. 
3.3.1  Drafting History of Article 1F(b) and ‘Serious’ Crime 
 
 An examination of the drafting history of the Refugee Convention, 
commonly referred to as the Travaux Préparatoires,31 is vital to an 
                                                        
28 Zimmermann and Wennholz, ‘Article 1F’ (n 2) 597; UNHCR, Handbook (n 15) 
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30 See, for example: R (JS)(Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 15, para 2. 
31 United Nations, Travaux Preparatoires, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Twenty-fourth 
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understanding of the evolution of Article 1F(b) and its subsequent place as 
a field of academic and juridical discourse. Indeed, the implementation of 
the Refugee Convention by key negotiating states was nearly derailed by the 
inclusion of sub-clause (b) as a basis of criminality exclusion from the 
international legal protection to be entrenched by the new treaty. This 
disagreement was principally driven by the United Kingdom and France, 
who took diametrically opposing views on the exclusion of so-called 
‘common law criminals’. 
 For its part, France favoured the broad exclusion from refugee status 
of persons who had committed “crimes before entry into the territory of the 
receiving country.”32 In fact, the French delegate maintained that it would 
be impossible for France to agree to the Convention without a limiting 
clause relating to common law criminals. It stood firmly by its position that 
a receiving country should be entitled to protect itself from those who had 
committed common crimes, and that to accord such persons the status of 
Convention refugee would ultimately bring discredit to that status.33 
Undeniably, the French proposal advocated a broad discretion to exclude 
persons on the basis of past criminal behaviour. 
 In stark contrast, the United Kingdom argued for the deletion of sub-
clause (b) in its entirety, maintaining that it was both unnecessary and 
potentially dangerous. The United Kingdom insisted that the provision was 
unwarranted, since refugee claimants whom receiving countries could 
reasonably want to exclude were already covered by sub-clause (a) (those 
who had committed crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity) and sub-clause (c) (those who were guilty of acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations). Further, the United 
Kingdom asserted that Article 33(2)34 of the proposed Convention 
adequately preserved the state protective principle sought by the French, in 
that the Article allowed a receiving country to return (or refoule) a refugee 
                                                                                                                                                            
Meeting  (UN Doc A/CONF.2/SR.24, 27 November 1951) (Travaux SR24); Summary 
Record of the Twenty-ninth Meeting (UN Doc A/CONF2/SR.29, 28 November 1951) 
(Travaux SR29). 
32 Travaux SR24, 5; Travaux SR29, 18. 
33 Travaux SR29, 19. 
34 Article 33(2): The benefit of the present provision [i.e. right of non-refoulement] 
may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for 
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having 
been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a 
danger to the community of that country. 
 102 
who had been convicted in the receiving country of a ‘particularly serious 
crime’ and who thereby posed a danger to the community of that country. 
Finally, in terms of its potential dangers, the United Kingdom claimed that 
a broadly worded exclusion clause could ultimately be destructive of the 
Convention’s central purpose of protecting refugees. It envisioned that 
states might take advantage of such a provision by excluding refugee 
claimants for petty or non-serious common crimes, thereby abdicating their 
responsibility to provide such persons with the surrogate protection that 
they needed.35 
 Not unexpectedly, the French delegation was not convinced of the 
United Kingdom’s objections to Article 1F(b). Admittedly, although its 
objections were pointed and meaningful, the position of the United Kingdom 
failed to recognise some important differential aspects of sub-clause (b) in 
relation to the other two sub-clauses and Article 33(2). Firstly, while sub-
clause (a) and (c) dealt with crimes of an international character, sub-
clause (b) was meant to capture criminality of a common character.36 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Article 1F(b) and Article 33(2) 
imported entirely different temporal requirements. The force of Article 33(2) 
was to allow a receiving country to return a person already recognised as a 
refugee if that person was subsequently convicted of a particularly serious 
crime in the country of refuge and posed a danger to that community. 
Conversely, Article 1F(b) sought to prevent the granting of refugee status in 
the first place to persons who had committed criminal acts of a common 
law character before arriving in the country of refuge.37 
 Ultimately, this apparently insurmountable impasse created by the 
respective positions of France and the United Kingdom was broached by 
compromise proposals from other delegates, principally Yugoslavia and 
Belgium.38 A key change was the addition of the qualifying adjective 
‘serious’ before the word ‘crime’. It was also made clear that the target of 
sub-clause (b) was criminal conduct which had occurred prior to entry in 
the receiving country. In the end, the delegates were able to agree to the 
                                                        
35 Travaux SR24 (n 31) 4; Travaux SR29 (n 31) 11-12. 
36 ibid; the French position clearly distinguished between the international 
criminals covered by sub-clauses (a) and (c), and common law criminals covered by 
sub-clause (b). 
37  Travaux SR29 (n 31) 11-12, 17-24. 
38 ibid 17-24. 
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following wording for Article 1F(b) as a basis of criminality exclusion: “he 
has committed a serious crime under common law outside the receiving 
country before being admitted to it as a refugee.”39  This version of Article 
1F(b) is very close to the final wording found in the Refugee Convention,40 
with the most significant additional amendment being the inclusion of the 
adjective ‘non-political’ to modify the word ‘crime’ (which distinct issue is 
the focus of the next chapter). 
 On the one hand, the amendments to Article 1F(b) realised by the 
compromise proposals produced a clause that was acceptable to the 
negotiating delegates, including France and the United Kingdom. On the 
other hand, it is precisely the indeterminate legal quality of a term such as 
‘serious crime’ that made the clause widely acceptable. Essentially, the 
vague quality of the compromise-inspired terms has also served as an 
authorisation for subsequent state approaches to Article 1F(b) that vary 
significantly. Interestingly, this margin of discretion has not always been 
exercised in a predictable manner. In fact, the United Kingdom, despite 
being the most vocal opponent of Article 1F(b) at the drafting stage, has 
domestically implemented some of the most expansive interpretations of 
criminality exclusion. As Goodwin-Gill and McAdam observe about 
expansionist trends in exclusion, “[t]hese developments are nowhere more 
clearly in evidence than in the recent practice of the United Kingdom – the 
original defender of the ‘minor’ criminal refugee.”41 In contrast, France has 
employed a very restrictive interpretation of ‘serious crime’, reserving its 
application for those who have committed exceptionally serious crimes.42 
 Consequently, scrutinising the drafting history of Article 1F(b) does 
not necessarily shed light on current national approaches to its application. 
What it does do is highlight that the indefinite and discursive quality of 
Article 1F(b) finds its roots in the very drafting of the provision. As 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam have concluded, to judicial approval, a close 
examination of the Travaux Préparatoires provides ‘no hard answers’ about 
                                                        
39 ibid 25. 
40 Final version of Article 1F(b) in Refugee Convention: “he has committed a serious 
non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that 
country as a refugee.” 
41 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 12) 175. 
42 UNHCR, Asylum in the European Union: A Study of the Implementation of the 
Qualification Directive (November 2007) 90-107 < 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/473050632.html> accessed 17 March 2014. 
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the intended scope of Article 1F(b).43 In fact, it would appear that achieving 
consensus was only possible by avoiding ‘hard answers’. This historical and 
political dimension to the exclusion clause has made the interpretive task 
for agents of refugee law that much more difficult.  
3.3.2  Objectives of the Exclusion Clause 
 
 Scrutiny of this drafting history by courts in the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia has produced inconclusive answers about the scope 
of application intended for Article 1F(b).44 In searching for guidance in the 
exercise of statutory interpretation, courts have not only examined the 
drafting evolution of the specific terms contained in the exclusion clause, 
but have also attempted to glean the particular objectives that the drafters 
envisaged the clause as promoting. It has been commonly reiterated that, 
broadly speaking, Article 1F acts to deny refugee protection to those who 
are undeserving of it.45 And yet an elucidation of more distinct objectives 
stemming from that broad objective is necessary if the purposes of the 
exclusion clause are to have interpretive instrumentality. These distinct 
objectives can both complement and conflict with one another. Appreciating 
the interrelationship of a plurality of objectives is pivotal to understanding 
various approaches to the substantive issues faced by refugee law decision-
makers (the role of expiation; international and national standards of 
seriousness; the adoption of mechanistic or contextual approaches to 
determining seriousness). All of these substantive issues, and the positions 
with respect to them that are propounded by various agents of refugee law, 
are grounded in particular teleological visions. 
 In its seminal decision in Jayasekara, the Federal Court of Appeal of 
Canada carefully examined the Travaux Preparatoires, academic writing, 
and Commonwealth case law regarding the purposes of the exclusion 
                                                        
43 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 12) 175; Ovcharuk v 
MIMA (1998) 158 ALR 289 (FCA) (Sackville J). 
44 Zimmermann and Wennholz, ‘Article 1F’ (n 2) 587-602. 
45 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion 
Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
(HCR/GIP/03/05, 2003) para 2; UNHCR, Background Note on the Application of the 
Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (2003) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f5857d24.html> accessed 17 
March 2014, paras 3, 8; European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), 
‘Position on Exclusion from Refugee Status’ (2004) 16(2) Int J Refugee Law 257, 
para 8; Zimmermann and Wennholz, ‘Article 1F’ (n 2) 583. 
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clause.46 This examination led the Court to conclude that the drafters of the 
Refugee Convention intended that the exclusion clauses should serve four 
different but complementary purposes: 
(1) to ensure that the perpetrators of international crimes could not 
claim asylum (Articles 1F(a) and (c)); 
(2) to ensure that the perpetrators of ordinary crimes committed for 
fundamentally political purposes could claim asylum (the intention 
behind the modifying adjective ‘non-political’ in Article 1F(b)); 
(3) to ensure that the perpetrators of ordinary crimes could not flee 
foreign justice by claiming asylum (the ‘fugitives from justice’ 
purpose of Article 1F(b)); and 
(4) to ensure that the country of refuge could protect its own people by 
closing its borders to criminals whom it regards as undesirable 
because of the seriousness of the ordinary crimes that they have 
committed (the ‘state protective’ purpose of Article 1F(b)).47 
 This reading of the teleological context of the exclusion clauses is 
supported by the findings of other courts, particularly in Australia.48 While 
the Court in Jayasekara described these purposes as complementary, the 
possibility that such purposes could have countervailing effect is certainly 
apparent as soon as one examines more particular legal issues. For 
example, discourse regarding the role of expiation in exclusion 
determinations instantiates this point unmistakably. Indeed, how one 
comes down on the role of expiation depends largely on which purpose one 
emphasises. 
3.3.3  The Role of Expiation 
 
 Agents of refugee law have long grappled with the following question: 
can a person still be excluded by virtue of Article 1F(b) as someone who has 
“committed a serious non-political crime” if that crime is no longer 
justiciable? More particularly, if the person has served his sentence, or has 
since been pardoned or benefitted from an amnesty, does Article 1F(b) still 
operate to exclude him from refugee protection if the essential elements of 
the provision are otherwise satisfied (i.e. the crime is serious and non-
                                                        
46 Jayasekara v Canada, 2008 FCA 404, paras 18-35. 
47 ibid, para 28. 
48 Dhayakpa v MIEA [1995] FCA 1653; Ovcharuk v MIMA (1998) 158 ALR 289 (FCA). 
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political)? While this question of expiation is typically handled, in a juridical 
sense, under the rubric of ‘seriousness’, it might also be appropriately 
characterised as a threshold or jurisdictional issue. Essentially, asking 
whether expiation precludes exclusion is tantamount to asking whether 
Article 1F(b) has any continuing jurisdiction over the refugee claimant who 
has already expiated his crimes. 
 On the issue of expiation, the Travaux Préparatoires provide little, if 
any, guidance. It is not clear whether exclusion under Article 1F(b) was 
meant to principally operate as a complement to extradition (that is, against 
persons who are sought for serious, extraditable crimes that are still 
justiciable), or whether its intended scope was considerably broader. 
Certainly, the wording of the clause gives no meaningful indication in this 
respect.49 It simply designates as excluded those persons who have 
committed serious non-political crimes, without any reference to the 
current justiciability of those crimes. As a result, instead of extracting 
meaning from the terms in the clause itself, regard must be had to the 
underlying purposes of the provision. Yet, given the interplay of different 
purposes (the four purposes described in Jayasekara), resorting to 
teleological insight also provides no clear answers. 
 It is unsurprising then that two leading contemporary refugee law 
scholars, Hathaway and Goodwin-Gill, reach different conclusions on the 
role of expiation in the exclusion analysis. For his part, Hathaway claims 
that exclusion under Article 1F(b) is limited “to persons believed to have 
committed serious, pre-entry crimes which remain justiciable.”50 The 
foundation of Hathaway’s claim consists in the broader claim that the true 
purpose of Article 1F(b) is to ensure that the perpetrators of ordinary but 
serious crimes cannot avoid foreign justice by claiming asylum. In focusing 
exclusive attention on this purpose of the exclusion clause (the third 
purpose identified in Jayasekara), Hathaway is able to characterise 
exclusion under Article 1F(b) as a complement to extradition. In his view, 
the Article aims to prevent the avoidance of criminal responsibility by 
                                                        
49 Gilbert, ‘Current Issues’ (n 26) 447-448. 
50 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (CUP 2005) 
343; a restatement of his position from: James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee 
Status (Butterworths 1991) 221. 
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fugitives from justice, thereby promoting international comity in the fight 
against crime.51 
 Reminiscent of the approach of the UK delegate at the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries in 1951, Hathaway sees no role for the state protective 
purpose (the fourth purpose identified in Jayasekara) in the context of 
Article 1F(b). Rather, he maintains that ‘national security’ interests only 
come into play pursuant to Article 33(2), where a state can return a refugee 
who has been convicted of a particularly serious crime in the country of 
refuge and represents a danger to the host community.52 In Hathaway’s 
view, operating together, Article 1F(b) and Article 33(2) “form a coherent 
and logical system”: whereas Article 1F(b) denies refugee status to a person 
who has not expiated serious criminal acts, Article 33(2) allows a state to 
protect its own security interests against refugees who pose a threat to the 
community.53 This understanding of Article 1F(b) confines it to the ‘fugitives 
from justice’ purpose, and relegates the state protective purpose to Article 
33(2). While such a view of the exclusion clause is consistent with the 
original British position,54 it is far less clear that such a position won the 
day among the drafters of the Convention. In fact, as has already been 
suggested, agreement was achieved by way of a compromise that 
concurrently accommodated the various positions of the negotiating 
parties.55 
 Despite its overstated teleological strength, Hathaway’s ‘fugitives 
from justice’ approach to Article 1F(b) has seen judicial support, at least 
historically. An apparent vote of judicial confidence in Hathaway’s approach 
came from the Supreme Court of Canada in Pushpanathan.56 In obiter 
remarks, Justice Bastarache seemingly agreed with the proposition that the 
purpose of Article 1F(b) was to prevent fugitives from escaping foreign 
justice by claiming refugee protection.57 Two years later, in Chan,58 the 
obiter remarks from Pushpanathan were parlayed into a direct judicial 
                                                        
51 Grahl-Madsen, Status of Refugees (n 29) 291-292; James C Hathaway and Colin 
J Harvey, ‘Framing Refugee Protection in the New World Disorder’ (2001) 34 Cornell 
Int'l LJ 257, 296. 
52 Hathaway, Rights of Refugees (n 50) 342-355. 
53 ibid 349-355. 
54 Travaux SR24 (n 31) and Travaux SR29 (n 31). 
55 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 12) 172-176. 
56 Pushpanathan v Canada, [1998] 1 SCR 982. 
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finding by the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada: Article 1F(b) cannot be 
applied to a refugee claimant who has been convicted of a crime and served 
his sentence before claiming refugee protection.59 Although this finding 
would be overturned by the same court eight years later,60 for a time at 
least, the ‘fugitives from justice’ approach to Article 1F(b) appeared to enjoy 
a place of privilege over other approaches. 
 In addition to this judicial support, the thrust of Hathaway’s 
argument is reflected in the position of the UNHCR, with one important 
qualification. The UNHCR does not treat the question of expiation as a 
threshold issue, but rather as an important, possibly decisive, 
consideration in a contextual approach to determining seriousness (to be 
discussed later in this chapter). While expiation creates a presumption 
against exclusion, the clause can nevertheless be applied if it is shown that 
“the applicant’s criminal character still predominates.”61 The UNHCR 
appears to have accepted a qualified version of Hathaway’s ‘fugitives from 
justice’ approach to Article 1F(b), attempting to reconcile it with the state 
protective purpose of Article 1F(b).62  This does not mean that the state 
protective purpose operates as an independent ground of exclusion. It does 
not. In the absence of serious reasons for considering that the claimant has 
committed a serious non-political crime, a finding that he is a risk to the 
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security of the receiving state cannot be invoked, on its own, as a basis for 
exclusion. Rather, the state protective purpose helps to identify the type of 
criminal act and actor that Article 1F(b) is meant to capture, and can be 
considered “as part of the holistic, individualized assessment of all relevant 
circumstances.”63 In this light, the UNHCR’s approach operates as an 
analytical rubric that seeks to harness the complementarity of purposes 
underlying the exclusion clause. That said, given the presumptive status 
generated by evidence of expiation, such an approach arguably still gives 
superior standing to the fugitives from justice purpose. 
 In contrast to Hathaway’s approach to Article 1F(b), Goodwin-Gill 
and McAdam claim that it has “never been very clear exactly what role the 
extradition analogy is supposed to play.”64 They point out that the words of 
the clause import no such restriction to extraditable crimes, nor can any 
direct limitation to the extradition context be extracted from the Travaux 
Préparatoires.65 Most importantly, however, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 
shed light on a real danger to the fugitives from justice approach to Article 
1F(b), a danger than might not be immediately apparent. At first glance, 
limiting Article 1F(b) to the extradition context seems to promote a more 
restrictive approach to exclusion, whereas permitting the consideration of 
state security interests seems to promote a more expansive approach to 
exclusion. Yet, ironically, tying exclusion to the extradition context has led 
to precisely the opposite result. As extradition practice has evolved to 
capture a much broader range of offences than it has historically, parallel 
expansionist developments have been seen with exclusion.66 Although 
perhaps not the consequence intended by proponents of the ‘fugitives from 
justice thesis’ (as Goodwin-Gill and McAdam refer to it), linking exclusion to 
extradition has resulted in a simplistic or mechanistic approach to 
exclusion determinations. It has also resulted in a commensurate growth in 
application, including crimes of an economic nature that do not necessarily 
invoke any concerns about preserving the human security interests of the 
receiving state. Such a growth in the scope of exclusion, in the context of 
an ever-diminishing opportunity for individualised assessment, creates a 
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normative conflict with the overarching human rights protection objective of 
the Refugee Convention. 67 
 As an alternative to the fugitives from justice thesis, Goodwin-Gill 
and McAdam offer an approach where a principled concept of security, kept 
within a framework of accountability, provides the necessary theoretical 
basis for exclusion determinations. Rather than focusing on whether a 
refugee claimant is wanted for an extraditable crime, Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam aim to preserve the individualised nature of exclusion 
determinations by re-focusing the analysis on whether exclusion is 
warranted in light of the receiving state’s interest in protecting its own 
security. As they readily admit, such an approach requires a system of 
accountability to prevent overly broad or opportunistic visions of security 
from taking hold. Provided such a system of accountability is maintained, 
however, a focus on the state protective purpose to Article 1F(b) is said to 
ground an approach that better respects the overall purpose of the Refugee 
Convention.68 As will be developed later in this chapter, a human security 
lens provides that necessary system of accountability, fostering a principled 
application of the state protective purpose by requiring agents to clearly 
identify, understand and assess the interests at stake. 
 In line with the approach propounded by Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 
early judicial rejection of an extradition-lens view of Article 1F(b) is reflected 
in the much-cited case of Ovcharuk.69 In that important decision, the 
Federal Court of Appeal of Australia held that the purpose of Article 1F(b) is 
to protect the order and safety of the receiving state.70 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court referred to the Vienna Convention,71 requiring 
international treaties to be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning72 of its terms and in light of its object and purpose. It 
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also canvassed the opinion of James Hathaway promoting the fugitives 
from justice approach, and Canadian case law which seemingly supported 
that view.73 The Court contrasted Hathaway’s approach with the approach 
of the Australian court in Dhayakpa,74 where it had concluded that 
expiation did not prevent the application of exclusion under Article 1F(b). In 
the end, the Court of Appeal in Ovcharuk rejected the narrow construction 
offered by Hathaway, concluding instead that Article 1F(b) serves a 
protective rather than a punitive function. The Court concluded that 
limiting exclusion to fugitives from justice would be inconsistent with the 
ultimate aim of Article 1F(b), that is protecting the order and safety of the 
receiving state.75 
 Over time, the Australian approach to the role of expiation has come 
to dominate the judicial landscape. As previously discussed, the Canadian 
courts initially accepted the restrictive understanding of Article 1F(b) 
promoted by Hathaway.76 For several years, Canada did not exclude 
persons who had already served their sentence, regardless of the nature of 
the underlying crime. However, judicial support for the fugitives from 
justice thesis has been gradually eroded. In its decision in Zrig,77 the 
Federal Court of Appeal questioned its earlier decision in Chan restricting 
the application of Article 1F(b) to fugitives from justice. In particular, the 
Court of Appeal questioned whether such an approach failed to recognise 
the state protective purpose of the exclusion clause.78  This questioning of 
the fugitives from justice approach became direct judicial disapproval in 
Jayasekara. In that case, the Federal Court of Appeal held, in ratio, that 
expiation does not preclude exclusion under Article 1F(b). According to the 
Court, to find otherwise would be to ignore the complementary purposes of 
the exclusion clause, and in particular the state protective purpose.79 
                                                        
73 Ovcharuk v MIMA (1998) 158 ALR 289 (FCA) 298-299 (Branson J); Hathaway, 
Law of Refugee Status (n 50) 221; Pushpanathan v Canada, [1998] 1 SCR 982 
(Bastarache J); Canada  v Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689, 743. 
74 Dhayakpa v. MIEA [1995] FCA 1653. 
75 Ovcharuk v MIMA (1998) 158 ALR 289 (FCA) 294, 300; see also: MIMA v Singh 
[2002] HCA 7, paras 94-95. 
76 Chan v Canada, [2000] 4 FC 390 (CA). 
77 Zrig v Canada, 2003 FCA 178; see Gilbert’s view of Zrig, agreeing with the 
decision that Article 1F(b) was not limited to extraditable crimes, but disagreeing 
that expiation should not vitiate exclusion: Gilbert, ‘Running Scared Since 9/11’ (n 
72) 104, 108-109. 
78 Zrig v Canada, 2003 FCA 178, para 119 (Decary J). 
79 Jayasekara v Canada, 2008 FCA 404, paras 28-29. 
 112 
 Similarly, refugee law decision-makers in the United Kingdom have 
found no basis for reading the principle of expiation into the exclusion 
clauses.80 Consequently, although enjoying an initial period of influence, 
the fugitives from justice thesis has waned, at least in the juridical realm. 
Increasingly, expiation is seen as only one of many factors to be considered 
in determining if a crime rises to the level of being ‘serious’, rather than 
constituting a jurisdictional or threshold issue which might preclude 
exclusion entirely. The role of expiation as a contextual factor will be 
revisited later in this section when mechanistic and contextual approaches 
to determining seriousness are discussed. To properly frame this discussion 
of mechanistic and contextual approaches, an examination of the relative 
importance of international and national standards of seriousness is first 
necessary.  
3.3.4  International versus National Standards of Seriousness 
 
 Determining whether a crime rises to the level of being ‘serious’ has 
been the subject of much debate, both academically and juridically. 
Approaches vary significantly, largely due to the absence of any 
international legal instruments telling agents of refugee law which crimes 
are serious and which are not, or even providing agents with some guidance 
as to how to approach such a determination. In contrast, specific direction 
is provided in the wording of Article 1F(a): he has committed a crime 
against peace, war crime, or crime against humanity, as defined in the 
international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such 
crimes. Accordingly, in making determinations under Article 1F(a), agents 
have regard to various international legal instruments which tell them “this 
is a war crime and this not,” or “this is a crime against humanity and this 
is not.”81 
 On the other hand, with respect to Article 1F(b), it is unclear how 
one is meant to determine if a crime is ‘serious’. ‘Serious’ is a rather 
nebulous term, capable of accommodating widely divergent 
understandings. Is trafficking cocaine a ‘serious’ crime? What if the drug 
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being trafficked is marijuana instead of cocaine? What about credit card 
fraud? The answers to these questions will undoubtedly vary depending on 
the perspective of the decision-maker, informed as it is by national, 
cultural, and experiential aspects. Given such a broad scope for variation, it 
is unsurprising that the single adjective ‘serious’ has generated a high level 
of interpretive and operational difficulty for agents of refugee law. 
 This interpretive obstacle to Article 1F(b) is recognised by the 
UNHCR. It acknowledges that it is difficult to define what constitutes a 
‘serious’ crime, especially since the concept will have different connotations 
in different legal systems.82 Despite this obvious difficulty immanent to the 
wording of the exclusion clause, the UNHCR maintains that ‘serious crime’ 
is still a workable legal concept. In its view, the preeminent rule for 
determining seriousness is that “the gravity of the crime should be judged 
against international standards.”83 While regard can be had to how the 
crime would be characterised by the criminal justice system of the receiving 
country, the determinative factor must always remain the understanding of 
such an act within a framework of international standards. Whether 
international or multinational legal instruments proscribe the conduct in 
question, or seek to tackle it as a matter of international concern, is a 
relevant consideration. So too is whether most jurisdictions would consider 
the act in question to be a serious crime punishable by a lengthy term of 
imprisonment.84  
 With primacy accorded to international standards of criminality, the 
UNHCR maintains that a ‘serious crime’ refers to a “capital crime or a very 
grave punishable act.”85 The following examples of ‘serious crimes’ are 
provided: murder, rape, arson and armed robbery. With few exceptions, 
these crimes are universally considered to be of a serious nature. Other 
types of offences could also be considered serious if they include the use of 
weapons, involve serious injury to persons, or are part of serious habitual 
criminal conduct. In contrast, crimes such as petty theft or the possession 
of narcotics for personal use would not satisfy the seriousness threshold of 
Article 1F(b).86 A human security approach will endorse this view of ‘serious 
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crime’, a view that ultimately challenges the expansionist trend in state 
practice on exclusion. 
 Similarly, the weight of academic opinion is compellingly in favour of 
restricting ‘serious crimes’ to those acts which are very grave in an 
international sense, which typically attract lengthy custodial sentences, 
and which compromise physical integrity, life, and liberty. As recently 
canvassed, and endorsed, by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in 
AH (Algeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,87 leading refugee 
law scholars88 all promote a view of ‘serious crime’ grounded in a framework 
of international standards proscribing conduct as serious criminality. As 
observed by the Court of Appeal, only such a view of ‘serious crime’ can be 
reconciled with the concept that the words of the Refugee Convention speak 
with one true international autonomous meaning.89 In fact, the Court could 
“not accept the submission that each signatory state is free to adopt its own 
definition of what constitutes a serious crime for the purpose of Article 
1F(b).”90 
 Notwithstanding recent judicial interest in fostering an international 
meaning to ‘serious crime’, supported as it is by the UNHCR and refugee 
law scholars, operational understandings of ‘serious crime’ have largely 
been shaped by national standards of criminality rather than by 
international ones. Indeed, the maxim – while regard may be had to 
national standards, the gravity of the act must ultimately be judged against 
international standards – has been, in practice, turned on its head: while 
regard may be had to international standards, the gravity of the act is 
ultimately judged according to the perspective of the receiving state. Among 
others, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Australia, and 
Germany have all at some point employed a definition of ‘serious crime’ that 
uses as its central reference point the disapprobation that the criminal act 
in question would receive in the host country.91 Rather than focusing on 
how the act would be viewed within a framework of international standards, 
agents of refugee law tend to resort to the local and familiar, scrutinising 
                                                        
87 AH (Algeria) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 395. 
88 Hathaway, Law of Refugee Status (n 50) p. 224; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 
Refugee in International Law (n 12) 176; Grahl-Madsen, Status of Refugees (n 29) 
297; Gilbert, ‘Current Issues’ (n 26) 449. 
89 AH (Algeria) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 395, paras 30, 50. 
90 ibid, para 30; see also: R (JS)(Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 15, para 2. 
91 See below in s 3.3.5. 
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criminal conduct through the lens of their national criminal justice system. 
As articulated by the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada, “in the absence of 
an international consensus on the seriousness of a crime, a Court having to 
interpret the Convention will look to its domestic law, striving to reconcile it 
with that of other states so far as possible.”92 
 That national standards of criminality should play some role is 
acknowledged by the UNHCR and refugee law scholars. As is readily 
recognised, the Refugee Convention is not self-applying. Each Convention-
applying state “must determine what constitutes a serious crime, according 
to its standards up to a point.”93 But this allowance for some margin of 
discretion to apply national standards of criminality has been seized upon 
by some states as the principal basis upon which to determine seriousness, 
rather than as a corollary to the application of international standards and 
norms. Nowhere is this tendency more evident than in the approaches of 
the Australian and Canadian courts, and in the national practices of the 
United Kingdom and Germany. Fundamentally, a focus on national 
standards of criminality has generated mechanistic approaches to 
determining seriousness. 
3.3.5  Mechanistic Approaches to Determining Seriousness 
 
 Mechanistic approaches to determining whether a crime reaches the 
threshold of seriousness typically apply the following rudimentary formula: 
(1) determine what the criminal conduct is; (2) determine which domestic 
criminal law offence best describes that criminal conduct; and (3) if 
domestic criminal law could punish such conduct with a sentence of x 
years, the crime is presumptively serious for the purpose of Article 1F(b).94 
                                                        
92 Zrig v Canada, 2003 FCA 178, para 136 (the Federal Court of Appeal places a 
heavy reliance on domestic law within the context of Article 1F(b)): “Article 1F(b) 
deals with ordinary crimes, non-political crimes, which if I might so phrase it are 
committed in the ordinary course of life in a society. Such crimes have not been 
defined by the international community acting collectively. Such crimes are not 
defined by the Convention: on the contrary, Article 1F(b) incorporates concepts of 
domestic law.” 
93 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 12) 176. 
94 The value of x has varied among states; as discussed later in this section, 
Canada and other states have used 10 years; Germany has used a one year 
threshold in the past; the United Kingdom has used a ‘two years reasonably 
expected to be imposed’ approach, and a list of designated offences (see later in this 
section). 
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Ironically, the genesis of presumptive exclusion probably consists in 
a refugee decision-making exercise guided by the UNHCR itself. When 
125,000 Cuban refugee claimants arrived in the United States in 1980, 
individualised assessment of each claim became a very difficult operational 
prospect. In an effort to streamline and expedite the refugee determination 
process, claims involving some element of criminality were examined in a 
joint exercise by the UNHCR and U.S. State Department.95 The following 
decision-making rubric was established in the context of that joint exercise: 
 presumptive exclusion applied in relation to any of the following 
offences: homicide, rape, child molesting, wounding, arson, drug 
trafficking, and armed robbery; 
 this presumption of exclusion was rebuttable by reference to various 
mitigating factors, including the following: minority age of the 
offender; parole; passage of five years since completion of sentence; 
otherwise of good character; less serious role in the offence (e.g. 
accomplice); other offence-specific circumstances such as 
provocation and self-defence; 
 other offences might also satisfy the threshold of seriousness: 
burglary, theft, robbery, receiving stolen property, embezzlement, 
possession of drugs in quantities over what might be necessary for 
personal use, and assault; however, for these offences to qualify as 
‘serious crimes’, some aggravating factor needed to be present: use of 
weapons; injury to persons; high value of property; type of drug (i.e. 
‘hard’ drugs); and, evidence of habitual criminal conduct.96 
Naturally, this exclusion decision-making rubric was designed as a 
response to the very special situation of a mass influx of refugee claimants. 
Be that as it may, the joint UNHCR/U.S. State Department exercise did 
establish a precedent for employing the concept of a rebuttable 
presumption in relation to the seriousness threshold. 
 Undoubtedly, this presumptive exclusion precedent has had 
consequences that were not intended by the UNHCR. Some states have 
adopted approaches to seriousness that incorporate the concept of 
presumptive exclusion, but without necessarily incorporating the 
contextualising factors that are needed to keep it in check. These 
                                                        
95 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 12) 179-180. 
96 ibid. 
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approaches have also tended to use a minimum-sentence threshold based 
on domestic criminal law, rather than a presumption based on the 
qualitative seriousness of certain types of offences. In Canada, for example, 
the Federal Court of Appeal in Chan established a ten-year yardstick for 
determining seriousness: if the criminal conduct (had it occurred in 
Canada) would constitute an offence for which a person could get a 
custodial sentence of ten years or more, then this is a presumptively 
serious crime for the purpose of Article 1F(b).97 However, in contrast to the 
very serious crimes contemplated by the UNHCR in the United States mass 
influx situation, employing a ten-year yardstick certainly captures a much 
wider spectrum of offences. Many offences, even theft or fraud in relatively 
small amounts of money, are indictable offences for which a person could, 
in theory, receive a ten-year sentence in Canada.98   
 Quite reasonably, one might have confidence that such a yardstick 
would be used sensibly and contextually, and would be restricted to the 
types of very serious offences that affect physical integrity, life and liberty. 
And yet, employing this mechanistic, minimum-sentence approach to 
seriousness, Canadian courts have sanctioned exclusion on the basis of a 
broad range of offences: various economic crimes, including 
embezzlement,99 smuggling,100 bribery,101 credit card fraud,102 money 
laundering,103 tax evasion,104 theft,105 and marking up the price of 
lumber;106 various drug offences, including trafficking and simple 
possession, in relation to both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ drugs.107 While some of these 
                                                        
97 Chan v Canada, [2000] 4 FC 390 (CA). 
98 Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 334(a) (theft over $5000); s 338(2) 
(theft of cattle); s 342(1)(e) (stealing or forging a credit card); s 380(1)(a) (fraud over 
$5000). 
99 Xie v Canada, 2004 FCA 250; Zeng v Canada, 2008 FC 956. 
100 Lai v Canada, 2004 FC 179. 
101 Vlad v Canada, 2007 FC 172. 
102 Noha v Canada , 2009 FC 683. 
103 Naranjo v Canada, 2011 FC 1127. 
104  Simkovic v Canada, 2014 FC 113. 
105 Farkas v Canada, 2007 FC 277. 
106 Xu v Canada, 2005 FC 970. 
107 In Jayasekara v Canada, 2008 FCA 404, exclusion was upheld in relation to a 
conviction for trafficking in a small amount of opium for which the applicant 
received a 29-day sentence, plus 5 years probation; see also: Shire v Canada, 2012 
FC 97; Jawad v Canada, 2012 FC 232 (simple possession); Garcia Medina v 
Canada, 2006 FC 62 (possession of marijuana with intent to distribute); Benitez 
Hidroro v Canada, 2010 FC 111 (possession of cocaine); the Canadian expansive 
approach to exclusion for drug offences is also seen in the United States: Miguel-
Miguel v Gonzales (2007) 500 F3d 94 (9th Cir, USCA) (selling $20 of crack cocaine is 
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findings of seriousness might be questionable when assessed against 
international standards of grave criminal conduct that affects human life 
and liberty, they appear to flow unproblematically from a mechanistic, 
minimum-sentence approach. 
 Similarly, mechanistic approaches have been seen in some states of 
the European Union. The Slovak Republic uses the same ten-year 
yardstick.108 Germany, at least in the past, has interpreted the term 
‘serious’ by reference to the German Criminal Code, providing that an 
offence punishable by a minimum term of one year constitutes a ‘serious 
crime’.109 As pointed out by the UNHCR in its 2007 study of the 
implementation of the EU Qualification Directive, the German approach “is 
incompatible with UNHCR guidance, which states that the term ‘serious’ 
should be interpreted by reference to international jurisprudence.”110 
Moreover, the German approach has led to the exclusion of individuals on 
the basis of crimes that are of dubious seriousness, such as providing food 
and other necessary goods to so-called violent organisations.111 
 For its part, the “original defender of the minor ‘criminal’ refugee” 
has employed a somewhat different but nevertheless mechanistic approach 
to determining seriousness under Article 1F(b). In the United Kingdom, 
‘serious crime’ is not defined, although agents are directed to have regard to 
the definition of ‘particularly serious crime’ (i.e. in relation to Article 33(2)) 
as a general guide in interpreting Article 1F(b).112 A ‘particularly serious 
crime’ for the purpose of Article 33(2) is defined in the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002113 as being a crime for which a custodial 
sentence of at least two years has been imposed, or which is listed in the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Specification of Particularly 
                                                                                                                                                            
a ‘particularly serious crime’); on drug crimes and 1F(b), see: M. Gottwald, ‘Asylum 
Claims and Drug Offences: the Seriousness Threshold of Article 1F(b) of the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the UN Drug Conventions’ 
(2006) 18 Int J Refugee Law 88. 
108 UNHCR, Asylum in the European Union (n 42) 99. 
109 ibid 98; the UNHCR study points out that there were plans in Germany to 
change this, with no bottom line drawn as to the seriousness of the crime. 
110 ibid 98-99. 
111 ibid 99. 
112 UK Home Office, Asylum Instruction – Exclusion: Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention (30 May 2012) s 5.2. 
113 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s 72. 
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Serious Crimes) Order 2004.114 Despite the fact that the 2004 Order 
contains an expansive list of criminal offences,115 the scope for Article 1F(b) 
seriousness appears to be even broader. The UK Asylum Instruction 
provides the following caveat: “given that the Article 1F(b) requirement 
states exclusion will be merited following a ‘serious’ crime, as opposed to 
‘particularly serious’, it may be appropriate to regard a crime for which a 
custodial sentence of 12 months or more upon conviction might be 
expected (if that crime had been tried in the United Kingdom) as a ‘serious 
crime’.”116 Given these instructional parameters, the British approach to 
‘serious’ crime in Article 1F(b) is quite far-reaching.117 
 What is common among all mechanistic approaches is that they 
employ some measure of seriousness grounded in national standards of 
criminality. Further, this measure operates not as a supplement to 
international standards but as the key benchmark for determining 
seriousness. Nonetheless, as seen in the AH (Algeria)118 case discussed 
above, judicial approval for such mechanistic national approaches appears 
to be on the wane. Similar judicial developments have been witnessed in 
the European Court and in Canada.119 Indeed, the judicial trend seems to 
be towards a more contextual approach to determining seriousness. Such a 
contextual approach employs international standards, and allows for the 
consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining 
seriousness. 
3.3.6  Contextual Approaches to Determining Seriousness 
 
 A contextual approach to determining if a refugee claimant should be 
excluded for having committed a ‘serious’ crime has been consistently 
                                                        
114 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Specification of Particularly 
Serious Crimes) Order 2004, No 1910. 
115 The 2004 Order contains an extensive list of offences, including those under the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, Immigration Act 1971, Customs and Excise Act 1979, 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and various terrorism-related statutes. 
116 UK Home Office, Asylum Instruction (n 112) s 5.2. 
117 R (Polat) v SSHD [2011] EWHC 3445 (Admin), para 73: in obiter, the High Court 
questioned the wisdom of such a sentence threshold approach, noting that it would 
capture a broad spectrum of offences. 
118 AH (Algeria) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 395 (discussed in s 3.3.4 above). 
119 See discussion in s 3.3.6 below. 
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promoted by the UNHCR and most refugee law scholars.120 Advocates of a 
contextual approach maintain that determining the seriousness of a 
particular crime involves a careful consideration of several factors: 
 the nature of the criminal act 
 the actual harm inflicted by the criminal act 
 the form of procedure, or mode of prosecution, used to prosecute the 
crime 
 the nature of the penalty for such a crime 
 whether most jurisdictions would consider the act in question to be a 
serious crime 
 any aggravating or mitigating factors, including evidence of expiation 
 a final ‘balancing’ consideration where the gravity of the crime is 
weighed against the degree of persecution feared by the refugee 
claimant121 
As discussed in previous chapters, the final balancing consideration has 
been rejected by most jurisdictions, despite being almost uniformly 
promoted in the academic and international spheres.122 With respect to the 
other contextual factors, an increasing (albeit inconsistent) judicial 
awareness is emerging. 
 An important starting point is the recognition that Article 1F 
represents a limitation on a humanitarian legal instrument. Consequently, 
exclusion must be narrowly construed.123 As highlighted by many refugee 
law scholars, generalised or mechanistic approaches run contrary to the 
requirement for restrictive construction. By determining seriousness on the 
basis of minimum-sentence thresholds, mechanistic approaches ignore the 
more important task of individualised assessment. In contrast, a 
                                                        
120 UNHCR, Handbook (n 15) para. 157; UNHCR, Background Note (n 45) paras 39-
40; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 12) 176-184; 
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consideration of all contextual factors, including mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances, ensures that Article 1F(b) exclusion is applied only to those 
who have committed truly serious crimes and are therefore undeserving of 
refugee protection.124 
 Likewise, the UNHCR has reiterated its claim that a determination of 
seriousness requires a contextual rather than mechanistic assessment of 
the individual case. In its statement to the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Justice in B and D,125 the UNHCR described crimes under Article 
1F(b) as involving a “high threshold of gravity,” using the serious 
international crimes described in Articles 1F(a) and (c) as a point of 
comparison.  Determining whether a common criminal act rises to this high 
threshold of gravity requires a careful assessment of the nature of the act, 
the context in which it occurred, and all relevant circumstances of the 
case.126 The Grand Chamber in B and D did not need to fully and directly 
address the seriousness issue in disposing of the case before it. It also 
agreed with the submission that no balancing or proportionality 
assessment was required. However, such agreement was based on the fact 
that an individualised assessment of seriousness and criminal 
responsibility had been made.127 Perhaps even more significantly, in its 
reading of B and D, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in AH 
(Algeria) appears to endorse the position of the UNHCR calling for an 
international and contextual approach to determining seriousness.128 The 
extent to which a contextual approach will permeate exclusion decision-
making remains to be seen, since in AH (Algeria), the Court also did not 
need to canvass this issue fully. Nonetheless, these and other recent cases 
certainly signal a movement toward a more contextual approach.129 
                                                        
124 ibid; see also: Zimmermann and Wennholz, ‘Article 1F’ (n 2) 600-602; Goodwin-
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 Somewhat surprisingly, a more elaborate elucidation of a contextual 
approach to exclusion has now been developed in Canada. Perhaps as a 
reaction to the mechanistic application of the ten-year yardstick that 
followed its earlier decision in Chan, the Federal Court of Appeal in 
Jayasekara emphasised that regard must be had to international standards 
of seriousness.130 In that case, which concerned a claimant who had been 
convicted of trafficking in opium,131 the Court of Appeal canvassed 
international instruments against drug trafficking.132 It also examined and 
compared the treatment of drug trafficking by criminal justice systems in 
various jurisdictions, including Canada, the United States, England and 
Wales, Australia, New Zealand, and France.133 Most importantly, the Court 
of Appeal reminded decision-makers that “whatever presumption of 
seriousness may attach to a crime internationally or under the legislation of 
the receiving state, that presumption may be rebutted by reference to the 
above [contextual] factors.”134 
 Clearly, the Court of Appeal in Jayasekara did not entirely dispense 
with the concept of presumptive exclusion. Such a presumption of 
seriousness can still arise given international standards or even national 
ones (i.e. the ten-year yardstick). However, the Court did endorse, and in 
fact mandated, the consideration of most of the contextual factors espoused 
by the UNHCR and refugee law scholars. A notable exception is rejection of 
the idea that the seriousness of the offence should be balanced against the 
degree of persecution feared.135 Another is the scope of the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances that may be considered. For the Court of Appeal, 
                                                                                                                                                            
involving the consideration of factors such as expiation, remorse and rehabilitation: 
UNHCR, Factum of the Intervener UNHCR, Febles v Canada, Supreme Court of 
Canada Court File No 35215, filed 11 March 2014 <http://www.scc-
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130 Jayasekara v Canada, 2008 FCA 404, paras 37, 48-52. 
131 ibid, para 53 (the applicant was convicted of trafficking in a small amount of 
opium, a class B felony in the United States; he received a sentence of 29 days in 
jail, plus five years probation). 
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133 Jayasekara v Canada, 2008 FCA 404, paras 50-53. 
134 ibid, para 44. 
135 ibid (relying on the Canadian case of Xie v Canada, 2004 FCA 250; the US case 
of INS v Aguirre-Aguirre (1999) 526 US 415 (USSC); the Australian case of 
Dhayakpa v MIEA [1995] FCA 1653; and, the UK case of T v SSHD [1995] 2 All ER 
1042 (CA)). 
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such factors must relate to the underlying criminal act.136 For example, an 
aggravating circumstance might be the use of a weapon or the abuse of a 
position of authority, whereas a mitigating circumstance might include the 
presence of an element of duress falling short of a full defence at common 
law.137 
 On the other hand, it is less clear whether aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances not temporally connected to the underlying criminal act can 
be considered. Apparently, a decision-maker can still take into account the 
fact that an applicant has already been convicted and served his sentence, 
even though this does not actually speak to the seriousness of the 
underlying criminal act at the time that it occurred.138 However, other 
“factors extraneous to the facts and circumstances underlying the 
conviction” appear to be off limits.139 In fact, as subsequent decisions of the 
Canadian courts suggest, remorse or rehabilitation are post-event, 
extraneous factors that cannot be considered under the contextual 
approach.140 The relevance of other factors particular to the individual 
applicant (such as personal tragedy and socioeconomic status) is still 
uncertain, with decisions supporting opposite conclusions.141 
 Similarly, judicial treatment of still other contextual factors promoted 
by the UNHCR – mode of prosecution and length of sentence – is variable. 
In cases where the claimant has already been prosecuted for the crime 
outside the country of refuge, the mode of prosecution selected in the 
context of so-called hybrid offences might be a significant indication of the 
seriousness of the crime. Economic offences, drug offences, and sexual 
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crimes of a less serious nature typically occupy this hybrid field. In such 
cases, prosecuting authorities have some discretion in deciding whether to 
proceed with the more serious (indictable or felony) or the less serious 
(misdemeanour or summary) route of prosecution. The fact that a crime is a 
hybrid offence indicates that there is a ‘spectrum of seriousness’ for that 
particular act. It is up to the decision-maker to determine where the 
claimant’s crime falls on that spectrum, taking into account the specific 
circumstances of the individual case.142 Further, the particular choice made 
by the prosecuting authority with respect to the mode of prosecution could 
provide a good indication of the seriousness of the claimant’s crime. 
However, regard must be had to the possibility that such a choice was 
influenced by prosecutorial realities with little or no connection to the 
actual seriousness of the crime in question.143 Similar caution must be 
exercised in gleaning the level of seriousness from the length of the actual 
sentence imposed, a factor which must never be considered in isolation.144 
 Certainly, the exact scope of a contextual approach to determining 
seriousness is still in flux. Nonetheless, the courts in Canada, the United 
Kingdom and Europe are signalling a judicial trend away from mechanistic 
approaches. Ironically, France – which insisted on the inclusion of Article 
1F(b) in the first place – already employs an approach that is not grounded 
in national standards of criminality and that requires a very high threshold 
of seriousness for exclusion to apply. In fact, French refugee law decision-
makers consider the provision sparingly, and its actual application is 
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rare.145 The extent to which the United Kingdom, and other Commonwealth 
states, will move toward this more restrictive, contextual approach to 
seriousness remains to be seen. 
3.4 A Human Security Approach to Determining 
Seriousness 
 
 Among the various approaches to determining seriousness 
elucidated in this chapter, what preferences are evinced by a human 
security approach to criminality exclusion? As developed in Chapter Two, a 
human security approach highlights that both the inclusion and exclusion 
questions in refugee law are directed at protecting the basic security of 
human individuals. Human security serves an important framing function 
by ensuring that the individual remains the ultimate referent object of 
security throughout the entire analytical process. It refocuses the exclusion 
analysis on the human rights normativity of the Refugee Convention by 
asking whether the receiving state’s security interests warrant exclusion on 
the basis of serious criminality.146 Those state security interests are 
grounded not in broad claims to ‘national security’ but rather in the most 
basic rights stemming from human dignity (that is, human security).147 
Consequently, a human security approach would frame the seriousness 
question elicited by Article 1F(b) in the following way: is the claimant’s past 
criminal conduct serious in the sense that it is the type of conduct that 
invokes a real concern for the basic human security of the individuals in 
the host community? In highly developed refugee determination systems, 
judicial and quasi-judicial decision-makers have both the training and 
expertise to make risk assessments based on the evidence before them. In 
fact, this is the heart of the analytical exercise on the inclusion question. 
Human security reminds them that it should be the heart of the analytical 
exercise on the exclusion question as well. 
 In relation to the issues explored in this chapter, the preferences of a 
human security approach can be summarised as three fundamental 
principles. First, the objectives of Article 1F(b) are complementary. One 
important objective is preventing fugitives from evading foreign justice by 
                                                        
145 UNHCR, Asylum in the European Union (n 42) 90-107. 
146 Ch 2, s 2.6. 
147 The normative content of a human security approach to refugee law, consisting 
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taking advantage of asylum. However, Article 1F(b) is not limited to fugitives 
from foreign justice. It also allows a host country to protect its security 
interests by denying refugee status to those who are a threat to human 
security on account of the seriousness of the crimes that they have 
committed. Consequently, while expiation is a factor to be considered in 
making a determination about exclusion, it does not alone preclude 
exclusion for serious criminality. Second, the word ‘crime’ in Article 1F(b) 
should be understood as a non-technical term. Agents should not place any 
particular weight on the specific disapprobatory designation of conduct, or 
on a specific requirement for double criminality. Instead, focus should rest 
on whether the conduct is a ‘serious crime’ (read together) within a 
framework of international standards and human rights normativity. Third, 
a contextual approach grounded in international standards of criminality 
should be employed in determining whether conduct reaches the threshold 
of a serious crime. Article 1F(b) is targeted at criminal conduct which 
presents a basic threat to human life and liberty. Mechanistic approaches 
grounded in national standards, such as minimum-sentence thresholds, 
are not particularly helpful in identifying such conduct on an individualised 
basis. In contrast, an approach that consists in international standards, 
and which allows for the meaningful consideration of all contextual factors, 
ensures that Article 1F(b) exclusion is reserved for grave conduct that 
compromises human security. An international, contextual approach to 
seriousness serves as an accountable framework within which to advance 
the state protective purpose of Article 1F(b). 
 Turning to each of these principles in turn, the first point 
emphasised by a human security approach is that the purposes of Article 
1F(b) are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, both the fugitives from justice 
purpose and the state protective purpose are capable of congruous 
actualisation. Article 1F(b) can be properly applied to exclude a person 
fleeing foreign justice if the crime for which he is wanted is also serious and 
non-political. However, the current justiciability of the crime is not 
determinative. For example, a refugee claimant may be sought for 
prosecution in an outside country for an economic crime that is 
extraditable. Unless that crime also meets the threshold of seriousness, 
arguably a high burden in the context of an economic crime, it is not an 
excludable crime despite its current justiciability. Conversely, a serious 
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crime such as murder, which is no longer justiciable due to expiation, may 
still warrant exclusion after a consideration of all relevant contextual 
factors. A human security approach neither prioritises nor neutralises the 
question of whether a claimant is currently wanted for prosecution. Rather, 
it treats this question as one relevant factor in determining if the serious 
crime committed by the claimant elicits a real concern for the human 
security of the receiving country. 
 Similarly, a human security approach places no decisive weight on 
the particular characterisation of an act as criminal by national criminal 
justice systems. As suggested by Zimmermann and Wennholz, ‘crime’ 
should be understood as a non-technical term in the context of Article 
1F(b).148  It should be read and interpreted together with its preceding 
adjective ‘serious’. Considered in isolation, whether an act is designated as 
a ‘crime’ is not necessarily a useful indication of its seriousness on the 
basis of international standards. Consider hypothetically that a country 
does not criminalise the intentional killing by a husband of his wife if he 
believes that she has committed adultery. Since such an act would not be a 
‘crime’ in the country of its occurrence, it would not meet a strict 
application of double criminality.149 Yet, judged against international 
human rights standards, that act is likely to be considered a serious crime 
despite its indulgence by the country in which it took place. In fact, the risk 
of such a state-tolerated killing would form the basis of a valid refugee 
claim made by a woman from that country, as a violation of her basic 
human right to life and liberty.150 This reflexive quality to the inclusion and 
exclusion questions highlights that the international human rights 
normativity entrenched by the Refugee Convention (as developed in Chapter 
Two) is the true blueprint against which the nature of conduct should be 
assessed. Indeed, both inclusion and exclusion involve the making of a risk 
assessment on the basis of international normative and legal standards. 
 The primacy accorded to international standards is also reflected in 
the third, and most important, principle of a human security approach to 
                                                        
148 Zimmermann and Wennholz, ‘Article 1F’ (n 2) 597. 
149 See s 3.2.2; the converse could also be true, where peaceful political dissent, the 
possession of alcohol, and the ‘immodest’ dress of women could be regarded as 
seriously criminal in the country in which it occurred even though it is not criminal 
in the host country – see: Ovcharuk v MIMA (1998) 158 ALR 289 (FCA) (Branson J); 
Jayasekara v Canada, 2008 FCA 404, para 37. 
150 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 12) 473-474. 
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determining seriousness. Whereas approaches grounded in national 
standards tend to focus on mechanistic determinations based on domestic 
benchmarks of seriousness, a human security approach seeks to preserve 
the individualised assessment of conduct that is ultimately judged against 
international standards. Since the aim of a human security approach to 
Article 1F(b) is to exclude only those persons who have committed grave 
criminal acts that invoke a real concern for the basic human security of the 
host community, an individualised assessment of all contextual factors 
within a framework of international standards is required.  
 Such an assessment requires the decision-maker to first assess the 
conduct against international standards. This includes asking whether 
most jurisdictions, including that of the receiving state, would consider the 
act in question to be a serious crime, typically punishable by several years 
of imprisonment. It also involves an examination of international 
instruments proscribing the conduct or seeking to address it as a matter of 
international concern.151 This preliminary assessment will give some 
indication about the seriousness of the conduct in the context of 
international standards. However, an individualised determination of 
seriousness can only be made after assessing all contextual factors, 
including the following: the nature of the act; the harm caused by the act; if 
already prosecuted for the offence, the mode of prosecution chosen and the 
penalty that was imposed; and, any mitigating or aggravating factors that 
speak either to the gravity of the act or to whether the person who 
committed it represents an ongoing threat to core human security 
interests.152 
 While rebuttable legal presumptions are understandably appealing to 
legal actors – for example, murder is presumptively serious whereas theft is 
presumptively not serious – these are not particularly helpful legal concepts 
in the context of Article 1F(b). Ultimately, an evaluation of seriousness is a 
qualitative assessment of both the act and the actor. A contextual and 
individualised assessment is not well served by a legal framework of 
presumptive conclusions. Rather, seriousness should be decided on the 
                                                        
151 Such as the examination undertaken in Jayasekara v Canada, 2008 FCA 404, 
paras 48-53. 
152 This is in contrast to the limited contextual approach promoted by the Court in 
Jayasekara v Canada, 2008 FCA 404, and more in line with the broad contextual 
approach promoted by the UNHCR and refugee law scholars (see s 3.3.6). 
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basis of the unique circumstances of each case, viewed through the lens of 
international standards. Further, the contextual assessment should not be 
temporally restricted to the commission of the underlying criminal act, as 
recent Canadian case law suggests.153 Regard should be had to all 
mitigating and aggravating factors with the potential to impact the 
assessment of whether the claimant’s criminal conduct constitutes a threat 
to the human security of the host community. Consequently, mitigating 
factors such as expiation, remorse and rehabilitation ought to be 
considered, but then so too should aggravating factors such as a lack of 
rehabilitation or ongoing, habitual criminal behaviour.154 
 Clearly, a broad contextual approach to determining seriousness will 
ask refugee law agents to take a harder look at the individual 
circumstances of each case. It will certainly present challenges to the 
expansionist ‘list’ of excludable offences, such as certain types of drug and 
economic crimes.155 Although mechanistic, minimum threshold approaches 
have been permissive of such expansionism, a contextual approach that 
refocuses the assessment on real threats to human security will make 
justifying such exclusion decisions more difficult. For example, while a 
large-scale or international drug trafficking operation might still be 
categorised as a ‘serious crime’ using a human security lens, trafficking in 
$30 worth of opium almost certainly would not be.156  
 Undeniably, this understanding of a human security approach to 
criminality exclusion evinces a restrictive construction that may not be 
enthusiastically received by national juridical systems.157 Mechanistic 
                                                        
153 Camacho v Canada, 2011 FC 789; Cuero v Canada, 2012 FC 191; Feimi v 
Canada, 2012 FC 262, aff’d 2012 FCA 325; Poggio Guerrero v Canada, 2012 FC 
937; Febles v Canada, 2011 FC 1103, aff’d 2012 FCA 324 (under appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, Case File No 35215). 
154 By not temporally restricting mitigating and aggravating circumstances to the 
underlying criminal act, all factors which speak to the question of ‘ongoing criminal 
character’ become relevant. 
155 See s 3.3.5. 
156 This example refers to the criminality in Jayasekara v Canada, 2008 FCA 404, 
which despite the application of a limited contextual approach, was still held to 
warrant exclusion under Article 1F(b); on seriousness and drug offences, see also: 
M Gottwald, ‘Asylum Claims and Drug Offences: the Seriousness Threshold of 
Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the UN 
Drug Conventions’ (2006) 18 Int J Refugee Law 88. 
157 As stated by Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 12) 
184: “The simplistic approach – here is a serious non-political crime, there is 
exclusion – will likely appeal to administrations and others adverse to a rights 
approach. The failure to consider all the circumstances, however, does an injustice 
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approaches based on national standards and questionable teleological 
integrity have prevailed in many jurisdictions for several years. Stepping 
away from mechanistic approaches by embracing an international and 
contextual framework for determining seriousness will require incremental 
development. Recently, the courts in Canada, the United Kingdom and 
Europe seem to be laying the groundwork for the development of such a 
contextual approach to ‘serious crime’. At the moment, a framework of 
individualised assessment grounded in the overarching human rights 
purpose of the Convention is a somewhat hazy image on the horizon. The 
extent to which that image comes into focus will depend on whether judicial 
momentum in favour of an international approach to the Refugee 
Convention can be sustained and cultivated. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
to the words of article 1F(b), none of which is self-applying, to the object and 




Chapter 4 – ‘Non-Political’ Crime 
4.1 The Scope of this Chapter 
 
 In the previous chapter, the focus shifted to a doctrinal examination 
of exclusion on the basis of Article 1F(b). This examination was informed by 
a human security approach normatively grounded in the protection of core 
human rights. The question addressed by that chapter was whether the 
putatively disqualifying conduct amounts to a serious crime. It was 
concluded that a contextual approach which preserved individualised 
assessment and focused on serious threats to human security would best 
honour the purpose and meaning of the exclusion clause.  
 In this chapter, attention shifts to the requirement under Article 
1F(b) that the disqualifying conduct constitutes a non-political crime. As 
only serious and non-political crimes can result in exclusion from refugee 
status, serious but political crimes do not create the disqualification. The 
idea of a ‘political crime’ is a very thick concept, with both political and 
legal dimensions that now appear in many different fields of discourse. The 
root of the ‘political crime’, however, is grounded in the political offence 
exception found in extradition law. An examination of the history of the 
political offence exception in extradition law is first undertaken. Definitional 
problems immanent to the concept of the ‘political’ are explored. Attempts 
to deal with this uncertainty are then examined, with particular emphasis 
on the judicial development of a ‘proportionality’ test to determining the 
political or non-political nature of a criminal act. Various national 
approaches to the political offence exception are canvassed, both in the 
judicial and legislative realm. The trajectory of these judicial and legislative 
developments has been the gradual narrowing of the concept of the political 
offence, or stated another way, the growing legal depoliticisation of political 
offences. Such depoliticisation has been accomplished through a 
combination of increasingly restrictive judicial interpretations of 
‘proportionality’, and substantive limitations imposed by national and 
transnational legal instruments.  
 The narrowing of the concept of a political offence within extradition 
law is then tied to developments in the counter-terrorism field. This 
counter-terrorism analysis proceeds by examining the following key themes: 
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terrorism as an emerging legal concern; definitional problems at the 
international level; and, regional and national approaches that have 
attached a legally presumptive non-political quality to ‘terrorist’ acts. 
Emerging from this analysis is the main claim that expansionist counter-
terrorism measures have created a pre-emptive tool – the ‘terrorist’ label – 
which seeks to render the political/non-political question irrelevant in both 
extradition law and refugee law. While the pre-emptive power of such 
measures is strongest in certain jurisdictions, such as the United States 
and Australia, the overall normative and legal impact of the counter-
terrorism world on the exclusion question is profound. 
 After focusing on the concept of a ‘political’ offence as it is found in 
extradition and counter-terrorism, the second half of the chapter addresses 
this concept from a refugee law perspective. Stemming from ideas developed 
in the previous chapter, the particular objectives of the exclusion clause are 
examined – objectives which are grounded in the human rights normativity 
of the Refugee Convention and which caution against unreasoned 
conceptual borrowing from other legal fields, namely extradition and 
counter-terrorism. Judicial and legislative approaches to the ‘non-political’ 
question in exclusion are then canvassed, and (as with extradition law) a 
significant narrowing trend is observed. Once again, this trend is marked 
by the increasing legal depoliticisation of political acts, ever-increasing 
substantive limitations, and a normative and legal rejection of political 
violence that may put lives at risk. Such developments have restricted the 
concept of a political crime in Article 1F(b) to the point where it now has 
very little meaning beyond the purely political offence. On the other hand, 
recent movement by the UK and European courts points to an earnest 
attempt to rediscover a contextual, autonomous, refugee law approach to 
deciding the political/non-political question. 
 Those recent judicial attempts at rediscovering contextual 
importance are then harnessed in the final section of this chapter, where a 
human security lens is applied to the ‘non-political’ question within refugee 
law. Several general and specific principles are developed, all of which seek 
to highlight the reflexive nature of a human security approach – it grounds 
both the inclusion and exclusion questions in the human rights standards 
of the Refugee Convention. It asks questions that are aimed at protecting 
the basic security of human individuals. Briefly summarised, a human 
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security approach to the non-political question evinces clear interpretive 
preferences: (1) a focus on the particular and complementary objectives of 
the exclusion clause, which are grounded in human rights standards; (2) 
the development of an autonomous refugee law meaning to the concept of a 
political offence, rather than reliance on the presumptive approaches 
offered by other fields of law; (3) the use of a contextual and individualised 
proportionality approach to deciding the non-political question, an 
approach that examines both the circumstances faced by the offender and 
the circumstances created by the offender; and, (4) a recognition that 
human rights standards can, in limited circumstances and in a particular 
political context, justify the retention of the ‘political’ descriptor even in the 
case of violent or personally injurious conduct. 
 Before those conclusions can be properly and fully understood, it is 
necessary to start at the beginning, in extradition law. The detailed analysis 
that follows serves a greater purpose than simply providing a historical 
account of the political offence exception in extradition law. Because 
refugee law picks up the concept of ‘political crime’ from extradition law, 
understanding its genesis and evolution in the extradition context is vital if 
one is to work with the concept in the exclusion context in a meaningful 
way. 
4.2 Extradition Law 
4.2.1  The History of the Political Offence Exception 
 
A copious amount of judicial and academic discourse has centred on 
the political offence exception in extradition law, tracing its inception and 
evolution. For decades, before it was narrowed into practical insignificance, 
the political offence exception was recognisably the most widely discussed 
problem in extradition law.1 The concept of ‘political crimes’ played a pivotal 
role in determining if a request for extradition would be honoured. Indeed, 
the exceptional quality of ‘political crimes’ and their special legal treatment 
originates not from international refugee law but from nineteenth century 
                                                        
1 Geoff Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law: Extradition 
and other Mechanisms (Martinus Nijhoff 1998) 203-204; Christine Van Den 
Wijngaert, The Political Offence Exception to Extradition: Defining the Issues and 
Searching a Feasible Alternative (Report presented at the International Seminar on 
Extradition, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, Noto, 
Italy, June 1983). 
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developments in extradition law. Prior to these developments, the concept of 
extradition was in fact primarily reserved for political offenders rather than 
common criminals. Monarchs or despotic rulers would render individuals 
who had committed acts against their counterparts in other realms.2 In 
time, however, the French and American revolutions recognised the 
inalienable right of people to fight against governments that threatened 
their liberty.3  This principle produced a reversal in the aim of extradition: 
while common criminals could be extradited to face lawful prosecution in 
another state, political offenders “heroically fighting tyrannical 
governments” would be protected from surrender.4    
Grounded in this broader liberal democratic ethic,5 the legal 
development of the political offence exception in extradition emerged in the 
context of bilateral treaty arrangements rather than as a general norm of 
international law.6 Beginning with the introduction of a political offence 
exception in the Franco-Belgian treaty of 1834,7 the idea that political 
offenders should not be subject to extradition made its way into the treaties 
of most civil and common law countries within a very short period.8 Despite 
this rapid international growth, however, a consistent and universal 
understanding of what was meant by ‘political offence’ was impossible to 
formulate, nor was there any serious attempt to do so. It was left up to the 
requested state, based on its own understanding and interests, to define 
                                                        
2 Lloyd W Grooms and Jane M Samson, ‘The Political Offense Exception to 
Extradition: A 19th Century British Standard in 20th Century American Courts’ 
(1984) 59 Notre Dame L Rev 1005; Jennifer M Corey, ‘Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Doherty: the Politics of Extradition, Deportation, and 
Asylum’ (1992) 16 Md J Int’l L 83, 92-93. 
3 For example: United States Declaration of Independence 1776, para 1: “whenever 
any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends [life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness], it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it.” 
4 Barbara Ann Banoff and Christopher H Pyle, ‘To Surrender Political Offenders: 
The Political Offence Exception to Extradition in United States Law’ (1984) 16 NYU 
J Int’l L & Pol 169, 180-181. 
5 Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) 208-209; see also: 209-211 (Gilbert 
examines how the political offence exception can also be linked to another political 
philosophy being developed in the 19th century, anarchism). 
6 Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, 
OUP 2007) 116. 
7 Belgium-France Extradition Treaty 1834, art 5; in the previous year, Belgium had 
enacted a law that provided for the non-extradition of political offenders: Belgian 
Extradition Act 1833, reprinted in Official Bulletin No. 77 (1833); see: Bram 
Delbecke, ‘The Political Offence and the Safeguarding of the Nation State: 
Constitutional Ideals, French Legal Standards and Belgian Legal Practice, 1830-70’ 
(2013) 1 Comparative Legal History 45. 
8 M Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice (OUP 
2007) 650-655. 
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and determine whether the criminal conduct benefitted from the political 
offence exception. Consequently, the idiosyncratic quality of the exception’s 
application was deeply grounded in the respective political sensibilities and 
interests of the requesting and requested state. Political and military 
alliances have always played a pivotal role.9 Extradition arrangements 
between politically allied and like-minded states often bypass the question 
of ‘political’ crimes, or in some circumstances, omit the exception entirely.10 
In fact, attempts to legally characterise a crime as ‘political’ when it is 
committed in a state similarly minded to the requested state have typically 
been difficult, although not impossible. 
Commentators have noted that in examining the evolution of the 
political offence exception, it is difficult to identify any concrete and 
enduring doctrinal conclusions from the jurisprudence. And yet the phrase 
‘political offence exception’ has endured. Judicial interpretations of the 
exception have varied significantly between different countries, but have 
also been adapted to suit the political events of different time periods. For 
example, the 1920s and 30s produced ‘political offenders’ adhering to 
fascistic or communistic ideologies and employing methods that today 
would be summarily considered ‘terrorism’. The Second World War 
produced ‘collaborators’ and ‘war criminals’, whereas the Cold War 
generated political activists fleeing the Eastern Block and its ‘oppressive’ 
and ‘totalitarian’ regimes. Other more particular conflicts over the past fifty 
years, such as the Algerian conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the 
Northern Ireland conflict, have all produced their own ostensibly ‘political’ 
offender.11 
The nature and content of these subsequent circumstantial 
adaptations of the political offence exception, without a more 
comprehensive overhaul, are inherently problematic. As Gilbert has 
highlighted, the roots of the political offence exception lie in one political 
                                                        
9 Corey, ‘Doherty’ (n 2); Guy S Goodwin-Gill, International Law and the Movement of 
Persons between States (Clarendon Press 1978) 226-228. 
10 For example, in the treaties between communist/socialist states; see: Martin E 
Gold, ‘Non-extradition for Political Offences: the Communist Perspective’ (1970) 11 
Harv Int Law J 191. 
11 Van Den Wijngaert, The Political Offence Exception (n 1) 742-743 (where her 
review of this evolution shows that it is difficult to draw general conclusions, as 
courts have adapted their interpretations to take account of the political context). 
 136 
space, and yet now must be applied most commonly to the opposite 
political space: 
The exemption was aimed to protect people fighting 
for liberal democracy, yet the same language is 
applied today to persons intent on destroying liberal 
democracy. It is evident, therefore, that the exemption 
may be in need of reassessment and it may need to 
be redrafted, in so far as this is possible. To 
paraphrase Jefferson, extradition law cannot be 
made to wear the same clothes it wore in its 
infancy.12 
 
For the time being, no such broader revision within extradition law 
has developed. On this question, that is how and why a requested state has 
historically decided if the political offence exception applies to a given set of 
circumstances, a political realist account is probably still the most 
convincing. Indeed, whether criminal conduct was deemed ‘political’ and 
therefore not subject to extradition was heavily informed not only by 
whether the political ethic of the requesting state is anathema to the 
requested state, but also the extent to which the requested state 
sympathised with the objectives of the particular political activist. For 
example, courts in the United States routinely found members of the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) to benefit from the political 
offence exception while denying the same to members of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO).13 For some time, opposite results were seen 
between these two groups despite similarities in the means and targets of 
the politically charged conduct, and despite the fact that in both cases the 
requesting state was a political ally of the requested state. As will be seen, 
over time there has been a significant narrowing of the political offence 
exception.14 Before its current depreciated status was achieved, however, 
results were heavily informed by political considerations. A closer 
                                                        
12 Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) 209. 
13 For a discussion of the United States cases on this topic, see: Corey, ‘Doherty’ (n 
2) 96-97 (she examines how IRA members have been found to be political offenders, 
while members of other ‘terrorist’ organizations such as the PLO have not fared well 
before United States courts; Corey also rejects the idea that the reason for these 
different results is differences in the targets of the violence (i.e. military versus 
civilian), claiming that a closer examination and comparison of the facts of these 
cases shows striking similarities); see also: Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive 
Offenders (n 1) 228-229; Bassiouni, International Extradition (n 8) 679-695.  
14 Alun Jones, Jones on Extradition and Mutual Assistance (Sweet & Maxwell 2001) 
ch 3; Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) ch 6; Bassiouni, International 
Extradition (n 8) ch viii; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 
6) 123. 
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examination of the political offence exception, and its evolution, is required 
for a proper understanding of that current status.  
4.2.2  Definitional Problems and Concepts of the ‘Political’ 
 
The first point to be made is that the term ‘political offence’ or 
‘political crime’ is a qualitative label assigned to certain conduct rather than 
a definable criminal act with distinct elements. As a result, efforts to create 
a normatively neutral understanding of a political offence, with universal 
application in modern social and political life, are typically circular. As one 
writer has described, the tautological character of attempts to define 
political offences makes them in effect unusable for legal purposes: 
The term “political offence” does not refer to a well-
determined criminal transaction which can be 
specified in terms of a moral and a material element. 
It is rather a descriptive label which can be adhered 
to each offence which subjectively (i.e. in the author’s 
intention) or objectively (i.e. as far as the nature of the 
interests injured or the consequences of the act are 
concerned) affects the polis, i.e. existing sociopolitical 
order. Therefore most definitions of the term political 
offence are tautologous, in the sense that the term 
“political” is usually defined by reference to the 
polis.15 
  
Conceptions of the ‘political’ occupy a very broad spectrum. In fact, 
one might understand any human act as having a political dimension, 
since it occurs within the inescapable context of social and political life. 
Obviously, the political offence exception is presumed to have some 
meaning as an exception, rendering this widest conception useless. Yet, 
even if a seemingly neutral but more focused starting point to defining 
‘political’ is used – any act aimed at the organs of the state – a lack of 
definitional clarity will persist and significant questions will remain. Is that 
definition grounded in a subjective or objective understanding of an act 
aimed at the organs of the state? If subjective, is it the perspective or 
motivation of the actor that matters, or does the perspective of the 
requested state with respect to that conduct carry the day? Or perhaps 
even the perspective of the requesting state plays some role? On the other 
hand, if the understanding of ‘political’ must be grounded in considerations 
                                                        
15 Van Den Wijngaert, The Political Offence Exception (n 1) 744. 
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that are seemingly less perspectival and more objective, is an examination 
of the rights affected by the act determinative? Or must the act also be 
incidental to a struggle for political power?16 
Certainly, the definitional hurdle immanent to a broad term like 
‘political’ is easily appreciated. This hurdle becomes particularly 
problematic when a legal field, such as extradition, demands a workable 
understanding of the concept of a ‘political offence’. It is one thing for most 
extradition arrangements and treaties, as they do, to provide for a political 
offence exception to extradition. It is another matter for agents of 
extradition law to apply that concept to real cases. This inherent 
definitional problem has led many academic and judicial commentators to 
suggest that the particular identification of political offences is simply a 
matter of state practice that is not amenable to a general principle of 
international law.17 As Viscount Radcliffe observed, “no definition has yet 
emerged or by now is ever likely to.”18  And yet some agents have still 
sought to discover a more principled basis to the exception than a simple 
relegation to the realm of state practice. Indeed, if the central purpose of 
the political offence exception is to ensure that the requested state will not 
render a person for prosecution (or, perhaps more accurately, persecution) 
on account of his political beliefs or conduct, then a concept of ‘political 
offence’ that actually serves this purpose is necessary. It is to these 
attempts to establish a workable legal concept of ‘political’ that this chapter 
now turns. 
4.2.3  Juridical Attempts to Create a Workable Concept of 
Political Offence – Early Case Law 
 
Doctrinally, extradition law has tried to cope with the lack of 
definability by conceptually demarcating two main types of political 
offences: (1) pure or absolute political offences, involving direct attacks on 
the organs of the state – offences such as espionage, treason, sedition, and 
                                                        
16 ibid; the importance of each question will vary depending on the approach taken 
with respect to the political offence question, which approaches are developed and 
discussed in s 4.2.3, 4.2.4; see also: Bassiouni, International Extradition (n 8) 656-
657. 
17 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 6) 116; Gilbert, 
Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) 212; Richard B Lillich, The Human Rights of 
Aliens in Contemporary International Law (Manchester University Press 1984) 36. 
18 Schtraks v Israel [1964] AC 556 (HL) 569. 
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membership in a prohibited political party; and (2) relative political 
offences, involving acts of a common criminal nature but with a political 
motivation and a desire to effect change within the state.19 Other 
subcategories of relative political offences are also found within extradition 
law, such as ‘compound’ political offences (where there are elements of both 
absolute and relative offences) or ‘connected’ political offences (where the 
commission of a common offence is followed by the commission of a 
political offence).20 For present purposes, a basic understanding of the 
treatment of relative political offences within extradition law is sufficient, as 
it is the broad principles from this area that have been transposed to 
exclusion in refugee law. 
The earliest, and arguably still most persuasive, jurisprudence on 
the relative political offence exception in extradition law is to be found in a 
series of decisions made by the Swiss courts. While more elaborate 
approaches with subcategories have since been developed, the traditional 
Swiss approach is seen as having established a two-part test focusing on (1) 
predominance, and (2) proportionality.21  The first element, predominance, 
inquires into the motivation of the offender. If the predominant reason for 
engaging in an otherwise common criminal act is political, and a direct 
relationship can be seen between the offence committed and the goal 
sought, then the first part of the test will be satisfied. In general, this 
requirement means that the act in question needs to have been committed 
in connection with a political struggle motivated by political ideology and 
goals. The aim of such a political struggle is to destabilise the balance of 
power within the state or to generate political movement within the state in 
a particular direction.22      
                                                        
19 For an early discussion of the differences between pure and relative political 
offences, see: In re Fabijan (1933) 7 Ann Dig 360 (Supreme Court of Germany) 363-
365; see also: Bassiouni, International Extradition (n 8) 654-655. 
20 A detailed discussion of these categories and subcategories of the political 
offence exception can be found in the following: Jones, Jones on Extradition (n 14) 
ch 3; Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) ch 6; Bassiouni, International 
Extradition (n 8) ch viii. 
21 Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) 234-236; Geoff Gilbert, 
Responding to International Crime (Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 205-228; Joseph Rikhof, 
The Criminal Refugee: The Treatment of Asylum Seekers with a Criminal Background 
in International and Domestic Law (Republic of Letters 2012) 298. 
22 Cheng v Pentonville Prison Governor [1973] AC 931 (HL); In re Nappi (1952) 19 Intl 
L Rep 375 (Switzerland Federal Tribunal). 
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In answering this predominance question, the court is to examine 
motivation in its specific factual context. An appreciation of the factual 
context can be seen as adding an objective component to the analysis. 
Typically, a consideration of context engages the principle that a close, 
direct link between the act and the goal is more likely to be found where the 
act has occurred in a less democratic and more authoritarian state, or in 
the context of a civil war or armed rebellion. In contrast, in democratic 
countries with independent judiciaries, a direct relationship between act 
and goal is seemingly lost – other more acceptable means of achieving 
political change are presumptively available. As the Swiss court in the early 
case of Re Pavan suggested, “Homicide, assassination and murder, is one of 
the most heinous crimes. It can only be justified where no other method 
exists of protecting the final rights or humanity.”23  
While such an examination of context might also be appropriately 
canvassed under proportionality, cases in extradition law tend to treat this 
factor as falling within the predominance question. Even if established, 
however, political predominance or motivation is not on its own sufficient to 
warrant non-extradition on account of the political offence exception. There 
must also exist proportionality between the harm caused by the act and the 
purpose sought to be achieved by the act. While the first part of the test 
looks at motivation, this second part of the test seeks to weigh the harm 
caused by the criminal act on the one hand, and the achievement of a 
political goal in a specific socio-political context on the other. This part of 
the test is seen as infusing an important objective component to the legal 
analysis. Simply stated, the means used must be commensurate with the 
ends pursued. Admittedly, an assessment of proportionality is a qualitative 
weighing exercise that involves the consideration of a number of factors, 
including whether there is a rational connection between the targets of the 
attack and the political objective, or conversely, whether the harm or 
danger is visited upon an indeterminate or indiscriminate number of people 
who are unconnected to the political objective. Again, such considerations 
are to be assessed in a contextual way, taking into account the political 
climate (such as totalitarian regimes or situations of internal armed 
conflict) and whether there were other less damaging ways by which to 
                                                        
23 Re Pavan [1927-1928] Ann Dig 347 (Switzerland Federal Tribunal) 349; the 
penultimate word ‘or’ is probably erroneous as ‘of’ would make more sense. 
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achieve the intended political aim.24 Certainly, these same sensibilities have 
made their way into both counter-terrorism law and refugee law, but with 
significantly variable degrees of impact, a matter that will be discussed in 
subsequent sections of this chapter. The genesis of these concepts, 
however, is grounded in extradition law, where the principles of 
‘predominance’ and ‘proportionality’ in determining the political nature of a 
crime were introduced and developed. 
Interestingly, in contrast to its subsequent narrowing, the Swiss 
cases that developed the predominance and proportionality approach to 
identifying political offences applied it permissively. Consequently, in Re 
Ficorilli,25 the killing of a ‘traitorous’ member of a neo-fascist organisation 
by another member, in the context of an armed struggle, was found to be a 
political offence. The Swiss Court held that, in the context of the Italian civil 
war, and given the political rather than personal motivation of the 
perpetrator, “even the execution…appears to be a political act.”26 Similarly, 
in Re Kavic,27 the Swiss court found that the members of a Yugoslav 
passenger plane were non-extraditable, since in its view the constraining of 
the crew and forcible diversion of the plane to Switzerland for the purpose 
of making an asylum claim was a political offence. In so finding, the Court 
held that it “must not abandon that spirit [of justice] in favour of legalistic 
constructions, and must take account of historical and political 
developments.”  Importantly, the Court emphasised a broad understanding 
of the concept of political struggle, finding previous approaches too 
restrictive in their requirement for a crime committed “in the framework of 
a fight for political power.” Instead, “[s]uch a character must also be 
attributed to offences which were committed in order to escape the 
constraint of a State which makes all opposition and, therefore, the fight for 
power impossible.”28 Admittedly, such an understanding of political 
offences is in keeping with the original purpose of the exception – that is, to 
prevent the rendition of politically motivated offenders who have engaged in 
                                                        
24 Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) 234-236; Rikhof, Criminal Refugee 
(n 21) 298. 
25 In re Ficorilli (1951) (Switzerland Federal Court) < 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b6258.html> accessed 19 March 2014.  
26 ibid; the Court was responding to the claim that the two different offences 
needed to be differentiated, one being political and the other non-political. 
27 In re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic (1952) (Switzerland Federal Court) 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b7448.html> accessed 19 March 2014. 
28 ibid. 
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conduct that is reasonable in the context of the polity in which it was 
committed. And yet, almost certainly those same cases would not now be 
decided in the same way. An examination of the jurisprudential (and then 
legislative) evolution of the political offence exception will reveal the more 
restrictive approach that predominates today. 
4.2.4   National Approaches to the Political Offence Exception 
 
 A full review of national approaches to the political offence exception 
in extradition law is both not possible and not necessary in the context of 
this thesis.29 However, a brief examination of the evolution of two different 
approaches – the ‘incidence’ approach (United Kingdom and United States) 
and the ‘injured rights’ approach (France) will instantiate the key theme: 
initial approaches were both too narrow and too broad, and have moved 
toward the adoption of some form of proportionality test first established by 
the Swiss jurisprudence; and, this movement toward a proportionality 
assessment has generally resulted in a narrower application of the political 
offence exception, severely limiting the types of circumstances that might 
be permissive of its use to refuse an extradition request.30 
 Beginning with the United Kingdom, early statutory references to 
non-extradition for political offences simply speak of offences “of a political 
character.”31 From this blank slate, the courts developed what is commonly 
referred to as the ‘incidence’ test to the political offence exception in 
extradition law, originating in the early case of In re Castioni.32 In order to 
qualify as a political offence, the commission of that offence had to be 
“incidental to and form part of political disturbances.”33 The putative focus 
of this test is not the offender but the offence itself. Whether the offence 
                                                        
29 A comprehensive review of national approaches to the political offence exception, 
examining both similarities and differences, can be found in: Gilbert, Transnational 
Fugitive Offenders (n 1) ch 6. 
30 Jones, Jones on Extradition (n 14) ch 3; Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders 
(n 1) ch 6; Bassiouni, International Extradition (n 8) ch viii; Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 6) 123. 
31 Extradition Act 1870, s 3(1): “a fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the 
offence is one of a political character…or if…the requisition for his surrender has in 
fact been made with a view to try or punish him for an offence of a political 
character” (incorporating the perspective or motivation of the requesting state); 
Fugitive Offenders Act 1967, s 4(1)(a); Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 
1965, s 2(2)(a) (since repealed). 
32 In re Castioni [1891] 1 QB 149 (QB). 
33 ibid 156. 
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was committed ‘in the course of’ and ‘in furtherance of’ an actual political 
struggle is the determinative question.34 According to this approach, the 
actor must be ‘at odds with the State’ and the act must be part of a 
movement contending for political power, in an effort to change the 
government or a government policy. Aside from this incidence aspect, the 
other requirement is some proximity between the act and the aim: robbing a 
bank to fund a political party would be too remote to be labelled a political 
act, whereas killing a dictator would be proximate enough to qualify as 
political.35 
 The ostensibly objective focus of the British incidence test is also 
found in the early American jurisprudence. While not having any statutory 
equivalents to those in the United Kingdom, various bilateral treaties of the 
United States have for many years excluded offences of a ‘political 
character’. Relying on In re Castioni, the U.S. court in In re Ezeta36 held that 
a crime committed ‘in the course of’ or ‘in furtherance of a political 
disturbance’ will be deemed to be an offence of political character.37 
However, the additional proximity consideration found in the UK 
jurisprudence,38 was largely ignored in early American cases. Consequently, 
almost any crime committed during the course of a political disturbance 
was deemed political, even when rather weak connections between act and 
aim were present. As Gilbert argues, such an approach was both too 
narrow and too broad: it was too narrow in its absolute requirement for a 
political uprising, excluding situations where a clearly identifiable political 
uprising or struggle for power was absent; it was too broad in that once 
such a political uprising was found to exist, then almost any acts 
committed by the actor’s political group would fall within the exception.39 In 
fact, in the United States, until 1986 (when judicial and political 
developments changed the landscape), no member of the IRA had ever been 
extradited to the United Kingdom – all acts committed by IRA members 
                                                        
34 ibid 165-166. 
35 Cheng v Pentonville Prison Governor [1973] AC 931 (HL) 945 (Diplock LJ). 
36 In re Ezeta (1894) 62 F 972  (ND Cal Dist Ct). 
37 This interpretation of Ezeta was confirmed in many subsequent cases, as 
discussed in: Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) 227. 
38 In particular, the caution in In re Castioni noted above: text to n 32-34. 
39 Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) 230. 
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were considered to be political offences for which the actor could not be 
extradited.40 
 Over time, however, the ‘objective’ incidence approach was modified 
both in the United Kingdom and in the United States through the 
incorporation of greater proximity requirements (that is, between act and 
aim) and elements of the Swiss proportionality test (that is, between ends 
and means). Much of this judicial movement was generated by a growing 
view that the political offence exception was never meant to apply to the 
type of terrorism emerging in the 1970s and beyond, or perhaps, viewed 
another way, with conduct that the requested state did not want to support 
and would therefore mark with the ‘terrorism’ label. Incorporation of some 
form of proportionality test – which, in contrast to the stricter incidence 
test, allowed for the weighing of ends and means – provided a ready legal 
mechanism by which to exclude conduct from the exception if it was 
considered by the requested state to fall within its understanding of 
terrorist violence.41   
 While these concepts will receive further examination in the following 
sections of this chapter, it is worth stating here that such developments in 
extradition law were tied to broader national and international 
developments with respect to counter-terrorism as a field of law. In fact, it 
is within this broader political and legal context that principles of 
proportionality made significant inroads into the approaches to extradition 
in the United Kingdom and United States. Indeed, it was through the 
adoption of proportionality considerations that the United Kingdom and 
United States could increasingly deny the exception to those activists whose 
conduct was clearly ‘political’ in the traditional sense that it was incidental 
to a political struggle, but could not be endorsed because it harmed an ally, 
or reflected a struggle against rather than for liberal democracy,42 or stated 
                                                        
40 ibid 229; two developments were key to this change in approach toward 
members of the PIRA: the case law after 1986 (when the Court of Appeals agreed to 
extradition in Quinn v Robinson (1986) 783 F 2d 766 (9th Cir, USCA); and the effect 
of the Anglo-US Supplementary Extradition Treaty 1986. 
41 Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) ch 6. 
42 Cheng v Pentonville Prison Governor [1973] AC 931 (HL) (request by the United 
States for attempted murder of the Taiwanese vice-premier, which occurred in New 
York); see also: Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) 205, 218-226;  
German [BVerwG 17.5.1983 – 9 C 874.82 (Admin Ct)] and Irish [Quinn v Wren 
[1985] IR 322 (SC); Russell v Fanning [1988] IR 333 (SC) 340] courts also employ 
similar principles that the act cannot be a fight against democracy, or as the Irish 
courts characterise it, an effort to destroy the very constitutional protections under 
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in its most objective form, was likely to cause indiscriminate injury or death 
to innocent members of the public (i.e. terrorism). Through the ‘objective’ 
lens of a proportionality or proportionality-type approach, distinctly violent 
but nevertheless political acts, such as those of the Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS) in Algeria43 and the PLO in Israel/Palestine,44 became, under the law, 
non-political acts. Certainly, it is ultimately argued here that such acts 
which cause indiscriminate injury should generally not qualify for the 
political offence exception (in either extradition or refugee law). Based on a 
human rights normativity and human security lens that endorse 
contextual, proportionality-type considerations, indiscriminate acts of 
serious violence should generally be legally viewed as non-political. 
Nonetheless, the political reality within which this movement toward 
proportionality gained momentum needs to be understood. 
 Movement toward proportionality is also seen in the judicial 
approaches to the political offence exception in France, but from a different 
trajectory. Originally, the French position was the clearest illustration of the 
‘injured rights’ theory of the political offence exception: “Political offences 
are those which injure the political organism, which are directed against 
the constitution of the Government and against sovereignty…The offence 
does not derive its political character from the motive of the offender, but 
from the nature of the rights it injures.”45 In this classic form, the injured 
rights approach is meant to serve as a purely objective framework, asking 
whether the act injures the rights of the requesting state and only those 
rights. The narrowness of such an approach should be immediately 
apparent – the crimes must affect only the state and must not in any way 
harm an individual, even if that individual is a key member of the state 
apparatus such as a head of state. Plainly, the problem with such an 
approach is that it would only ever apply to pure or absolute political 
offences such as espionage or sedition. The perpetrator of a relative political 
offence could never benefit from the exception, since his conduct, in that it 
                                                                                                                                                            
which they now seek protection from extradition; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 
Refugee in International Law (n 6) 118. 
43 T v SSHD [1996] AC 742 (HL) (where the Court uses proportionality directly – the 
crime’s proportionality to its political objective, and its degree of ‘atrocity’). 
44 Eain v Wilkes (1981) 641 F 2d 504 (7th Cir, USCA) (where the Court said it was 
leaving ‘proportionality’ to another day, instead using the principle of ‘proximity’ 
(between the offence and goal) to essentially achieve the same result). 
45 Re Giovanni Gatti [1947] Ann Dig 145, 145-146 (as reproduced in Gilbert, 
Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) 217).  
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combines political and common criminal elements, would by its very nature 
injure some rights beyond those of the state as a political organ.46 
 While the nature of the rights injured remains a consideration that is 
to be taken into account, the injured rights approach was unworkable as 
the determinative question in deciding whether the political offence 
exception would apply. As such, the French courts moved away from it and 
toward the adoption of the Swiss predominance and proportionality 
approach. The Swiss approach has allowed the courts to consider the 
exception in both pure and relative political offence situations. This has 
not, however, necessarily meant a broader application of the exception to 
situations previously not covered by it. In fact, the opposite has been seen 
in the case of Basque separatists. Traditionally protected from extradition 
to Spain, the French Conseil d’Etat has rejected claims to the political 
offence exception in cases where the gravity of the offence (such as armed 
attacks) is said to deprive it of its political character.47 Undeniably, the 
depoliticisation of politically motivated conduct because of its lack of 
proximity to the goal, or because of the effect of the means chosen, is 
‘proportionality’ language. 
 In fact, proportionality has now found a primary place in almost all 
national approaches to the political offence exception, even though there 
are some nuances to its application. Apart from those discussed above, 
Ireland is another clear example. Early Irish decisions largely ignored the 
nature of the conduct if the extradition request was made by the United 
Kingdom.48 Over time, however, notions of proportionality between ends 
and means began to infuse the jurisprudence. Particularly ‘brutal, cowardly 
and callous’ conduct could not benefit from the exception irrespective of the 
actor’s easily understood political motivation within a clear and present 
struggle for power.49 Across national juridical boundaries, the legal 
                                                        
46 Thomas E Carbonneau, ‘The Political Offence Exception to Extradition and 
Transnational Terrorists: Old Doctrine Reformulated and New Norms Created’ 
(1977) 1 ASILS Int’l L J 1, 19-22; In re Colman [1947] Ann Dig 139; In re Hennin 
[1967] La Semaine Juridique 15274. 
47 Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) 233-234. 
48 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 6) 120. 
49 McGlinchey v Wren [1982] IR 154 (SC) 159: “Modern terrorist violence…is often 
the antithesis of what could be regarded as political.” (the murder of an elderly 
postmistress by the PIRA); Shannon v Fanning [1984] IR 548 (SC) (the murder of a 
former Speaker of the Northern Ireland Parliament and his son); Ellis v O’Dea (No. 
2) [1991] ILRM 346 (HC & SC); see also: Geoff Gilbert, ‘The Irish Interpretation of 
the Political Offence Exception’ (1992) 41(1) Int’l & Comp L Q 66. 
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depoliticisation through proportionality of seriously injurious political 
conduct is obvious. Nonetheless, this narrowing of the concept of a political 
offence has received strength from outside the judicial realm as well. 
Paralleling judicial depoliticisation of political offences have been various 
statutory and treaty developments that have progressively limited the legal 
ambit of the political offence.  
4.2.5   Narrowing of the Political Offence Exception – Statutory 
Tools and Bilateral and Regional Treaty Arrangements 
 
In addition to the general judicial narrowing of circumstances under 
which the political offence exception could apply, national statutory and 
transnational treaty initiatives have considerably restricted the legal 
concept of a political offence. This is not to suggest that such substantive 
limitations on the political offence exception are a new idea. In fact, 
substantive restrictions have existed for some time, particularly in the 
European context. They have typically arisen (although are not limited to) 
the counter-terrorism context, both by treaty and domestic legislation – for 
example, the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,50 
originally implemented in the United Kingdom through the Suppression of 
Terrorism Act.51 Furthermore, over time, bilateral (e.g. Anglo-US 
Supplementary Extradition Treaty),52 regional (e.g. Convention relating to 
Extradition between Member States of the European Union),53 and 
international (e.g. International Convention for the Protection of All persons 
                                                        
50 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977; the Convention 
provides that certain offences shall not be considered political offences: offences 
against aircraft; internationally protected persons; kidnapping or hostage-taking; 
use of explosives or automatic firearms endangering persons (art 1); states may 
also decide to not regard as political offences which create a danger to life, physical 
integrity, or liberty of persons, or offences directed at property which create a 
collective danger for persons (art 2). 
51 Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978, as repealed and amended by Extradition Act 
2003. 
52 Anglo-US Supplementary Extradition Treaty 1986; art 4(2) of this Treaty provides 
a good indication of the types of offences typically excluded from the political 
offence exception, including (among others) murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, 
hostage-taking, and the possession and use of incendiary devices. 
53 Convention relating to Extradition between Member States of the European 
Union 1996, art 5; the Convention was subsequently replaced by Council 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant [2002] OJ L190/1. 
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from Enforced Disappearance, 2010)54 treaties have all sought to restrict the 
availability of the political offence exception. This restriction occurs on two 
theoretical bases: (1) the shared political values of the party states; and (2) 
the depoliticised understanding of seriously injurious conduct regardless of 
its political motivation and context. 
Although a thorough review of treaty and statutory arrangements 
which have limited the political offence exception is well outside the scope 
of this chapter, the European context instantiates both of these two key 
justifications for substantive limitations. Dealing first with the shared 
values approach to restricting the exception, the Convention relating to 
Extradition between Member States of the European Union, 1996 (although 
subsequently replaced by a Framework Decision) is particularly illustrative. 
While stopping short of an outright ban on the political offence exception, 
the convention stresses that extradition between member states should be 
rapid and efficient.55 Moreover, as all states are democracies that observe 
the rule of law and comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, 
an offence for which an individual’s extradition is sought by another 
member state may not “be regarded by the requested Member state as a 
political offence, as an offence connected with a political offence or an 
offence inspired by political motives.”56 The normative justification here is 
grounded in the claim that no European state would seek to disguise 
political persecution as a common criminal prosecution. If another member 
state has requested the extradition of an individual to face criminal 
                                                        
54 International Convention for the Protection of All persons from Enforced 
Disappearance 2010, art 13: the offence of enforced disappearance shall not be 
regarded as a political offence for the purpose of extradition. 
55 Convention relating to Extradition between Member States of the European 
Union 1996, preamble: “STRESSING that Member States have an interest in 
ensuring that extradition procedures operate efficiently and rapidly in so far as 
their systems of government are based on democratic principles and they comply 
with the obligations laid down by the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950”; the 
convention was subsequently replaced by Council Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant [2002] OJ 
L190/1. 
56 ibid, art 5; however, under art 5(2), states can provide notification that this 
exclusion only applies to offences proscribed by the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism 1977; Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism 2005, art 20; see also: Harmen Van Der Wilt, ‘The Political Offence 
Exception in Extradition Law: An Antidote to Prefixed Ideas About Political 
Integration in Europe?’ (1997) 4(1) Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 25. 
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prosecution, then presumptively that prosecution relates to serious conduct 
for which a common criminal character predominates. 
The second justification for substantive limitations is found in the 
nature of the conduct itself. In the European context, two Directives of the 
EU Council of Ministers add to an understanding of extradition that 
“particularly cruel actions” are non-political, even if they are committed 
with a political objective.57 Here, the normative justification is that certain 
conduct, regardless of its context, will fail any proportionality assessment 
required for the political offence exception to have application. Indeed, this 
European regional understanding does not stand alone. The exemption of 
certain conduct from the political offence exception based on its 
seriousness, such as murder or attempted murder, exists at the national 
and bilateral level in many contexts. While this trend will be revisited in 
subsequent sections of this chapter, it is worth noting here that countries 
such as Australia and the United States have excluded, both from the 
political offence exception in extradition law and the non-political offence 
exception in refugee law, a very long list of activities considered to fall 
under their legal understanding of ‘terrorism’.58   
At the international level, very serious crimes such as genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity have long been excluded from the 
political offence exception.59 The key point, however, is that the types of 
offences which presumptively fail any proportionality test has continued to 
grow to a very long list, both within particular national or treaty 
                                                        
57 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving 
temporary protection [2001] OJ L212/12 (Temporary Protection Directive) art 
28(1)(a)(ii); Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or 
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection [2011] OJ L337/19 
(Asylum Directive) art 12(2)(b): “particularly cruel actions, even if committed with 
an allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious non-political crimes.” 
(this Directive is a recasting of the 2004 Council Directive 2004/83/EC); in the 
refugee context, the UNHCR has criticised the concept of ‘particularly cruel actions’ 
as being too vague and without meaning in international law: UNHCR, Statement 
on Article 1F of the 1951 Convention: Issued in the context of the preliminary ruling 
references to the Court of Justice of the European Communities from the German 
Federal Administrative Court regarding the interpretation of Articles 12(2)(b) and (c) of 
the Qualification Directive (July 2009) (Statement on Article 1F), s 4.1.1.2. 
58 s 4.3.3, 4.4.2 below. 
59 For example: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide 1948, art III (provides that genocide cannot be considered a ‘political’ 
offence for the purpose of extradition); for a comprehensive overview, see: M Cherif 
Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (Kluwer Law 
1999). 
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arrangements, and internationally. The Yugoslav aircraft hijackers in Re 
Kavic60 (discussed above), to whom the Swiss court granted the political 
offence exception, would not today receive the same treatment. Also, almost 
certainly now exempt from the political offence exception would be those 
who compromise maritime safety,61 who threaten or use force against 
diplomats,62 who take hostages,63 or who finance ‘terrorist’ activity,64 to 
name a few. Some of the treaties applicable to these acts specifically 
exclude the political offence exception, while others have become subject 
more generally to the presumptions attaching to crime that is considered 
internationally serious.65 In fact, all of this conduct now falls within the 
purview of ‘international crime’ – it is the subject of both transnational and 
international suppression efforts as a serious matter deserving of universal 
concern. Of course, the quid pro quo of the transnational and international 
disapprobation of such conduct is its legal depoliticisation.  
Such conduct is no longer, irrespective of context, considered a 
reasonable or proportionate way to pursue a political objective. The very 
nature of the conduct – in that it lacks proximity and spreads its effects too 
widely or indiscriminately – causes it to lose its political character. 
Academic discourse about the real foundations of such developments is 
vast, spanning from the universalist to the anarchist. On the one side, 
there are those who believe that “with respect to violent crimes, the political 
                                                        
60 In re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic (1952) (Switzerland Federal Court) 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b7448.html> accessed 19 March 2014. 
61 As proscribed internationally by: Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988, together with its Protocol, 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the 
Continental Shelf 1988. 
62 Organization of American States Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of 
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that 
are of International Significance (Inter-American) 1971; Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents 1973, art 7, 8 (demonstrate the principle that with 
respect to such ‘international crimes’, the state must either extradite or prosecute 
the offence itself). 
63 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 1979. 
64 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
1999; art 6 removes the political offence exception; art 7 establishes universal 
jurisdiction. 
65 There is an interplay here between the political offence exception and the aut 
dedere, aut iudicare principle (extradite or prosecute). Even if an international 
convention does not specifically exclude the political offence exception, states need 
to be prepared to prosecute the offence themselves if they do not extradite. This is 
the complementary nature of the state obligations created at the international level. 
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offence has no place in extradition treaties between stable democracies.”66 
On the other side, there are those who reject the entire political system on 
which the concept of extradition is based.67 Somewhere in the middle are 
those who see some very limited role for serious or violent acts, even in so-
called stable democracies.68 One needs to examine the actual practice in 
these democracies, and “allow violent action, therefore, in limited 
circumstances where the State was not fulfilling its democratic credentials 
and the action was proportionate to that level of failure.”69 At this point, the 
firmly entrenched notion of conduct ‘universally’ condemned among 
Western liberal democracies (incorporating both normative justifications for 
depoliticisation of political offences) seems to be winning the day in 
extradition law. As commentators have been observing for some time now, 
the political offence exception has been narrowed over the years to very 
limited circumstances. As claimed at several points in this chapter already, 
such a restrictive view of political offences within extradition law (both 
judicially and legislatively) is largely tied to developments in the counter-
terrorism field. In this sense, the depoliticisation of politically motivated 
conduct is a legal development that spans different fields of law. It is to a 
closer examination of counter-terrorism law that this chapter now turns. 
4.3 Counter-terrorism Law 
4.3.1  Terrorism as an Emerging Legal Concern 
 
 Firstly, it is plain that a comprehensive account of counter-terrorism 
law is not possible within the confines of this thesis. Large amounts of 
judicial and academic discourse have emerged in this field, particularly 
since the attacks of September 11. This section of the chapter will not 
endeavour to engage with all or even most of that literature. Rather, those 
aspects of counter-terrorism law that have had the greatest impact on how 
refugee law has dealt with ‘terrorist’ acts within exclusion determinations 
                                                        
66 Statement of Judge Sofaer, Legal Adviser, US State Department, Senate Hearing 
on the Anglo-US Supplementary Extradition Treaty, S Hrg 99-7-3, 1 August 1985.  
67 Robert Paul Wolff, The Rule of Law (Simon and Schuster 1971) 60-64. 
68 Ted Honderich, Three Essays on Political Violence (B Blackwell 1976) 109-110; 
contrast with a view that disobedience in a democracy must be non-violent: John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Clarendon Press 1972) 364;  for a comprehensive 
examination of different perspectives, see: Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders 
(n 1) 269-281. 
69 Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) 278. 
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will be explored. A brief elucidation of terrorism as a legal concept, 
definitional problems immanent to that status as a legal concept, and 
trends that have set the foundation for legal depoliticisation will be 
undertaken. How these particular developments within the counter-
terrorism field have impacted on understandings of exclusion within 
refugee law will then, together with the lessons from extradition law, be 
considered in the remaining sections of this chapter. 
 Ironically, the concept of ‘terrorism’ – which in the legal discourse of 
extradition and refugee law represents a clear example of conduct that is 
non-political – is a fundamentally political construct. Its genesis rests not in 
legal but in political discourse.70 Also ironically, at its roots terrorism was 
understood as a tool used by the state to exert control, rather than the 
common modern understanding of terrorism as a tool used by individuals 
or groups acting against the state.71 Accounts of how and why the concept 
of terrorism was transformed into a legal concern about the conduct of non-
state actors vary depending on the theoretical foundations of their authors. 
Some see it as a logical extension of the growing universal condemnation of 
conduct that violates basic human rights and human dignity (i.e. a sensible 
extension of international legal concern over acts which are so grave that 
they transcend traditional ideas about sovereignty). In contrast, others 
would emphasise that this transformation of terrorism into a legal 
construct aimed at non-state actors is the exercise of political power and 
control (both nationally and internationally) by other means – the use of law 
books instead of tanks.72     
                                                        
70 Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (OUP 2006) 1-2. 
71 Its genesis is in the Jacobin Terror or ‘Reign of Terror’ in France between 1793 
and 1794; see: Michael Philip Carter, ‘The French Revolution: “Jacobin Terror”’ in 
David C Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (eds), The Morality of Terrorism: Religious 
and Secular Justifications (2nd edn, Columbia University Press 1989) 151; Vincent 
Robert Johnson, ‘The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens of 
1789, the Reign of Terror, and the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris’ (1990) 13(1) 
Boston College Int’l & Comp L Rev 1. 
72 For a variety of perspectives, see: Ana Maria Salinas de Frias, Katja Samuel and 
Nigel White (eds), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (OUP 2012); 
Kimberley N Trapp, State Responsibility for International Terrorism (OUP 2011); 
Nigel D White, ‘Preventive Counter-terrorism and International Law’ (2013) 18(2) J 
Conflict & Sec L 181; Alex Conte, ‘Human rights beyond borders: a new era in 
human rights accountability for transnational counter-terrorism operations?’ 
(2013) 18(2) J Conflict & Sec L 233; Mathieu Deflem, ‘Global Rule of Law or Global 
Rule of Law Enforcement? International Police Cooperation and Counter-terrorism’ 
(2006) 603 Ann Am Acad Polit Soc Sci 240; Mark D Kielsgard, ‘A Human Rights 
Approach to Counter-terrorism’ (2006) 36 Cal W Int’l L J 249; George D Brown, 
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As stated, the field is vast. Many other differentially grounded 
accounts of counter-terrorism as a legal discipline are to be found. 
Regardless of which account is adhered to, however, it is contended here 
that the political and legal power immanent to the ‘terrorism’ label is 
inescapable. Authority over the very use of the term carries weighty political 
and legal power: 
[T]he particular semantic power of the term…is its 
capacity to stigmatize, delegitimize, denigrate, and 
dehumanize those at whom it is directed, including 
legitimate political opponents. The term is 
ideologically and politically loaded; pejorative; implies 
moral, social, and value judgment; and is ‘slippery 
and much-abused’. In the absence of a definition of 
terrorism, the struggle over the representation of a 
violent act is a struggle over its legitimacy. The more 
confused a concept, the more it lends itself to 
opportunistic appropriation.73 
 
What is immediately apparent about the above observations is that 
they apply equally to terrorism as a political and as a legal concept. In fact, 
the two appear inextricably connected, leading one to question whether any 
separation is even possible. Sceptics will claim that no meaningful 
differentiation between the political reality and legal conceptualisation of 
terrorism can be made – all accounts will be inherently perspectival and 
interest-based. And yet legal systems, of national, transnational and 
international dimensions, have all had to grapple with the reality of violent 
acts politically and popularly labelled as terrorism. However one views the 
development of the concept of terrorism, the undeniable reality is that law 
must now deal with terrorism in some way. As with the hope that grounds 
this thesis in relation to refugee law, the vision with respect to counter-
terrorism is that “legal definition could plausibly retrieve terrorism from the 
ideological quagmire, be severing an agreed legal meaning from the 
remainder of the elastic, political concept.”74 The other option, that is 
relegating the legal definition of terrorism to subjective state practice, is 
inherently problematic for concerns like refugee law that are grounded in 
international normativity and law. Nonetheless, success at achieving a 
                                                                                                                                                            
‘Counter-Counter-Terrorism via Law Suit: the Bivens Impasse’ (2009) 82 S Cal L 
Rev 841; P Green and T Ward, State Crime: Governments, Violence and Corruption 
(Pluto Press 2004). 
73 Saul, Defining Terrorism (n 70) 3. 
74 ibid 4. 
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common understanding of terrorism as a legal concept has been qualified at 
best. Important obstacles remain. 
 
4.3.2  Definitional Problems: Terrorism as an International Legal 
Concept 
 
 The first observation to be made is a trite one: an international legal 
definition of terrorism has remained elusive. This has led some in refugee 
law to question whether, as a result, the legal concept of terrorism has any 
use whatsoever in the exclusion context.75 A return to this debate will be 
made in the sections that follow. For the time being, a review of what does 
and does not exist at the international level in terms of defining terrorism 
will be explored. 
 What does not exist is a binding legal definition of terrorism at 
international law. What does exist is a patchwork of suggested definitions 
and specialised, topical treaties and conventions. An early attempt to define 
‘acts of terrorism’ by the League of Nations in 1937 focused on “criminal 
acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of 
terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the 
general public.”76 The proposed Convention then attempted to set out the 
types of very serious acts, those against the person and against property, 
which would be included in the definition. However, the Convention never 
received enough support to enter into force, and the question only 
resurfaced in a meaningful way in the aftermath of the 1972 Munich 
Olympic Games.77 Attempts have never resulted in a legally binding 
definition, although the negotiation of a Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism produced a 2005 draft definition that comes the 
closest to a concrete legal understanding of terrorism. That definition 
speaks, inter alia, of persons committing a terrorist offence when they 
                                                        
75 On debates about the value of terrorism as a concept for use in refugee law, see: 
Ben Saul, ‘Exclusion of Suspected Terrorists from Asylum: Trends in International 
and European Refugee Law’ (2005) The Institute for International Integration 
Studies Discussion Paper Series (Paper 26) 12; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee 
in International Law (n 6) 191-197; Erika Feller, ‘Asylum, Migration and Refugee 
Protection: Realities, Myths and the Promise of Things to Come’ (2006) 18(3/4) Int 
J Refugee Law 509. 
76 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 1937 (never entered 
into force). 
77 Alex Schmid, ‘Terrorism – The Definitional Problem’ (2004) 36 Case W Res J Int'l 
L 375, 385-395. 
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unlawfully and intentionally cause death, serious bodily injury, or serious 
damage to public or private property, where the aim of such conduct “is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”78 
 However, even this definition could not garner sufficient consensus 
to achieve binding international status. Clearly, demarcating the legal from 
the political is a formidable task, particularly at the international level. 
Disagreements persist about issues such as whether national liberation 
movements would be exempt from the definition, and whether the actions of 
states could come within its purview. At their core, these disagreements 
reflect “more a political than a legal or semantic problem.”79 As articulated 
above, a struggle for the legal representation of violence is in essence a 
struggle over its legitimacy. Different participants continue to espouse 
different representations about the limitations of legitimate violence, 
depending on their own political sensibilities and interests. Undeniably, 
“there are so many conflicting definitions of terrorism precisely because 
terrorism scholars have realized that judgements about what is and is not 
terrorism are inherently contested.”80 Consequently, agreement on a 
comprehensive legal definition of terrorism with broad application has been 
unattainable. Instead, international agreement has primarily been found 
through more specialised treaties concerning activity that is now commonly 
understood to fall within the wider umbrella of ‘terrorism’. 
 This piece-meal approach to legally defining and proscribing terrorist 
activity is exemplified through various international treaties.81 These 
include, but are not limited to, treaties that concern acts against aviation,82 
                                                        
78 United Nations Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (Draft) 
(UN Doc. A/59/894) app II, art 2(1); art 6 provides that the acts proscribed by the 
Convention cannot be justified by political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or other similar considerations; art 8 requires states to take appropriate 
measures to deny refugee status to those who have committed acts proscribed by 
the Convention. 
79 Alex Schmid, ‘Terrorism’ (n 77) 390. 
80 John Horgan and Michael J Boyle, ‘A Case Against ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’’ 
(2008) 1(1) Critical Studies on Terrorism 51, 56. 
81 For an overview, see: A Sambie, A Du Plessis and M Polaine, Counter-Terrorism 
Law and Practice, An International Handbook (OUP 2009); RJ Currie, International 
and Transnational Criminal Law (Irwin Law 2010). 
82 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 
1963; Hague Hijacking Convention 1970; Montreal Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civilian Aviation 1971, together with its 1988 
Protocol. 
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acts of terrorist bombings,83 terrorist financing,84 nuclear terrorism,85 
hostage taking,86 maritime terrorism,87 and acts against internationally 
protected persons.88 Moreover, in keeping with the understanding that 
terrorist activity is, by its very nature, a phenomenon which loses its 
political character and gains a predominantly criminal character, several of 
these treaties (the first four mentioned above) specifically preclude the 
application of the political offence exception. Other treaties may not 
specifically exclude the operation of the political offence exception, but 
strong normative and legal presumptions that terrorist activity would fail 
any proportionality assessment and thereby be deemed non-political still 
apply.89 In fact, ‘terrorism’ ostensibly reflects the antithesis of legitimate 
forms of manifesting political opposition and struggle.  
 While certainly in development beforehand, international efforts in 
the counter-terrorism field burgeoned after September 11. Security Council 
Resolution 1373, among other UN initiatives, has strengthened the import 
of these international instruments by calling on states to actively combat 
terrorism.90 Importantly, it has also established links between terrorism 
and abuse of the international refugee and extradition law systems.91 
                                                        
83 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997. 
84 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
1999; art 6 removes the political offence exception. 
85 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2005. 
86 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 1979. 
87 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation 1988, together with its Protocol, Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf 1988. 
88 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 1973. 
89 The international treaties concerning aircraft, terrorist bombings, terrorist 
finance and nuclear terrorism preclude the finding of a political offence; the others 
do not contain this specific exclusion, but as instruments proscribing certain types 
of crime as being grave and of international concern, the legal depoliticisation of 
such acts is nevertheless strong; see: Sambie et al, Counter-terrorism Law and 
Practice (n 81); with respect to the acts covered by these and other treaties, and 
acts which are not covered by a specific treaty but which may fall under customary 
international law, see: Bassiouni, International Extradition (n 8) 718-722. 
90 UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), calling on states to escalate efforts 
in combating terrorism. 
91 ibid; in particular, art 3(f) makes the association between ‘terrorists’ and abuse 
of refugee or asylum systems; art 3(g) does the same with respect to extradition; art 
5 declares that ‘terrorist’ acts are contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations (a reference to Article 1F(c) of the Refugee Convention); also 
important are UN Security Council Resolution 1269 (1999) and UN Security 
Council Resolution 1624 (2005); these Resolutions have been widely used by states 
to introduce restrictive measures in refugee law; see: Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘Forced 
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Indeed, the currently predominating theory of how terrorism must relate to 
extradition and refugee law is captured in the maxim aut dedere, aut 
iudicare – either extradite or prosecute. The notion that no ‘terrorist’ should 
find safe haven anywhere in the world is now firmly entrenched by a 
combination of international legal and political instruments. And yet this 
principle does not necessarily fit comfortably with the political offence 
question. If the perpetrator of a ‘terrorist’ act is extradited, the offence has 
been found to be non-political. On the other hand, if extradition is not 
granted because the offence is considered to fall within the exception 
(assuming the exception is not precluded within the particular factual 
context), and the perpetrator is granted some form of asylum, how then 
could the receiving state prosecute the perpetrator for an offence that it has 
found fits within the ambit of a political offence? To be sure, there may be 
circumstances where extradition, or an immigration-based form of removal, 
is refused on other bases (such as lack of fair trial) and not because the 
offence has been found to be political. In these circumstances, domestic 
prosecution may be possible on the ground of universal jurisdiction over 
international crimes. However, as Goodwin-Gill maintains, the aut dedere, 
aut iudicare maxim does not entirely resolve the issues flowing from the 
intersection of international counter-terrorism measures with extradition 
and refugee law. Removal to persecution – the principal harm that the 
Refugee Convention aims to avoid – remains possible.92 
  Another development at the international counter-terrorism level 
which presents discrete problems for extradition and refugee law is the 
practice of listing organisations and/or individuals involved in terrorist 
activities. These issues will be explored further in the section on Article 
1F(b) exclusion law below. However, at this point, it is noteworthy that 
listing serves functions at both the international and national level. At the 
international level, listing allows for the freezing and forfeiture of assets and 
for the issuance of travel bans.93 More importantly for purposes here, 
                                                                                                                                                            
Migration: Refugees, Rights and Security’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Forced Migration, 
Human Rights and Security (Hart Publishing 2008) ch 1. 
92 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 6) 177-178; see also: 
Catherine Dauvergne, ‘The Troublesome Intersection of Refugee Law and Criminal 
Law’ in Katja Franko Aas and Mary Bosworth (eds), The Borders of Punishment: 
Migration, Citizenship and Social Exclusion (OUP 2013) 82-88. 
93 UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) and UN Security Council Resolution 
1989 (2011); the so-called Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee lists organizations and 
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international listing allows for presumptive proof of involvement in terrorist 
activity, in the context of proceedings that occur at the national level, 
including refugee law proceedings where criminality exclusion is at issue.94 
Further, since the terrorism label carries either presumptive or conclusive 
failure of proportionality, and therefore a non-political label, exclusion can 
become a mechanistic rather than a contextual exercise. This trend is 
visible in the national approaches of several countries, and especially the 
United States and Australia (to be discussed in greater detail below). Such 
trends have received strength both by international developments in 
counter-terrorism and by regional and national ones. It is to a 
consideration of the regional and national dimension that this chapter now 
turns. 
4.3.3  Regional and National Approaches to Counter-terrorism: 
Further Trends toward the Legally Presumptive Non-
Political Quality of Terrorist Acts 
 
 Regionally, counter-terrorism treaties have existed for some time. 
Africa,95 Asia,96 the Arab world,97 the Americas,98 and Europe99 all have 
counter-terrorism treaties. Some of these treaties seemed to simply reaffirm 
international counter-terrorism treaties at a regional level, while others 
sought to define and treat terrorism more comprehensively as a criminal 
and transnational concern. In terms of transnational understandings of 
                                                                                                                                                            
individuals subject to asset-freezing and travel bans; this sanctions regime has 
been subject to much criticism; see: Didier Pacquee and Steven Dewulf, ‘Protecting 
human rights in the war on terror: challenging the sanctions regime originating 
from Resolution 1267 (1999)’ (2006) 24(4) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
607; Rene Uruena, ‘International law as administration: the UN's 1267 Sanctions 
Committee and the making of the war on terror’ (2007) 4(2) Int’l Org L Rev 321; 
Sambie et al, Counter-Terrorism Law and Practice (n 81) 288-302. 
94 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 21) 305-306; note that in Joined Cases C-57/09 and 
C101-09 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D [2010] ECR I-10979, the Court 
concluded that listing was conclusive with respect to the nature of the 
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95 Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism 1999. 
96 South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation Regional Convention on 
Suppression of Terrorism 1987. 
97 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Cairo 1998; Convention of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism 1999. 
98 Organization of American States Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of 
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that 
are of International Significance 1971; Inter-American Convention Against 
Terrorism 2002. 
99 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977; European 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005. 
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terrorism, the definition of terrorism suggested by the European Council 
Position and Framework Decisions is particularly instructive. A ‘terrorist 
act’ is considered to have both an objective and subjective dimension: (1) an 
objective injured rights dimension - an act which “may seriously damage a 
country or an international organisation”; and, (2) a purposive dimension  - 
“committed with the aim of…seriously intimidating a population, 
or…unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to 
[certain action or inaction], or…seriously destabilising or destroying 
fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures…” 
Specific acts are then listed exemplifying a serious destabilisation or 
destruction of such social structures, including various forms of attacks on 
people and property. Existing international treaties certainly already cover 
some of these acts, while others expand the types of activities that fall 
under the concept of terrorism.100  
 Most importantly, whether they simply reaffirm existing international 
understandings of terrorism or expand it, none of the regional counter-
terrorism treaties recognise the political offence exception.101 Again, the 
principle at work here is that conduct which can be legally labelled as 
‘terrorist’ is by its very nature disproportionate to any putative political 
objective. That is, subsumed within the definition of a ‘terrorist act’ is that 
it is an illegitimate expression of political violence. Conduct cannot legally 
be both ‘terrorist’ and ‘political’. The later 2002 convention applicable to the 
Organization of American States makes this explicit, asserting that 
someone who has committed a terrorist offence within the meaning of the 
convention cannot receive refugee status or asylum.102 The clear message is 
                                                        
100 Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific 
measures to combat terrorism [2001] OJ L344/93, art 1(3); Council Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism [2002] OJ L164, 
art 1 (terrorist offences and fundamental rights and principles), and preamble (3) 
(terrorist acts cannot be regarded as political offences); Council Framework 
Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism [2008] OJ L330/21, art 1 (expanding 
offences ‘linked to terrorist offences’); see: Eugenia Dumitriu, ‘The E.U.’s Definition 
of Terrorism: The Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism’ (2004) 5 
German Law Journal 585; for a rule of law paradigm applied to European counter-
terrorism measures, see: Cian C Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-Emption 
and the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing 2012).  
101 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 21) 302. 
102 Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism 2002, art 12: Each state party 
shall take appropriate measures, consistent with the relevant provisions of national 
and international law, for the purpose of ensuring that refugee status is not 
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that no refugee law analysis is required. Exclusion from refugee status or 
asylum is a necessary and absolute implication of the terrorism label. 
 Regional trends toward the presumptive (or even conclusive) non-
political legal quality of terrorist acts have also made their way down to the 
national level, particularly in the post-September 11 climate. The clearest 
example of this trend is the legislative and executive zeal exercised in the 
United States. Combined with a simultaneous bar on asylum for the 
perpetrators of terrorist activities,103 the USA Patriot Act104 and REAL ID 
Act105 have created an expansionist legal understanding of terrorist acts. 
Those who have committed or are likely to commit a terrorist act, who incite 
such an act, or who represent or are members of organisations that endorse 
or espouse such an act, fall within the terrorism purview. Terrorist activity, 
which may be committed individually or as a member of group, includes 
conduct such as preparing or gathering of information, soliciting funds, 
providing material support, and receiving or harbouring others. In turn, 
some of these acts, such as ‘material support’ and membership, are subject 
to very broad interpretation. Such interpretations have gone well beyond 
the limits of membership, support or complicity as legally circumscribed in 
refugee law. Added to these new legislative counter-terrorism measures, the 
United States has created broad powers of designation at the executive 
level, with similar parallel effect on refugee law.106 Most importantly for 
purposes here, the expansionist interpretations developed by counter-
terrorism law have, in the United States, received judicial approval in the 
immigration and refugee law context as well.107 
                                                                                                                                                            
granted to any person in respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering 
that he or she has committed an offense established in the international 
instruments listed in Article 2 of this Convention. 
103 Immigration and Nationality Act 1952, as amended, s 208(b)(2)(A) (criminality 
bars to exclusion go beyond Article 1F; the Act also contains expanded definitions 
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105 REAL ID Act 2005. 
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 This significantly expansionist trend generated by counter-terrorism 
measures can be seen not only in the United States but in other countries 
as well, most notably Australia. Through legislative amendments brought 
post-September 11, a long list of ‘terrorist’ activity is now a priori excluded 
from being considered ‘political’, either by extradition law or refugee law.108 
The approach here, as in the United States, is to render the political/non-
political question in both extradition and refugee law irrelevant. Another 
field of law – counter-terrorism – answers the question pre-emptively.109 In 
contrast, other jurisdictions – reflected in the recent jurisprudence of the 
United Kingdom and Europe - have started to show resistance against such 
presumptive and mechanistic approaches to the political/non-political 
question, even though they also proscribe much of the same terrorist 
activity. This contrast will soon become clear. After a considerable but 
necessary examination of how the political offence question has been dealt 
with by both extradition and counter-terrorism law, the discrete question of 
non-political crimes under Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention is 
tackled directly. 
4.4 Non-Political Offences in Article 1F(b) Exclusion Law  
 
 The first observation about the approach to the term ‘non-political’ 
found in Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention is that historically it has 
been indistinguishable from the approach to the political offence exception 
in extradition law. In fact, most courts interpreting Article 1F(b) have 
                                                                                                                                                            
444 F 3d 178 (3rd Cir, USCA); Khan v Holder (2009) 584 F3d 773 (9th Cir, USCA); 
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affirmatively adopted the predominance and proportionality test from 
extradition law for the purpose of deciding the ‘non-political’ question.110 It 
is not possible to understand the approach to political offences in exclusion 
law without first understanding its genesis and development in extradition 
law. The two concepts are often seen as saying the same thing in two 
different ways: extradition (an enforcement mechanism) excludes from its 
reach those who have committed political offences; whereas, refugee law (a 
protection mechanism) excludes from its reach those who have committed 
non-political offences. The combined result of the operation of both areas of 
law is the same. Political offenders cannot be extradited and can benefit 
from the granting of refugee status. Conversely, non-political offenders can 
be extradited and cannot benefit from the granting of refugee status. 
Although seemingly axiomatic, it is not clear that this equivalency of the 
political offence concept in extradition and refugee law is entirely justified. 
Some differences between the two disciplines may be important, starting 
with the very objectives served by the concept of a political offence within 
the normative and legal paradigms offered by the respective disciplines. 
4.4.1  Objectives of the Exclusion Clause 
  
 As developed in the previous chapter, the objectives of Article 1F can 
be summarised as four principles: (1) to ensure that the perpetrators of 
international crimes could not claim asylum (Articles 1F(a) and (c));  (2) to 
ensure that the perpetrators of ordinary crimes committed for 
fundamentally political purposes could claim asylum (the intention behind 
the modifying adjective ‘non-political’ in Article 1F(b)); (3) to ensure that the 
perpetrators of ordinary crimes could not flee foreign justice by claiming 
asylum (the ‘fugitives from justice’ purpose of Article 1F(b)); and, (4) to 
ensure that the country of refuge could protect its own people by closing its 
borders to criminals whom it regards as undesirable because of the 
seriousness of the ordinary crimes that they have committed (the state 
protective purpose of Article 1F(b)).111 It was also developed in the previous 
chapter that these four objectives are meant to operate in a complementary 
                                                        
110 Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, ‘Article 1F(b): Freedom Fighters, Terrorists, and 
the Notion of Serious Non-Political Crimes’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 46, 
s 4.1; Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 21) 344-349. 
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manner. Interpretations of the specific elements of the exclusion clauses 
should work to fulfil that complementarity.112 
 With respect to the ‘non-political’ question, a synthesis of the latter 
three objectives is apposite: political offenders should be protected from 
persecution, while ordinary offenders should not be shielded from 
prosecution; differentiating accurately between these two groups ultimately 
serves both the overall human rights purpose of Refugee Convention and 
the state protective purpose of the criminality exclusion clause. The true 
complementarity of these purposes will become clear later in this chapter, 
when a human security lens will frame the non-political question in a way 
that highlights the reflexive nature of the inclusion and exclusion issues. 
For the time being, however, recognition of the basic purposive threads – 
protecting individuals from the violation of their basic human rights while 
concurrently protecting those in the receiving state from serious criminals – 
allows for meaningful comparison between fields of law. 
 What differences, if any, are there between the purposes served by 
the non-political question in exclusion law and the purposes served by the 
political offence exception in extradition law? The first important 
observation is that the two concepts operate within a different overall 
normative and legal paradigm. On the one side, as developed in Chapter 
Two, the Refugee Convention operates as an international human rights law 
instrument that directly limits state sovereignty. It limits sovereignty both 
by restricting the ways in which a state can treat its own citizens, and by 
requiring that a state accept those who have been mistreated by other 
states. On the other side, extradition law operates through various bilateral 
or regional legal instruments in a manner that reinforces state sovereignty. 
States work cooperatively to suppress crime, and to support their respective 
right to prosecute those who have committed criminal acts within their own 
territorial jurisdictions, according to their own laws and procedures.113 
Consequently, at a broader level, the two exceptions function within legal 
                                                        
112 see: ch 3, s 3.3; also, for the idea that refugee law (and the law of exclusion 
within it) is lex specialis, see: Joseph Rikhof, ‘Exclusion Law and International Law: 
Sui Generis or Overlap?’ (2013) 20 International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights 1, 2. 
113 Cheng v Pentonville Prison Governor [1973] AC 931 (HL) 943 (where the Court 
describes that the duty to extradite does not arise out of a principle of international 
law, but rather from the bilateral transaction of two states that have agreed to 
cooperate with respect to the rendering of criminals to their respective 
jurisdictions); Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders (n 1) 5-6. 
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structures serving different, and in some ways countervailing, purposes. At 
a narrower level, the two exceptions have much greater teleological 
similarity, although even at this level there are some important differences. 
 Their similarity consists in the ‘humanitarian’ principle,114 reflected 
in the combined outcome that political offenders cannot be extradited and 
can benefit from asylum or refugee status. In extradition law, the political 
offence exception serves the “humanitarian purpose of preventing the 
offender being surrendered to a jurisdiction in which there was a risk that 
his trial or punishment might be unfairly influenced by political 
considerations.”115 In circumstances where the exception is meant to apply, 
a factual finding about the motivations underlying the extradition request – 
that is, the persecution of a political opponent rather than the prosecution 
of a criminal offender – is at work. Similarly, in refugee law, the non-
applicability of Article 1F(b) to ‘political’ offenders furthers the human 
rights objective of protecting an individual from persecution disguised as 
prosecution. A purposive reading of ‘non-political’ maintains the principal 
objective of the Refugee Convention, as reflected in the inclusion clause – 
protecting persons from persecution on various human rights grounds, 
including ‘political opinion’.116  
 Despite this underlying normative similarity in the concept of the 
political offence in extradition law and refugee law, differences appear upon 
closer examination. In the House of Lords decision in Cheng,117 an 
extradition case, the Court identified two purposes to the political offence 
exception. One is the ‘humanitarian’ principle discussed above. The other is 
what might be termed the ‘non-involvement’ principle: to avoid involving the 
requested state in the internal political conflicts of the requesting state. As 
explained by the House of Lords, “today’s Garibaldi may well form 
tomorrow’s government.”118 While understandable in the extradition 
context, which is grounded in bilateral or regional arrangements, such an 
                                                        
114 The word humanitarian has been placed in single quotation marks to 
distinguish it from the meaning attributed to ‘humanitarian’ at international law, 
i.e. international humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict. 
115 Cheng v Pentonville Prison Governor [1973] AC 931 (HL) 946. 
116 Refugee Convention 1951, art 1A(2) protects persons who have a well-founded 
fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion (emphasis added). 
117 Cheng v Pentonville Prison Governor [1973] AC 931 (HL). 
118 ibid 946. 
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interstate political relations purpose has a marginal place in international 
refugee law.119   
 As will be developed in the following sections, the non-political 
question within refugee law must operate at a higher, international and 
autonomous level that is grounded in individualised assessment. To use the 
language of approaches to statehood canvassed in the first part of Chapter 
Two, while extradition law may rest somewhere between the partialist and 
impartialist understandings of statehood, refugee law must remain both 
normatively and legally seated on the impartialist side. More particularly, to 
use the language of approaches to security canvassed in the second part of 
Chapter Two, while extradition law may use both the individual and the 
state as the referent objects of security, refugee law must preserve the 
individual as the ultimate referent object of security all the way through the 
analytical process. 
 Similarly, a comparison of the objectives served by refugee law and 
counter-terrorism law reflects areas of both congruence and incongruence. 
Without reiterating accounts that focus on legal counter-terrorism 
measures as a vehicle of political power, ostensibly, “[t]he core rationale for 
definition and criminalization is that terrorism undermines fundamental 
human rights, jeopardizes the State and peaceful politics, and threatens 
international peace and security.”120 As with the ‘humanitarian’ principle in 
extradition law, counter-terrorism seeks to protect against conduct that 
violates basic human rights. Protecting basic human rights is also the 
lynchpin of the Refugee Convention, and more specifically, the reason 
behind the exception for political offenders whose basic human rights 
would be violated on account of their political opposition to the established 
regime. Despite this similarity, differences emerge with refugee law when 
counter-terrorism measures are said to serve the interests of the state, and 
its relations with other states, and indeed, with the entire international 
                                                        
119 While it is true that the last paragraph of the Preamble to the Refugee 
Convention speaks about avoiding the problem of refugees from “becoming a cause 
of tension between states”, it is clear from the penultimate paragraph of the 
Preamble that the envisaged problem is one where “the grant of asylum may place 
unduly heavy burdens on certain countries.” Transnational cooperation here is 
used in the sense of sharing the burden of accepting refugees. This does not 
change the nature of the central objective of the Refugee Convention, which is to 
provide protection when another state is not living up to its human rights 
obligations. 
120 Saul, Defining Terrorism (n 70) 3. 
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community. These considerations transcend the legal and analytical 
boundaries of the Refugee Convention as an international human rights law 
instrument that aims, first and foremost, to protect individuals from 
human rights abuses through a system of individualised assessment. 
Again, the objectives of refugee law stem directly from its vision of the 
individual as the ultimate referent object of security, a vision that is not 
entirely shared by either extradition law or counter-terrorism law.121 
This theme will receive further elucidation in the section on human 
security at the end of this chapter. However, before returning to the 
teleological distinctiveness of refugee law as an important feature to the 
‘non-political’ question, a more specific examination of the judicial 
treatment of ‘non-political’ within Article 1F(b) itself is necessary. That 
examination will demonstrate an overall narrowing of the concept of the 
‘political’ within the law on exclusion, consistent with the restrictive trends 
in extradition law that were explored earlier.  
4.4.2  Judicial and Legislative Narrowing of the Concept of the 
‘Political’ 
 
  Interestingly, the leading Canadian case on the meaning of ‘non-
political’, Gil,122 started its analysis with an acknowledgement that there are 
important differences in the concept of a political crime as used by 
extradition and refugee law. In fact, the Court of Appeal questioned, in part, 
Hathaway’s view that the two concepts (political offence exception; non-
political crime) are simply two sides of the same coin.123 The Court 
enumerated nine differences between the concept of a political offence in 
extradition law and refugee law, many of which stemmed from the distinct 
objectives and jurisdictional dimensions of the two fields. Of import is the 
Court’s observation that in refugee law, legal obligations are owed by the 
state at the international level, whereas in extradition law, these obligations 
arise under bilateral treaty arrangements.124 Given this and the other 
differences it identified, the Court warned that there is “a need for even 
                                                        
121 On how counter-terrorism measures do not necessarily fit, either in purpose or 
application, with exclusion within refugee law, in the European context, see: 
Elspeth Guild and Madeline Garlick, ‘Refugee Protection, Counter-Terrorism, and 
Exclusion in the European Union’ (2011) 29(4) Refugee Surv Q 63. 
122 Gil v Canada, [1995] 1 FC 508 (CA). 
123 ibid, para 11. 
124 ibid.  
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greater caution in characterizing a crime as political for the purposes of 
applying Article 1F(b) than for the purpose of denying extradition.”125 
 Even though the analytical starting point appears to have been the 
recognition of both complementarity and difference between extradition law 
and refugee law, the impact of the differences is not at all clear. In fact, the 
Court in Gil, after acknowledging the differences, went on to apply the 
incidence and proportionality test from extradition law without any 
noticeable difference in content or application. It concluded that there was 
no objective nexus between targeted violence against wealthy supporters of 
the Khomeini regime and the ultimate goal of changing the political 
structure of Iran. In effect, the connection between means and ends was too 
remote. Moreover, the means chosen to achieve the goal were considered 
disproportionate: the Court could not “condone the use of deadly force 
against an unarmed civilian commercial target in circumstances where 
serious injury or death to innocent bystanders was simply inevitable. 
Violence of this sort is wholly disproportionate to any legitimate political 
objective.”126 
 This Canadian approach to non-political in Article 1F(b), which 
adopts an extradition analysis – that is, some form of motivation 
consideration (incidence or predominance) with some form of 
proportionality consideration – is exemplified in most other jurisdictions. In 
fact, the Swiss predominance and proportionality test from extradition law 
has permeated the question of non-political crimes in refugee law.127 For 
example, in the United States, the leading case of McMullen (PIRA attacks 
against civilians)128 acknowledged that beyond the political motivation 
requirement, a direct and causal link between the goal and method must be 
present. As later confirmed and clarified by the Supreme Court in Aguirre-
Aguirre,129 determining if a crime is political or non-political also involves an 
assessment of whether the political dimension of an act outweighs its 
common law criminal character. To make such an assessment, the 
decision-maker needs to consider the proportionality between the means 
                                                        
125 ibid, para 12. 
126 ibid, para 42. 
127 For a recent comparative analysis: Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 21) 295-349. 
128 McMullen v INS (1986) 788 F 2d 591 (9th Cir, USCA) (where the Court endorses a 
balancing approach that includes consideration of the proportionality of a crime to 
its objective and its degree of atrocity). 
129 INS v Aguirre-Aguirre (1999) 526 US 415 (USSC). 
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and ends, and whether the acts involve so-called ‘atrocious’ acts that 
cannot be supported regardless of the political aims. With respect to the 
acts of the PIRA, the outcome of such an assessment was that 
“indiscriminate bombing campaigns, murder, torture and maiming of 
innocent civilians”130 could not be justified by the admittedly political aim 
underlying those acts. 
 A predominance and proportionality approach is also at the heart of 
the much-cited decision of the UK House of Lords in T.131 In that case, 
involving bomb attacks on a civilian airport and attacks on military 
barracks in Algeria, the Court held that for a crime to be political, it must 
satisfy two elements: (1) a political purpose; and, (2) a close and direct link 
to that purpose. The second requirement engages a proportionality 
assessment between ends and means. In the T case, that proportionality 
assessment resulted in a finding that the acts were non-political. While 
some violent acts against specific political targets could be considered 
‘political’, any acts which could lead to indiscriminate killing or injury were 
disproportionate to the achievement of the political objective.132 Similarly, 
acts such as threats of serious violence, smuggling of weapons, preparing 
for a suicide mission, malicious wounding and torture have all been found 
to fail the proportionality assessment.133 
Such an approach to the political/non-political question in the law 
on exclusion is replicated throughout the common law world and beyond it. 
In France, the final determination of a crime’s political or non-political 
quality requires a balancing of the political objectives and the legitimacy of 
the violence used to achieve that objective.134 On this basis, attacks against 
civilians by the PKK in Turkey were considered non-political even though 
they were committed in pursuit of a clear political aim.135 Similarly, the 
large number of fatalities committed in the pursuit of democracy in 
                                                        
130 McMullen v INS (1986) 788 F 2d 591 (9th Cir, USCA) s II(B) (Wallace J). 
131 T v SSHD [1996] AC 742 (HL). 
132 ibid 786-787; see also: UK Home Office, Asylum Instruction – Exclusion: Article 
1F of the Refugee Convention (30 May 2012) s 5.3. 
133 Gurung v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 04860, para 135; AA (Exclusion Clause)(Palestine) 
[2005] UKIAT 00104, para 46; Boroumand v SSHD [2010] EWHC 225 (Admin), para 
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Belgium and the United Kingdom’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 195, 204. 
134 CE, 195356, S, 28 February 2001.  
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Azerbaijan, though a laudable political goal, rendered the acts non-
political.136 In contrast, the actions of a member of a Chechen combat unit, 
actions which did not violate the rules of war, were found to be political.137 
While the French approach is to incorporate the predominance and 
proportionality test from extradition law, it also demonstrates an interest in 
preserving an individualised assessment of proportionality based on the 
specific circumstances of the particular case.138 
Seemingly less keen on preserving individualised assessment, but 
still adopting the predominance and proportionality test from extradition 
law, is the approach of the Netherlands. Refugee law decision-makers in the 
Netherlands employ a form of the ‘dominance’ test to relative political 
offences, which requires an examination of the following factors: the nexus 
between the act and the objective, whether the act is an effective means of 
achieving the objective, whether peaceful means are available to achieve the 
objective, and whether there is a reasonable (or proportionate) connection 
between the criminal act and the political objective.139 While ostensibly 
broad, the application of the predominance and proportionality test is 
heavily restricted in the Netherlands by the exclusion of many offences from 
the political offence exception, either by reference to international legal 
instruments or the Dutch Criminal Code140 (a trend that has already been 
mentioned in relation to the United States and Australia, and that will be 
discussed again in the section below). For the most part, such restrictions 
make it relatively simple to find that a serious offence is non-political in the 
context of Article 1F(b). Apparently, however, they do not foreclose the 
possibility entirely, especially in cases that evoke congruent political 
sensibilities, such as opposition to the Hussein regime in Iraq.141  
While there are variations on the precise statement and application 
of the key principles, the approach to determining whether a crime is non-
political for the purpose of Article 1F(b) has always, in effect, been the 
Swiss approach to the political offence exception in extradition law – an 
approach which, over time, most jurisdictions adopted in the extradition 
                                                        
136 CRR, 538535, Tagiyev, 25 July 2006. 
137 CRR, 552944, S, 25 January 2007. 
138 For a review of French case law, see: Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 21) 323. 
139 Dutch Aliens Manual (Vreemdelingencirculaire) 2000 (C), as reproduced in 
English in Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 21) 329-330. 
140 ibid 330. 
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realm as well.142 Although there is some variation in application, and 
certainly nothing that can be accurately described as a clear international 
consensus on the interpretation of non-political crimes under Article 1F(b), 
harmonisation of principles has occurred at a high level. Broadly speaking, 
a test which focuses on the two aspects of dominance/predominance and 
proportionality is used to provide a workable legal structure within which to 
answer the exclusion question. This is consistent with a more international 
approach to the issue. In fact, the Swiss extradition approach is specifically 
endorsed, for the purpose of interpreting the political/non-political question 
in Article 1F(b), by the UNHCR.143 
Also significant is that the answer to the question of whether a crime 
is political is now almost always negative.144 Indeed, perhaps the more 
important point than the overall movement toward a predominance and 
proportionality approach is that this movement has corresponded to a legal 
depoliticisation of most political acts that can also be regarded as serious. 
The notion that violent or personally injurious acts cannot be political 
appears to have taken on an aphoristic quality. This holds true in refugee 
law, as well as in extradition and counter-terrorism law. To use, once again, 
the example from Re Kavic,145 one of the early Swiss cases in which the act 
was found to be ‘political’, it is now inconceivable that aircraft hijackers 
should benefit from the political offence exception in either extradition or 
refugee law. Such an act would now be popularly and legally labelled 
terrorism, essentially pre-empting the political/non-political question. 
In fact, as this chapter has elucidated, all three legal fields – 
extradition, refugee, and counter-terrorism law – find themselves in a 
                                                        
142 As examined in s 4.2. 
143 UNHCR, Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F 
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (2003) 
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mutually reinforcing relationship marked by a growingly restrictive legal 
understanding of the ‘political’. For refugee law, this means that the line 
occupied by the ‘political’ act is now very thin indeed: it applies to either 
pure political offences; or, if relative political offences, then only to less 
serious acts occurring in the context of an internal political struggle (such 
as the transporting of small amounts of small arms,146 or throwing rocks at 
a political rally during which the police became unreasonably violent).147 As 
highlighted throughout this chapter already, this line has been made even 
thinner by the impact of legislative initiatives in the counter-terrorism field. 
The narrowing effect of counter-terrorism on the non-political question has 
been profound.  
The same way that a judicial movement toward a predominance and 
proportionality approach in extradition law has, in practice, resulted in a 
more restrictive application of the political offence exception, the adoption 
of an almost identical approach in refugee law has had the same effect on 
the ‘non-political’ question. While the traditional Swiss approach on which 
these judicial principles rest was far more permissive, current 
interpretations provide for very limited circumstances in which offences can 
be both serious and political. Adding to this judicial narrowing of the legal 
concept of political crime is counter-terrorism law, with its affinity for the 
listing or labelling of people or organizations as ‘terrorist’. It has narrowed 
the concept even further. As has been discussed in the sections above, the 
pre-emptive exclusion from the political offence exception of those who wear 
the terrorist label has become a popular legislative mechanism. Exemplified 
most dramatically by the current legal regimes in the United States, 
Australia and the Netherlands, the normative and legal narrative proceeds 
as follows: if a person is a ‘terrorist’ within the meaning of international or 
national legal instruments (some of which are very expansive), then he is 
morally undeserving of and legally precluded from the benefit of the 
                                                        
146 RSAA Appeal No 70001, 30 April 1997 (New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals 
Authority); the claimant, a member of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) of 
Ethiopia, had transported small arms; the tribunal held that such acts were 
proportionate to the political purpose of the OLF. 
147 Berhane v Holder (2010) 606 F3d 819 (6th Cir, USCA); the claimant had been 
involved in throwing rocks during a political rally in Ethiopia; appealing the finding 
that he was excluded, the Court of Appeal sent the matter back for 
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 172 
political offence exception in both extradition and refugee law. Such a 
narrative makes the job of refugee law agents relatively straightforward. No 
meaningful analysis is necessary. As observed in the previous chapter with 
respect to mechanistic approaches to the ‘seriousness’ question,148 the 
complexity of the ‘non-political’ question disappears through the imposition 
of ready legal conclusions.  
As Goodwin-Gill and McAdam claim, it is questionable whether there 
is any real content left in the concept of ‘political’ as it is used in the 
context of exclusion under Article 1F(b). The broader conceptual evolution 
of political/non-political offences has been marked by increasing 
depoliticisation, ever-growing limitation by way of treaties, agreements and 
conventions, and a legal rejection of political violence that may put lives at 
risk.149 In this normative and legal space, it is difficult to conceive of 
political offences beyond those that can be classified as absolute or pure 
political offences – those acts which have no common criminal element and 
are strictly political, such as treason, espionage, and simple political party 
membership. Certainly, it appears that there may not be much meaning left 
in the words ‘non-political’, found in Article 1F(b), beyond that which 
consists in a purely political context. The exemption would still have 
application in these limited circumstances. On the other hand, conduct of a 
relative political character (combining both political and common criminal 
elements) that would be benign enough to meet the proportionality aspect 
of the non-political test would almost certainly be too benign to meet the 
immediately preceding serious requirement in Article 1F(b). In effect, the 
two aspects cancel one another out. In the vast majority of cases, the words 
‘non-political’ in Article 1F(b) now seem to have very little work to do. 
4.4.3  Recent Movement toward Rediscovering a Contextual 
Approach 
  
 Appealing as such prescriptive formulas have been to states in the 
post-September 11 world, they have also been subject to criticism. In this 
regard, the concerns expressed by the UNHCR, and in the judicial 
reasoning of the European and UK courts, have had the greatest resonance. 
At the international level, the UNHCR has endorsed the Swiss 
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predominance and proportionality approach from the extradition context as 
providing the most useable paradigm for answering the ‘non-political’ 
question in refugee law.150 That endorsement includes an acknowledgement 
that in most cases involving serious terrorist acts, the predominance and 
proportionality test will not be met.151 Nonetheless, the UNHCR cautions 
that cases, including cases bearing the terrorist label, must still be 
assessed on their individual merits. As will be echoed by a human security 
approach, “it is not the ‘terrorist’ label attached to such acts which prompts 
the application of the exclusion clauses, but the nature and seriousness of 
the offences.”152  
 Proceeding on the basis of a contextual approach, the UNHCR 
maintains that although support for a listed terrorist organization could 
lead to exclusion under Article 1F(b), it does not automatically or 
necessarily lead to such a conclusion. Other factors, such as the level of 
affiliation or involvement, or the amount of financial support, must be 
taken into account in making a final determination about the exclusion 
question.153 Similarly, while acknowledging that the removal of the political 
offence exception from several bilateral and international treaties is a 
significant factor to be taken into account, it is not determinative.154 The 
refugee law decision-maker must still consider all relevant and contextual 
factors in deciding if the crime is both ‘serious’ and ‘non-political’. 
Prescriptive listing measures from other areas of law necessarily, by their 
very nature, exclude the consideration of contextual factors that ought to 
be considered in a refugee law context. To be sure, while appreciating the 
interdisciplinarity of the exclusion question, the UNHCR has sought to 
maintain a distinct conceptual and legal identity for the political/non-
political question in refugee law. 
 In the previous chapter on the ‘seriousness’ question, it was 
observed that the contextual approach promoted by the UNHCR with 
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respect to that question has received its strongest support from the 
European Court in the B and D case, and from the UK Courts in AH 
(Algeria), and most recently, in Al-Sirri and DD (Afghanistan).155  In the B 
and D case,156 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice 
considered whether the listing of an organisation as a terrorist organisation 
(pursuant to the European Common Position)157 was also determinative for 
the question of exclusion. On that question, the Court took an approach 
that recognised both the effect of national and international legal 
developments in counter-terrorism law, and the need to preserve 
individualised assessment in refugee law. It held that while the act of being 
listed was legally conclusive with respect to the nature of the organisation 
as a terrorist organisation, it was not conclusive with respect to the 
individual liability of the refugee claimant for a ‘serious, non-political 
crime’. As expressed by the Court, “the mere fact that the person concerned 
was a member of such an organisation cannot automatically mean that the 
person must be excluded from refugee status pursuant to those 
provisions.”158  The key point is that although the terrorism label is a factor 
to be considered, only a particularised assessment of what the individual 
actually did can answer the question of whether that conduct is both 
‘serious’ and ‘non-political’. There must be “a full investigation into all the 
circumstances of each individual case.”159 
 This cautionary note expressed by the European Court has been 
preceded and echoed by the judiciary in the United Kingdom.160 Although 
the House of Lords in the T case (1996) found the League of Nations 
definition of terrorism to be ‘serviceable’ for the purpose of exclusion,161 
several subsequent decisions have emphasised that the legal terrorism label 
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is not definitive for the purpose of exclusion. Admittedly, such a label can 
be an important factor,162 and “it may be obvious in a particular case that 
active involvement in crimes which have been or can be properly described 
as acts of terrorism will…fall within Article 1F(b).”163 Nonetheless, as stated 
by the UK Immigration Appeals Tribunal shortly after September 11, “it 
remains crucial not to equate Article 1F with a simple anti-terrorism 
clause.”164   
 Attempts to preserve the distinctiveness of an individualised refugee 
law assessment to the exclusion question are also evinced by the recent 
decisions of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales and by the UK 
Supreme Court. As discussed in the previous chapter, the courts in AH 
(Algeria)165 and R (JS) (Sri Lanka)166 stressed that the words in the Refugee 
Convention must have an autonomous international meaning. Relying on 
the decision of the European Court in B and D and the UK Supreme Court 
decision in R (JS) (Sri Lanka), the Court of Appeal in AH (Algeria) found that 
exclusion must be grounded in an international refugee law meaning of the 
concepts it engages.167 Moreover, the Court called for a contextual and 
individualised understanding of the exclusion question. An analytical 
structure rooted in presumptive exclusion, based on a broad and ever-
growing proscription of acts as ‘terrorist’, is incompatible with such an 
autonomous and contextual understanding. In fact, as stated expressly by 
the Court, it is possible for an act labelled as terrorism to fall below the 
threshold for Article 1F(b).168 
 While the Court of Appeal in that case was addressing the 
seriousness question, its reasoning is equally applicable to the non-political 
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question. The idea that refugee law, and the exclusion issue within it, must 
retain an autonomous meaning grounded in the contextual assessment of 
particular questions, is an idea that must have application all the way 
through the analytical process. It is only by assessing the particular acts 
committed by the individual refugee claimant, in their full context, that a 
final determination about their quality (i.e. ‘serious’ and ‘non-political’) can 
be made. An analytical process which simply demands reference to a list of 
acts presumptively (or even conclusively) deemed to be both serious and 
non-political is anathema to this understanding of the foundations of 
international refugee law. While recognising the effect of other legal 
domains, a contextual and individualised analytical framework is the only 
way to preserve an autonomous approach to exclusion issues within 
refugee law. 
 The wide-reaching effect of this autonomous and contextual 
approach to the exclusion clauses is also clear in other recent UK decisions 
- the decision of the High Court in Polat169 and of the Supreme Court in Al-
Sirri and DD (Afghanistan).170 In the latter case, the Court considered 
whether acts domestically labelled ‘terrorism’ should necessarily result in 
exclusion under Article 1F(c), as acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations. In rejecting the government’s argument 
that all such acts necessarily amounted to exclusion under Article 1F(c), 
the Court once again relied on B and D, R (JS) (Sri Lanka), and UNHCR 
opinion. Stressing, yet again, that the clauses of the Refugee Convention 
must be given an autonomous meaning, the Court took a contextual 
approach to the 1F(c) exclusion question. Historically, that clause had been 
given a restrictive interpretation, requiring very grave acts that have a 
serious effect upon international peace and security. In the Court’s view, 
some acts now domestically labelled ‘terrorism’ would meet that threshold 
while others would not. The only way to properly answer the question was 
to assess the actual conduct presented by a particular case, and to 
determine if that conduct satisfied the restrictive understanding of ‘acts 
contrary to the purpose and principles of the United Nations’.171 
                                                        
169 R (Polat) v SSHD [2011] EWHC 3445 (Admin); see also: Rikhof, ‘Exclusion Law 
and International Law’ (n 112) 1, 20. 
170 Al-Sirri and DD (Afghanistan) [2012] UKSC 54. 
171 ibid, paras 12-16, 26-40. 
 177 
 The trend away from a prescriptive and toward a contextual 
approach to determining the questions raised by the exclusion clauses is 
unmistakable in recent UK case law. Although in 1996 the House of Lords 
in T found the League of Nations definition ‘serviceable’ for the purpose of 
the exclusion clauses, the highest UK court now appears far less prepared 
to interpret exclusion in a way that links it decidedly to legal instruments 
from the counter-terrorism world. Undoubtedly, this movement is in no 
small measure a response to the rapid growth since September 11 in the 
body of acts legally labelled as ‘terrorism’. Rather than promoting the 
simpler prescriptive approach, courts in the UK have rightly sought to 
acknowledge that while many acts labelled terrorism should result in 
exclusion, some may not, depending on the individual facts. Although 
decisions to this point have largely focused on re-establishing a contextual 
approach to determining whether a crime is ‘serious’, or whether acts are 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, the 
justifications underlying that contextual approach apply to the 
political/non-political question as well. As Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 
highlight, in the expression of an idea that will be revisited in the final 
chapter, all three elements of Article 1F(b) – ‘serious reasons for 
considering’, ‘serious’ crime, and ‘non-political’ crime – are interrelated: 
None of these points of assessment is sealed off from 
any other, and each impacts on every other, for no 
serious non-political crime exists in a vacuum, 
whatever national legislation or executive certification 
may provide. This is why it is relevant to consider not 
only the nature of the crime or crimes in question, but 
also the persecution feared, and whether criminal 
character in fact outweighs the applicant’s character 
as a bona fide refugee.172 
 
Indeed, all three elements of Article 1F(b), including the non-political 
question, must be considered in context. What a contextual approach 
means for the non-political issue has been signalled by the UNHCR and by 
the European and UK courts. A human security lens will make the content 
of a contextual approach even clearer.  
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4.5 A Human Security Approach to Determining ‘Non-
Political’ 
  
 The preferences of a human security approach to determining 
whether a crime is non-political for the purpose of Article 1F(b) have been 
stated at various points throughout this chapter. Those preferences will 
now be explained more fully. As developed in Chapter Two, a human 
security approach emphasises that both the inclusion and exclusion 
questions in refugee law are aimed at protecting the basic security of 
human individuals. Human security serves an important framing function 
by ensuring that the individual remains the ultimate referent object of 
security throughout the analytical process. It refocuses the exclusion 
analysis on the human rights normativity of the Refugee Convention by 
asking whether the receiving state’s security interests warrant exclusion on 
the basis of serious non-political criminality.173 Those state security 
interests are grounded not in broad claims to ‘national security’ but rather 
in the most basic rights stemming from human dignity.174 In this light, a 
human security approach would frame the non-political question elicited by 
Article 1F(b) in the following way: is any mitigation arising out of the 
political context within which a serious crime was committed outweighed by 
its common criminal character, thereby eliciting a real concern for the basic 
human security of the individuals in the receiving state? 
 Several more precise principles can be distilled from this basic claim. 
With respect to the issue of ‘non-political’ crime explored in this chapter, 
the propositions offered by a human security approach can be summarised 
as four principles. First, the ‘non-political’ question must be answered by 
reference to the complementary objectives of the exclusion clause. One 
important objective is that the perpetrators of ordinary crimes committed 
for fundamentally political purposes can claim asylum. Another objective is 
that the host country be allowed to protect its security interests by denying 
refugee status to those who are a threat to human security on account of 
the seriousness of the crimes that they have committed, which cannot be 
legitimised by the political motivation and context in which they occurred. 
While aspects of these objectives are shared by extradition law and counter-
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terrorism law, refugee law has a distinct overall normative and legal 
framework that positions the individual as the ultimate referent object of 
the concerns it addresses. That same referential point must be maintained 
in assessing the proportionality of conduct when determining if a serious 
crime is ‘non-political’.  
 Second, the word ‘non-political’ in Article 1F(b) should be given an 
autonomous refugee law meaning. An assessment of the political or non-
political quality of a particular act must be judged on an individual basis. 
While the designation of certain acts as presumptively non-political – 
particularly ‘terrorist’ acts – is one factor to be considered, the ‘terrorist’ 
label should not be determinative in the exclusion context. Instead, focus 
should rest on whether the particular conduct can be described as non-
political within an individualised, contextual proportionality assessment 
grounded in the human rights normativity of the Refugee Convention.
 Third, the content of a contextual proportionality approach to the 
non-political question in Article 1F(b) seeks to identify criminal conduct 
that presents a basic threat to human life and liberty. Presumptive 
approaches grounded in national or transnational legal instruments are not 
very useful in identifying such conduct on an individualised basis. In 
contrast, a proportionality approach that allows for the meaningful 
consideration of all contextual factors ensures that Article 1F(b) exclusion 
is reserved for grave conduct that compromises human security. The 
content of a contextual approach speaks to both the circumstances faced 
by the individual and the circumstances created by the individual.  
 Fourth, a contextual proportionality approach allows, in limited 
circumstances, for the identification of offences as ‘political’ even in the 
case of violent or personally injurious conduct. A human security lens to 
exclusion appreciates the reflexive nature of the inclusion and exclusion 
clauses of the Refugee Convention. The same human rights normativity 
that informs the inclusion question can also provide, in a particularly 
oppressive political context, the justification for retention of the ‘political’ 
label for otherwise serious criminal conduct.  
 The content of the first three principles has been developed 
throughout the progression of this chapter and only requires brief 
discussion and consolidation here. The fourth principle will need more 
detailed elucidation. Starting with the first principle, which was discussed  
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in detail above,175 a human security approach takes a distinctly human 
rights view of the purposive dimension of the exclusion clauses. While a 
human rights purpose is shared by extradition law and counter-terrorism 
law, the overall normative and legal content of these other fields points to 
purposes that position the state, and not the individual, as the ultimate 
referent object of the concerns sought to be addressed. Refugee law does 
not share this bilateral or multilateral state relations concern as one of its 
primary objectives, and particularly not in relation to the exclusion clause. 
Consequently, a teleological reading of the term ‘non-political’ in Article 
1F(b) may entail considerations that are different from those in other legal 
fields. Refugee law considerations are driven by the complementary 
purposes of the exclusion clause: protecting political offenders from human 
rights abuses by allowing them to claim refugee status, while allowing the 
receiving state to protect the human security of its members by denying 
refugee status to those who present a threat to that security. Although both 
academic and judicial commentators have noted that there are purposive 
differences between exclusion and extradition,176 a human security lens 
makes clear that those differences consist in the human rights purpose of 
the Refugee Convention. 
 The second principle stems from the first. Having established that 
refugee law concepts, including those surrounding exclusion, should be 
interpreted in light of its individual human rights purpose, a human 
security approach endorses an autonomous, international, refugee law 
meaning to ‘non-political’. As supported by the UNHCR and recent case law 
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from the UK and Europe,177 an autonomous meaning to the exclusion 
clauses requires a contextual and individualised assessment of all the 
circumstances presented by a particular case. Again, this notion recognises 
that refugee law is first and foremost about protecting the basic human 
rights of individuals. The individual is the recipient of the good that is 
served by the Refugee Convention. Such a contextual and individualised 
approach by its very nature rejects the presumptive or conclusive 
approaches to the non-political question, which have been discussed at 
length in this chapter. In particular, the pre-emptive determination that an 
ever-growing list of ‘terrorist’ acts constitute non-political crimes for the 
purpose of Article 1F(b) is inconsistent with an autonomous refugee law 
meaning grounded in a human rights normativity. While a legal ‘terrorism’ 
label created by national, transnational and international instruments may 
be considered in assessing the political/non-quality of a criminal act, that 
label does not obviate the need to conduct a full contextual analysis. 
Certainly, in the absence of an accepted definition of terrorism with 
application throughout the realm of international law, the ‘terrorism’ label 
attached to conduct by other legal fields cannot be determinative for the 
purpose of international refugee law. 
 Flowing from the groundwork established by the first two principles, 
the third principle seeks to give content to the contextual approach that 
refugee law requires. That content is generated by reference back to the 
complementary purposes of the exclusion clauses – both providing human 
rights protection to individuals fleeing persecution and protecting the 
human security of the receiving state by identifying the perpetrators of 
criminal acts that represent a threat to that security. Essentially, the non-
political question asks whether otherwise serious and criminal conduct can 
be justified under human rights standards. If so, that conduct does not 
represent a threat to the human security of the receiving state, and should 
retain its political label. Naturally, the content of presumptive approaches, 
with expansive lists of ‘terrorist’, ‘non-political’ crimes, does not allow for 
such a qualitative assessment of whether the conduct in the particular case 
can be justified according to those human rights standards. While many 
acts of ‘terrorism’ – such as the indiscriminate killing of civilians – would 
surely not satisfy that human rights justificatory process, other acts within 
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the expansive list may withstand that scrutiny, depending on the particular 
facts of the case.  
 The only meaningful way to ensure that criminality exclusion from 
refugee status is reserved for grave conduct that compromises human 
security is to undertake a contextual analysis that is grounded in human 
rights standards, both in relation to the circumstances faced by the 
individual, and the circumstances created by the individual. With respect to 
the circumstances faced by the individual, a contextual analysis would 
pursue certain lines of inquiry: (1) the nature and degree of the person’s 
claim to persecution on human rights grounds (i.e. the inclusion claim); (2) 
the manner in which similarly situated persons have been treated by the 
state in which the offence took place; (3) the extent to which the state 
respects or violates basic human rights standards, including those in 
relation to the expression of political opinion; (4) the overall political 
climate, and the opportunity for lawful political dissent and change; and, 
(5) the nature and history of any political disturbance or struggle which 
relates to the individual’s circumstances.  
With respect to the circumstances created by the individual, a 
contextual analysis would examine the following factors in relation to the 
criminal act: (1) the nature of the act; (2) the motivation behind the act; (3) 
the intended target(s) of the act; (4) the connection between the targets of 
the act and the goal sought to be achieved; (5) the harm caused by the act, 
including whether the effects are visited upon a political target or civilians; 
(6) the foreseeability of the harm caused; and, (7) any other factors specific 
to the individual case that speak to the overall proportionality among the 
goal sought to be achieved by the act, the means chosen to achieve that 
goal, and the harm that has been caused. This list of factors is not 
exhaustive. Other factors can be considered in addition to these, provided 
that any such additional factors are aimed at answering the right question: 
whether the conduct is justifiable according to international human rights 
standards, and therefore, whether the person’s conduct represents a threat 
to the human security of the receiving state. 
The fourth principle stems from the third, and is the most 
controversial application of the third principle, which calls for a contextual 
proportionality approach to deciding the ‘non-political’ question. As noted 
above, that contextual approach involves an assessment of, among other 
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things, the extent to which the state where the conduct occurred respects 
basic human rights and permits political dissent. As suggested in several of 
the cases canvassed throughout this chapter, an inverse relational principle 
exists with respect to this factor – the less respectful a state is of basic 
human rights and political dissent, the more serious the conduct 
committed in opposition to that regime can be while still retaining its 
‘political’ label (termed herein the ‘repressiveness principle’). In this regard, 
the observation by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in Gil illustrates 
the nature of this proportionality relationship in concrete terms, 
juxtaposing politically motivated crimes against Hitler and Kennedy: 
Where it is appropriate to use a proportionality test 
under Article 1F(b) is in the weighing of the gravity of 
the crime as part of the process of determining if we 
should brand it as "political." A very serious crime, 
such as murder, may be accepted as political if the 
regime against which it is committed is repressive 
and offers no scope for freedom of expression and the 
peaceful change of government or government policy. 
Under such a regime the claimant might be found to 
have had no other option to bring about political 
change. On the other hand, if the regime is a liberal 
democracy with constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and expression (assuming that such a regime 
could ever produce a genuine refugee) it is very 
difficult to think of any crime, let alone a serious one, 
which we would consider to be an acceptable method 
of political action. To put the matter in concrete terms, 
the plotters against Hitler might have been able to 
claim refugee status; the assassin of John F. 
Kennedy could never do so.178  
 
 Although the Court held that these considerations did not come into 
play in the case before it (as it was decided on a lack of nexus between the 
goals and the targets of the conduct), the Court certainly left it open that 
violent acts, even murder, could retain their political status in the right 
circumstances. However, Gil was decided in 1995, and as discussed in the 
previous sections, much has changed in the political and legal landscape 
since then. In fact, a review of Canadian jurisprudence since Gil indicates a 
judicial predisposition to never find that an act is ‘political’ if violent means 
have been used to achieve a political objective. As Rikhof observes in his 
recent and thorough examination of Canadian case law, “no claimant has 
been able to convince a court so far that his criminal activities fit the 
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political offence exception.”179 Certainly, the idea that a violent act might be 
considered proportionate to its political goal, and therefore keep its political 
label, appears to be legally possible but practically impossible. 
 At first glance, it may be tempting to conclude that no cases have 
arisen which sufficiently engage the political sympathies of the receiving 
state. Surely, if the right case presented itself, where the receiving state 
ideologically supported the political objectives of the violent offender, the 
court would use the legal test of proportionality to ‘legitimise’ the violence 
and allow it to retain a political characterisation. Nevertheless, the judicial 
and legislative narrowing of the legal concept of a political crime appears to 
have detached it even from this political dimension. This was seen earlier in 
the chapter with respect to the change in approach by the United States 
toward members of the PIRA. In Canada, the same trend is exemplified by 
the A.C. case.180 In that case, the refugee claimant had participated in a 
coup against the Bangladeshi regime which resulted in the death of the 
president and members of his family and guard. Canada had been among 
the first countries to politically recognise the new post-coup civilian 
government, resulting from the legitimate overthrow of a previously 
autocratic and brutal regime. And yet, for legal purposes, and specifically 
with respect to Article 1F(b) exclusion, participation in the acts that led to 
that overthrow was labelled ‘non-political’. The acts were said to lose their 
political character because the killing of the president and members of his 
family and guard was ‘brutal’, despite some evidence that those ultimate 
victims had fired first.181 While not suggesting that this was necessarily the 
wrong result, the cursory analysis undertaken in such circumstances 
suggests that although judicial actors appear to accept, as a matter of legal 
principle, that violent acts can still be ‘political’, they have difficulty coming 
to terms with that idea when faced with real cases. That reality brings home 
the point, uncomfortably, that revolutions – especially those against 
particularly repressive regimes - are sometimes only possible through 
violent means. 
 Indeed, there is a distinct judicial inability to demonstrably reconcile 
the idea that violent means may sometimes be a legitimate vehicle in the 
                                                        
179 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 21) 319. 
180 AC v Canada, 2003 FC 1500. 
181 ibid, para 49. 
 185 
achievement of a political end. Although this inability may partially stem 
from a sanitised Western view of revolution, it is also likely the result of the 
absence of a proper analytical framework to the proportionality concept, as 
it relates to the level of repressiveness of a regime. It is one thing to say that 
the gravity of acceptable conduct increases with the level of repressiveness, 
and another to apply that principle to real situations. Similar difficulty with 
the practical application of the repressiveness principle has been observed 
in extradition law. The need for an analytically robust legal principle is 
apparent. As Bassiouni argues in respect of extradition law, developing 
such a principle is not about justifying lawlessness or anarchy but about 
infusing “an otherwise nebulous concept [with] a legally or judicially 
manageable theory of law.”182 He proffers a standard that is grounded in 
criminal law itself, with the paradigmatic analogy being the legal concept of 
self-defence. In relation to the political offence exception in extradition law, 
this principle takes the form of a “right to ideological self-preservation or 
political self-defense,” which is assessed on the basis of three key factors 
and several sub-factors.183  
 That resort should be had to established criminal law principles in 
giving a workable meaning to the repressiveness principle in extradition law 
is entirely sensible. Extradition law is itself rooted in the transnational 
enforcement of common criminal law. Drawing on a legal concept (self-
defence) that is almost universally recognised as part of traditional criminal 
law is logical and instructive.184 Arguably, the repressiveness principle 
within the proportionality assessment in exclusion could also be analogised 
to the criminal law of self-defence. There are certainly points of intersection, 
as the disqualifying conduct for exclusion must be criminal in nature. 
However, as has been developed throughout this and the previous chapters, 
the normative groundwork of refugee law consists not in criminal law, or 
extradition law, or counter-terrorism law, but in international human rights 
law. As such, the most appropriate paradigm from which to draw to give the 
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repressiveness principle functionality is international human rights law 
itself.  
 In writing about the relationship between counter-terrorism law and 
international law, Ben Saul has suggested that defences and justifications 
known to international law provide the normative and legal framework 
within which to conclude that some ‘terrorism’ is excusable. Specifically, in 
limited circumstances – namely the collective defence of human rights – 
some acts of terrorism could properly be regarded as ‘illegal but 
justifiable’.185 This idea serves as a meaningful starting point for the 
exclusion analysis as well. Naturally, the potentially disqualifying conduct 
is illegal – it amounts to what is otherwise a ‘serious crime’. The non-
political question then asks whether that otherwise illegal and serious 
conduct is justifiable by the political context in which it occurred. It is 
argued here that in answering that justifiability question, regard must be 
had to the human rights objectives and standards entrenched by the 
Refugee Convention itself. Again, it is the reflexive nature of the inclusion 
and exclusion questions in refugee law that gives normative and legal 
content to the determination of whether a crime is both ‘serious’ and ‘non-
political’. Whichever question is being answered – inclusion for persecution, 
or exclusion for criminality – that question must be framed in a way that 
recognises the human rights focus of refugee law. 
 At the international level, the UNHCR endorses the view that in 
determining whether a crime is ‘non-political’, reference should be had back 
to the human rights principles that are promoted by the inclusion clause: 
protecting individuals from persecution on the grounds of their race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and political 
opinion. For example, on the political motivation issue, the UNHCR 
maintains that the political objective must be consistent with those human 
rights principles in order to be regarded as political.186 Admittedly, this 
places normative preference, indeed exclusivity, on political movements 
that seek to further an individual human rights objective. But such a 
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preference is conceptually and doctrinally sound. The Refugee Convention 
seeks to accomplish precisely that normative and legal primacy, at an 
international level. The understanding of human rights that it entrenches 
should guide the analytical focus all the way through the determination 
process. That these difficult areas of disciplinary intersection should be 
addressed by reference back to the very human rights standards that 
ground refugee law has, as previously canvassed, received strong support 
in the academic world. Whether relying strictly on ‘human rights’, or 
choosing to frame that human rights normativity as ‘human security’,187 the 
ultimate goal remains the same: to “tackle this difficult interface between 
forced migration and security in the spirit of the human rights standards so 
painstakingly developed over the second half of the past century.”188 
 In this light, the normative and legal concept of a human right to be 
free from persecution on account of ‘political opinion’ is firmly entrenched 
in the Refugee Convention. That right is found in the inclusion clause. 
Other rights, such as freedom from persecution on the grounds of race, 
religion, nationality, or particular social group, may also factor into 
situations of political oppression, depending on the particular facts 
presented by the individual case.189 An assessment of how these rights are 
respected or violated by the state in which the criminal conduct occurred is 
the most appropriate way to apply the repressiveness principle in 
determining exclusion. It is precisely for this reason that state prohibitions 
on so-called ‘balancing’ between inclusion and exclusion (the main theme of 
Chapter Six) are completely misguided. It is impossible to conduct a 
meaningful proportionality assessment on the ‘non-political’ question (and 
other questions) without considering, in detail, the inclusion question. It is 
the answer to that inclusion question that provides a workable analytical 
and factual framework within which to apply the repressiveness principle. 
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In its absence, the non-political question is typically answered in an overly 
simplistic way, and by reference to catch-all labels such as ‘brutal’ or 
‘callous’, or even more simplistically, ‘unacceptable’. 
 Essentially, human security offers a better way of asking the 
necessary questions.190 By reference back to the human rights standards 
entrenched by refugee law, the exclusion question, and the non-political 
question within it, seeks to identify threats to human security. Serious 
criminal conduct which can otherwise be justified by reference to those 
same human rights standards is removed from this realm of threats to 
human security. Said another way, the state protective purpose of the 
exclusion clause does not require the exclusion of the particular individual 
in circumstances where his conduct is justifiable according to human 
rights normativity and law. 
 Viewed through a human security lens, application of the 
repressiveness principle to individual cases requires the decision-maker to 
consider several non-exhaustive factors, all of which give content to a 
contextual approach: (1) the nature of the basic human rights at stake and 
which have been violated by the state; (2) the degree to which the state has 
historically violated those specific rights; (3) the overall political climate and 
human rights picture of the violating state; (4) the extent to which non-
violent expression of political opinion is permissible in the violating state; 
(5) the availability of other means of asserting the basic rights that have 
been violated, or of asserting other analogous rights; and (6) the specific 
factual context of the person’s inclusion claim, and the nature and degree 
of the human rights violations actually experienced or feared. While these 
six factors capture the concepts in need of elucidation for a proper 
determination, the identification of other factors, or sub-factors, is certainly 
possible. Regardless of their particular form, the aim of any such factors is 
to elicit the right questions in determining whether the particular political 
context in which a serious crime was committed can justify that conduct as 
circumstantially reasonable or proportionate. If the answer to that 
justification question is positive, the legal conclusion is that the conduct, 
although serious and criminal, is excusable or justifiable. In such 
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circumstances, the ‘political’ descriptor for such conduct should remain, 
and exclusion from refugee status under Article 1F(b) should not follow. 
 In the end, a contextual approach to the non-political question in 
exclusion stays true to the omnipresent authority of human rights 
standards in refugee law. By relying on that human rights normativity 
throughout the analytical process, it preserves the individualised 
assessment vital to a refugee determination analysis that concurrently 
protects people fleeing persecution and people in the receiving state. A 
contextual approach gives meaning to the concept of the political offence 
beyond that which consists exclusively in the pure or absolute political 
context. It recognises that, in certain limited circumstances, the defence of 
basic human rights can justify conduct that is otherwise morally and 
legally blameworthy. Without such recognition, the Refugee Convention 
finds itself in the paradoxical condition of, on the one hand (through the 
inclusion clause), providing the strongest international condemnation of 
basic human rights abuses, while on the other hand (through the exclusion 
clause), disallowing any right to defend against such basic human rights 
abuses. Refugee law must resist this untenable position if it is to sustain 
the human rights normativity that forms its core. That same goal informs 
the next chapter on the standard of proof and evidentiary issues 




Chapter 5 – Standard of Proof and Evidence 
5.1 The Scope of this Chapter 
 
 The two previous chapters examined the substantive elements of 
exclusion under Article 1F(b): the requirement that a crime is ‘serious’; and 
the requirement that a crime is ‘non-political’. In this chapter, the focus 
shifts to evidentiary issues. Those evidentiary issues are initially examined 
at a broad level, with attention paid to the unique standard of proof found 
in the exclusion clause – ‘serious reasons for considering’. The approaches 
of the UNHCR and most academic observers, calling for a standard of proof 
for exclusion that is higher than a balance of probabilities, is contrasted 
with the approaches of most states, calling for a standard of proof that is 
lower than a balance of probabilities. A human security lens is then 
appealed to so that some conceptual and operational sense might be 
brought to bear on the question. A human security lens repositions the 
standard of proof for exclusion as reflexive of the standard of proof for 
inclusion – ‘serious possibility’ or ‘reasonable chance’ - and in a manner 
that will necessarily modulate according to the strength of the inclusion 
case. ‘Serious reasons for considering’ is a standard that is more contextual 
and flexible than implied by the judicial and scholarly preoccupation with 
placing it specifically on the spectrum of standards of proof known to other 
fields of law. A human security approach will endorse the view of the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court that ‘serious reasons for considering’ should very 
simply be taken to mean exactly what it says.1 
 The second half of this chapter will then consider evidentiary issues 
more specifically, looking at the nature and quality of particular types of 
evidence common to exclusion cases. Three categories of evidence will be 
examined: (1) formal evidence – documents such as convictions, 
indictments and warrants, and terrorist listings; (2) substantive evidence – 
the claimant’s own statements or non-cooperation, and other evidence such 
as witness testimony or primary documentary evidence; and (3) 
controversial evidence – secret evidence, sensitive evidence, or evidence 
obtained through the use of torture. Specific conclusions will be reached 
                                                        
1 R (JS)(Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 15, para 39. 
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about the best way to approach each category of evidence. The unifying 
theme among all of those conclusions is that a juridical process grounded 
in procedural fairness and contextual, individualised assessment allows 
refugee law decision-makers to reach well-reasoned judgments about 
exclusion. Assessing the nature and quality of evidence becomes refocused 
on the ultimate aim of obtaining clear and reliable evidence upon which to 
determine the human security interests at stake, staying true to both the 
inclusion and exclusion aspects of the Refugee Convention. 
5.2 Standard of Proof: ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ 
5.2.1  Standard of Proof for Inclusion 
 
Before an examination of the standard of proof for exclusion can be 
properly undertaken, the standard of proof applicable to the inclusion 
question must first be considered. This is particularly important given the 
ultimate conclusion directed by a human security approach, which sees the 
standards applicable to both the inclusion and exclusion questions as 
reflexive and incapable of categorical separation. In deciding what is meant 
by ‘serious reasons for considering’ that a refugee claimant has committed 
a serious non-political crime (the exclusion question), it is instructive to 
start by exploring what is meant by the legal statement that a refugee 
claimant has established that he or she has a ‘well-founded fear of 
persecution’ on the grounds prohibited by the Refugee Convention (the 
inclusion question). 
A few preliminary observations about basic principles of refugee law 
are required: (1) a ‘fear’ of persecution imports a forward-looking test, 
asking whether the person is at risk of core human rights violations if 
returned to the country of origin;2  (2) a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ 
includes both a subjective and objective element – the claimant must 
establish that he is subjectively in fear of persecution, and that fear must 
                                                        
2 Andreas Zimmermann and Claudia Mahler, ‘Article 1A, para. 2’ in Andreas 
Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 341; UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.3, 2011) 
paras 37-50. 
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be objectively well-founded on the basis of the evidence available;3 and, (3)  
while the burden of proof in establishing inclusion rests with the refugee 
claimant, the burden of proof in establishing exclusion rests with the state.4 
These key principles are not subject to any serious dispute among states 
applying the Refugee Convention. Beyond these foundational evidentiary 
rules, however, state practice has varied in the particular content ascribed 
to such rules.5 
On the particular question of the standard of proof that must be 
discharged by the claimant on inclusion, the drafting history of the Refugee 
Convention provides little direct guidance. Drafters of the Convention spoke 
in very general terms only - reasonable grounds’,6 ‘good reasons’,7 or a 
‘justifiable’ case.8  Guidance offered by the UNHCR has not been much 
more specific: “the applicant’s fear should be considered well-founded if he 
can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his 
country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in 
the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned 
there.”9 Added to this is the caveat that the requirement of evidence should 
“not be too strictly applied,”10 taking into account the inherent difficulty 
faced by a claimant in proving certain facts while outside his country of 
origin, and other factors such as cultural differences and fear of authority 
figures. However, this does not mean that unsupported or non-credible 
statements must be accepted. It is ultimately up to the decision-maker to 
                                                        
3 Zimmermann and Mahler, ‘Article 1A’ (n 2) 338-340; UNHCR, Handbook (n 2) 
paras 37-50. 
4 UNHCR, Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (2003) 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f5857d24.html> accessed 17 March 2014, para 
105; Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd 
edn, OUP 2007) 165; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR), ‘Safeguarding 
the Rights of Refugees under the Exclusion Clauses: Summary Findings of the 
Project and a Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Perspective’ (2000) 12 (Supp) 
Int J Refugee Law 317, s 2.2. 
5 Zimmermann and Mahler, ‘Article 1A’ (n 2) 341; Joseph Rikhof, The Criminal 
Refugee: the Treatment of Asylum Seekers with a Criminal Background in 
International and Domestic Law (Republic of Letters 2012) 109-114. 
6 United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN 
Doc E/AC32/L2 (1950) para 1. 
7 United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 
Statement of the United Kingdom (Brass), UN Doc E/AC32/SR18 (1950) para 6. 
8 United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 
Corrigendum to France: Proposal for a Draft Convention, UN Doc E/AC32/L3/Corr 
1 (1950) para 1. 
9 UNHCR, Handbook (n 2) para 42. 
10 ibid, para 197. 
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decide what is reasonable in the circumstances.11 At the international level 
then, the standard of proof for the inclusion question has been described 
only generally. As long as the conclusion that a fear of persecution is ‘well-
founded’ is based on a reasonable view of both the claimant-specific and 
country-condition facts presented, a positive Convention refugee finding will 
be justified.12 As will be supported by a human security approach, refugee 
law principles at the international level have avoided placing the standard 
of proof for inclusion at some precise point on the scale of readily 
identifiable legal standards.13 
This flexible standard of reasonableness has also informed state 
practice. In Germany, for example, the court articulated a ‘reasonable 
person’ test quite early on: inclusion rested on whether a ‘reasonable 
person’ would draw from the ‘external facts’ that the refugee claimant runs 
the risk of being persecuted in the future.14 While this approach is 
consistent with that of the UNHCR, other refugee law agents have spoken in 
terms that imply a much higher standard of proof than simple 
reasonableness: ‘considerable likelihood’ of persecution’, or even more 
demandingly, whether ‘the risk of persecution upon return cannot be 
excluded’.15 In fact, the original American position imported a ‘reasonably 
likely to occur’ standard equivalent to the civil standard of a balance of 
probabilities. Undoubtedly, this is higher than the reasonable degree 
standard suggested by the UNHCR, since on its face, a balance of 
probabilities standard requires a finding that persecution is likely to occur 
should the claimant be returned to his country of origin.16 
Over time, however, earlier suggestions of a balance of probabilities 
standard have given way to a lower evidentiary threshold. The development 
of this lower threshold is largely attributable to the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca.17 In that case, the Court 
lowered the ‘reasonably likely to occur’ standard to one of ‘reasonable 
                                                        
11 ibid, paras 37-50, 195-205. 
12 ibid, paras 41-45. 
13 reasonable and probable grounds; balance of probabilities; proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
14 3719 II/58, 25 March 1959 (Administrative Court of Ansbach, Germany); 
translated by Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, 
Volume 1 (AW Sijthoff 1966) 174; Zimmermann and Mahler, ‘Article 1A’ (n 2) 341. 
15 Zimmermann and Mahler, ‘Article 1A’ (n 2) 341. 
16 ibid. 
17 USINS v Cardoza-Fonseca (1987) 480 US 421 (USSC). 
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chance’. In the Court’s view, a well-founded fear of persecution could 
certainly arise in circumstances where there was less than a 50% chance of 
persecution in the future. In turn, this more generous approach adopted by 
the United States Supreme Court infused other national approaches, such 
as those of the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, where the standard 
has been variably described as one of a ‘serious possibility’, ‘real 
possibility’, ‘reasonable chance’ or ‘real chance’ of persecution.18 Such a 
standard is said to rest somewhere above a mere possibility and below a 
balance of probabilities.19 While some American courts have sought to 
reduce that test to a percentage,20 most national approaches leave the 
concept of ‘serious possibility’ or ‘reasonable chance’ to be applied 
according to the circumstances of the individual case.21 
Given the unique difficulties immanent to proof in a refugee claim, a 
‘serious possibility’ or ‘reasonable chance’ threshold is the most sensible 
standard of proof for the inclusion question. Admittedly, a decision-maker 
should deny a claim where the claimant is not credible or the documentary 
evidence speaking to the fear of persecution is weak.22 On the other hand, 
the standard used must appreciate the obstacles faced by a claimant trying, 
while outside of his country of origin, to establish a well-founded fear of 
persecution with respect to that country. In particular, attempting to 
quantify the probability of a future occurrence can be fraught with 
uncertainty, depending as it does on many variables, some of which may 
not even be known at the time of determination.23 As a result, a flexible 
standard of serious possibility or reasonable chance allows refugee law 
decision-makers to bring an individualised approach to determining if a 
claimant faces a serious risk of being persecuted in the future. In some 
cases, the evidence will be very strong and the conclusion obvious. In other 
                                                        
18 Canada v John, [1993] FCJ No 130 (FC); Adjei v Canada (1989), 57 DLR (4th) 153 
(FCA); Ponniah v Canada (1991), 132 NR 32 (FCA); Chan v MIEA, [1989] HCA 62; 
Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 (CA (Civ Div)); Degirmenci v SSHD [2004] 
EWCA Civ 1553. 
19 ibid; there is some suggestion that the UK approach is somewhat more 
restrictive, although still falling within the same spectrum: Zimmermann and 
Mahler, ‘Article 1A’ (n 2) 341-342. 
20 D Vanheule, ‘A Comparison of the Judicial Interpretations of the Notion of 
Refugee’ in J-Y Carlier and D Vanheule (eds), Europe and Refugees: A Challenge? 
(Klewer Law 1997) 91, 96 (suggestion that 10% chance is enough). 
21 Zimmermann and Mahler, ‘Article 1A’ (n 2) 342 (support for individual 
approach). 
22 UNHCR, Handbook (n 2) paras 195-205. 
23 USINS v Cardoza-Fonseca (1987) 480 US 421 (USSC). 
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cases, the evidence will be very weak and the conclusion equally obvious. 
For the many cases falling somewhere in between, the decision-maker must 
decide whether the totality of the evidence – claimant-specific and country-
specific – establishes a serious possibility or reasonable chance of 
persecution in the future.24 The remainder of this section proceeds on the 
basis that the widely accepted standard of ‘serious possibility’ or 
‘reasonable chance’ is the most appropriate standard upon which to 
determine the question of inclusion. This inclusion standard will become 
important, once again, when a human security approach is applied to the 
‘serious reasons for considering’ standard applicable to exclusion. 
5.2.2  Standard of Proof for Exclusion – Preliminary Observations 
 
 The standard of proof for exclusion is subject to considerable 
academic and judicial debate. This debate is unsurprising, given the 
Refugee Convention’s use of the phrase ‘serious reasons for considering’, an 
unusual standard that “is not a familiar concept in domestic legal 
systems.”25 While many national judicial systems are accustomed to 
applying standards such as reasonable or probable grounds,26 a balance of 
probabilities,27 or proof beyond a reasonable doubt,28 the phrase ‘serious 
reasons for considering’ is unique to refugee law. Moreover, the drafters of 
the Refugee Convention provided no guidance on the meaning to be given to 
the standard.29 As a result, states have ascribed content to ‘serious reasons 
for considering’ in a manner that draws on their own understanding of 
where such a standard should fall on the scale of other recognised legal 
standards. Comparative examinations of state practice have consistently 
shown a wide variation in how the standard is expounded, with many 
                                                        
24 some draw a distinction between the standard of proof for the underlying facts, 
to be proven on a balance of probabilities, which are then assessed against the 
ultimate standard of ‘serious possibility’ or ‘reasonable chance’ with respect to the 
degree of risk: Lorne Waldman, Immigration Law and Practice (2nd edn, 
Butterworths 2013) s 8.94; others speak simply in terms of the degree of risk 
necessary in order to establish a well-founded fear: Zimmermann and Mahler, 
‘Article 1A’ (n 2) 341; or, just referring to the degree of risk as synonomous with the 
standard of proof: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Interpretation of the 
Convention Refugee Definition in the Case Law (IRB 2010) s 1.4.13. 
25 UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 107; Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 109. 
26 the standard typically used for the issuance of warrants or indictments. 
27 the civil standard of proof. 
28 the criminal standard of proof. 
29 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 109. 
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descriptions being articulated in terms of what the standard does not 
mean.30 
   Despite the interpretive divergence generated by this unusual 
standard, two key starting points are widely accepted: (1) the burden of 
proof with respect to exclusion rests with the receiving state;31 and (2) the 
standard of proof for exclusion does not require proof of a criminal 
conviction, or proof that would rise to the level of the criminal standard.32 
In respect of the first point, with exclusion operating as an exception to the 
refugee definition, it makes sense that the state should have the burden of 
proving that the claimant has committed a serious non-political crime, 
rather than the claimant having to prove that he has not committed such 
an act. Although some situations are said to create a rebuttable 
presumption that the claimant must then discharge,33 it is generally 
accepted that the ultimate burden of proving exclusion rests with the 
government. In respect of the second point, as recognised at the 
                                                        
30 ibid 109-114; European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), ‘Position on 
Exclusion from Refugee Status’ (2004) 16(2) Int J Refugee Law 257, s 3.1; Michael 
Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons for Considering: Minimum Standards of Procedural 
Fairness in the Application of the Article 1F Exclusion Clauses’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int 
J Refugee Law 92, s 2.3; UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 107; European Legal 
Network on Asylum (ELENA), International Course on the Application of Article 1C 
and Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (17-19 
January 2003, Denmark) 25. 
31 UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 105; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in 
International Law (n 4) 165; LCHR, ‘Safeguarding Rights’ (n 4) s 2.2; James C 
Simeon, ‘Ethics and the exclusion of those who are ‘not deserving’ of Convention 
refugee status’ in Satvinder Singh Juss and Colin Harvey (eds), Contemporary 
Issues in Refugee Law (Edward Edgar 2013) 286. 
32 Andreas Zimmermann and Philipp Wennholz, ‘Article 1F’ in Andreas 
Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 592; LCHR, ‘Safeguarding Rights’ (n 4) s 
3; Ramirez v Canada, [1992] FC 306 (CA); Sibylle Kapferer, ‘Exclusion Clauses in 
Europe—A Comparative Overview of State Practice in France, Belgium and the 
United Kingdom’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 195, s 3.1; Bliss, ‘Serious 
Reasons for Considering’ (n 30) s 2.3; UNHCR, Handbook (n 2) para 149; UNHCR, 
Background Note (n 4) para 107; UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: 
Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees (HCR/GIP/03/05, 2003), para 35; UNHCR, Statement on Article 
1F of the 1951 Convention: Issued in the context of the preliminary ruling references 
to the Court of Justice of the European Communities from the German Federal 
Administrative Court regarding the interpretation of Articles 12(2)(b) and (c) of the 
Qualification Directive (July 2009) (Statement on Article 1F) 9. 
33 The example given by the UNHCR is where the claimant is the subject of an 
international criminal tribunal warrant (Background Note (n 4) para 105), with the 
standard of proof in rebutting the presumption being that of “a plausible 
explanation regarding non-involvement or dissociation from any excludable acts, 
coupled with the absence of serious evidence to the contrary.” (Background Note (n 
4) para 110). 
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international and national levels, an exclusion finding does not involve a 
determination of criminal guilt. Neither a conviction nor a level of evidence 
that would rise to a criminal standard of proof is necessary in order to find 
that a claimant is excluded from the refugee definition because he has 
committed a serious non-political crime. This second generally accepted 
starting point also makes sense. By the very definition found in Article 
1F(b), of a crime committed ‘outside the country of refuge’, requiring a 
criminal standard of proof would be illogical and impractical. As developed 
in previous chapters, one of the key objectives of the exclusion clause is to 
prevent fugitives from escaping foreign criminal justice.34 While some 
fugitives may have already been charged and convicted in the foreign 
jurisdiction, others will have fled before the criminal process has 
concluded. To require a conviction in such circumstances, where the 
person is no longer within the territory of the foreign state seeking to 
prosecute the offender, would run contrary to one of the main objectives of 
the exclusion clause.35  It would also place undue weight on the presence of 
a criminal conviction. As will be developed in the third section of this 
chapter, a criminal conviction may or may not rise to the level of ‘serious 
reasons for considering’, depending on the nature and quality of the foreign 
process by which that conviction was obtained.36 On the other hand, any 
attempt to treat the refugee determination process as a substituted criminal 
trial would be entirely impractical, as the criminal cause of action, and all 
of the evidence and witnesses relating to it, will typically rest in the foreign 
state where the crime was committed.37 Accordingly, for both principled and 
practical reasons, requiring a criminal conviction or criminal standard of 
proof in exclusion determinations is unworkable. 
While refugee law agents agree on these two key starting points – 
that the burden of proof on exclusion lies with the state, and that a 
                                                        
34 Ch 3, s 3.3.2. 
35 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (CUP 2005) 
343; because Hathaway sees 1F(b) as restricted to the ‘fugitives from justice’ 
purpose, he also argues that the standard must be lower than a conviction (a 
conviction is required under Article 33(2), i.e. relating to a crime that occurred 
within the receiving state); there is strength to this argument, since the fugitives 
from justice purpose is one important purpose served by the exclusion clause; 
however, it cannot answer the question completely, since the exclusivity of a 
fugitives from justice view of Article 1F(b) was rejected in ch 3, s 3.3.3. 
36 James Sloan, ‘The Application of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention in Canada 
and the United States’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 222, s 4.5. 
37 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 273. 
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criminal standard of proof is not required – what is meant by ‘serious 
reasons for considering’ is otherwise contested. As developed in the next 
section, this debate can be divided according to those who advocate for a 
standard that is higher than a balance of probabilities (the civil standard of 
proof), and those who advocate for a standard that is lower than a balance 
of probabilities. Although a human security approach will ultimately step 
away from trying to describe the exclusion standard in a way that relates it 
precisely to other standards, for the purpose of examining this discourse, 
the dividing line set by the civil standard is instructive. 
5.2.3  ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ as Higher or Lower than 
a Balance of Probabilities 
 
 The UNHCR and most academic commentators promote an 
understanding of ‘serious reasons for considering’ that places it higher than 
a balance of probabilities. For its part, the UNHCR justifies its claim that a 
balance of probabilities is too low a standard on two bases: the standard 
must be high enough to ensure that genuine refugees are not excluded 
erroneously, given the serious consequences of a wrong decision; and, as 
an exception to the overall humanitarian objective of the Refugee 
Convention, exclusion must be interpreted restrictively.38 In rejecting the 
balance of probabilities standard, the UNHCR appears to equate the 
balance of probabilities standard with ‘simple suspicions’. Instead, the 
UNHCR opts for the standard found in civil law jurisdictions – ‘serious 
reasons from which arise a substantial suspicion’ – as being the minimum 
requirement.39 It further describes the applicable standard as one that 
requires “clear and credible evidence of involvement in excludable acts.”40  
Added to these justifications is the claim that the benefit of the doubt about 
exclusion should militate in favour of the refugee claimant,41 even though 
this sounds very much like the criminal standard of proof, a standard the 
UNHCR agrees is not applicable.42 When read together, the UNHCR’s 
direction on the standard of proof for exclusion may create more confusion 
than clarification. Refugee law agents are left with several potentially 
                                                        
38 UNHCR, Handbook (n 2) para 149; UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 107. 
39 UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 107. 
40 ibid, para 108. 
41 ibid, para 105. 
42 UNHCR, Guidelines (n 32) para 35. 
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inconsistent options: the standard must be higher than a balance of 
probabilities;43 simple suspicions are insufficient; serious reasons from 
which arise a substantial suspicion is the very least that is required; clear 
and credible evidence of involvement in excludable acts is required; and, 
the benefit of the doubt goes to the claimant. Undoubtedly, the confusing 
nature of the UNHCR’s guidance on this point stems from the unenviable 
task of attempting to articulate that guidance in a manner that makes 
sense to different legal systems. 
Most academic writers agree with the UNHCR that ‘serious reasons 
for considering’ implies a standard higher than a balance of probabilities. 
These claims for a higher standard also rest on the same justifications – the 
exceptional nature of exclusion requires it to be narrowly construed, and a 
high standard will help to prevent wrong decisions with serious 
consequences to the individual, in keeping with the overall protection 
mandate of the Refugee Convention.44 In fact, Gilbert maintains that “it is 
laxity with the standard of proof that calls into question how states have 
implemented Article 1F.”  In his view, if a higher “standard of proof were 
demanded in individual cases, then there would be fewer concerns over 
abuse of the exclusion clauses.” Ultimately, a high standard is seen as 
instrumental in preserving the human rights protection mandate of the 
Refugee Convention, and in forestalling the opportunistic appropriation of 
the exclusion clauses for dubious state purposes. That high standard, while 
not quite at the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, should “at least 
approach the level of proof necessary for a criminal conviction.”45 
Setting aside differences in how justifications are articulated, the 
UNHCR and most academic writers agree that the standard for exclusion 
                                                        
43 The UNHCR confirmed its position very recently that “the balance of probabilities 
is too low a threshold”: UNHCR, Factum of the Intervener UNHCR, Febles v 
Canada, Supreme Court of Canada Court File No 35215, filed 11 March 2014 
<http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/factums-memoires/35215/FM050_Intervener_United-
Nations-High-Commissioner-for-Refugees.pdf> accessed 18 March 2014, para 
15(iv). 
44 See, for example: Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ (n 30) s 2.3; Geoff 
Gilbert, ‘Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses’ in E Feller, V 
Turk, and F Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law (CUP 2003) 
448, 450-455, 470-471; Zimmermann and Wennholz, ‘Article 1F’ (n 32) 593; Joan 
Fitzpatrick, ‘The Post-Exclusion Phase: Extradition, Prosecution and Expulsion’ 
(2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 272 (regarding linkages to extradition and 
problems with using lower extradition threshold); see also: LCHR, ‘Safeguarding 
Rights’ (n 4) ss 2.2, 3. 
45 Gilbert, ‘Current Issues’ (n 44) 470. 
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lies somewhere between the civil and criminal standards of proof. State 
practice tells a different story. Although many civil law jurisdictions are 
satisfied with requiring ‘clear and credible evidence’ that falls somewhere 
below the criminal standard of proof,46 common law jurisdictions have been 
preoccupied with placing the exclusion standard on the standard of proof 
scale that is known to them from other fields of law. In undertaking this 
placement, states have largely rejected the UNHCR and academic 
approaches. Instead, they have opted for an understanding of ‘serious 
reasons for considering’ which places it below the civil balance of 
probabilities standard and closer to the reasonable grounds standard 
applicable to preventative or investigatory police powers. For example, the 
United States places the exclusion standard at reasonable grounds or 
probable cause, although this is accomplished through judicial 
interpretation of domestic asylum legislation rather than the Refugee 
Convention.47 Other common law countries, such as Canada and Australia, 
have also adopted a lower threshold than the civil standard in applying the 
exclusion clause. 
In Canada, the courts have squarely rejected the UNHCR and 
academic positions, claiming that the terms of the Refugee Convention 
must be interpreted according to domestic jurisprudence, and in keeping 
with the intent of the Convention’s signatories.48 According to the Canadian 
view, there is no cogent reason to impose a standard equivalent to or higher 
than a balance of probabilities, as such a standard was not intended by the 
Convention’s signatories. In fact, the signatories intended to reserve for 
themselves a wide discretion to exclude criminals from Convention refugee 
status. On this justificatory basis, the appropriate standard of proof for 
exclusion is that of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’, a standard higher than 
suspicion but lower than a balance of probabilities.49 Reasonable grounds 
                                                        
46 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 111-112 (regarding Germany, Netherlands, France 
and Belgium); cf: ELENA, International Course (n 30) s 3 (some inconsistency and 
lack of clarity in European states, including Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, 
and UK). 
47 Immigration and Nationality Act 1952, as amended, s 208(b)(2)(A)(iii); Khouzam v 
Ashcroft (2004) 361 F 3d 161 (2nd Cir, USCA); Yusupov v AG (2008) 518 F 3d 185 
(3rd Cir, USCA); McMullen v INS (1986) 788 F 2d 591 (9th Cir, USCA); Rikhof, 
Criminal Refugee (n 5) 110-111. 
48 Canada v Moreno, [1994] 1 FC 298 (CA) (the Court of Appeal acknowledges the 
weight of the UNHCR and academic literature, but declines to follow it). 
49 ibid; Ramirez v Canada, [1992] 2 FC 306 (CA). 
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must amount to more than subjective belief; it must be grounded in 
objective evidence. Moreover, the objective basis for the belief must be 
established through ‘compelling and credible information’.50 Australian case 
law falls along the same lines, confirming that ‘serious reasons for 
considering’ may fall below the civil standard, although ‘clear and 
convincing evidence’ is still required.51 In the United Kingdom, the 
description of evidence ‘pointing strongly’ to the claimant’s guilt has been 
used, meaning evidence that is not tenuous, inherently weak, vague, or 
built around suspicion.52 
In attempting to give further guidance to the ‘reasonable grounds’ or 
‘clear and convincing’ standard, regard has also been had to international 
criminal law. Since ‘serious reasons for considering’ is the applicable 
standard throughout Article 1F, including the international crimes found in 
Article 1F(a), the approaches taken by international criminal judicial 
systems have been contemplated for the exclusion standard.53 With respect 
to ‘reasonable grounds’, this is the same standard used by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for the issuance of indictments.54 In 
this context, the standard has been interpreted as requiring a reasonable 
suspicion that the person committed the crime, and that there is sufficient 
evidence of the essential facts that could result in a conviction.55 
Admittedly, this is a fairly low evidentiary standard, inspiring others to 
point to a more robust standard used in the indictment confirmation stage 
at the International Criminal Court (ICC). For example, the European 
Council on Exiles and Refugees asserts that the standard applicable to the 
confirmation of international criminal indictments before the ICC is 
                                                        
50 Mugesara v Canada, 2005 SCC 40, para 114; Charkaoui v Canada, 2004 FCA 
421, para 103. 
51 SRYYY v MIMA [2005] FCAFC 42; VWYJ v MIMA [2006] FCAFC 1; Arquita v MIMA 
[2000] FCA 1889. 
52 T v SSHD [1995] 2 All ER 1042 (CA). 
53 UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) paras 106-107; Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 
112-114; ECRE, ‘Position on Exclusion’ (n 30), paras 33-35; LCHR, ‘Safeguarding 
Rights’ (n 4) s 3. 
54 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
1993, as amended, art 18.4; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) 1994, as amended, art 17.4 (prima facie case); then Rules of 
Evidence and Procedure specify that there be “sufficient evidence to provide 
reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has committed a crime”: art 47(B) 
(ICTY); art 19.1 (ICTR). 
55 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 112-113. 
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instructive to the exclusion context. While warrant issuance is based on 
reasonable suspicion, the confirmation of charges is made on a higher 
‘substantial grounds to believe’ basis. It is this latter standard that the 
Council suggests serves as the most appropriate parallel to the exclusion 
context, given its textual similarity to the exclusion standard, and the 
comparability of objectives between the exclusion clause and the 
international criminal justice system.56    
However, it is not clear what content, if any, the ‘substantial 
grounds’ standard adds to the exclusion standard as otherwise articulated 
by national courts. It appears to simply lead back to the requirement for 
clear, credible and convincing evidence.57 As will be discussed in the section 
on the nature and quality of the evidence, it is more the practice at the 
international level of requiring very strong evidence subject to the closest 
scrutiny which makes it an attractive model for many refugee law agents.58 
Additionally, as cautioned by Rikhof, care should be taken when adopting 
legal standards or terms from the international criminal justice context. 
Whereas at the international level ‘reasonable grounds for believing’ has 
been equated with ‘reasonable suspicion’, national judicial approaches 
(especially those in common law jurisdictions) often place decided 
importance on the difference between suspicion and belief.59 As observed 
above, in establishing a ‘reasonable grounds for believing’ standard to 
Article 1F, the Canadian and Australian courts have taken care to point out 
that this standard is definitively higher than that of ‘suspicion’. In fact, 
‘reasonable grounds for believing’ in this context is equated with clear, 
convincing and compelling evidence. This language imports the requirement 
                                                        
56 ECRE, ‘Position on Exclusion’ (n 30) paras 33-35; Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 
112-113. 
57 ECRE, ‘Position on Exclusion’ (n 30), para 35 (finding the ‘substantial grounds’ 
standard of the ICC to be instructive took the ECRE back to the requirement for 
‘clear, reliable and convincing information, which is already the core of the ‘serious 
reasons for considering’ standard as articulated by national approaches); on ‘clear 
and convincing evidence’, see: UNHCR, Handbook (n 2) para 108; and most 
recently: UNHCR, Statement on Article 1F (n 32) (where the reference to a higher 
than balance of probabilities standard is interestingly absent, replaced with the 
words ‘clear and convincing evidence’). 
58 The UNHCR claims that the exclusion standard must be higher than a balance of 
probabilities, while concurrently asserting that warrants issued by international 
criminal tribunals are sufficient “given the rigorous manner in which indictments 
are put together by international criminal tribunals.” (Background Note (n 4) para 
107); see also: LCHR, ‘Safeguarding Rights’ (n 4) s 3.1.5. 
59 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 113-114. 
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for a stronger quality of evidence than contemplated by the language of 
suspicion. As further explained by the UK Supreme Court in R (JS)(Sri 
Lanka), the term ‘considering’ used in Article 1F is closer to ‘believing’ than 
it is to ‘suspecting’, meaning that the relevant standard must be higher 
than reasonable suspicion.60 At the very least, this aspect of the exclusion 
standard is certain. Consequently, while the debate surrounding the 
national and international intersection of legal standards is subject to 
greater complexity than can be engaged with here, it is clear that the value 
of interjurisdictional borrowing of standards of proof is questionable. 
Indeed, the academic and judicial preoccupation with clearly placing 
‘serious reasons for considering’ on the spectrum of other civil and criminal 
law standards is largely misguided. On this point, the UK Supreme Court 
has demonstrated the greatest understanding. After confirming that 
‘serious reasons for considering’ must import a standard higher than 
suspicion, the Court made the following pointed observation: “Beyond this, 
it is a mistake to try to paraphrase the straightforward language of the 
Convention: it has to be treated as meaning what it says.”61 The simplicity 
of this statement is also its strength. It highlights the fact that attempts to 
restate the exclusion standard in other more domestically entrenched legal 
terms is not useful. Similarly, while the European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles asserts that the standard should be sufficiently high and points to 
ICC indictments as a guide, it also seems to acknowledge that adding yet 
another definition would not be helpful.62 A human security approach to 
the standard of proof for exclusion will support the claim that ‘serious 
reasons for considering’ should be given its natural meaning. Focus should 
be had on whether the evidence is strong enough to justify a reasonable 
belief that the claimant has committed a serious non-political crime, rather 
than on trying to clearly demarcate the place occupied by the exclusion 
standard relative to legal standards widely used in other fields of law. 
 
                                                        
60 R (JS)(Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 15, para 39. 
61 ibid; see also: AG v Tamil X [2010] NZSC 107, para 39 (for the same approach in 
New Zealand). 
62 ECRE, ‘Position on Exclusion’ (n 30) para 33 (more important than defining it is 
to identify an approach for common interpretation). 
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5.2.4  ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ as a Reflexive Standard 
– A Human Security Approach 
 
As developed in the previous chapters on ‘serious’ and ‘non-political’ 
crimes, a human security approach favours a contextual, individualised 
consideration of these key concepts. It rejects the use of mechanistic 
paradigms in the determination of the exclusion question. Rather, it is only 
through a contextual approach to the pivotal exclusion issues that the 
overall human rights protection purpose of the Refugee Convention can be 
preserved. By asking questions that pay attention to the aim of protecting 
the human security of both individual refugee claimants and the 
individuals in the receiving state, a human security lens stays true to the 
normative foundation of international refugee law.63 Unsurprisingly then, a 
human security approach to the standard of proof in exclusion similarly 
draws attention to the need for a contextual and individualised 
consideration of this element as well. 
It is with respect to the standard of proof that this work suggests a 
more nuanced approach than the one advocated at the international level 
by the UNHCR. To this point, the conclusions reached by a human security 
approach to the scope of serious non-political crimes have been largely 
consonant with the recommendations of the UNHCR. Indeed, as a whole, 
the UNHCR’s guidance provides the most coherent and teleologically sound 
account of the exclusion clauses.64 On the issue of standard of proof, 
however, it is unclear from a human security perspective why a state 
applying the Refugee Convention must, at a threshold level, prioritise the 
human security of refugee claimants over the human security of its own 
citizenry. As canvassed in Chapter Two, and particularly by reference to the 
works of Sandel, Nagel and Habermas,65 impartiality becomes conceptually 
slippery when it starts to demand “that the more universal communities we 
                                                        
63 Chs 2-4. 
64 For a claim that the ‘soft law’ of the UNHCR should be given greater authoritative 
value, see: Satvinder Singh Juss, ‘The UNHCR Handbook and the interface between 
‘soft law’ and ‘hard law’ in international refugee law’ in Satvinder Singh Juss and 
Colin Harvey (eds), Contemporary Issues in Refugee Law (Edward Edgar 2013) 31-
67; see also: Corinne Lewis, UNHCR and International Refugee Law: From Treaties 
to Innovation (Routledge 2012) 170. 
65 Ch 2, s 2.3. 
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inhabit must always take precedence over the more particular ones.”66 
Making such demands causes impartiality to lose the very quality that 
makes it impartialist. Arguably, this is the effect of the UNHCR’s position, 
when its guidance on the respective standards for inclusion and exclusion 
is read together. On the exclusion standard, the UNHCR maintains that it 
must be higher than a balance of probabilities, a standard that seems to 
approach if not reach the criminal standard.67 On the other hand, the 
inclusion standard simply requires a reasonable degree of evidence pointing 
to a well-founded fear of persecution.68 At an evidentiary threshold level, 
the human rights interests of the universal concern (the refugee) are 
prioritised over the human rights interests of the particularist concern (the 
individual in the receiving state).  
While the much higher exclusion standard is justified by the UNHCR 
by reference to the exceptional nature of exclusion, and the overall human 
rights protection purpose of refugee law, the cogency of these justifications 
is uncertain from the perspective of human security. It is true that 
criminality exclusion is an exception to the definition of a Convention 
refugee, but it is also a purposive one. The drafters of the Convention 
clearly intended to exclude from refugee status those persons who fell 
within the exclusion clause. The principled foundation of exclusion as a 
concept is that states should not be required to grant refugee status to a 
person who, even though he is in need of surrogate protection, does not 
deserve to acquire it from the receiving state on account of his serious 
criminal acts and the threat he poses to the human security of the 
individuals in that receiving state. As developed more fully in previous 
chapters, a human security lens frames questions in such a way that 
recognises the Refugee Convention’s mandate to protect both the human 
rights of those fleeing persecution and the human rights of those in the 
receiving state.69   
Ultimately, the UNHCR’s approach to standard of proof prioritises 
the rights of the former and devalues the rights of the latter, in a categorical 
manner that a textual and purposive reading of the Refugee Convention 
                                                        
66 Michael J Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public 
Philosophy (Harvard University Press 1996) 343. 
67 UNHCR, Handbook (n 2) para 149; UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 107. 
68 UNHCR, Handbook (n 2) para 42. 
69 Chs 2-4. 
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may not reasonably bear. In fact, under the UNHCR’s standard of proof 
paradigm, a person with a relatively weak inclusion case that barely meets 
the ‘reasonable degree’ standard would still be granted refugee status, even 
in the face of very strong evidence of having committed excludable acts, if 
such evidence does not quite approach the criminal standard of proof. 
Given the detailed account of the purposes of the exclusion clause explored 
in Chapters Three and Four,70 such a result is teleologically questionable. 
Claimants who properly fall under Article 1F are precluded from acquiring 
refugee status regardless of a genuine need for surrogate protection.71 Of 
course, this gives rise to another dilemma – the prospect of refoulement to 
persecution – which many states have dealt with through the provision of 
some form of complementary or ancillary protection falling short of 
Convention refugee status (a concept that will be revisited in the concluding 
chapter). While rightly alarming, concerns about refoulement to persecution 
of criminally excluded individuals should not be alleviated by doing 
injustice to the terms of the Refugee Convention itself. 
There are also strong practical considerations that demonstrate the 
unworkable nature of a standard of proof for exclusion that approaches the 
criminal standard of proof. With respect to the inclusion standard, as 
discussed above, one of the justifications for a ‘serious possibility’ or 
‘reasonable chance’ standard is the inherent difficulty faced by a refugee 
claimant in proving a well-founded fear of persecution in his country of 
origin while being outside of it.72 Yet similar considerations are at play in 
the exclusion context as well. While exclusion evidence typically includes a 
warrant or indictment, other documents relating to the commission of a 
serious crime, and perhaps the statements of the claimant himself, the 
primary evidence – such as original documents and witnesses – will still 
rest in the state in which the crime was committed. The absence of this 
evidence would, in an ordinary criminal trial, result in the criminal 
standard not even being approached let alone satisfied. And yet the absence 
of this evidence is commonplace in the context of an exclusion 
                                                        
70 Ch 3, s 3.3.2; ch 4, s 4.4.1. 
71 Ch 1, s 1.1.1; unfortunately, this rather trite concept – you are excluded even if 
you would otherwise be included – is the underlying rationale for holding that ‘no 
balancing’ between inclusion and exclusion is allowed; but courts have used this 
concept erroneously: see ch 6, 6.2. 
72 s 5.2.1. 
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determination made in a refugee proceeding. For example, a refugee 
claimant would be in a position to say, in almost every case where he has 
fled before facing prosecution, that the evidence does not approach a 
criminal standard of proof because he has not had the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. As Rikhof highlights, any standard of 
proof must not be so high that it fails to take account of the reality of 
asylum proceedings, which include relaxed rules of evidence and 
administrative (as opposed to criminal) law procedures.73 This reality must 
be appreciated not only with respect to inclusion, but with respect to 
exclusion as well. Otherwise, it is not clear how the application of the 
Refugee Convention could ever be meaningfully used to protect the human 
security interests of the receiving state. 
Of course, none of this is to suggest that the standard for exclusion 
should be lower than the standard for inclusion, or that evidence of 
exclusion should not be subject to robust scrutiny. Evidence of exclusion 
should be clear, credible and convincing. It should not be based on tenuous 
and vague information, or on mere suspicion. However, as affirmed by the 
UK Supreme Court, the words ‘serious reasons for considering’ should 
simply be given their plain meaning.74 For the inclusion question, decision-
makers must decide if the evidence leads them to believe that a serious 
possibility or reasonable chance of persecution exists. So too for the 
exclusion question, decision-makers must decide if the evidence points to 
serious reasons for considering or believing that the claimant has 
committed a serious non-political crime. Ultimately, the inclusion and 
exclusion standards are reflexive. Both ask the decision-maker to determine 
what he or she believes. That belief must be objectively justifiable, in that it 
must be supported by a reasonable view of the evidence. Put another way, 
the evidence must be clear and convincing enough to reasonably support 
the belief. For refugee law purposes, this plain meaning approach is both 
sufficient and preferable. It is preferable because it does not seek to 
categorically separate the key elements of the refugee definition in a way 
that does disservice to all of them. 
                                                        
73 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 273. 
74 R (JS)(Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 15, para 39; see also: UK Home Office, 
Asylum Instruction – Exclusion: Article 1F of the Refugee Convention (30 May 2012) 
ss 2.4, 3.2. 
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As considered in the chapter on non-political crimes, Goodwin-Gill 
and McAdam highlight the need to treat all of the fundamental elements of 
refugee determination – inclusion, ‘serious’ and ‘non-political’ crimes, and 
standard of proof – as interrelated.75 Together these fundamental elements 
form a cohesive whole, allowing for the individualised assessment that is 
meant to underlie Convention refugee determination. As Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam assert, mechanistic approaches are problematic in respect of the 
standard of proof as well. Drawing on the reflexive nature of inclusion and 
exclusion, they claim that a contextual approach to the standard of proof 
would better serve the ultimate purposes of the Refugee Convention. In 
particular, if the inclusion case includes strong, credible evidence of 
persecution, then the Article 1F exclusion case, including its evidentiary 
requirements, should be subject to robust scrutiny.76 Such an approach is 
sound in both practice and principle. Although it is true that strong 
evidence of inclusion does not necessarily vitiate equally strong evidence of 
exclusion, the requirement of ‘serious reasons for considering’ will 
necessarily modulate depending on the quality of the inclusion evidence. 
‘Serious reasons for considering’ is a contextual, more flexible standard that 
allows decision-makers to be confident that they are reaching the right 
decision by way of an individualised assessment of the particular case. In 
the face of convincing evidence of persecution, decision-makers ought be at 
least equally convinced of the claimant’s involvement in serious criminality, 
from an evidentiary perspective, before considering the application of the 
exclusion clause.77 
In this sense, an individualised assessment approach to all refugee 
determination issues, including the standard of proof, better serves both 
the individual human rights protection purpose and the state protective 
purpose of the Refugee Convention. Refusing to categorically place the 
standard of proof on some other more recognised scale, or refusing to define 
it further, is not about promoting unchecked decision-making discretion. It 
is about appreciating the binary yet ultimately cohesive quality of a refugee 
                                                        
75 Ch 4, s 4.4.3. 
76 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 4) 183. 
77 Being convinced from an evidentiary perspective does not end the analysis; the 
decision-maker must still determine that the crime is both serious and non-
political, when assessed against the context of the particular inclusion case (i.e. 
‘balancing’ inclusion and exclusion, or as this thesis characterises it, 
‘individualised assessment’). 
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claim determination.78 The most reliable way to maintain that appreciation 
is to follow the direction of the UK Supreme Court by treating the standard, 
‘serious reasons for considering’, as meaning exactly what it says.79 
Arguably, the more interesting and illuminating questions relate to the 
nature and quality of evidence used to establish exclusion. Debates about 
whether certain types of evidence should or should not be considered clear 
and convincing are probably of greater functional value to refugee law 
agents than are debates about how to paraphrase the standard of proof. It 
is to a consideration of the nature and quality of the evidence used to 
establish exclusion that this chapter now turns. 
5.3 Nature and Quality of the Evidence 
 
 In discussing the nature and quality of the evidence used to 
establish exclusion, it is useful to separate the types of evidence into three 
categories: (1) formal evidence – documents such as convictions, 
indictments and warrants, and terrorist listings; (2) substantive evidence – 
the claimant’s own statements or non-cooperation, and other evidence such 
as witness testimony or primary documentary evidence; and (3) 
controversial evidence – secret evidence, sensitive evidence, or evidence 
obtained through the use of torture.80 The first two categories of evidence 
are the most common when Article 1F(b) is in question, since the claimant’s 
commission of a common but serious crime is typically decided on the basis 
of formal evidence from foreign sources, together with any substantive 
evidence arising in the context of the refugee claim process itself. On the 
other hand, the third category of evidence – controversial evidence – is 
exceptional, and ordinarily arises only in the context of the two other 
subclauses of Article 1F which cover crimes of an international character. 
That said, Article 1F(b) is occasionally at play as a supplement to the other 
                                                        
78 Unlike a criminal trial, which is focused strictly on determining the person’s 
guilt, a refugee law decision-maker must consider both the person’s claim to 
protection from persecution and whether he has committed s serious non-political 
crime; the assessment has this binary quality, with the two sides at cross-purposes 
in terms of the individual claimant. 
79 R (JS)(Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 15, para 39; similarly, on the inclusion 
standard, the English courts are (beyond asserting a few basic points) reluctant to 
engage with standard of proof debates; it is clear that they do not view such 
debates as very meaningful: Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 (CA (Civ 
Div)); Degirmenci v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 1553. 
80 This taxonomy is borrowed from: ECRE, ‘Position on Exclusion’ (n 30). 
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subclauses under Article IF, where the conduct is said to be of both an 
international and common criminal character. Such was the case, for 
example, in the European case of B and D, where terrorist activity 
implicated both Article 1F(c) (terrorism as contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations) and Article 1F(b) (since terrorism is legally 
considered ‘non-political’, as discussed in the previous chapter, the acts 
committed in furtherance of it amount to serious non-political crimes).81 In 
unique circumstances, Article 1F(b) may also be combined with Article 
1F(a) (war crimes or crimes against humanity), or in fact with both 1F(a) 
and 1F(c) concurrently. Although state practice varies with respect to 
combining the three subclauses of Article 1F, it is possible for one factual 
scenario to fall within all three subclauses: “for instance, a bombing attack 
with a large number of victims during an armed conflict and designed to 
terrorize people, which was committed before the perpetrator came to a 
country of refuge could fall within the parameters of all three exclusion 
grounds.”82 
 In this section, all three categories of evidence – formal, substantive, 
and controversial - will be examined, with a focus on their respective 
impact on exclusion under Article 1F(b). This examination proceeds on the 
basic assumption that the consideration of exclusion evidence must accord 
with the principles of procedural fairness that underlie any judicial or 
quasi-judicial process, including refugee determination. As asserted by the 
UNHCR, academic commentators, and courts, rigorous procedural 
safeguards are essential to the exclusion decision-making process.83 The 
fact that the traditional rules of evidence do not apply to refugee 
determination does not vitiate the need to ensure that procedural fairness 
is maintained. Such fundamental precepts of procedural fairness include 
the right of the person to be advised of the evidence to be used against him, 
and the right to challenge that evidence and put forward his own account of 
the facts. While the precise content of procedural fairness will not be 
identical to that in a criminal trial, an administrative law proceeding like 
                                                        
81Joined Cases C-57/09 and C101-09 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D 
[2010] ECR I-10979; see also: Zrig v Canada, 2003 FCA 178. 
82 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 104; for a case in which all three exclusion 
subclauses were said to be implicated, see: Canada v Maan, 2005 FC 1682. 
83 UNHCR, Statement on Article 1F (n 32) s 2.2.2; LCHR, ‘Safeguarding Rights’ (n 4) 
s 3.3.1; Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ (n 30) intro. 
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refugee determination must honour the basic principles of procedural 
fairness if the decision flowing from it can have any claim to legitimacy.84 
Questions about procedural fairness are nowhere more acute than in 
relation to the third category – controversial evidence. However, as an 
overriding principle, the spirit and substance of procedural fairness 
grounds all evidentiary considerations in the refugee determination process. 
With that guiding principle in mind, the first category to be examined is 
formal evidence. 
5.3.1  Formal Evidence 
 
 Simply stated, formal evidence refers to the documented legal 
outcome of a formal legal process that has taken place outside the receiving 
state.85 In the case of exclusion, this documented legal outcome speaks to 
the claimant’s involvement in a serious non-political crime outside the 
country of refuge. Formal evidence can take the form of a conviction, a 
national or international arrest warrant or indictment, or a national or 
international terrorist listing. Common to all of these types of formal 
evidence is that it is not the refugee claim decision-maker who has reached 
the legal conclusion about responsibility for criminality, but rather some 
other decision-maker as part of a foreign judicial (or sometimes legislative 
or executive)86 process. 
 An existing criminal conviction for the potentially excludable act can 
be strong evidence, amounting to ‘serious reasons for considering’ that the 
claimant has committed a serious non-political crime.87 Evidence of a 
conviction may be present where the claimant has been through the foreign 
judicial process but fled before being sentenced, or has been convicted and 
already served his sentence. As canvassed in the previous section on 
standard of proof, a criminal conviction is not required for an exclusion 
                                                        
84 Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ (n 30) intro, s 2.4 (although technical 
rules of evidence do not apply, including hearsay, decision-makers should where 
possible seek evidence from direct sources); see also: Mugesera v Canada, 2005 
SCC 40 (general principles and procedural safeguards re: determining if there is an 
objective basis for a belief, ie. based on compelling and credible information).  
85 A national terrorist listing by the receiving state would be an exception to 
‘outside the receiving state’, although in that case it is still ‘formal’ in the sense 
that it is an outcome of another legal process, not the refugee determination 
process. 
86 Unlike convictions or warrants, terrorist listings are usually not the result of a 
judicial process, but rather a legislative or executive one. 
87 UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 108. 
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finding.88 While not required, the presence of a conviction – and a 
description of the facts underlying it89 – may be a solid basis upon which to 
determine exclusion. Yet, just as the absence of a conviction is not 
dispositive, neither is its presence. As explained by the UNHCR, a 
conviction may form the basis of an exclusion finding if the conviction is 
also reliable. To determine reliability, an “assessment of the fairness of the 
criminal proceeding is required, taking into account the relevant country’s 
adherence to international standards on criminal justice.”90 Similarly, the 
UK Home Office Guidance provides that although a conviction will normally 
constitute ‘serious reasons for considering’, it may, in certain 
circumstances and with respect to certain foreign regimes, itself constitute 
evidence of persecution (that is, inclusion evidence of persecution disguised 
as prosecution).91 Consequently, refugee claim decision-makers cannot 
accept foreign convictions at face value, but must assess their reliability 
based on both country condition documentation and the claimant’s own 
assertions.92 As the Federal Court in Canada has maintained, it is 
particularly important to ‘look behind’ the conviction where the claimant 
has made allegations of an unfair foreign process, such as the inability to 
confront or cross-examine witnesses. If, after considering all of the available 
information, the foreign process is found to have been unfair, the decision-
maker should not base ‘serious reasons for considering’ on formal evidence 
of a conviction. That finding, if it is to be made, must be grounded in other 
evidence.93 
 Similar considerations apply to formal evidence of indictments or 
warrants issued by foreign judicial bodies. Such formal evidence is typically 
available in circumstances where the person has fled before the foreign 
process has been engaged or completed. As with convictions, indictments 
are not automatically considered sufficient evidence of an excludable act. 
Both the available country condition evidence and the claim-specific 
evidence (including that provided by the claimant) must be considered 
                                                        
88 s 5.2.2. 
89 Certificates of Conviction may be accompanied by reasons for sentencing, 
transcripts of evidence, or other documentary record of the proceeding leading to 
the conviction. 
90 UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 108. 
91 UK Home Office, Asylum Instruction (n 74) s 3.2. 
92 Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ (n 30) s 2.4.2; Sloan, ‘Application of 
Article 1F’ (n 36) s 4.5. 
93 Biro v Canada, 2007 FC 776; Canada v Toktok, 2013 FC 1150. 
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carefully. Decision-makers need to be satisfied that the foreign prosecution 
is not in fact evidence of persecution, and that the foreign process has 
adhered to basic principles of procedural fairness.94 The ultimate weight to 
be given to the warrant or indictment is to be determined by the decision-
maker, but only after he or she has considered all of the country condition 
information and made credibility findings with respect to the claimant’s 
own account of the true nature of the foreign process brought against 
him.95 The key point, once again, is that formal evidence of this type can 
ground an exclusion finding if all of the facts particular to the case are 
properly and reasonably considered. 
 With respect to warrants and indictments, qualitative differentiation 
is often made between nationally and internationally issued documents. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the UNHCR suggests that indictments 
by international criminal tribunals create a rebuttable presumption of 
exclusion. Given the “rigorous standards used by international criminal 
tribunals” in practice, the UNHCR is confident that the issuance of an 
indictment by such a tribunal is, prima facie, grounds for finding that there 
are serious reasons for considering that the claimant has committed an 
excludable act.96 This confidence in the international criminal justice 
system holds true despite the fact that the standard of proof applicable to 
such indictments is lower (reasonable grounds or substantial grounds) than 
the standard recommended by the UNHCR for exclusion (higher than a 
balance of probabilities). Academics and stakeholders agree with this 
assessment of the evidentiary value of an international criminal 
indictment.97 In contrast, far less faith is placed in indictments or warrants 
                                                        
94 UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 108; LCHR, ‘Safeguarding Rights’ (n 4) s 
3.1.4; Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ (n 30) s 2.4.3; see also: Fitzpatrick, 
‘Post-Exclusion Phase’ (n 44) (regarding concerns in the extradition context, since 
extradition often uses ‘loose’ standards of probable cause). 
95 Legault v Canada, [1997] 219 NR 376 (FCA) (warrant and indictment was 
sufficient, but it was from the US and there was no testimony from the claimant to 
contradict it); Gurajena v Canada, 2008 FC 724 (relying on the warrant without 
properly assessing the credibility of the claimant’s assertions is an error); Xie v 
Canada, 2004 FCA 250 (decision-maker entitled to give weight to the warrant 
because dealt with and rejected claimant’s evidence). 
96 UNHCR, Guidelines (n 32) para 34; UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 107. 
97 ECRE, ‘Position on Exclusion’ (n 30) para 34; LCHR, ‘Safeguarding Rights’ (n 4) s 
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issued at the national level,98 although this too will vary depending on the 
state in which the indictment was issued. Speaking of its confidence in the 
international criminal tribunal system, the UNHCR adds that “[d]epending 
on the legal system, this may also be the case for certain individual 
indictments.”99 For example, a Canadian refugee claim decision-maker is 
likely to place greater presumptive weight on a criminal indictment issued 
in the United Kingdom than on a criminal indictment issued in Iran. In this 
way, accurate and current country condition information creates an 
analytical anchor for the weighing of formal evidence. Of course, the weight 
ultimately attributed to a particular piece of evidence will depend not only 
on the country condition information, but also on the unique facts of the 
individual case and the totality of the evidence before the decision-maker. 
Conceivably, exceptional circumstances might exist where an indictment 
from the United Kingdom would be given little weight, or conversely, where 
an indictment from Iran would be given significant weight. 
 Finally, in terms of formal evidence, national or international 
terrorist listings of an individual (the claimant) or an organisation (of which 
the claimant was a member) may be introduced in a refugee claim as 
evidence of exclusion. Terrorist listings were examined in some detail in 
Chapter Four, in relation to the ‘non-political’ question,100 and a full 
recounting will not be made here. However, a few additional points will 
highlight the limited value of terrorist listings as evidence of exclusion. In 
fact, the UNHCR cautions strongly against the use of such listings as 
evidence that itself satisfies the standard for exclusion. It maintains that 
the standard of proof for such lists is considerably lower than that for 
exclusion. More importantly, the listing process is often more a political 
than a legal exercise. As a general rule, the UNHCR asserts that 
international lists may be given more weight than national ones, but 
caution should be exercised even with international lists, “in view of the fact 
                                                                                                                                                            
either way the exclusion issue would be resolved); cf Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 
114 (it is not clear that an acquittal would resolve the issue; would need to examine 
the record carefully to determine reasons for acquittal; may still be able to exclude 
based on lower exclusion standard of proof). 
98 UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 108; Gurajena v Canada, 2008 FC 724; 
LCHR, ‘Safeguarding Rights’ (n 4) s 3.1.2; Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ 
(n 30) s 2.4.3.  
99 UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 107. 
100  Ch 4, ss 4.3, 4.4. 
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that the evidentiary threshold falls below the exclusion threshold in some 
cases.”101 
 Of course, this approach to the treatment of terrorist listings as 
evidence of exclusion is premised on the UNHCR’s first-line stance that the 
standard of proof for exclusion is higher than a balance of probabilities. As 
discussed above, most courts have rejected this view, opting instead for a 
lower standard of ‘reasonable grounds for believing’. When proceeding on 
the basis of this lower threshold for exclusion, the evidentiary value of a 
terrorist listing is potentially much greater. As Rikhof claims, since the 
same standard of reasonable grounds is used for both an executive terrorist 
listing and a legal exclusion finding, this reinforces the argument that the 
executive terrorist listing should be treated as conclusive for refugee law 
decision-makers. While Rikhof rightly observes that the decision of the 
European Court of Justice in B and D is supportive of this argument,102 a 
few words of caution are necessary.  
 On the one hand, the Court in B and D did allow for a terrorist listing 
to have determinative effect on refugee decision-makers in terms of the 
nature of the organisation.103 On the other hand, as pointed out by the 
Court, the act of executive listing only establishes the ‘terrorist’ nature of 
the organisation to which the claimant belonged. Two further inquiries 
must be undertaken: (1) the decision-maker must decide if the organisation 
has committed acts which fall within the scope of Articles 1F(b) or (c), and 
listing is a factor that can be taken into account in making that 
determination;104 and, (2) the decision-maker must decide if the claimant 
bears individual responsibility for the commission of acts that fall within the 
scope of Articles 1F(b) or (c).105 This latter inquiry is pivotal. It emphasises 
the point that mere membership in a group labelled ‘terrorist’ is on its own 
insufficient to establish serious reasons for considering that the claimant 
has committed an excludable act. Although academic and judicial discourse 
about the legal concepts of individual responsibility and complicity is 
                                                        
101 UNHCR, Statement on Article 1F (n 32) s 4.1.3; UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) 
paras 106, 109. 
102 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 307. 
103 Joined Cases C-57/09 and C101-09 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D 
[2010] ECR I-10979, paras 79-99. 
104 ibid, para 90. 
105 ibid, paras 91-96. 
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abundant in relation to Article 1F(a),106 the judgment of the European Court 
of Justice in B and D reminds refugee decision-makers that such concepts 
apply to exclusion under Article 1F(b) as well. “Before a finding can be 
made that the grounds for exclusion…apply, it must be possible to attribute 
to the person concerned…a share of the responsibility for the acts 
committed by the organisation in question while that person was a 
member.”107 
 The importance of determining individual responsibility for 
excludable crimes stresses the limited evidentiary value of a terrorist 
listing. On its own, a terrorist listing can never be dispositive of the 
exclusion question. Individual responsibility can only be decided after a 
careful assessment of both the objective and subjective evidence. 
Documentary evidence about the organisation, and its nature and 
activities, must be synthesised with evidence about the individual 
claimant’s role in that organisation. In assessing the subjective evidence, 
the decision-maker must also deal with the claimant’s own statements, 
especially if those statements suggest that his role was minimal or that he 
refuted the violent or criminal means employed by the organisation. While it 
is generally true that the more prominent the claimant’s position in the 
organisation, the greater the presumption of involvement in excludable 
acts, “it nevertheless remains necessary to examine all of the circumstances 
before a decision excluding that person from refugee status…can be 
adopted.”108  
 On the question of individual responsibility in circumstances where 
exclusion is primarily based on membership in an organisation, the recent 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ezokola is instructive.109 In 
that case, the Court conducted a detailed examination of guidance from the 
UNHCR, as well as case law from Canada, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the international criminal tribunals (ICC, ICTY, ICTR). In the 
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109 Ezokola v Canada, 2013 SCC 40 (the court relied heavily on R (JS)(Sri Lanka) v 
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end, the Court rejected what had emerged as the Canadian approach of 
permitting exclusion, in certain circumstances, merely on the basis of 
membership in an organisation, or ‘guilt by association’. Instead, the Court 
opted for the more persuasive international jurisprudence requiring a 
contribution-based test for individual responsibility. This test requires the 
decision-maker to be convinced that the individual claimant made a 
significant and knowing contribution to the organisation’s criminal 
activity.110 In making that assessment, six factors must be considered: (1) 
the size and nature of the organisation; (2) the part of the organisation with 
which the claimant was most directly concerned; (3) the claimant’s duties 
and activities within the organisation; (4) the claimant’s position or rank in 
the organisation; (5) the length of time the claimant was a member, 
particularly after acquiring knowledge of the organisation’s criminal 
activity; and, (6) the method by which the claimant was recruited and 
whether there were any opportunities to leave the organisation.111 The 
purpose of carefully assessing these factors is to determine whether the 
individual claimant made a significant and knowing contribution to the 
organisation’s criminal activity, and thereby, whether he should be held 
individually responsible for excludable acts. Importantly, the ‘significant 
contribution’ test highlights the need for an individualised assessment of 
responsibility for serious crimes.  
 While Ezokola concerned exclusion under Article 1F(a), namely 
complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, there is no reason to suggest that the same reasoning 
cannot be applied to determining individual responsibility for serious non-
political crimes under Article 1F(b). Indeed, a similar test would be 
particularly appropriate where the Article 1F(b) exclusion allegation is 
based on membership in an organisation.112 In such circumstances, in 
addition to determining whether the organisation’s crimes were serious and 
non-political, the decision-maker must determine the claimant’s individual 
responsibility for those crimes. Certainly, decision-makers are entitled to 
                                                        
110 ibid, paras 84-90. 
111 ibid, paras 91-100. 
112 See, for example, the majority reasons of Justice Nadon in Zrig v Canada, 2003 
FCA 178, holding that the principles of complicity from Article 1F(a) case law could 
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find the claimant’s disavowal of complicity not to be credible. But what they 
cannot do is ignore or fail to adequately address the claimant’s evidence, by 
relying exclusively on the combination of a terrorist listing and the 
claimant’s connection to that listing. Adequately addressing the claimant’s 
own evidence is imperative. The considerations related to the second 
category of evidence – substantive evidence – will illustrate this imperative 
even more clearly. 
5.3.2  Substantive Evidence 
 
  Substantive evidence of exclusion typically refers to the statements 
of the claimant himself, although it can also include the testimony of other 
witnesses, as well as other types of documentary or expert evidence that are 
recognised as an essential part of the refugee determination process.113 
Given the lack of adherence in refugee determination to a rigid adversarial 
paradigm, even in common law countries, such evidence can also include 
the results of the decision-maker’s own investigations, and the reports of 
international organisations, human rights organisations, embassies, 
informers, journalists, or other subject-matter experts.114 This evidence 
may provide either specific information relating to the claimant’s 
involvement in excludable acts, or it may provide the country condition 
information against which the claimant-specific evidence may be assessed. 
Of course, such evidence will vary in its accuracy, reliability and 
impartiality, making it crucial that decision-makers are clear and specific 
about their assessment of each piece of evidence.115 For example, while the 
evidence of informers or witnesses may constitute evidence of exclusion in 
the proper circumstances, decision-makers must be alert to the fact that 
some individuals may be motivated to provide false testimony, if inspired by 
personal vendettas, jealousy, or political interests.116 
 The area of substantive evidence that has received the most 
attention, however, is that which flows from the refugee claimant himself. 
                                                        
113 ECRE, ‘Position on Exclusion’ (n 30) 35; LCHR, ‘Safeguarding Rights’ (n 4) s 
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As previously noted, exclusion determinations are most often based on a 
combination of formal evidence and the statements of the claimant.117 For 
the purpose of discussion, the statements of the claimant can be usefully 
separated into three categories: the claimant’s confession; the claimant’s 
non-cooperation; and, the claimant’s denial or justification. With respect to 
the first category, a claimant’s confession to having committed an 
excludable act may have occurred either in the country in which the act 
took place, or in the context of the refugee hearing itself. As most observers 
highlight, it is particularly important to assess voluntariness and lack of 
coercion where the claimant’s confession has occurred in a foreign state, 
and especially if it is in the country of origin against which the inclusion 
claim is made. Such a confession may be used as evidence of exclusion, but 
only once the decision-maker has determined that it is reliable for the truth 
of its contents. Indeed, a forced or fabricated confession may in fact be 
evidence of persecution on the inclusion claim. A decision-maker must be 
alert to this potential, and be satisfied that this is not the case before 
relying on the confession as evidence of exclusion.118   
Similarly, a confession made by the claimant directly to the refugee 
decision-maker must also be assessed for its reliability as evidence of 
exclusion. As Sloan points out, evidence of participation in excludable acts 
very often comes from the claimant himself, made in an effort to bolster his 
inclusion claim by representing such acts as connected to the persecution 
faced in his country of origin.119 On the one hand, it is certainly possible for 
a confession to be used as evidence of exclusion, and in some 
circumstances, as dispositive evidence of exclusion.120 However, before 
decision-makers attribute determinative weight to a confession, they should 
satisfy themselves that the claimant is not simply making false statements 
to strengthen his inclusion case.121 Approaching such confessions with 
caution is necessary in order to avoid punishing the naïve claimant while 
rewarding the sophisticated one. Refugee decision-makers need to keep in 
                                                        
117 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 273. 
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mind that, generally speaking, “the craftier the applicant, the more likely he 
or she is to circumvent the system.”122 
On the other end of the spectrum from the confessing claimant is the 
claimant who does not cooperate at all in respect of the exclusion issue. 
While the right to remain silent is a fundamental principle of criminal law 
in many jurisdictions, and especially those jurisdictions which also have 
highly developed refugee determination systems, the issue of non-
cooperation is not so easily disposed of in the refugee law context.123 Given 
the binary nature of a refugee claim which raises the question of exclusion, 
the proceeding is one in which the claimant is seeking the recognition of 
status as a Convention refugee, while the state is raising the prospect of 
exclusion from that status. On the inclusion issue, it is the claimant who 
bears the burden of proof. As such, the claimant’s cooperation in providing 
the information needed to decide a refugee claim is paradigmatic to the 
refugee determination process.124 This makes a claimant’s non-cooperation 
(or ‘right to remain silent’) on exclusion more of a contextual than a 
categorical consideration in refugee law, as acknowledged even by those 
who advocate on behalf of the individual claimant.125 
The starting point is that non-cooperation is on its own insufficient 
to amount to ‘serious reasons for considering’ that the claimant has 
committed an excludable act. The fact that the claimant will say nothing 
about exclusion cannot be the sole basis upon which to ground an 
exclusion finding.126 Beyond that, the effect of non-cooperation will depend 
on the other circumstances of the case. In some cases, there will be other 
clear and convincing evidence, such as a conviction or indictment that has 
been found to be sufficiently specific and reliable. In such cases, the 
claimant’s silence is not a barrier to an exclusion finding; in fact, failing to 
refute the allegations may suggest acceptance of them.127 It is also 
distinctly possible that non-cooperation on exclusion can affect the 
inclusion determination. There may be an absence of sufficient claimant-
                                                        
122 Sloan, ‘Application of Article 1F’ (n 36) s 2.4.1. 
123 LCHR, ‘Safeguarding Rights’ (n 4) s 2.2.1. 
124 Zimmermann and Mahler, ‘Article 1A’ (n 2) 341-342. 
125 n 123. 
126 UNHCR, Guidelines (n 32) para 35; UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 111; 
Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ (n 30) s 2.2. 
127 LCHR, ‘Safeguarding Rights’ (n 4) s 2.2.1; on ‘selective cooperation’ (i.e. 
cooperate with the inclusion case but not the exclusion case) which may raise 
overall credibility issues, see: Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ (n 30) s 2.2. 
 221 
specific evidence to establish an inclusion claim, or the claimant’s non-
cooperation may contribute to negative credibility findings that affect the 
entire case. On the one hand, it is important for the decision-maker to be 
satisfied that non-cooperation is not the result of extrinsic factors, such as 
lack of understanding, interpretation difficulties, trauma, mental capacity, 
or fear.128 On the other hand, if so satisfied, then in the face of non-
cooperation, the decision-maker may be left with no other reasonable 
position than to attribute significant weight to other credible and 
convincing information. For example, in Legault,129 the Canadian Federal 
Court of Appeal held that a U.S. arrest warrant and accompanying 
indictment was sufficient evidence of an excludable crime, in circumstances 
where the claimant had not given evidence. Broadly speaking, in the 
absence of any evidence to refute the information contained in formal 
evidence that has been assessed to be reliable, it would be very difficult to 
characterise an exclusion finding as unreasonable. 
Finally, the claimant may admit to having committed certain acts, 
but seeks to explain or justify those acts in some way. In certain cases, 
these justifications will be inseparably linked to the inclusion claim, as 
discussed in the previous chapter on non-political crimes.130 In other cases, 
the claimant will raise what can be understood to be an affirmative defence, 
such as duress or self-defence. Any such claims bring the decision-maker 
back to a focus on determining individual responsibility for excludable 
criminal acts.131 Again, while these questions are far more developed in the 
academic and judicial discourse surrounding Article 1F(a) (war crimes and 
crimes against humanity), they can apply in the context of Article 1F(b) as 
well, albeit more infrequently.132 A decision-maker faced with such 
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assertions by the claimant must make specific and reasoned credibility 
assessments, and must decide how such assertions factor into the ultimate 
exclusion finding. To be sure, the lack of categorical precision with which 
issues such as defences are considered in exclusion cases can be 
disconcerting for those who are accustomed to working under a traditional 
criminal law framework. And yet it is neither desirable nor possible for 
refugee hearings to become criminal trials. The best that can be done to 
assuage some of the concerns with the lower standard of proof, and with 
the more contextual approach to the assessment of evidence, is to ensure 
that administrative law principles of procedural fairness are faithfully 
maintained throughout the refugee determination process. 
Indeed, given the unique convergence of relaxed rules of evidence 
with high factual and legal complexity, it is particularly important that 
refugee decision-makers be properly trained and skilled at addressing the 
many issues that may arise in an exclusion case. Many front-line refugee 
decision-makers are neither lawyers nor judges, and yet an exclusion case 
often calls on them to tackle extremely sophisticated factual and legal 
situations. In this context, a very high level of skill is required. As many 
critics observe, decision-makers must have the capacity to properly assess 
all the evidence before them, whether formal evidence, country condition 
evidence, or other substantive evidence. Exclusion cases in particular call 
for decision-makers who are experienced and familiar with the legal terrain, 
in addition to possessing strong questioning, analytical, and writing skills. 
Established and coordinated support systems, with access to accurate and 
current country of origin information, are also vital.133 Without such skills 
and support, a refugee decision-maker seeking to make a well-reasoned 
and principled decision on exclusion would find that task very difficult. 
Perhaps the most difficult evidentiary task that may be asked of a refugee 
decision-maker is the consideration of controversial evidence.  
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5.3.3  Controversial Evidence 
 
 Unlike formal and substantive evidence, where the evidence is 
contested on an individual, fact-specific basis, controversial evidence is 
contested categorically, that is as a threshold question about its value as 
evidence at all. As previously mentioned, while the use of controversial 
evidence is most commonly encountered in cases involving crimes of an 
international or ‘terrorist’ nature (Articles 1F(a) and 1F(c)), it may 
occasionally be seen with Article 1F(b) as well, especially where a 
combination of the subclauses is being considered. For the purpose of 
discussion, it is instructive to separate controversial evidence into three 
categories: (1) secret evidence – evidence where some or all of the content of 
the evidence is withheld from the individual about whom it relates; (2) 
sensitive evidence – evidence where the content is disclosed but the identity 
of the source of information is withheld; and, (3) torture evidence – evidence 
that has been obtained through the use of investigative methods amounting 
to torture. Each of these categories of evidence has spawned a vast body of 
judicial and academic discourse, far more than can be engaged with in this 
section. That said, each category will be briefly considered, with a view to 
appreciating its key impact in terms of exclusion under Article 1F. 
 Starting with secret evidence, two preliminary observations are 
necessary. First, the problem of secret evidence arises where the state seeks 
to rely on certain evidence against an individual as proof of his involvement 
in serious, usually ‘terrorist’, criminality, while concurrently seeking to 
withhold that evidence from him on the basis that disclosure would be 
injurious to national security interests. Second, the use of secret evidence 
in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings has grown dramatically over the 
past two decades. It spans a wide spectrum of legal concerns,134 from 
immigration and refugee law,135 to criminal and counter-terrorism law,136 to 
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employment137 and civil law.138 Regardless of which field of law is 
implicated, however, the same core tension persists – how does one 
reconcile the individual’s fundamental right to procedural fairness with the 
state’s claim for the need to protect vital national security interests? The 
most common solution offered to reconciling this tension is some form of 
special advocate regime. This involves a specially appointed, security-
cleared counsel who does in fact see the secret evidence and who advocates 
on behalf of the individual concerned.139 While their use has seen 
considerable growth, the fairness and effectiveness of special advocate 
regimes remains largely contested.140 
 For refugee law agents considering the use of secret evidence in the 
context of exclusion cases, the starting point is clear: Entirely secret 
evidence (that is, where not even the general content is disclosed to the 
claimant) can never be used in a refugee determination to make an 
exclusion finding. Relying on evidence that the individual has absolutely no 
way to challenge offends the most basic principles of procedural fairness. In 
cases where national security interests are truly at stake if full disclosure of 
evidence is made, then procedural safeguards such as content summaries 
and the use of special advocates are required.141 Certainly, leading national 
and transnational judicial opinion supports an understanding of these 
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safeguards as minimum requirements.142 As will be confirmed by a human 
security approach, it is also good sense. Exclusion findings must be made 
on the basis of evidence that is reliable. It is axiomatic that a proper 
reliability assessment cannot be made within a legal process that permits 
no method of challenging or testing the evidence. Naturally, problems with 
the reliability or cogency of evidence will not be uncovered if there is no 
mechanism by which to uncover them.  
 Debates will certainly remain about the precise formula needed to 
effectively and fairly reconcile the tension between claims to ‘national 
security’ and the fairness rights of the individual. Debates will also remain 
about the best way to handle the problem of secret evidence in the refugee 
context specifically. For example, in Canada, secret evidence procedures are 
available in immigration proceedings for determining inadmissibility and 
deportation, and, of course, in the entire security certificate regime.143 
However, secret evidence procedures are not provided for in the refugee 
context.144 In fact, if the individual has launched a refugee claim, that claim 
is suspended pending the determination in the other proceeding, in which 
the secret evidence is scrutinised and potentially considered.145 The 
advantage of this approach is that refugee hearings do not become snarled 
in the very high level of complexity immanent to secret evidence 
proceedings. The disadvantage is that the criminal inadmissibility 
determination made in the other proceeding will be determinative for the 
refugee claim as well, under circumstances where evidence relating to 
inclusion (and which allows for a contextual assessment of exclusion) 
would not necessarily have been adduced or considered.146  Unfortunately, 
any formula for dealing with secret evidence will be imperfect and fairness 
concerns will remain. Nonetheless, it is clear that if the use of secret 
evidence is even to be contemplated in a particular proceeding, a rigorous 
procedure to maximise fairness and reliability must be employed. 
                                                        
142 Chahal v UK [1996] ECHR 54; A and Others v UK [2009] ECHR 301; SSHD v AF 
[AF (No 3)], [2009] UKHL 28; Charkaoui v Canada, 2007 SCC 9.  
143 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, Division 9 – Certificates 
and Protection of Information. 
144 ibid, s 86 (provides that comparable procedures can be used in an admissibility 
hearing or detention review before the Immigration Division of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board, or in an appeal before the Immigration Appeal Division, but no 
provision is made for the Refugee Protection Division). 
145 ibid, s 77(3). 
146 ibid, s 101(1)(f). 
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 Similar fairness concerns guide the use of sensitive evidence, where 
the entire content of the evidence is disclosed to the individual but the 
identity of the source of the information is withheld in order to protect the 
safety of that source. The UNHCR claims that sensitive evidence can be 
used in exclusion cases on an exceptional basis, if the decision-maker is 
satisfied that concealing identity is absolutely necessary in order to protect 
the safety of the information source, and it does not substantially prejudice 
the ability of the claimant to challenge the substance of the evidence.147 
Disclosure of identity is the presumptive position, with concealment the 
exception. In circumstances where concealing identity is not absolutely 
necessary, or where it would cause substantial prejudice to the claimant, 
then identity must be disclosed, or the evidence must be disregarded 
entirely.148 This too will be supported by a human security approach. 
 Finally, perhaps more so than any other form of controversial 
evidence, evidence obtained through the use of torture has generated 
impassioned judicial and scholarly discourse. This discourse is vast, and 
only a small segment of it can be considered within the confines of this 
work. That said, a few general observations are instructive. While torture 
has a long history of use for the purpose of procuring information and 
confessions to be used by the state against the individual, it was outlawed 
long ago in most jurisdictions.149 More importantly, over time the 
prohibition against torture has been entrenched internationally through 
various treaties, although strict reliance on these treaties is no longer 
required. The prohibition against torture is now a peremptory norm of 
international law, or jus cogens. The prohibition applies to all state actors 
and in all circumstances, even in times of war or emergency. As an 
inviolable norm, torture is never a permissible investigatory technique 
through which to obtain information.150 The fact of torture evidence in 
                                                        
147 UNHCR, Guidelines (n 32) para 36; UNHCR, Background Note (n 4) para 113. 
148 Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons for Considering’ (n 30) s 2.4.5. 
149 Michael Scharf, ‘Tainted Provenance: When, If Ever, Should Torture Evidence be 
Admissible?’ (2008) 65 Wash & Lee L Rev 129, 133-136; Stephanie J Spencer, ‘A 
and Others v. Secretary: The Use of Torture Evidence Against Criminal Defendants’ 
(2007) 21 Temp Int'l & Comp LJ 205, 206; Stephen C Thaman, ‘Constitutional 
Rights in the Balance: Modern Exclusionary Rules and the Toleration of Police 
Lawlessness in the Search for Truth’ (2011) 61 UTLJ 691, 693.  
150 Spencer, ‘A and Others’ (n 149) 224; Thomas Poole, ‘Judicial Review at the 
Margins: Law, Power, and Prerogative’ (2010) 60 UTLJ 81, 105-106; David Jenkins, 
‘Rethinking Suresh: Refoulement to Torture under Canada’s Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms’ (2009) 47 Alta L Rev 125; Thaman, ‘Constitutional Rights’ (n 149) 701; 
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contemporary juridical processes is not then a product of any deficiency in 
legal prohibition. Rather, the continuing problem of torture evidence stems 
from the movement of torture into the margins of extra-legal state conduct, 
particularly in the context of national and international political conflict, or 
in the ‘war on terror’.151 Further, slippery definitions of torture, and an 
enforcement regime at international law that is “really no more than peer 
pressure,”152 have made the elimination of torture an unrealisable ideal.153 
Regrettably, the prospect of torture evidence being used in a juridical 
process endures for the foreseeable future. 
 For the purpose of juridical processes such as refugee 
determinations, both the common law and international law make the use 
of any evidence obtained by torture absolutely prohibited. As expressed by 
the House of Lords in A, “evidence is inadmissible if obtained by torture, no 
matter where, by whom or on whose authority the torture is inflicted.”154 
This must be treated as an absolute rule. Under the Convention Against 
Torture, torture evidence can only ever be used as proof against the person 
accused of committing torture.155 All other uses of such evidence are strictly 
prohibited, despite some outlying suggestions that torture evidence might 
be used in certain circumstances for the purpose of establishing 
background information only.156 The reasons for the exclusionary rule are 
several: judicial acceptance of torture evidence is responsible for the 
                                                                                                                                                            
Chahal v UK [1996] ECHR 54; A and Others v UK [2009] ECHR 301; Othman (Abu 
Qatada) v UK [2012] ECHR 56. 
151 Spencer, ‘A and Others’ (n 149) 207-209; Fenwick and Phillipson, ‘Covert 
Derogations’ (n 134) paras 41-43, 65-67 (they claim that there is in fact a 
connection between torture evidence and secret evidence; that secret evidence may 
be used as a way of preventing revelations that evidence has been obtained through 
torture; they also observe that governments generally overclaim the need to protect 
evidence, and that much greater disclosure can be safely managed).  
152 Spencer, ‘A and Others’ (n 149) 223. 
153 On definitional problems, see: Nicholas Grief, ‘The Exclusion of Foreign Torture 
Evidence: A Qualified Victory for the Rule of Law’ (2006) 2 EHRLR 201; Poole, 
‘Judicial Review’ (n 150) 105-106; on the differences between rule and practice, 
and in problems with how legitimacy is conceived, see: Ian Hurd, ‘Torture and the 
Politics of Legitimation in International Law’ in Andreas Follesdal et al (eds), The 
Legitimacy of International Human Rights Regimes (CUP 2014) 165-185. 
154 A v SSHD [2005] UKHL 71; see also: Grief, ‘Exclusion of Foreign Torture 
Evidence’ (n 153); Spencer, ‘A and Others’ (n 149) 209-223. 
155 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment 1984, art 15: “only against a person accused of torture as evidence 
that the statement was made.” 
156 One such outlying suggestion is found in Scharf, ‘Tainted Provenance’ (n 149) 
168-172 (using the example of the Cambodia Tribunal, he suggests that under 
certain circumstances, evidence obtained by torture can be admitted to establish 
background information only (in that case, the Khmer Rouge command structure)). 
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flourishing of torture; the exclusion of torture evidence would make torture 
unrewarding and unattractive to state actors; the need to preserve the 
integrity of the judicial process; and, the inherent unreliability of evidence 
obtained by torture.157 All of these reasons are key, but for present 
purposes, the latter two are perhaps the most illustrative. Refugee claim 
decision-makers must ensure that they protect the integrity of their 
juridical process, and they must ensure that they base exclusion 
determinations on reliable evidence. Torture evidence compromises both of 
these principles so fundamentally that its use can never be justified. 
 While this exclusionary rule is categorical, difficulties still arise in its 
application. As mentioned above, definitional problems persist. What if the 
conduct through which the evidence was procured was particularly 
aggressive or even cruel, but did not quite rise to the level of ‘torture’, as the 
relevant law and facts are understood by the decision-maker? Does the 
same categorical exclusionary rule apply in such circumstances? The 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Gafgen158 leaves this 
uncertain.159 Furthermore, it is clear that the decision-maker is not 
required to believe the individual’s claim about the use of torture.160 But to 
what standard of proof must the individual establish that the impugned 
evidence was obtained through torture? The applicable standard of proof 
has been contested at the highest judicial levels. For example, in the House 
of Lords judgment in A, Lord Bingham and two other justices expressed the 
                                                        
157 United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Question of Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (UN Doc E/CN.4/1993/26, 15 December 1992) paras 
590-591; J Herman Bergers and Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention 
Against Torture: A Handbook on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Martinus Nijhoff 1988) 147-148; A 
v SSHD [2005] UKHL 71, para 130. 
158 Gafgen v Germany [2011] 52 EHRR 1. 
159 Thaman, ‘Constitutional Rights’ (n 149) 702-703 (less categorical treatment for 
‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ than for torture; have ‘harmless error’ and 
‘inevitable discovery’ exceptions); another example: JD Mujuzi, ‘The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Admissibility of Evidence 
Obtained as a Result of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment’ (2013) 
17(3) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 284, 286-289 (exclusionary rule 
does not apply to evidence obtained in violation of any human right; needs to be 
‘grave violation, to be assessed objectively’). 
160 Lu v Canada, 2008 FC 1112; Lai v Canada, 2005 FCA 125 (while the decision-
maker must consider the allegations made by the claimant that statements had 
been obtained by torture, he or she is not required to accept them, provided that 
adequate reasons are given). 
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view that the purpose of the inquiry is to determine if there is a ‘real risk’ 
that the evidence was obtained through the use of torture.161 In contrast, 
Lord Hope and three other justices suggested that a balance of probabilities 
was the more appropriate standard.162 The more recent judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Othman (Abu Qatada)163 supports the 
‘real risk’ approach of Lord Bingham, although the Court did suggest that 
there could be distinctions between the immigration and criminal 
contexts.164 More generally, however, the Court suggested that care should 
be taken to not impose too high a burden, particularly given the special 
difficulties of proving torture, a crime that is practiced secretly and by 
highly skilled perpetrators.165 In the end, the Court described the required 
burden as one of showing a ‘real risk’ of a flagrant denial of justice through 
the use of evidence obtained by torture.166 Although Othman was not a case 
about the application of the Refugee Convention, given the practical and 
purposive similarities relative to the issue of torture evidence, the ‘real risk’ 
approach is apposite for refugee law. It also corresponds well with the 
refugee claimant’s burden on inclusion of showing a real risk (or ‘serious 
possibility’ or ‘reasonable chance’) of persecution. If a refugee decision-
maker believes that there is a real risk that the evidence tendered was 
obtained through torture, then that evidence should be entirely disregarded 
as both violative of an inviolable norm of international law, and as 
inherently unreliable. That preference to approaching torture evidence, 
together with the other principles of a human security approach to 
assessing evidence, will be set out next. 
 
 
                                                        
161 A v SSHD [2005] UKHL 71, paras 54-62. 
162 ibid, paras 117-126. 
163 Othman (Abu Qatada) v UK [2012] ECHR 56. 
164 ibid, para 274 (the court pointed to the fact that A [2005] was an immigration 
proceeding, whereas in Othman, the issue of torture evidence arose in the context 
of evidence that could be used in Jordan to obtain a criminal conviction with a 
lengthy sentence). 
165 ibid, para 276. 
166 ibid, paras 272-280; see also: Re Mahjoub, 2010 FC 787 (where a ‘reasonable 
grounds to believe’ test was used re: torture evidence in the security certificate 
context); Lu v Canada, 2008 FC 1112 (the Court described the decision-maker’s 
task in an Article 1F(b) exclusion case more generally, as determining if the 
claimant’s evidence re: torture was ‘reliable’). 
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5.3.4  A Human Security Approach to Assessing Evidence 
 
 As developed in the first half of this chapter, a human security 
approach to the standard of proof for exclusion frames ‘serious reasons for 
considering’ in a way that is contextual and based on individualised 
assessment. Appealing to the reflexive nature of the inclusion and exclusion 
questions, a decision-maker must decide what he or she believes in respect 
of both the inclusion and exclusion case, based on the presence of clear 
and credible evidence to support that belief. In cases where the inclusion 
case is particularly strong, the exclusion case will need to be equally strong 
in order to deny refugee status to the individual claimant. In such cases, 
the scrutiny with which particular types of evidence are assessed will 
necessarily be heightened. 
 The preferences of a human security approach to assessing all three 
categories of evidence – formal, substantive, and controversial – have 
already been set out throughout the second half of this chapter. Those 
preferences are guided by the need to preserve procedural fairness in any 
juridical process, not simply because this is what developed legal systems 
grounded in human rights require, but also because the pursuit of human 
security as a value is dependant on reliable information. Framing questions 
through an overarching human security lens allows decision-makers to 
focus their efforts on determining which information is reliable and which 
information is dubious, and thereby determining who should be recognised 
as a Convention refugee and who should not.  
 A human security approach to scrutinising the quality of exclusion 
evidence is, once again, grounded in contextual and individualised 
assessment. As it relates specifically to the different categories or types of 
evidence, a human security approach to assessing that evidence can be 
summarised in the following manner. With respect to the first category - 
formal evidence - a criminal conviction for the potentially excludable act 
may be strong evidence that amounts to ‘serious reasons for considering’ 
that the claimant has committed that act. A conviction is neither required 
in order to find exclusion, nor is its presence dispositive. Decision-makers 
must look behind the formal conviction by examining both the country 
condition evidence and the claim-specific evidence. In particular, they must 
pay attention to any allegations about fabricated criminal charges or an 
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unfair judicial process. Depending on the strength of the evidence on the 
inclusion case, a conviction may in fact be evidence of persecution rather 
than evidence of an excludable crime. These considerations will vary 
depending on the country of origin and on the individual circumstances of 
the case. A decision-maker is required to consider all of this information 
and to make a determination about the reliability of the conviction. If found 
to be reliable, a conviction can be considered clear and credible evidence of 
an excludable crime. On the other end of the spectrum, evidence of an 
acquittal will usually be strong evidence that the claimant should not be 
excluded. However, it too is not dispositive. To revisit the example used in 
Chapter Three on seriousness, the fact that a man was acquitted of 
homicide in his country of origin because he killed his wife on suspicion of 
adultery would not be determinative of the exclusion issue.167 
 Similar considerations apply to indictments and warrants. Whether a 
particular indictment is reliable evidence of exclusion will depend on an 
assessment of both the country condition and claim-specific evidence. A 
presumptive starting point may exist depending on the country of origin,168 
or if the indictment has been issued by an international criminal tribunal. 
Nonetheless, decision-makers must still consider any specific claims of 
unfairness in the foreign judicial process, or of persecution disguised as 
prosecution. Decision-makers must be alive to the possibility that a state 
which generally respects human rights and has fair judicial processes could 
still generate an indictment that is unreliable, for various reasons. 
Conversely, a claimant who has in fact committed a common, serious crime 
like murder may be from a country with a poor human rights record 
generally, but the indictment may actually reflect what it purports to in 
that specific situation. How deeply one must look behind the indictment 
will necessarily modulate according to the circumstances of the individual 
case.  
                                                        
167 Ch 3, s 3.4; see also: Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 5) 114 (if acquitted at the 
international level, should still examine the record carefully and the reasons for 
acquittal; exclusion may still be reasonable based on the applicable standard). 
168 This assumes that the country of origin (i.e. the country against which the 
refugee claim is made) and the country in which the crime was committed are the 
same, the scenario in many exclusion cases; however, the excludable act could 
have taken place in a third country, in which case the country condition evidence 
relevant to assessing the formal evidence of exclusion would be the evidence 
relating to that third country. 
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 With respect to national and international terrorist listings, the fact 
that an organisation, of which the claimant was a member, is listed as 
‘terrorist’, is simply one factor to consider. Although such a listing may 
establish the ‘terrorist’ nature of the organisation, the refugee decision-
maker considering exclusion under Article 1F(b) must still be satisfied that 
two more important facts have been established: (1) the organisation 
engaged in acts that are serious non-political crimes; and (2) the claimant 
bears individual responsibility for those crimes. Since a human security 
approach focuses on identifying criminal actors who represent a threat to 
the human security of the receiving state, determining whether the 
individual made a significant and knowing contribution to the 
organisation’s criminal activity is pivotal. Before excluding a claimant on 
the basis of membership in a terrorist organisation, the decision-maker 
must be satisfied that the claimant was complicit in and bears individual 
responsibility for the crimes committed by the organisation.169 Legal tests 
for determining complicity in the international realm are also instructive to 
determining complicity in the context of Article 1F(b), particularly where the 
prospect of exclusion is grounded in membership in an organisation. 
 A human security approach to the second category - substantive 
evidence - also generates clear preferences. In dealing with the testimony of 
witnesses, documentary and expert evidence, decision-makers must 
specifically assess the credibility of witness testimony and the reliability of 
documentary or expert evidence. Such evidence will vary in its accuracy, 
impartiality, and specificity, all of which should be taken into account in 
determining its overall reliability. Particular care should be exercised with 
the testimony of witnesses, as some individuals may be motivated to 
provide false testimony, by reason of personal vendetta, jealousy, or 
political interest. Decision-makers must be clear about why an item of 
third-party evidence is or is not reliable as evidence of the claimant’s 
responsibility for an excludable act. 
 Similarly, in assessing the reliability of a claimant’s confession to 
having participated in an excludable act, it is vital to assess the 
                                                        
169 Asha Kaushal and Catherine Dauvergne, ‘ The Growing Culture of Exclusion: 
Trends in Canadian Refugee Exclusions’ (2011) 23(1) Int J Refugee Law 54 (their 
review of Canadian refugee exclusion cases leads them to conclude that the 
principle of individual responsibility is not being upheld amid a growing net of 
exclusion). 
 233 
voluntariness of that confession. Particularly in circumstances where the 
confession took place in the country of origin (against which the refugee 
claim is made), decision-makers must be satisfied that the confession was 
not fabricated, or obtained through coercion. In such circumstances, the 
inclusion evidence (both country condition and claim-specific) provides a 
factual foundation within which to make that assessment. Once again, this 
highlights the interconnection of the inclusion and exclusion questions, 
and the need for an individualised assessment. Confessions made by the 
claimant directly to the refugee-decision maker must also be considered 
carefully. While determinative weight could certainly be attributed to such a 
confession, the decision-maker should first be satisfied that the claimant is 
not simply making false statements to strengthen his inclusion case. On 
the other hand, the claimant’s non-cooperation in addressing the exclusion 
issue is on its own insufficient to satisfy the standard for an exclusion 
finding. The effect of non-cooperation will depend on the individual 
circumstances of the case. Where there is other evidence, such as a 
conviction or indictment that has been found to be reliable, the claimant’s 
non-cooperation does not preclude exclusion, and may contribute to 
negative credibility findings that affect the entire case. Given the binary 
nature of a refugee claim with an exclusion issue, the claimant’s non-
cooperation may have a significant impact on the inclusion case as well. 
 In circumstances where the claimant is not silent, but rather asserts 
an affirmative justification such as duress or self-defence, the decision-
maker must assess the credibility of such an assertion and determine its 
impact on the question of individual responsibility for an excludable crime. 
Depending on the specific nature of the justification claimed, and whether 
it is connected to the inclusion claim, reference back to the country 
condition evidence and claim-specific evidence may be required in order to 
assess the impact of the justification on the exclusion issue. A contextual, 
individualised approach to determining the weight accorded to a 
justification is consistent with a human security lens, which frames the 
inquiry and analysis in such a way so as to identify conduct that reflects a 
threat to the human security of the receiving state. 
 Finally, the third category - controversial evidence - is also subject to 
the specific parameters engendered by a human security approach. Secret 
evidence, to the extent it amounts to evidence that is completely concealed 
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from the individual claimant, cannot be considered. As there is no way to 
test or assess such evidence, it is unreliable for juridical purposes. It also 
violates the basic principles of procedural fairness to which any sound 
refugee determination process must adhere. If the state has a legitimate 
national security interest in preventing disclosure, then a system of 
procedural safeguards including content summaries and special advocates 
may provide a structure within which to consider that evidence. Even in 
these circumstances, however, the decision-maker must be satisfied that 
the evidence is reliable before using it as a basis for exclusion. If its 
reliability is unclear to the decision-maker, given the lower level of testing 
inherent to a special evidentiary regime, then that evidence should not be 
used to ground an exclusion finding. In relation to sensitive evidence, a 
claimant should be provided with both the content of the evidence and the 
source of that evidence. Exceptionally, if the decision-maker is satisfied 
that concealing the identity of the source is absolutely necessary and would 
not substantially prejudice the claimant’s ability to challenge the substance 
of the evidence, the evidence may be anonymised. Once again, decision-
makers must be satisfied that the concealment of identity from the claimant 
has not significantly impacted the decision-maker’s ability to properly 
assess the reliability of that evidence. 
 In contrast, the use of evidence obtained through torture is 
absolutely prohibited. There are no exceptions in the refugee determination 
context, even if the evidence is tendered to prove that the claimant 
represents a significant threat to the human security of the receiving state. 
Apart from the inherent unreliability of torture evidence, appealing to 
human security by defeating one of its most basic principles is 
fundamentally incoherent. Refugee decision-makers must preserve the 
integrity of their juridical process, and must ensure that they base 
decisions on reliable evidence. If there is a real risk that the tendered 
evidence was obtained by torture, it should be disregarded entirely. Even 
though a refugee hearing is not a criminal trial, certain cases will call for 
heightened scrutiny of the evidence put forward.170 Decision-makers should 
examine such issues carefully. 
                                                        
170 Meredith Angelson, ‘Beyond the Myth of “Good Faith”: Torture Evidence in 
International Extradition Hearings’ (2009) 41 New York Univ J Int'l L & Pol 630, 
646-650 (where she critiques the low level of scrutiny of torture evidence in 
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 This summary highlights the fact that although the traditional rules 
of evidence do not apply to an administrative process like a refugee 
determination, it is not a process without parameters. When setting those 
parameters is guided by a human security lens, the analysis refocuses on 
the ultimate aim of obtaining clear and reliable evidence upon which to 
determine the human security interests at stake. As asserted in previous 
chapters, while an exclusion finding does not require a specific legal 
determination that the claimant is a present danger to the public in the 
receiving state,171 the state protective purpose underlying Article 1F(b) 
should still frame the factual and legal inquiry in a way that stays true to 
the spirit of the Refugee Convention. Decision-makers need to ask 
themselves purposively framed questions in order to stay on the right path 
and off the wrong one. Whatever its type, the nature and quality of evidence 
should be approached with a view to deciding if it is a reliable basis upon 
which to conclude that there are serious reasons for considering that the 
claimant has committed a crime that is both serious and non-political. 
Identifying criminal conduct of a type that compromises the human 
security of the individuals in the receiving state is the purposive heart of 
the exclusion question. 
Certainly, the components of Article 1F(b) – ‘serious crime’, ‘non-
political crime’, and ‘serious reasons for considering’ – are typically 
examined and discussed as three distinct elements. This work is no 
exception, and each element has formed the basis of a separate chapter. 
However, as maintained throughout, the elements can be examined 
separately but must be understood collectively. Each is connected to the 
others. It is an appreciation of that interconnection which drives the 
overarching claim that exclusion determinations can only be properly made 
through a process based on a contextual and individualised assessment. It 
also leads to the necessary conclusion that the judicially popular principle 
                                                                                                                                                            
extradition proceedings; she suggests that the greater scrutiny found in 
immigration and refugee law is preferable and should be adopted in extradition 
proceedings as well). 
171 Ch 3, text to n 62, 63 (a danger finding is neither required for exclusion, nor 
does it operate as an independent ground of exclusion, i.e. in the absence of an 
excludable crime having been committed by the claimant); Joined Cases C-57/09 
and C101-09 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D [2010] ECR I-10979, para 105 
(do not need an express legal finding that the claimant presents a danger). 
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of ‘no balancing’,172 which positions each element as conceptually and 
doctrinally distinct, is ill-conceived. Examining the relationships between 
the different elements of exclusion, and showing how those relationships 
are strengthened by a human security approach situated in a process of 
individualised assessment, is the focus of the next and final chapter. 
                                                        
172 This refers to the principle that the nature of the excludable criminal act is not 
to be balanced with the severity of the persecution feared; see: ch 6, s 6.2.2. 
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 This final chapter will consider what is often presented in refugee law 
as the denouement to an exclusion analysis, the so-called ‘balancing’ 
question: in making a final determination on exclusion, must decision-
makers balance the nature and severity of the criminal act (the exclusion 
element) against the nature and degree of the persecution feared (the 
inclusion element)? Approaches that promote a final balancing test, led by 
the UNHCR and supported by most academics, will be contrasted with 
approaches that reject a final balancing test, as upheld by many national 
judiciaries, particularly in common law states.  
 A human security approach will then demonstrate how a contextual 
and individualised assessment of the three doctrinal elements explored in 
the previous chapters makes a final balancing test unnecessary in most 
cases. Since proportionality is paradigmatic to the human security 
approach endorsed in relation to those doctrinal elements, a conspicuous 
result should be revealed through that process of individualised 
assessment. However, in rare cases where the result is nevertheless 
unclear, a final balancing or proportionality assessment is warranted. Such 
an assessment asks decision-makers to weigh the clearly and concretely 
identified human rights interests on both sides and decide which interests 
should, on balance, direct the result. Ultimately, that decision (whether it is 
to exclude or not) must honour the human rights protection purpose of the 
Convention. In certain cases, honouring that human rights protection 
purpose will favour exclusion, and in others, inclusion. No lesser, 
‘compromise’ status is permissible under the Refugee Convention, and so 
decision-makers must reach a conclusion. A final proportionality 
assessment makes that conclusion possible in difficult cases.  
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6.2 ‘Balancing’ Inclusion and Exclusion 
6.2.1 Approaches that Promote ‘Balancing’ 
 Approaches that call for a balancing requirement in making a final 
determination on exclusion under Article 1F(b) have been assertively 
promoted by the UNHCR and most academic commentators. Leading this 
call, the UNHCR has always maintained that in making a final 
determination on the application of Article 1F(b),1 refugee law agents need 
to ‘strike a balance’ between the nature of the crime committed and the 
degree of persecution feared by the claimant. According to the UNHCR,2 
balancing inclusion and exclusion, or applying a ‘proportionality’ test, is a 
useful analytical tool that ensures decisions on exclusion are made in a 
manner consistent with the overall humanitarian object and purpose of the 
Refugee Convention. Weighing the gravity of the offence against the degree 
of persecution feared, in what some commentators have termed a double3 
or superadded4 balancing requirement, means that the final determination 
on exclusion will depend on considerations that necessarily modulate 
according to all the relevant facts of the individual claim. Consequently, in 
cases where the claimant has established ‘very severe’ persecution 
endangering life or freedom, the Article 1F(b) crime must be ‘very grave’ to 
warrant exclusion. On the other hand, in cases involving ‘less serious’ 
persecution, regard must be had to the nature of the crime in establishing 
                                                        
1 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion 
Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
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context of the preliminary ruling references to the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities from the German Federal Administrative Court regarding the 
interpretation of Articles 12(2)(b) and (c) of the Qualification Directive (July 2009) 
(Statement on Article 1F) ss 2.2.3, 4.4. 
3 Gilbert, ‘Running Scared Since 9/11’ (n 1)102. 
4 James C Hathaway and Colin J Harvey, ‘Framing Refugee Protection in the New 
World Disorder’ (2001) 34 Cornell Int'l LJ 257, 313. 
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whether the claimant is a fugitive from justice or whether his ‘criminal 
character’ outweighs his character as a bona fide refugee.5 This final 
proportionality assessment is seen by the UNHCR as a vital safeguard in 
the refugee determination process, ensuring that decision-makers take 
proper account of the consequences of applying the exclusion clause before 
doing so.6 
 The UNHCR’s justifications for a final proportionality assessment are 
several. In addition to the overarching rationale of maintaining consistency 
with the overall humanitarian purpose of the Refugee Convention, the 
UNHCR points to proportionality as a fundamental principle of many fields 
of international law, including international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law.7 In reference to the latter, proportionality 
considerations are seen as vital in a democratic society in order to 
effectively and fairly balance the interests of the community with the 
fundamental human rights of the individual.8 Indeed, proportionality tests 
have become ubiquitous in human rights law, in the national, regional, and 
international spheres.9 As the UNHCR further highlights, while it is true 
that balancing is not specifically mentioned in the Refugee Convention, 
balancing-type tests have emerged in relation to Article 1F(b), particularly 
in so far as the qualifying adjectives ‘serious’ and ‘non-political’ demand a 
contextual analysis that takes account of all relevant facts, including those 
facts that relate to the persecution feared by the claimant.10 In this light, 
while acknowledging that in practice most states have rejected a final 
balancing test, the UNHCR is not convinced (rightly, it will be argued here) 
                                                        
5 UNHCR, Handbook (n 2) para 156; UNHCR, Background Note (n 2) para 78. 
6 UNHCR, Guidelines (n 1) para 24; UNHCR, Statement on Article 1F (n 2) s 4.4. 
7 UNHCR, Background Note (n 2) para 77; UNHCR, Guidelines (n 1) para 24. 
8 UNHCR, Background Note (n 2) para 77, relying on Silver v UK [1983] 5 EHRR 347 
(where the European Court of Human Rights explained that proportionality 
considerations are essential in a democratic society to balance the general interests 
of the community and the fundamental rights of the individual). 
9 ibid, as an example at the transnational level; s 1 analysis under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, is an example at the national level (R v 
Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103); proportionality approaches adopted with respect to the 
interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
(Camargo (on behalf of Suarez de Guerrero) v Colombia, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979, IHRL 2570 (UNHRC, 1982) 31 March 1982, Human 
Rights Committee [UNHRC]), or with respect to the right of self defence under 
international law (Nicaragua v United States, 27 June 1986 (International Court of 
Justice)) are examples at the international level. 
10 UNHCR, Background Note (n 2) para 77, relying on Pushpanathan v Canada, 
[1998] 1 SCR 982, para 73; see, for example: Gil v Canada, [1995] 1 FC 508 (CA) 
para 44. 
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that proportionality or balancing is somehow at odds with the doctrinal 
demands of the Refugee Convention. Rather, the UNHCR persists in its view 
that as an exemption to a human rights guarantee, exclusion under Article 
1F(b) must be applied in a manner that is proportionate to its objective.11 A 
final balancing test works to achieve that aim. 
 Similarly, most refugee law scholars and other commentators 
persevere in their promotion of a final balancing test for Article 1F(b), while 
acknowledging that many refugee-receiving states have at this point 
rejected it.12 Aside from Switzerland, and at times Belgium, France and 
Germany, other civil law countries, and certainly common law countries, 
have rejected the concept of a final balancing test in applying Article 
1F(b).13 As Gilbert points out, although a rejection of balancing is now 
presented as the traditional view, in fact a balancing requirement was 
employed in continental Europe in the early days of the Refugee 
Convention, and more importantly, was envisaged by the drafters of the 
Convention.14 Similarly, before changing his view and coming to reject 
balancing, Hathaway insisted that the drafters of the Convention had 
contemplated a balancing test, pointing to the words of both the delegate 
from Denmark and the President of the Conference. Again, the outcome of 
                                                        
11 n 2. 
12 Geoff Gilbert, ‘Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses’ in E 
Feller, V Turk, and F Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law (CUP 
2003) 450-455; Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in 
International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2007) 180-184; Andreas Zimmermann and Philipp 
Wennholz, ‘Article 1F’ in Andreas Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 607-609; 
Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, ‘Article 1F(b): Freedom Fighters, Terrorists, and the 
Notion of Serious Non-Political Crimes’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 46, s 
4.2; Michael Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons for Considering: Minimum Standards of 
Procedural Fairness in the Application of the Article 1F Exclusion Clauses’ (2000) 
12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 92, s 2.1.2; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
(LCHR), ‘Safeguarding the Rights of Refugees under the Exclusion Clauses: 
Summary Findings of the Project and a Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
Perspective’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 317, s 3.2.1; Sibylle Kapferer, 
‘Exclusion Clauses in Europe—A Comparative Overview of State Practice in France, 
Belgium and the United Kingdom’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 195, ss 4.1-
4.2; Michael Kingsley Nyinah, ‘Exclusion under Article 1F: Some Reflections on 
Context, Principles and Practice’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 295, s 3.2; 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), ‘Position on Exclusion from 
Refugee Status’ (2004) 16(2) Int J Refugee Law 257, para 42. 
13 See Rikhof’s thorough comparative examination of the acceptance/rejection of 
the balancing test: Joseph Rikhof, The Criminal Refugee: the Treatment of Asylum 
Seekers with a Criminal Background in International and Domestic Law (Republic of 
Letters 2012) 114-122. 
14 Gilbert, ‘Current Issues’ (n 12) 451. 
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such a balancing test is that if the gravity of the harm feared by the 
claimant outweighs the significance of the criminal activity, then exclusion 
from Convention refugee status should not follow.15 
 Commentators arguing for a final balancing test present 
justifications that largely echo those offered by the UNHCR.16 The idea that 
international refugee law must not be allowed to lag behind other fields of 
international human rights law, which do incorporate proportionality tests, 
is a pervasive theme: “[s]ince the 1951 Convention itself constitutes an 
instrument of human rights protection, its dynamic interpretation with 
regard to the standards of human rights law, as it exists today, is also 
required as a matter of systemic consistency.”17 Others point out that 
international law, through a proportionality-type analysis, already 
legitimises certain acts of violence (which theme was canvassed in Chapter 
Four on ‘non-political’ crimes).18 Still others advocating a balancing test 
identify practical absurdities stemming from a rigid view of Article 1F(b). 
For example, while extradition law accommodates proportionality through 
‘discrimination’ clauses (i.e. extradition can be refused if the person would 
be prejudiced or punished on account of a discriminatory ground), an 
absolutist view of Article 1F(b) sends the opposite message and leads to 
absurd results.19 Along these same lines, even within the confines of the 
Refugee Convention itself, whereas ‘balancing’ under Article 33(2) may 
protect the person who has committed a crime in the country of refuge, it is 
irrationally precluded from doing so under Article 1F(b), in circumstances 
where the crime has been committed outside the country of refuge.20 Given 
both purposive and practical considerations then, it is hardly surprising 
                                                        
15 Original acceptance: James Hathaway, Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths 
1991) 224-225; subsequent rejection: Hathaway and Harvey, ‘Framing Refugee 
Protection’ (n 4) 309-313. 
16 n 12. 
17 Zimmermann and Wennholz, ‘Article 1F’ (n 12) 608-609. 
18 Gilbert, ‘Current Issues’ (n 12) 454-455; Kälin and Künzli, ‘Article 1F(b)’ (n 12) s 
4.2. 
19 Gilbert, ‘Current Issues’ (n 12) 454; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in 
International Law (n 12) 180-183. 
20 Zimmermann and Wennholz, ‘Article 1F’ (n 12) 609; of course, this is based on a 
view of Article 33(2) as incorporating some form of ‘balancing’, which is not 
accepted by everyone: James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International 
Law (CUP 2005) 354-355. 
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that the dominant academic view supports the UNHCR and sees the 
rejection of balancing as being with “little rational explanation.”21   
6.2.2 Approaches that Reject ‘Balancing’ 
 The rejection by most state courts, particularly in the common law 
world, of a final balancing test is typically justified on two grounds: (1) the 
absence of any text in the Refugee Convention suggesting that the decision-
maker should weigh the gravity of the crime with the degree of persecution 
feared; and (2) the availability of other mechanisms of complementary 
protection to address the interests of a claimant excluded from the Refugee 
Convention. On these bases, the courts in common law countries, and in 
some civil law countries, have dismissed the idea of a final proportionality 
assessment in deciding whether to apply the exclusion clause to a 
particular refugee claimant.22 At the supranational level as well, the 
European Court of Justice has agreed that no final or additional balancing 
test is required under Article 1F(b).23 While being prepared to acknowledge 
that some form of balancing consideration may be operative in relation to 
the individual elements of Article 1F(b), and the ‘non-political’ element in 
particular,24 courts have rejected a balancing test that is applied to the case 
as a whole in making a final determination on exclusion.  
 With respect to the first justification, the observation that the text of 
the Refugee Convention does not mention balancing is an accurate one. In 
fact, the first words of Article 1F simply state that “[t]he provisions of this 
Convention shall not apply to any person” who fits within the exclusion 
clauses. However, as several academic writers claim, relying on the absence 
of text to reject balancing represents an overly literal or ‘dogmatic’ reading 
                                                        
21 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 12) 180. 
22 Examples include: Xie v Canada, 2004 FCA 250; the US case of INS v Aguirre-
Aguirre (1999) 526 US 415 (USSC); the Australian case of Dhayakpa v MIEA [1995] 
FCA 1653; and, the UK case of T v SSHD [1995] 2 All ER 1042 (CA); see also: 
Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 13) 116-121; Gilbert, ‘Current Issues’ (n 12) 450; 
Lisbon Expert Roundtable, Summary Conclusions: Exclusion from Refugee Status (3-
4 May 2001) < http://www.unhcr.org/3b38938a4.html> accessed 15 March 2014, 
para 12. 
23 Joined Cases C-57/09 and C101-09 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D 
[2010] ECR I-10979, para. 109; see also: UK Home Office, Asylum Instruction – 
Exclusion: Article 1F of the Refugee Convention (30 May 2012) s 3.10 (relying on 
Article 12(2) of the EC Qualification Directive, the decision in B and D, and s 34 of 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, for the conclusion that there is to 
be no such balancing test).  
24 n 10. 
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of the Convention, a reading that is inconsistent with the modern 
interpretive approach that courts have otherwise taken.25 Much of that 
which now forms the body of international refugee law is not expressly 
stated in the Convention formulated in 1951. As claimed in Chapter One, 
the interpretive aim of refugee law agents should be to give the Refugee 
Convention a purposive reading in light of the current normative and legal 
landscape.26 While courts are seemingly prepared to do this with respect to 
inclusion issues,27 the analysis with respect to exclusion has tended in the 
other direction toward an insistence on literalism.28 
 The second justification for the rejection of balancing – the 
availability of complementary protection – is more complex and calls for an 
examination far more comprehensive than can be accommodated in a work 
focused on the Refugee Convention. Nonetheless, a few words of 
explanation are necessary, particularly since this justification will be found 
(in the section that follows) to be an inadequate basis upon which to 
displace the legal work that should be done by the Refugee Convention 
itself. Simplified to its most basic elements, complementary protection is “a 
shorthand term for the widened scope of non-refoulement under 
international law.”29 It captures those human rights obligations that 
complement or supplement the Refugee Convention. These human rights 
obligations arise under other international legal instruments, such as the 
Convention Against Torture, the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or indeed, as a result of 
non-refoulement having emerged as a customary norm of international law. 
Such human rights obligations, falling under the umbrella of 
‘complementary protection’, protect against the most serious types of harm, 
                                                        
25 Nyinah, ‘Exclusion under Article 1F’ (n 12) ss 3.1-3.2; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 
(n 12) 180-184; Gilbert, ‘Current Issues’ (n 12) 452. 
26 Ch 1, s 1.4. 
27 For example, as evinced by the recognition of gender and sexual orientation 
based claims under ‘particular social group’: Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada, Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-
Related Persecution (13 November 1996); HJ (Iran) & HT (Cameroon) v SSHD [2010] 
UKSC 31; UK Home Office, Asylum Instruction – Sexual Orientation Issues in the 
Asylum Claim (13 June 2011); Siobhan Mullally, ‘Gender Asylum Law: Providing 
Transformative Remedies?’ in Satvinder Singh Juss and Colin Harvey (eds) 
Contemporary Issues in Refugee Law (Edward Edgar 2013) 196-224. 
28 Gilbert, ‘Running Scared Since 9/11’ (n 1) 111. 
29 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 12) 285. 
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such as torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.30 
Depending on the facts of the particular case, by virtue of these obligations, 
a state may be precluded from removing a refugee claimant even though it 
has excluded him from the Refugee Convention for serious criminality 
under Article 1F.31 
 The manner in which complementary protection is given effect varies 
across national and transnational legal systems.32 Since examining each of 
these systems is well beyond the scope of this work, the Canadian 
experience will be used as an instructive example in relation to Article 
1F(b). In Canada, a refugee claimant who has been excluded under Article 
1F(b) pursuant to a formal refugee determination process is, at the removal 
stage, offered a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA). The aim of the PRRA 
is to assess whether removing the individual to a particular place would 
subject him to a risk to his life, or of torture, or of cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment.33 This assessment captures the types of human 
rights obligations owed by Canada under international law, beyond the 
obligations owed under the Refugee Convention.34 A positive risk 
assessment under the PRRA (that is, a finding that the person would be 
subject to such a risk) results in a stay of removal.35 The individual is not 
given Convention refugee status, but he is also not removed to the country 
where he would be subjected to the forbidden risk. It is the availability of 
this regime of complementary protection which has allowed the Federal 
Court of Appeal to reject balancing under Article 1F(b) with relative ease. 
                                                        
30 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 13) 15-26; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 12) 285-
354. 
31 Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (OUP 
2007) 228-234. 
32 n 30-31. 
33 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (IRPA) ss 97 and 112. 
34 ibid; see also: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Manual PP3: Pre-
Removal Risk Assessment (24 July 2009) s 2. 
35 IRPA, s 112(3)(c): refugee protection cannot result from a PRRA application made 
by someone excluded under Article 1F; s 114(1)(b): the result of a positive PRRA in 
such circumstances is a stay of removal; note that under s 113(d)(ii), before a stay 
of removal follows, the Minister must first ‘balance’ the protection need by 
considering “whether the application should be refused because of the nature and 
severity of acts committed by the applicant or because of the danger that the 
applicant constitutes to the security of Canada.”; see: CIC, Manual PP3, ss 9.4 and 
9.6; for ‘balancing’ in another complementary protection regime, see: Council 
Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving 
temporary protection [2001] OJ L212/12 (Temporary Protection Directive) art 
28(1)(a)(ii): “The severity of the expected persecution is to be weighed against the 
nature of the criminal offence...” 
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Since an exclusion finding does not necessarily result in removal, and since 
a subsequent proceeding will take into account the most serious protection 
interests of the individual, the case for a final balancing test under Article 
1F(b) is quite easily dismissed.36 
 As Rikhof claims, the ‘no balancing’ approach has now become firmly 
entrenched in the case law, despite the UNHCR’s consistent stance in 
favour of balancing. In Rikhof’s view, the accessibility of complementary 
protection to the criminally excluded refugee claimant has made the 
rejection of a balancing test ‘more palatable’ to judges, and this position is 
now unlikely to change.37 For his part, Hathaway stands apart from the 
dominant academic position and argues quite strongly against the UNHCR’s 
‘superadded balancing test’, despite being in favour of it in his original 
text.38 In fact, Hathaway and Harvey characterise the UNHCR’s balancing 
test as “not a legally tenable position”,39 while viewing the judicial rejection 
of it as “clear, and logically compelling.”40 At first glance, much of his 
criticism appears to be aimed at guarding against an expansive view of the 
exclusion clauses, which the type of discretion immanent to any 
proportionality-type test may, at least in theory, engender.41 However, upon 
more careful review, it is clear that Hathaway’s objection to the UNHCR’s 
balancing test springs from his view of Article 1F(b) as a simple corollary to 
extradition (the ‘fugitives from justice’ thesis of Article 1F(b) canvassed in 
Chapter Three). Hathaway must object to a balancing test because it 
conceptualises Article 1F(b) in a manner that does not restrict it to 
currently justiciable and extraditable crimes, and because it contemplates 
some role for the ‘state protective purpose’.42 The strict ‘fugitives from 
justice’ thesis was rejected in Chapter Three (‘serious’ crime) as not 
providing a full account of the purposes of the exclusion clause, and in 
particular the state protective purpose. The dictates of that thesis with 
respect to the ‘balancing’ question will similarly be rejected in the next 
section. 
                                                        
36 Xie v Canada, 2004 FCA 250, paras 30-33, 37. 
37 Rikhof, Criminal Refugee (n 13) 122. 
38 Hathaway, Law of Refugee Status (n 15) 224-225. 
39 Hathaway and Harvey, ‘Framing Refugee Protection’ (n 4) 310.  
40 ibid 313. 
41 ibid 309. 
42 ibid 310 (“extradition-derived exemption”), 311 (“excludes fugitives from justice”). 
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6.3 Preserving Individualised Assessment in Refugee 
Determination 
 
 Given the direction set out in previous chapters, it is clear that a 
human security lens calls for an approach, with respect to both the 
individual elements of Article 1F(b) and its final application, that 
predominant state practice will see as a violation of the ‘no balancing’ edict. 
In the previous three chapters, a human security approach to the doctrinal 
themes supported a contextual, individualised approach to the examination 
of each element within Article 1F(b) – the seriousness of the crime, its non-
political quality, and the standard of proof and evidentiary considerations. 
This individualised assessment demands that both exclusion and inclusion 
issues be considered together. In order to properly determine if a crime is 
‘serious’ and ‘non-political’, the decision-maker must consider the nature 
and gravity of the crime in the context of the individual claimant’s 
situation, which includes the nature and degree of persecution faced by 
him in his country of origin.43 Similarly, as concluded in Chapter Five, the 
standard of proof and evidentiary considerations with respect to exclusion 
will necessarily modulate depending on the strength of the inclusion case. 
Very strong evidence of persecution will, reflexively, demand very strong 
evidence of responsibility for an excludable crime.44 
 As already suggested above, even those who have rejected a final 
balancing test acknowledge that some form of balancing or proportionality 
assessment takes place within the individual elements of Article 1F(b). For 
example, the Canadian courts have rejected a final balancing test while 
acknowledging that some form of balancing mechanism is immanent to the 
determination of a crime’s political or non-political quality.45 This 
conclusion is inescapable, since the doctrinal analysis of ‘non-political’ in 
Article 1F(b), borrowed from extradition law, is itself centred on the 
application of a proportionality test.46 Similarly, the European Court of 
Justice agreed that no final balancing test is required for Article 1F(b), but 
based this conclusion on the precondition that “the competent authority 
has already, in its assessment of the seriousness of the acts committed by 
                                                        
43 Ch 3, s 3.4; ch 4, s 4.5.  
44 Ch 5, s 5.2.4. 
45 n 10. 
46 Ch 4, s 4.2. 
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the person concerned and of that person’s individual responsibility, taken 
into account all the circumstances surrounding those acts and the 
situation of that person.”47    
 Seen in this light, if a contextual, individualised assessment is 
preserved throughout the refugee determination process, then the absence 
of a final balancing test is less problematic. In contrast, when the 
mechanistic approaches to the different elements of Article 1F(b) examined 
in the previous chapters are combined with a ‘no final balancing’ approach, 
then the opportunity for individualised assessment is almost entirely lost. 
Indeed, mechanistic approaches often advocate a view of refugee 
determination whereby exclusion can be dealt with through an accelerated, 
admissibility type process, dispensing with the need to consider inclusion 
issues at all. Of course, those who advocate for a contextual, individualised 
approach, and certainly those who promote a final balancing test, insist 
that the refugee determination process must include an assessment of both 
inclusion and exclusion issues.48 As supported by a human security lens 
throughout this work, a contextual and individualised approach can only 
be realised through a process that allows all relevant factors to be properly 
considered, whether they relate primarily to inclusion or exclusion. 
 Viewed in this more holistic way, as suggested by Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam, the term ‘individualised determination’  (or, as used in this work, 
‘individualised assessment’)49 more accurately captures the concept at work 
than does the term ‘balancing’.50 Chapter Two expressed a cautionary note 
about the use of the balancing trope, which often positions the specific 
human rights interests of the individual claimant against the vague and all-
                                                        
47 Joined Cases C-57/09 and C101-09 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D 
[2010] ECR I-10979, para 109. 
48 On the ‘exclusion before inclusion’ principle (as asserted by those who reject 
balancing), or integrated determination (as asserted by those who promote 
balancing), see: UNHCR, Guidelines (n 1) para 31; UNHCR, Handbook (n 2) para 
157; UNHCR, Background Note (n 2) para 99; Lisbon Expert Roundtable, Summary 
Conclusions (n 22) 482; UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative 
Analysis and Recommendations for Law and Practice (March 2010) 57; Kapferer, 
‘Exclusion Clauses’ (n 12) s 4.1; Nyinah, ‘Exclusion under Article 1F’ (n 12) s 3.1; 
ECRE, ‘Position on Exclusion’ (n 12) para 43. 
49 The need to preserve ‘individualised assessment’ was recently reiterated by the 
UNHCR: UNHCR, Factum of the Intervener UNHCR, Febles v Canada, Supreme 
Court of Canada Court File No 35215, filed 11 March 2014 <http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/factums-memoires/35215/FM050_Intervener_United-Nations-High-
Commissioner-for-Refugees.pdf> accessed 18 March 2014, paras 3, 15(v), 24. 
50 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, Refugee in International Law (n 12) 180 (n 232). 
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encompassing ‘national security’ interests of the receiving state, and then 
asks decision-makers to choose between the two sides.51 Without rejecting 
the trope of balancing entirely, a human security approach has 
demonstrated the need to define these interests much more clearly and 
concretely. A process of individualised assessment allows decision-makers 
to ask the right questions, eliciting the information they need to determine 
and consider both the human rights interests of the individual claimant 
and the human rights interests of the individuals in the receiving state. 
When such an approach is used throughout the determination process, and 
in relation to all of the elements necessary to determine exclusion, the need 
for a final balancing test is considerably alleviated. If a decision-maker has 
determined the questions of seriousness, non-political, and standard of 
proof and evidentiary issues, in a manner that respects individualised 
assessment, the conclusion will be clear in most cases without resorting to 
a final proportionality consideration. 
 That said, in those rare cases where individualised assessment on 
the distinct elements of Article 1F(b) does not bespeak a particular result, 
the only meaningful way to reach a conclusion (and decision-makers must 
reach a conclusion) is to weigh the clearly and concretely identified 
interests in an overall manner. Serious threats to the core human rights 
interests of the individual claimant will have been identified. Criminal 
behaviour of such a nature and gravity that reflects a threat to the core 
human rights interests of the individuals in the receiving state will also 
have been identified. Comparably strong evidence of each will have been 
presented. In such cases, a final conclusion can only be reached by 
weighing the strength of the respective interests in the context of the 
particular case, and by deciding which interests, on balance, should carry 
the result. Within the confines of the Refugee Convention, there is no 
compromise position, no lesser status of protection that can be accorded to 
the criminally excluded. Consequently, as stressed by the UNHCR, 
decision-makers must carefully weigh the consequences of exclusion before 
making a final decision.52 Certainly, that final decision should honour the 
purpose and effect of the criminality exclusion clause. However, it should 
also always recognise that the clause is meant to be applied in a manner 
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proportionate to its objective, and importantly, proportionate to the overall 
human rights protection objective of the Refugee Convention.53 
 Further, the accessibility and effectiveness of complementary 
protection mechanisms should not be operate as a pretext for abdicating 
responsibility to conduct properly contextual and individualised 
assessment of claims under the Refugee Convention itself. Just as the 
possibility of complementary protection is offered as a justification for not 
allowing a final proportionality consideration, it serves more broadly as a 
justification for mechanistic approaches to all elements of Article 1F(b). It is 
unsurprising that states which have rejected any place for proportionality 
in finally applying Article 1F(b) have also initiated some of the most 
mechanistic approaches explored in the previous three chapters.54 
Reasoning that in effect removes content from the Refugee Convention, and 
repositions that content into other legal instruments of human rights 
protection, is very slippery. More expansive, mechanistic understandings of 
‘serious non-political crime’ combined with less robust evidentiary 
standards become increasingly acceptable to juridical systems that are 
content to relegate the correction of errors, and by extension the human 
rights protection mandate itself, to other legal regimes. And yet this 
confidence in other legal regimes is ill-conceived – how is it rationally 
defensible that the lynchpin of international human rights protection, the 
Refugee Convention, should be transformed into a system that does so little 
legal work? 
 There are several important reasons to reject such an eroded 
conception of the Refugee Convention and the exclusion clause. Firstly, as 
stressed by the UNHCR and academic commentators, to maintain rigour as 
a legal instrument of international human rights protection, interpretation 
of the Refugee Convention must progress with other developments in 
international law, including international human rights law.55 Secondly, as 
pointed out by the UNHCR, complementary protection mechanisms 
                                                        
53 UNHCR, Factum of the Intervener UNHCR, Febles v Canada, Supreme Court of 
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typically follow refugee determination in a separate procedure. It can be 
very difficult, during the refugee process itself, to predict the outcome of 
that subsequent procedure.56 Perhaps recognising that most states have 
rejected balancing and in an attempt to alleviate the resulting damage, the 
UNHCR restated its balancing test in 2009 to include an inquiry into the 
accessibility and effectiveness of complementary protection. However, this 
was only one factor to be considered, together with the other factors in its 
classic articulation of the balancing test.57 
 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it is essential that exclusion 
decisions pursuant to the Refugee Convention be correctly made, rather 
than being siphoned off to other legal regimes, precisely because 
complementary protection does not give rise to full Convention refugee 
status. As the Canadian example illustrated, an excluded refugee claimant 
may benefit from a stay of removal under the PRRA complementary 
protection regime. However, that excluded but minimally protected claimant 
does not enjoy the full rights that flow from Convention refugee status.58 He 
cannot apply for permanent residence on the basis that he is a Convention 
refugee, a necessary step toward full citizenship.59 Further, as a person who 
remains subject to a valid removal order, albeit one that is not currently 
being enforced, he is also subject to a host of immigration and other 
controls.60 
 Certainly, this weaker protection status is a reasonable result for the 
refugee claimant who has been rightly excluded. In fact, using a human 
security lens, the concurrent operation of these two international human 
rights regimes can be seen as a compromise that serves both the protection 
interests of the individual claimant and the protection interests of the 
receiving state. Even legal scholars who have advocated the attachment of 
full Convention refugee status regardless of the source of the state’s 
                                                        
56 UNHCR, Statement on Article 1F (n 2) s 4.4. 
57 ibid, ss 2.2.3, 4.4. 
58 McAdam, Complementary Protection (n 31) 218-242 (‘Categories of Rights’). 
59 Xie v Canada, 2004 FCA 250, para 33 (denied access to permanent residence); 
Colin Harvey, ‘Is Humanity Enough? Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the Rights 
Regime’ in Satvinder Singh Juss and Colin Harvey (eds) Contemporary Issues in 
Refugee Law (Edward Edgar 2013) 72 (refugee status “gives the individual a taste 
of the ‘substance of citizenship’”). 
60 In addition to reporting conditions, lack of a refugee travel document, etc., the 
stay of removal itself is subject to review on a periodic basis: CIC, Manual PP3 (n 
35) ss 9.6, 17. 
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protection obligation (whether under the Refugee Convention or some other 
complementary basis of protection) acknowledge that with the criminally 
excluded there is a moral and legal distinction warranting the attachment 
of a lesser status.61 Determining the precise content of this lesser status, 
and guarding against the building up of minimally required rights to a 
status that is consequentially equivalent to Convention refugee status, 
requires careful attention. As the UNHCR has cautioned, states must 
ensure that they do not to defeat the purpose of the exclusion clauses by 
excluding serious criminals only to subsequently grant them a status 
equivalent to that of a Convention refugee.62 Similarly, Fitzpatrick has 
called for improved international coordination with the aim of ensuring that 
the ‘excluded but protected’ do not enjoy impunity for international 
crimes.63 Indeed, there might be a tendency to forget that some excluded 
individuals represent the worst of serious international criminals and have 
generated many of the bona fide refugees seeking asylum in the same 
receiving states.64 Whether by expanding the scope of international 
jurisdiction to permit prosecution within the receiving state or through 
some other vehicle, any rights-granting measure subsequent to an 
exclusion finding must ensure that it does not simply operate as a safe 
haven for international criminals.65  
 Searching for comprehensive answers to many of these questions 
about complementary protection extends beyond the confines of this work. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that some lesser status for the criminally excluded 
is not just warranted but also demanded by international human rights 
                                                        
61 McAdam, Complementary Protection (n 31) 17, 218-219, 223; Jane McAdam, ‘The 
Refugee Convention as a Rights Blueprint for Persons in Need of International 
Protection’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security 
(Hart Publishing 2008) 263-282. 
62 UNHCR, Statement on Article 1F (n 2) s 4.5. 
63 Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘The Post-Exclusion Phase: Extradition, Prosecution and 
Expulsion’ (2000) 12 (Supp) Int J Refugee Law 272, s 1: see also: James C Simeon, 
‘Ethics and the exclusion of those who are ‘not deserving’ of Convention refugee 
status’ in Satvinder Singh Juss and Colin Harvey (eds) Contemporary Issues in 
Refugee Law (Edward Edgar 2013) 286. 
64 Sivakumar v Canada, [1994] 1 FC 433 (CA) 445; see also: Simeon, ‘Ethics and 
the Exclusion’ (n 63) 285-286 (although he finds it ‘no longer apt’ to speak of 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, he still views the exclusion clauses as performing an 
essential function: “those who are the cause of other people’s suffering and/or 
serious infringement and/or violation of their most essential human rights ought 
not to be beneficiaries of Convention refugee status.”). 
65 Fitzpatrick, ‘Post-Exclusion Phase’ (n 63) ss 1, 4, 6; McAdam, Complementary 
Protection (n 31) 223-226 (this, again, raises the ‘extradite or prosecute’ principle). 
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law. This basic principle is not controversial. And yet, if exclusion decisions 
are made in a mechanistic and peremptory fashion, then many who should 
be recognised as Convention refugees will only (and only possibly) benefit 
from the much weaker status conferred by complementary protection. 
Complementary protection is quite simply an inadequate response to 
concerns about ensuring that exclusion decisions are made correctly, and 
in a manner that respects the overall human rights protection purpose of 
the Refugee Convention. Those who should not be excluded must benefit 
from the full panoply of Convention rights. Anything less serves an injustice 
to both the wrongly excluded claimant and the Refugee Convention. An 
approach grounded in individualised assessment, with respect to both the 
legal components of Article 1F(b) and the final determination on exclusion, 




 This work has taken on the challenge laid out by Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam to ensure that refugee law maintains its place as the legal heart of 
international human rights protection. As they claim, to do so refugee law 
must find a way to accommodate both the needs of those fleeing 
persecution and of the states that receive them. As they also claim, and as 
this work accepts, a principled theory of security kept within a framework 
of accountability can form the basis upon which to achieve that synthesis. 
The focus of this thesis, Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention, is an 
appropriate doctrinal space for the development of that principled theory of 
security. In this doctrinal space, specific controversies in the interpretation 
of the individual components of serious non-political criminality present as 
problems with a lack of universality and proportionality. Consequently, the 
quest for a universal and proportionate approach to the exclusion question 
is plain: universal in that its guiding principles have application irrespective 
of systemic heterogeneity; proportionate in that its effect is to honour the 
human rights protection purpose of the Refugee Convention. As stated early 
on, this work endorses an approach that stays true to the normative 
consonance of the inclusion and exclusion questions: the protection of core 
human rights grounds both the recognition and denial of Convention 
refugee status.   
 At the broader theoretical level, the ethics of statehood and of state 
responses to refugees operates as a useful starting point for understanding 
different political and legal approaches to the global movement of people. 
That which is advocated by partialist and impartialist thought in terms of 
state responses to migrants is deeply linked to moral and political 
philosophies about the value of nationality and statehood. And yet partialist 
and impartialist thought can be bridged through the normativity and 
discourse of human rights. The duty of every state to protect core human 
rights is what brings partialists and impartialists together. In this way, the 
Convention refugee emerges as the ‘universal human’. States are obligated 
by universal morality and international law to accept refugees into their 
territory and to give them surrogate protection. As the personification of the 
violation of basic human rights by a sovereign state, the refugee occupies 
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that normative and legal space where the importance of state sovereignty 
disappears.  
 Further, any discretion states may have to reject Convention 
refugees can only be grounded in the exclusion clauses. Informing this 
limited discretion to exclude should be a principled theory of security, 
rather than a nebulous concept of ‘security’ that is open to opportunistic 
misappropriation. Human security, an analytical framework grounded in 
the protection of core human rights, serves as this principled theory of 
security. Clearly, debates about the relationship between human security 
and human rights will continue, as will warnings about the dangers of a 
human security approach. While this work does not dismiss such warnings, 
it does harness the dialectical possibilities between human security and 
human rights, which can be seen as reflexive and mutually reinforcing. 
Human security acts as a framing tool, ensuring that the individual 
remains the ultimate referent object of security throughout the analytical 
process. Human security structures that analytical process in a manner 
that identifies, understands and assesses the core human rights interests 
at stake, with respect to both the inclusion and exclusion question. 
Attempts to ‘balance’ the clearly identified individual security interests of 
the refugee claimant against the ‘security’ interests of an entire state are 
misguided. How can agents of refugee law possibly balance the security 
interests of one individual with those of an entire state, especially when the 
interests of the state are to be accepted as wide-ranging but not clearly 
identifiable or supportable? Unsurprisingly, the answers provided by the 
facile trope of balancing are overwhelmingly favourable to the state. In 
contrast, a human security approach provides better answers because it 
starts by asking better questions. 
 Asking better questions has particular consequences for the ways in 
which refugee law agents approach all of the legal elements of exclusion 
under Article 1F(b) for serious non-political criminality. In determining 
whether a crime is ‘serious’, a broadly contextual and individualised 
approach is needed. Currently popular mechanistic approaches that rely on 
minimum-sentence thresholds from domestic criminal law are not 
particularly useful. Such approaches have led to the exclusion from 
Convention refugee status of individuals who have committed crimes, such 
as relatively minor economic or drug crimes, which were likely not 
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envisaged by the drafters of the Refugee Convention as amounting to 
excludable acts. More importantly, excluding refugee claimants on the basis 
of such crimes is inconsistent with the very purpose of criminality 
exclusion: to allow the receiving state to protect its own citizens from an 
individual who represents a serious threat to the human rights of those 
citizens. Certainly, a separate legal determination that the individual 
represents a current danger to the host community is neither required nor 
sufficient. In the absence of serious reasons for considering that the 
claimant has committed a serious non-political crime, a finding that he is a 
present danger to the host community will not result in exclusion. 
Nevertheless, the purposive heart of Article 1F(b) is a state protective one, 
defined and understood on the basis of the core human rights interests of 
the individuals in that community. The questions asked in making an 
exclusion determination must be aimed at identifying and examining those 
interests. 
 Understood in this way, determining if a crime is ‘serious’ is guided 
by three basic principles. First, while preventing fugitives from evading 
foreign justice is one of the purposes of exclusion under Article 1F(b), it 
does not operate exclusively. Rather, the state protective purpose helps to 
identify the type of criminal conduct at which exclusion is truly directed. 
Second, the seriousness of a crime must be determined on the basis of 
international standards and human rights norms, rather than on national 
disapprobatory designations or minimum-sentence thresholds. Third, the 
seriousness of a crime can only be determined through a process of 
contextual and individualised assessment, where circumstances relating to 
both the crime and the criminal actor are properly considered. This 
contextual, individualised assessment requires that all aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances be taken into account, including expiation, 
remorse, rehabilitation, and recidivism. When guided by these principles, 
determining that a crime is ‘serious’ means that the claimant’s criminal 
conduct and character is of a category that invokes a real concern for the 
human security of the receiving state. A claimant who has committed 
murder is likely to meet the seriousness threshold, whereas a claimant who 
has forged cheques or used illicit drugs is unlikely to meet it. Many current 
refugee determination systems do little to differentiate between the two.  
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 Better questions also need to be asked in determining if a crime is 
‘non-political’. The concept of a ‘political crime’ has its origins in extradition 
law, where it consisted of meaningful normative and legal content. Applying 
a more permissive predominance and proportionality test, early legal 
approaches did occasionally shield the perpetrators of crimes committed in 
connection with a struggle motivated by political ideology and goals. 
However, contemporary approaches have largely done away with this 
flexibility. A progressive narrowing of the political offence exception has 
emerged by way of judicial trends (through a more restrictive application of 
the proportionality test), statutory tools, and bilateral and regional treaty 
arrangements. This narrowing of the concept of a political crime is closely 
tied to the growing reach of counter-terrorism law - an ever-expanding 
matter of international legal concern that brings with it, as a matter of 
course, an insistence on the legal depoliticisation of acts traditionally 
understood to be ‘political’. The list of criminal acts labelled ‘terrorism’ 
continues to grow, and it is unclear what boundaries, if any, might limit 
this expansion. Perhaps even more significantly, the ‘terrorism’ label 
attached to conduct by counter-terrorism law carries a pre-emptive 
authority across other fields of law, including refugee law. Such an 
authority claims to remove the question of whether a crime is political from 
refugee law entirely. Criminal conduct that carries the terrorist label cannot 
be considered political. Agents within refugee law need not concern 
themselves with this question, as counter-terrorism law answers the 
question for them. That answer is always negative. 
 This pre-emptive authority of counter-terrorism law has made some 
inroads into refugee law, a development that should be resisted. That 
resistance, once again, is based on the recognition that both the inclusion 
and exclusion questions in refugee law are grounded in the human rights 
standards of the Refugee Convention. Four guiding principles are apposite. 
First, complementary objectives of the exclusion clause are at work in 
relation to the ‘non-political’ question: ensuring that the perpetrators of 
serious, ordinary crimes committed for fundamentally political purposes 
can claim asylum, while allowing the receiving country to protect the 
human security of its own citizens by denying refugee status on account of 
serious crimes that cannot be legitimised by reference to their political 
context. Second, the term ‘non-political’ should be understood as having an 
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autonomous refugee law meaning. The ‘terrorist’ label assigned to certain 
conduct by counter-terrorism law is never determinative. Rather, the focus 
of the inquiry should be on whether serious criminal conduct is political or 
non-political within a contextual and individualised proportionality 
assessment grounded in the human rights normativity of the Refugee 
Convention. Third, the content of a contextual proportionality approach 
consists of questions aimed at identifying criminal conduct that presents a 
basic threat to human life and liberty, since exclusion should be reserved 
for grave conduct that compromises human security. Such an approach 
carefully examines both the circumstances faced by the individual and the 
circumstances created by the individual. By examining factors relevant to 
both inclusion and exclusion, refugee law agents will be answering the right 
question: whether the conduct is justifiable according to international 
human rights standards, and therefore, whether the person’s conduct 
represents a threat to the human security of the receiving state. The 
objective is to elicit the information needed to identify and consider the core 
human rights at stake. 
 Fourth, in cases where the connection between the inclusion and 
exclusion questions is particularly strong, a contextual and individualised 
assessment can be further guided by a ‘repressiveness’ principle. 
Essentially, the less a state respects basic human rights and permits 
political dissent through peaceful means, the more serious the conduct 
committed in opposition to that regime can be without losing its 
predominantly political character. Such a principle can be applied through 
the consideration of several factors, all of which are directed at carefully 
assessing both the general human rights situation in the country of origin 
and the specific inclusion claim that has been put forward by the 
individual. If, after considering all relevant factors, the answer is that the 
claimant’s actions were circumstantially reasonable and proportionate, the 
legal conclusion is that those actions, although serious and criminal, are 
excusable or justifiable. In such cases, the ‘political’ label for such conduct 
should be maintained, and exclusion from refugee status under Article 
1F(b) should not follow. Seen in this way, the same human rights 
normativity that informs the inclusion question can provide, in particularly 
repressive political climates, the justification for retention of the ‘political’ 
label for otherwise serious and injurious criminal conduct. Such an 
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approach does not countenance or ignore the real problems of criminality 
and terrorism, but instead rediscovers a concept of the political crime that 
actually consists of some normative and legal content. It will not shield the 
person who kills indiscriminately in furtherance of political aims, but it will 
also not condemn the person who uses reasonable violence against a 
seriously repressive, refugee-producing political regime. 
 Of course, deciding whether a criminal act is both ‘serious’ and ‘non-
political’ happens within a juridical process of refugee determination, and is 
subject to a unique evidentiary standard – ‘serious reasons for considering’. 
The judicial and scholarly preoccupation with placing this standard on the 
spectrum of more widely used and understood standards of proof is not 
particularly useful. ‘Serious reasons for considering’ should be understood 
as more contextual and flexible than is suggested by the judicial and 
academic discourse. This is not to suggest that refugee law agents should 
not apply a demanding standard of proof. Exclusion should certainly not 
follow in the absence of clear, credible and convincing evidence of a serious 
non-political crime. However, there is a reflexive quality to the inclusion 
(‘serious possibility’ or ‘reasonable chance’) and exclusion (‘serious reasons 
for considering’) standards of proof. Appreciating this reflexive quality, 
‘serious reasons for considering’ can be understood as a threshold that 
necessarily modulates depending on the quality and strength of the 
inclusion evidence. In particular, in the presence of strong evidence of 
persecution, evidence of participation in an excludable crime should be 
robustly scrutinised.  
 In examining different categories of evidence - formal evidence, 
substantive evidence and controversial evidence – decision-makers must 
ensure that determinations are made in a procedurally fair and 
individualised manner. Formal evidence such as convictions, indictments, 
warrants, and terrorist listings must be scrutinised with care, to determine 
if they are a reliable basis upon which to conclude that the claimant bears 
individual responsibility for an excludable criminal act. Similar care must 
be exercised in respect of substantive evidence, including the testimony of 
witnesses, documentary and expert evidence, and the claimant’s 
confession, non-cooperation or affirmative justification. The use of 
controversial evidence should be avoided whenever possible. Secret and 
sensitive evidence can be used only when absolutely necessary, and only 
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then if added procedural safeguards (such as content summaries and 
special advocates) do not substantially prejudice the claimant’s ability to 
challenge the evidence, or the decision-maker’s ability to properly assess 
the reliability of the evidence. If there is a real risk that evidence was 
obtained by torture, it should be disregarded as fundamentally abhorrent 
and inherently unreliable. Again, the ultimate aim of any refugee 
determination process is to obtain clear, credible and convincing evidence 
to identify and assess the core human rights interests at stake. By adopting 
an approach that recognises this vision, refugee law agents will reach well-
reasoned and proportionate decisions about exclusion: well-reasoned in 
that they are grounded in factual and legal findings that can be justified on 
the basis of reliable evidence; proportionate in that they respect the human 
rights protection purpose of the Refugee Convention. 
 When better questions are asked throughout a process of contextual 
and individualised assessment in relation to all three legal elements of 
Article 1F(b) – serious, non-political, and serious reasons for considering – a 
final ‘balancing’ or proportionality test becomes unnecessary in most cases. 
Proportionality is a central feature of that very system of contextual and 
individualised assessment. However, in those rare cases where a result is 
not clearly indicated despite the clear identification and assessment of the 
human rights interests at stake, the application of a final proportionality 
consideration should be employed. In such cases, a final proportionality 
consideration ensures that the final decision respects the Refugee 
Convention as a legal instrument primarily concerned with the protection of 
core human rights. Under this paradigm, individuals whose criminal 
conduct is of a nature that threatens core human rights are rightly 
excluded from Convention refugee status. At the same time, expansive 
conceptions of serious non-political criminality cannot be properly used to 
counterbalance the human rights protection needs of a genuine refugee and 
to deny status under the Convention. The availability of systems of 
complementary protection should not be used as a pretext for abdicating 
the legal work that must be done by the Refugee Convention. While some 
lesser status granted by complementary protection is a reasonable 
compromise for the criminally excluded individual who is at risk of serious 
harm if removed, the original decision to exclude must nevertheless be 
correctly made. Making correct decisions means making decisions that 
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respect the overall human rights protection purpose of the Refugee 
Convention. Individuals who should not be excluded must enjoy the full 
rights that Convention refugee status brings. Anything less works an 
injustice to individual refugees and the Convention designed to protect 
them. 
 Certainly, with respect to all of the doctrinal content examined in 
this work, a human security approach harnesses the dialectical potential of 
the inclusion and exclusion questions. Asking who should be excluded is 
simply another way of asking who should be included. Instead of 
understanding these questions as conceptually and doctrinally distinct, 
refugee law must retain a holistic view of its mandate. Fundamentally, this 
work seeks to merge theory and agency in a way that is helpful to those 
who think about and work in refugee law. The fact is that international 
refugee law has often found itself in a rather precarious position, highly 
susceptible to the vacillations of political and legal climates at the national, 
transnational and international levels. To respond to these challenges, the 
agents of refugee law must continue to show commitment. They must find 
ways to promote and maintain the universality of refugee law as the most 
effective global protector of human rights, even when such a hope may 
seem to be slipping away. A desire to further the achievement of this end is 
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